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**THE CONSULATE AND EMPIRE
OF FRANCE**

VOL. VII.

HISTORY OF THE
CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF FRANCE
UNDER NAPOLEON

BY LOUIS ADOLPHE THIERS

TRANSLATED, WITH THE SANCTION AND APPROVAL
OF THE AUTHOR, BY
D. FORBES CAMPBELL AND JOHN STEBBING

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HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE OF FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

BOOK XXXVII.

THE DIVORCE.

WHAT Napoleon most regarded in the Walcheren expedition was its influence over the negotiations at Altenburg. He had employed the time elapsed since the armistice of Znaïm in putting his army in Germany into the most flourishing condition, so as to be able to prostrate the Austrians if the conditions of the peace they proposed were not agreeable to him. His army, encamped at Krems, Znaïm, Brünn, Vienna, Presburg, Edeburg, and Grätz, well fed, well rested, largely recruited by the arrival and dissolution of the demi-brigades, remounted in cavalry horses, and provided with a numerous and splendid artillery, was superior to what it had been at any period of the campaign. Napoleon had formed under General Junot, with the garrisons left in Prussia, some demi-brigades under General Revaud, the reserves assembled in Augsburg, the provisional regiments of dragoons, and some Wurtembergers and Bavarians, an army of 30,000 foot and 5000 horse, to keep guard over Swabia, Franconia, and Saxony, and hinder the forays of the Duke of Brunswick Oels and of General Kienmayer. Marshal Lefebvre with the Bavarians was battling in the Tyrol. Lastly, there was the new army of Antwerp, the numbers and efficiency of which he no doubt greatly exaggerated, but which was nevertheless a force the more added to all those he already possessed. He was therefore in a condition to treat advantageously with a power which, though likewise making great efforts to reorganise its troops, was not in a condition to raise itself up again. Yet, notwithstanding the immense resources at his command, Napoleon sincerely desired peace, and for excellent reasons.

At the opening of the war, flattering himself that he should

crush Austria at a blow, and too much forgetting the greatness of the means she had prepared, Napoleon had been surprised by the resistance he had encountered; and though his confidence in himself had never been shaken, he had come to believe somewhat less in the facility of overthrowing the house of Hapsburg. As he had now no thoughts of destroying it, war was for him without an object; for having taken the Venetian States and the Tyrol from that power in 1805, there remained nothing which he could detach from it for himself. To wrest from the empire of Austria two or three more millions of inhabitants, in order to enlarge the Duchy of Warsaw towards Galicia, Saxony towards Bohemia, Bavaria towards Upper Austria, and Italy towards Carniola, was not worth a new campaign, however brilliant it might be. What would have completely fulfilled his wishes would have been to separate the three crowns of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary, put them upon three several Austrian or German heads, and thus bring down for ever the old house of Austria; or else to make his irreconcilable enemy, the Emperor Francis, abdicate in favour of his brother the Duke of Wurzburg, who had been successively sovereign of Tuscany, Salzburg, and Wurzburg, a good-natured and enlightened prince, formerly the friend of the general of the army of Italy, and still the friend of the Emperor of the French. In that case Napoleon would not have exacted any sacrifice of territory whatever, so much would his pride have been satisfied by dethroning an emperor who had broken word with him; so much would it have conduced to the security of his policy to see the throne of Austria occupied by a prince on whose attachment he counted. But to separate the three crowns would be to destroy the house of Austria, and to do that required two or three more great victories, which Napoleon was very likely to gain, but which would probably make Europe desperate, alarm Russia, and disgust her with our alliance, and cause a general rising of the nations. As for a change of sovereigns, it was not easy to bring the Emperor Francis to abdicate, though he was said to be weary of the throne. Besides, it was not seemly to make such a proposal. The suggestion ought to come from the Austrians themselves, in the hope of escaping territorial sacrifices. Thus the second plan was not much more feasible than the first. To weaken Austria in Galicia for the benefit of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, in Bohemia for the benefit of Saxony, in Upper Austria for the benefit of Bavaria, and in Carinthia and Carniola in order to procure a large continuity of territory from Italy to Dalmatia, and a land route towards the Turkish empire, was therefore the only practicable project. Napoleon resolved, then, to demand as much as possible in these several respects, and even to demand more than he was bent on obtaining, in order that

he might exact payment in money for so much of his claims as he should abate at the end of the negotiation. Should he find the court of Vienna too fractious, and still too much possessed with the notion of its own strength, he would then resume his first destructive intentions, whatever all Europe might think of it, Russia included.

Towards the latter power Napoleon intended to continue to behave amicably and as an ally, but still giving it to understand that he had perceived the coolness of its zeal during the last war, and that he no longer relied on it for difficult cases. Feeling certain that it was not disposed to recommence war with France, and believing that it would not expose itself to that contingency for the sake of ameliorating the lot of Austria, he did not wish to brave it beyond what was necessary to weaken Austria sufficiently, and for ever deprive England of her alliance. Nevertheless, as he was always ready for extreme resolutions, he was determined, if the negotiations with Austria failed, to dare everything against everybody, in order, as soon as possible, to close that long career of hostilities which the gigantic extent of his ambition had brought upon him. In consequence, after having maintained a long and even disdainful silence towards Alexander, he wrote to acquaint him with his victories, announce to him the opening of negotiations with Austria, and invite him to send to Altenburg a plenipotentiary furnished with his instructions as to the conditions of peace. Without naming any of those conditions, he asked that the person sent should be one who was friendly to that alliance which had already procured Finland for Russia, and which promised it Moldavia and Wallachia. Whether Alexander acceded to the proposal or not, whether or not he sent a negotiator to Altenburg, Napoleon's purposes would be equally served. A Russian negotiator might complicate the negotiation; but as he should be forced to side with the French, he would once more engage his court against Austria should hostilities be resumed.

Such were Napoleon's arrangements when the conferences for peace began. It was his intention, as we have said, to demand much more than he would be content to take, that he might exact payment of the difference in war contributions, which was fair enough, the expenses of the campaign having been enormous.

M. de Champagny set out in consequence for the little town of Altenburg, situated between Raab and Comorn, some leagues from the castle of Dotis, to which the Emperor Francis had retired after the battle of Wagram. M. de Champagny had orders to place the negotiation on the basis of *uti possidetis*, that is to say, the surrender to France of those territories which

our armies occupied, subject to such exchanges as might suit the convenience of Austria. Thus we held Vienna and Brünn, points which it was evident we could not retain; but under the system of *uti possidetis*, Austria would cede in Bohemia, Galicia, and Illyria as much territory and population as were restored to her at the centre of the monarchy. Whilst she was offered this facility in distributing her losses, a demand was made on her for nearly nine millions of inhabitants, that is to say, more than a third of her dominions, which was equivalent to destroying her. But this was only a first demand, thrown out by way of beginning business.

The negotiations opened at the moment when it was beginning to be known in Austria that the Walcheren expedition would not be very successful; and they naturally languished until it was positively known that the expedition would have no other result than to make England lose some thousand men and much money, and to procure Napoleon an army the more. The Emperor Francis, forced, in spite of himself, to treat for terms, appointed M. de Metternich to negotiate with M. de Champagny. M. de Metternich was to supersede, as prime minister, M. de Stadion, who had made himself the representative of the war policy, not so much of his own impulse as that of his brother, a hot-headed priest, and who, after the battle of Wagram, had felt the necessity of resigning, and making way for the partisans of peace. M. de Metternich, however, had consented to become M. de Stadion's successor only when the two powers should have formally made their election between peace and war by the conclusion of a definitive treaty. Until then M. de Stadion was to remain with the army at Olmutz, and direct affairs *ad interim*. The emperor had come to Dotis in Hungary, and M. de Metternich, whose triumphal entry into the cabinet would be the result of peace, had undertaken the task of negotiating at Altenburg. With him was joined M. de Nugent, chief of the staff of the Austrian army, for all military details, and for the discussion of points concerning the demarcation of frontiers. Whilst the negotiations were pending, the Austrians strove (like Napoleon on his side) to excite the zeal of the provinces still belonging to the monarchy, to recruit the army, and reconstruct its matériel.

The first conferences took place at the end of August, more than a month after the battle of Znaïm and the signing of the armistice: so much time had it taken to bring the plenipotentiaries together, and give them their instructions. This prolongation of the armistice, which was to have lasted only a month, was readily consented to, for nobody was in a hurry—neither Napoleon, because he was living at the expense of Austria, and had his reinforcements to receive; nor Austria,

because, although she defrayed the cost of our stay, she wanted to repair her forces, and to know the result of the Walcheren expedition.

From the first, M. de Champagny was good-tempered and calm, as usual, but proud of the sovereign he represented; M. de Nugent was gloomy, captious, and displayed the soreness of wounded military pride; M. de Metternich was cool, subtle, and formal, prolisly argumentative, and careful, as became his part, to repair the faults of his petulant colleague. After a while the awkwardness of the first days began to wear off. M. de Nugent became less bitter, M. de Metternich less formal, and M. de Champagny remained unchanged and peremptory, not from his natural disposition, but in obedience to his instructions. M. de Metternich saw there were two ways of concluding a peace: the one, large, generous, fruitful in good results, consisted in restoring to Austria all the prisoners just taken from her, and leaving her such as she had been before hostilities began. Touched by such generosity, she would become for France a much surer ally than Russia, because she was less changeable; and an ally at least as powerful as might have been perceived in the last battles. Such a result would be better than a new dislocation of her territory, for the advantage of ungrateful, impotent, insatiable allies like Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Saxony, that strove to promote war for the purpose of enriching themselves, and were not worth what they cost. This, he said, was one way in which peace might be conceived. And then there was another—narrow, difficult, insecure, cruel to the power from which fresh sacrifices were to be extorted, unprofitable to the power that was to obtain them; one after which both parties would be rather more dissatisfied with each other, and resigned to peace only so long as they could not recommence war. This way of treating consisted in computations of territory; it was a market job. If that was what the French preferred—as he much feared it was—they must speak first, and declare what they wanted; for, after all, it was not for Austria to despoil herself.

M. de Champagny replied that the first system of peace had been tried after Austerlitz, but to no good purpose; that at that period Napoleon, victorious over the Austrian and Russian armies, had received the Emperor of Austria at his bivouac, and upon a pledge that war should be made on him no more, had restored the whole Austrian monarchy, with the exception of some slight dismemberments; that after having preserved an empire which he might have destroyed, he had a right to count upon a durable peace; and yet, no sooner was he engaged with the English in Spain, than all promises had been forgotten, and war had been resumed without any regard to plighted

word; that after such experience it was no longer possible to be generous, and those must suffer for the war who had so readily and unscrupulously recommenced it.

M. de Metternich alleged in his rejoinder the thousand grievances for which it was so easy to find matter in Napoleon's ambition. He alleged, and with reason, the destruction of the house of Spain, the alarm caused in all courts by that audacious measure—an alarm which was anything but allayed by the establishment of a close intimacy with Russia, which gave reason to apprehend the most formidable designs against the security of all States; and lastly, the refusal to admit Austria, if not into that intimacy, at least into a knowledge of what Russia and France were preparing for the world. After the long enumeration of all these grievances, which occupied more than one official conference, and more than one private interview, it was necessary to come to a specific intimation of what was required, the Austrians persisting in it that the French, who demanded sacrifices, ought to speak first. Though conscious of the enormity of what he was about to put forth, M. de Champagny, in obedience to his master's orders, claimed to stand on the basis of *uti possidetis*, according to which each party was to keep what it had, saving the exchange of certain portions of territory for others. M. de Metternich replied, that if such a proposal was meant in earnest, both parties must prepare to fight, and fight with fury, for what was demanded was nine millions of inhabitants, a third, at least, of the monarchy; it was, in fact, its destruction; and that being the case, there must be an end to all negotiation.

After this first opening, both parties were silent for some days. A precaution taken by Napoleon threw a fresh chill upon the negotiation. Lest with reference to Galicia, and the aggrandisement of the Duchy of Warsaw, language should be imputed to him which he would not utter, and he should have attributed to him, in order to involve him in a quarrel with Russia, a design of re-establishing Poland, he required that minutes should be taken of the conferences. The precaution was not without utility, but it tended to make the negotiations interminable. "We are no longer negotiators, we are mere machines," observed M. de Metternich. "Peace is impossible," he repeated incessantly, and thereupon, with an air of sadness and despondency, he avowed to M. de Champagny that he considered the negotiation as illusory, for it resembled all those which France had entered upon with England; and in reality, he believed the Emperor Napoleon was resolved to continue the war. M. de Champagny, who knew the contrary, declared it was not so, that Napoleon desired peace, with the advantages he had a right to expect from the results of the war. "But

then," retorted M. de Metternich, "wherefore a principle of negotiation that cannot be accepted? Wherefore these interminable formalities which destroy all confidence?"

Things could not be left at this deadlock, and Napoleon, satisfied with the result already visible for him of the Walcheren expedition, and wishing to derive from it not the means of continuing the war, but that of concluding an advantageous peace, ordered M. de Champagny to make a first step towards a compromise. If Austria, for instance, manifested a disposition to consent to sacrifices, such as those to which she had consented at Presburg, and which had consisted in the surrender of about three millions of subjects, he should respond to this concession with another, and take a middle term between nine millions and three, that is to say, four or five, and then it would be for both parties to try and come to a mutual understanding as to details.

This overture, made confidentially to M. de Metternich, confirmed his previous surmise, that Napoleon was willing to abate his first exorbitant demands; but whilst so much was still claimed, he would not explain himself in the name of his court. The essential declaration that it was ready to make fresh sacrifices of territory, he was reluctant to utter, for hitherto it had always stood upon this principle, that it would give money but not territory. M. de Metternich, however, consulted his court, which was at Dotis, some leagues from Altenburg. Meanwhile the two Austrian diplomatists required a formal statement as to what Napoleon proposed to keep, and what he was willing to give back. They required that those general principles of negotiation should be laid aside, such as *uti possidetis*, and what were called *the sacrifices* of Presburg, which signified nothing, or signified things inadmissible.

Napoleon, who desired peace, determined then to take another step, and drew up with his own hand a very brief note, in which he began to speak clearly, and demanded, on the Danube, Upper Austria as far as the line of the Ens, to join it to Bavaria, leaving it for a future day to declare what sacrifice he should think fit to require in Italy. This demand involved a loss of 800,000 inhabitants, of the important town of Lintz, and of the line of the Traun and the Ens, together with the advance of the Bavarian frontier to within a few leagues of Vienna. The Austrian diplomatists received this note without any remark, taking it *ad referendum*, that is to say, to be communicated to their court. M. de Metternich contented himself with saying in conversation to M. de Champagny, "It seems your master does not wish that the Emperor Francis should return to Vienna, since he places the Bavarians at the gates of that capital." It is certain that if Napoleon's demand had been conceded, there would only have remained the position of

St. Polten to cover Vienna, and that the Emperor Francis would have had to transfer his capital to Presburg or Comorn.

After a pause of two days, the Austrian diplomatists replied, on the 27th of August, that so long as they did not know what was demanded in Italy, it would be impossible for them to explain themselves, and they begged the French negotiator would be good enough to state the desires of his government in full. Napoleon thereupon drew up another note, which was read at Altenburg by M. de Champagny. He intended, he said, on the Italian side, to reserve to himself Carinthia, Carniola, and the right bank of the Save from Carniola to the frontiers of Bosnia. Thus Napoleon reserved to himself—first, the slopes of the Carnic Alps, the upper valley of the Drave, Villach, and Klagenfurth; secondly, the slopes of the Julian Alps, the upper valley of the Save, Laybach, Trieste, and Fiume, which would give him a large and rich province connecting Italy with Dalmatia, and lead him by an uninterrupted contiguity of territory to the frontiers of the Turkish empire. This new sacrifice would uncover Vienna on the Italian side, as the former one would have uncovered it on the side of Upper Austria; since it would put into our hands the positions of Tarvis, Villach, and Klagenfurth, and nothing would remain for the defence of that capital but the positions of Leoben and Neustadt, that is to say, the prolongation of the Noric Alps. In point of population, the loss would amount to between 1,400,000 and 1,500,000 inhabitants.

This second note was, like the former, received in gloomy silence by the Austrian diplomatists, and again accepted *ad referendum*. M. de Metternich, who saw M. de Champagny every evening, merely said to him that he was dismembering the Austrian empire bit by bit, uncovering the capital on all sides, and taking away its defences both on the German and the Italian routes; that evidently his master did not wish for peace; but he was mistaken if he thought the Austrian power destroyed; the provinces still left to the empire displayed extraordinary zeal, and the war, if continued, would be a war of despair. To this M. de Champagny replied, that the sacrifices actually demanded, with the addition of those intended to be claimed in Bohemia and Galicia, did not amount to the half of what would accrue to France on the principle of *uti possidetis*. As for war, Napoleon did not fear it; he had employed the two months of the armistice in doubling his forces; without withdrawing a single man from his armies in Spain, he had 300,000 on the Danube, besides 100,000 on the Scheldt, owing to the happy issue of the Walcheren expedition, and with one month more of war the house of Austria would be destroyed. These declarations drew from M. de Metternich expressions of grief, which showed that his opinion was not very different from that of the French negotiator.

On the 1st of September came a fresh intimation from the Austrian plenipotentiaries that they desired to know the whole extent of the French claims. Was the surrender of Upper Austria, Carinthia, Carniola, and part of Croatia all that was required? Was nothing wanted elsewhere? They must know this before they could explain themselves.

Napoleon, who directed the whole negotiation from Schönbrunn, alternating his diplomatic labours with excursions on horseback to the cantonments of his troops, replied on the 4th of September by another note under his own hand. In it he said that the city of Dresden, the capital of his ally the King of Saxony, being within a day's march of the frontier of Bohemia, the danger of which situation had been revealed by the last campaign, he claimed three circles of Bohemia in order to make the Austrian frontier so much the more distant. This was a fresh sacrifice of 400,000 inhabitants, and one which, while covering Dresden, of course uncovered Prague. Lastly, to make known the totality of his demands, Napoleon intimated in a general way that in Poland the negotiators would have to arrange separately a sort of *uti possidetis* which, without express mention of details, implied the surrender of half Galicia, that is to say, of 2,400,000 inhabitants out of the 4,800,000 constituting the population of the two Galicias. Napoleon would not enter into any details on this subject, for fear of being compromised with Russia by any mention of the re-establishment of Poland. The sacrifices demanded in the various provinces of the monarchy amounted then to a total of 5,000,000 instead of the 9,000,000 implied by the principle of *uti possidetis*. In Germany, in exchange for Upper Austria, some Bohemian circles, Carinthia, and Carniola, Napoleon was willing to give back Styria, Lower Austria, and Moravia, superb provinces, which contained Vienna, Znaim, Brünn, and Grätz, and formed the centre of the monarchy. But however speciously reasoned, however soft in its tone was the note of the 4th of September, and however careful it was to set forth the difference between the claims it embodied and those which had been propounded in the first instance, it was not less painful to those to whom it was addressed. The Austrian legation again kept silence, only M. de Metternich in private interviews continued to deplore the system of peace adopted by Napoleon, which he called the close-handed peace, the cruel peace, the hard-bargaining peace, in lieu of the generous peace, which would have procured a long repose and a definitive pacification.

Meanwhile the French having fully explained themselves, the Austrians were now bound to do so in their turn, or break off the negotiations. The case was too plain to admit of any misconception. Napoleon's forces were augmented daily; the

only consequence of the Walcheren expedition had been to authorise the levy of additional troops (the German diplomatists wrote to that effect to their court); and Russia had just declared herself by sending M. de Czernicheff with a letter for the Emperor Napoleon, and another for the Emperor Francis. The czar declared that he did not choose to have a plenipotentiary at Altenburg, because he left the conduct of the negotiation to France alone; a course which left Russia free to accept or reject its result, but which also left Austria without support. He advised the Emperor Francis to make the promptest sacrifices, and the Emperor Napoleon to be moderate in his demands; and the only formal request he made of the latter was not to create him a Poland under the name of Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Provided he abstained from that infraction on the alliance, Napoleon might evidently do what he pleased. It even appeared from the language of the Russian letter that Napoleon's pretensions in Germany and Italy would be regarded with a more favourable eye than his pretensions in Galicia. Under such circumstances the Austrians could not choose but come to terms. The emperor just then recalled M. de Stadion to give him final instructions, and with him he had summoned the principal personages of the Austrian army, such as Prince John de Lichtenstein, M. de Bubna, and others, to give their opinions as to the resources remaining to the monarchy, and if necessary to go on a mission to Napoleon. They all agreed that peace must be made; that the prolongation of the war, though possible with the means in preparation, would be too hazardous; that nothing was to be expected either from the Walcheren expedition or from the intervention of Russia, and that consequently Austria must resign herself to sacrifices, but not so great as those claimed by Napoleon. Among these men, some of them M. de Metternich's rivals, like M. de Stadion, others inclined as military men to make light of diplomatists, to think them slow, formal, and tiresome, there was a disposition to think that it was the Austrian legation that mismanaged the negotiation, that it wasted valuable time, that it would end by disgusting or incensing Napoleon, and that a military man, who should go to him with a letter from the Emperor Francis, speak frankly to him, and ask him to be content with moderate sacrifices, would probably succeed better than all the diplomatists with their cumbrous and tortuous proceedings. This suggestion was adopted, and it was resolved to send to Schönbrunn M. de Bubna, aide-de-camp to the Emperor Francis, a soldier and a man of talent, who should address himself to certain qualities in Napoleon's character, his good nature, and facile humour, qualities which were easily awakened when the right way was taken. Thus, on the one hand, to reply by protocol to protocol,

the Austrian legation was to offer Salzburg and some sacrifices in Galicia, vaguely indicated; on the other, M. de Bubna was to make a personal appeal to Napoleon, quiet him as to the smallness of the offer made him, and bring him to prefer territories in Galicia to others in Germany or Italy, a thing which Austria much desired, for she had found Galicia not well affected towards her, and she would fain have thus flung an apple of discord between France and Russia. Lastly, M. de Bubna was to hint to Napoleon that he had been mistaken as to the character of M. de Stadion, and that with that minister peace would be more prompt, more sure, and more easily accepted in its hard conditions by the Emperor Francis.

M. de Bubna set out on the 7th of September for Napoleon's headquarters. The latter was abroad visiting his camps. He received M. de Bubna on his return amicably and graciously, as was his wont when recourse was had to his good feelings, and spoke with an extreme frankness which might even have been deemed imprudent had he not been in a position to render diplomatic dissimulation almost useless. M. de Bubna complained of the tediousness of the negotiations and the exorbitant demands of France, throwing all the blame, however, on M. de Metternich, who, he said, conducted the conferences badly. Then he invoked the victor's generosity, and repeated the ordinary theme of the Austrians, that Napoleon had nothing to gain by aggrandising Saxony and Bavaria, and appropriating to himself one or two ports on the Adriatic; that it was better for him to increase the new Poland, come to an understanding with Austria, attach her to him, and forget his dislike of M. de Stadion, who was quite cured of his warlike notions. Excited by M. de Bubna, Napoleon threw off his reserve, and disclosed all his thoughts with a sincerity which was in reality the more adroit, as it had the appearance of an involuntary impulse.* "You are right," he said; "we must not tie ourselves to what our diplomatists are doing. They conform to their trade by losing time, and asking more than we both want. If you are determined to act frankly with me, we may bring matters to a conclusion in forty-eight hours. It is very true that I have no great interest in procuring a million more inhabitants for Saxony or Bavaria. My true interest, would you know what it is? It is either to destroy the Austrian monarchy by separating the three crowns of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary, or to attach Austria to me by a close alliance. To separate the three crowns we should have to fight again, and though we ought, perhaps, to end matters in that way, I give you my word that I have no wish to do so. The second plan would

* There are in the imperial archives accounts of this interview, made both by Napoleon himself and by M. de Bubna.

suit me. But how is a close alliance to be expected of your emperor? He has good qualities, no doubt; but he is weak, swayed by those about him, and he will be led by M. de Stadion, who will himself be led by his brother, whose animosity and violence are notorious. There would be one sure way of bringing about a sincere, complete alliance, and one for which I would pay a very handsome price, as you shall see: this would be to make the Emperor Francis abdicate, and transfer the crown to his brother, the Grand Duke of Wurzburg. The latter is a wise, enlightened prince, who likes me, and whom I like; who has no prejudices against France, and who will not be led either by the Stadions or by the English. For him, do you know what I would do? I would withdraw forthwith, without demanding either a province or an écu, notwithstanding all the war has cost me, and perhaps I would do better still; perhaps I would give back the Tyrol, which is so hard to keep in the hands of Bavaria. But handsome as these conditions would be, can I institute a negotiation of this nature, and insist on the dethronement of one prince and the elevation of another? I cannot." As Napoleon accompanied these words with his searching and inquiring look, M. de Bubna hastened to reply, though with the hesitation of a faithful subject, that the Emperor Francis was so devoted to his house that if he supposed such a thing he would abdicate on the instant, for he would rather ensure the integrity of the empire for his successors than the crown on his own head. "Well," said Napoleon with marked incredulity, "if that be so, I authorise you to say that I will give up the whole empire on the instant, with something more, if your master, who often declares himself disgusted with the throne, will cede it to his brother. The regards mutually due between sovereigns forbid me to propose anything on this subject, but you may hold me as pledged should the supposition I make be realised. Nevertheless I do not believe this sacrifice will be made. In that case, not wishing to separate the three crowns at the cost of prolonged hostilities, and not being able to secure to myself the close alliance of Austria by the transfer of the crown to the Archduke of Wurzburg, I am forced to consider what is the interest which France may preserve in this negotiation, and to maintain it. Territories in Galicia interest me little, in Bohemia not more, in Austria rather more, for they would serve to remove your frontiers further from ours. But in Italy France has a great and real interest, namely, to open for herself a broad route towards Turkey by the coasts of the Adriatic. Influence over the Mediterranean depends on influence over the Porte. I shall not have that influence otherwise than by becoming the neighbour of the Turkish empire.

By hindering me from crushing the English as often as I have been on the point of doing so, and obliging me to withdraw my resources from the ocean to the continent, your master has constrained me to seek the land instead of the sea route in order to extend my influence to Constantinople. I am not thinking, then, of my allies, but of myself, my own empire, when I demand from you territories in Illyria. Let us, however, meet each other half way. I will consent to fresh sacrifices in favour of your master. I had not yet formally renounced the *uti possidetis*; I do so now, and will say no more about it. I claimed three circles in Bohemia; there shall be no more question of them. I insisted on Upper Austria to the Ens; I give up the Ens and even the Traun; I restore Lintz. We will find a line which, while giving you back Lintz, shall not place you under the walls of Passau, as you are at present. In Italy I will forego a part of Carinthia; I will retain Villach, and give you up Klagenfurth. But I will keep Carniola and the right bank of the Save as far as Bosnia. I demanded of you 2,600,000 subjects in Germany; I will not require of you more than 1,600,000. There remains Galicia: there I must round off the Grand Duchy, and do something for my ally, the Emperor of Russia; and I think that you, as well as ourselves, may be facile on that side, since we do not set much store by those territories. If you will come back in two days," said Napoleon in conclusion, "we shall settle all in a few hours, whilst our diplomatists, if we leave them alone at Altenburg, will never have done, and will set us on again to cut each other's throats." After this long and amicable interview, in which Napoleon treated M. de Bubna so familiarly as to pull him by the moustaches, he made the latter a superb present, and sent him away fascinated and grateful, and prepared to advocate at Dotis the cause of peace, of immediate peace, at the cost of greater sacrifices than had at first been decided upon.

He had to pass through Altenburg on his way to Dotis. Being by profession of the party of the military men, and not of the diplomatists, he related at Altenburg the part of the interview which concerned the two legations, and the jocularities Napoleon had indulged in at the expense of them both. This annoyed the Austrian legation, and increased the belief at Dotis that it was expedient to dispense with diplomatists, and continue to employ the intervention of military men.

M. de Bubna took pains to reassure the Emperor Francis as to Napoleon's intentions, and his wish to evacuate Austria, and Vienna in particular, as soon as peace should have been signed. He spoke to him of what concerned a change of reign, only with the reserve which befitted such a proposal, and as an offer

to which no great importance was to be attached. As for the new conditions obtained from Napoleon, it was not easy for him to make them acceptable, for the Altenburg legation took pains to depict them as disastrous; and besides, the Emperor Francis, being kept by those about him in continual illusions, could not conceive that, in order to have peace, it was necessary to abandon his finest provinces, and particularly the ports on the Adriatic, where alone the Austrian territory was in contact with the sea. He had habituated himself to the idea that, with Salzburg and the portion of Galicia most recently detached from Poland, he might pay the cost of the war; or, at most, that he might have to add some money thereto. So habituated was he to the notion that this would be the utmost extent of the sacrifices he should have to submit to, that he could not be very well content with the offers brought him by M. de Bubna. A decision, however, was necessary one way or the other; and it was resolved that M. de Bubna should return to Napoleon with another letter from the Emperor of Austria, thanking him for his pacific intentions, but telling him that the concessions he had made were almost nugatory, and asking others of him, in order to render peace possible.

It was on the 15th of September M. de Bubna returned to Dotis; he reappeared at Schönbrunn on the 21st, with the new letter from the Emperor Francis. On receiving it, Napoleon could not restrain a burst of impatience. He inveighed against those who represented the state of things to the Emperor Francis in a manner so completely untrue, and said that none of them knew even the geography of Austria. "I had not yet," he said, "renounced the basis of *uti possidetis*, and I renounced it at the desire of your emperor. I had demanded 400,000 souls of the population of Bohemia, and I have ceased to demand them! I wanted 800,000 souls in Upper Austria, and I content myself with 400,000! I had demanded 1,400,000 souls in Carinthia and Carniola, and I gave up Klagenfurth, which is again a sacrifice of 200,000 souls! I restore, then, a population of a million of subjects to your master, and he says I have conceded nothing! I have retained only what is necessary for me to keep off the enemy from Passau and the Inn; what is necessary for me to establish a contiguity of territory between Italy and Dalmatia; and yet he is told that I have not abated any of my claims! And it is thus they represent everything to the Emperor Francis; thus they enlighten him as to my intentions! By deceiving him in this way they have led him to war, and finally they will lead him to his ruin." Napoleon kept M. de Bubna with him to a very late hour; and under the influence of the feelings that possessed him, he dictated a very bitter letter to the Emperor of Austria. When he grew more calm,

however, he abstained from delivering it to M. de Bubna, remarking, that it was not becoming of one sovereign to tell another in writing, "*You do not know what you say.*" He sent for M. de Bubna, repeated before him all he had said on the preceding night, again declared that his last propositions were his ultimatum; that, short of their acceptance, there was war; that the season was advancing, he wished to make an autumn campaign, and must therefore have a prompt answer, otherwise he would break off the armistice; that his first impulse had been to write a letter which would not have been agreeable to the emperor, but he decided not to send it, that he might not offend that monarch; but he charged M. de Bubna to report at Dotis all he had heard, and return as soon as possible with a definitive reply.

But what he would not write directly to the emperor he caused to be said to the negotiators at Altenburg, to whom he addressed, through M. de Champagny, a most vehement note, wherein he vented all those feelings the expression of which he had thought proper to spare the emperor himself.

This controversy had entirely changed him; and though he did not consider the few leagues of territory and the few thousands of subjects in dispute as worth a new war, the idea of all the ill-will he perceived in the court of Austria took strong possession of his mind, and his inclination to destroy that power began to revive by degrees. In fact, he gave formal orders for resuming hostilities. His army had increased every day since the opening of the negotiations. His infantry was completed, rested, and as fine as ever. All his cavalry was remounted; he had 500 pieces of flying artillery, and 300 well-appointed pieces on the walls of the Austrian fortresses he occupied. He had reinforced Junot's corps in Saxony, and intended to join it to the forces of Massena and Lefebvre in Bohemia, which would make up a mass of 80,000 men in that province. He proposed with the corps of Davout and Oudinot, largely recruited, with the guard at that time 20,000 strong, and with the army of Italy, about 150,000 men in all, to debouch by Presburg, where he had executed great works, enter Hungary, and there deal the house of Austria the finishing blows. He had employed the materials in the isle of Lobau in constructing four portable bridges for the purpose of crossing all the rivers which the Austrians should attempt to put between him and them. He had put Passau, Lintz, Mülck, Krems, Vienna, Brünn, Raab, Grätz, and Klagenfurth in a complete state of defence, and he had thus a formidable basis in the very heart of the monarchy. Although the English had no longer a garrison on Walcheren, he had ordered that the organisation of the army of Flanders should be completed by uniting into divisions the demi-brigades

collected there, completing the horsing of the artillery, and reducing the national guards to the men disposed to serve. Lastly, he had taken a decree for levying upon the old conscriptions (a recent resource he had opened for himself) a last contribution of 36,000 men, who were to be drafted into the fourth battalions sent to France. These 36,000 conscripts, aged from 21 to 25 years, would furnish him with a good reserve if the war continued, or, if peace was signed, would contribute to recruit the army of Spain. He therefore ordered the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès immediately to present this decree to the Senate, that it might be voted before the end of the negotiations.

At the head of this imposing force, he awaited the reply from Dotis, as well inclined for war as peace, in consequence of the bad disposition he thought he perceived in the court of Austria. In anticipation of renewed hostilities, he even went and visited in Hungary and Styria positions he had not yet seen, and which he wished to see for himself in case he should have operations to direct in those countries.

Upon M. de Bubna's reappearance at Dotis, it was felt to be necessary to decide either for war or for making the sacrifices demanded by Napoleon. The anger he had manifested, and which he had rather unjustly vented on the Altenburg legation, which after all wished for peace, though it had very much decried the concessions obtained by M. de Bubna, made it scarcely possible to leave the sequel of the negotiations in the hands of MM. de Metternich and Nugent. Prince John de Lichtenstein, a brave soldier, with no great head, but plenty of heart, whom Napoleon liked for his frank and soldierly humour, was assigned as a colleague to M. de Bubna, and both were sent to Schönbrunn, through Altenburg, with power to consent to the principal bases laid down by Napoleon, but with injunctions to resist strongly as to the sacrifices demanded in Upper Austria, the war contributions, which it was foreseen would be demanded, and all other details of the treaty, so as to render it as little disadvantageous as possible.

As this purely military legation completely neutralised the legation left in Altenburg, M. de Metternich did not choose to prolong his stay in a place where the plenipotentiaries were of no use but to mask the real negotiation going on at Vienna, and he retired to Dotis by no means pleased with the part which M. de Stadion or the emperor had made him play. He was soon to be indemnified for this by taking into his hands the direction of the affairs of Austria, to hold it for forty years. He foresaw, too, that the military negotiators would be very unskilful tacticians on the new field of battle they had entered upon, and would soon be beaten by Napoleon; he therefore warned them

to be thoroughly on their guard, but his advice had rather the effect of alarming them at the task before them than of fortifying them against Napoleon. After all, it was much better for him that the officers who had the glory of figuring at Essling and Wagram (and victor or vanquished this was glory) should alone bear the responsibility of the severe sacrifices about to be incurred perforce. Hence when M. de Lichtenstein, alarmed by his advice, seemed almost inclined to hang back, M. de Metternich strongly encouraged him to persist in his intention of going to Schönbrunn.

MM. de Lichtenstein and de Bubna arrived on the 27th of September, and were most graciously received. M. de Lichtenstein had already obtained unsolicited and very flattering marks of favour from Napoleon. Orders had been given to spare his property round Vienna, and not to billet a soldier in his châteaux. The two plenipotentiaries gave Napoleon to understand that they were authorised to accept his principal conditions, with the exception of certain details which they were instructed to object to. Seeing, then, that he was master of them, and that to make an end of the matter he had only to forego a few square miles, a few thousand inhabitants, and a few millions of francs, he was willing to spare himself needless expense, and he ordered the minister of war to suspend all the movements of troops to Austria, which had begun again, since the Walcheren expedition ceased to cause any uneasiness.

On the 30th, after a theatrical performance, he sat down in his cabinet with the negotiators, and settled with them the principal bases of the treaty. With regard to Italy both parties were agreed; we were to have the circle of Villach without that of Klagenfurth, which still opened to us the Noric Alps; and we were to have Laybach and the right bank of the Save to Bosnia. Towards Bavaria, Napoleon had at first wanted the Ens, and then the Traun, for a boundary, but to facilitate the negotiation, he again consented to forego some portions of territory and some thousands of subjects in that quarter. He consented to a line taken between Passau and Lintz, starting from the Danube near Efferding, consequently leaving a territory round Lintz, touching Schwanstadt, abandoning the territory of Gmünd at that point, and finally connecting itself by the Kammersee with the country of Salzburg, which was ceded to Bavaria. On the Bohemian side he contented himself with some detached portions of territory which Austria had in Saxony, close to Dresden, and not comprising a population of 50,000. In fine, instead of 1,600,000 subjects in Italy and Austria he had demanded previously, Napoleon did not insist on more than 1,400,000 or 1,500,000.

In Galicia the question was more difficult, because it was

newer, Napoleon having postponed explaining himself as to that country on account of Russia.. The province consisted of Old Galicia, which Austria had obtained upon the first partition of the Polish provinces, and which bordered the whole of North Hungary, and of New Galicia, obtained at the last partition, and stretching along both sides of the Vistula to the gates of Warsaw. New Galicia comprised on one side the countries between the Bug and the Vistula, on the other the countries between the Vistula and the Pilica. Napoleon had required to be ceded to him all New Galicia in order to enlarge the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, besides two circles round Cracow to form a territory for that ancient metropolis, and three circles on the eastern side, those of Solkiew, Lemberg, and Zloczow, to bestow on Russia as a gift which might console her for the aggrandisement of the Duchy of Warsaw. This would cut off 2,400,000 subjects from the 4,800,000 contained in the two Galicias. Here again Napoleon gave up a population of 400,000 or 500,000 souls in order to facilitate the negotiation. He now only insisted on New Galicia, from the Vistula to the Pilica on the left, from the Vistula to the Bug on the right, and the circle of Zamosc, with a smaller territory round Cracow, but one which should include the salt-mines of Wieliczka. Lastly, he waived his claim to the circle of Lumberg, and contented himself with the circles of Solkiew and Zloczow for Russia, thereby reducing the total of his demands in Galicia to about 1,900,000 souls.

On these bases there was a tolerable agreement. But two points of great importance remained to be settled: the one was the reduction of the Austrian army; the other, the war contribution required by Napoleon to indemnify him for his expenses. Prussia was bound by secret treaty not to have more than 40,000 men under arms, and to pay an enormous contribution. Napoleon intended, in like manner, to constrain Austria not to reduce her effective to 40,000 men, but greatly to diminish her army, and to pay a part of the costs of the war. These matters had only been mentioned orally, and not at all in writing; so much did they implicate the financial credit of Austria. Napoleon intended that for the future Austria should reduce her force to 150,000 men, and that she should pay down 100 millions of francs, on account of the 200 millions of war contributions, of which he had as yet only received 50. The two negotiators readily consented to reduce the Austrian army to the number of 150,000 men; the finances of Austria did not permit her to keep more on foot; but they required a limit of time, without which such a constraint would have become an intolerable vassalage. To give this condition a less humiliating import, it was settled that Austria should be bound to this restriction of her effective only during the maritime war, in

order to deprive England of any ally on the continent. Lastly, Napoleon, in consenting to evacuate the conquered countries forthwith, and to leave a part of the contributions undischarged, demanded 100 millions within a brief period. On this point the two Austrian negotiators had no latitude; and after a long evening spent in discussing it, both parties separated without having been able to come to an agreement. It was settled that on the following day M. de Bubna should go to Dotis in order to smooth away the last difficulties.

Though it had been expected at first that the business would be concluded in three or four days, the time wore away until the 6th of October, in disputes over the map about certain contours of territory, some thousands of subjects to be taken or left here and there, and above all, the millions demanded by Napoleon. The contribution became matter of seemingly insurmountable difficulty. On the 6th of October, Napoleon, beginning again to lose patience, left M. de Champagny a formal ultimatum which allowed of no more tergiversations. The weather was still fine, and there were certain positions in Styria which he desired to revisit, from that instinct which prompted him to study with his own eyes places to which he might one day be called by war. On his return to Vienna, he expected to find the question of peace or war decided positively, and beyond all doubt, one way or the other. This time, however, he wished rather to intimidate than to break off; for the differences between Austria and him were certainly not such as he would have recommenced war for, though he was much bent on obtaining the contribution, his finances having great need of immediate help.

The two negotiators referred for further instructions to Dotis; and at the last moment the Emperor Francis's intimate advisers hesitated much before resigning themselves to such sacrifices. To lose in Italy the frontier of the Alps, in Austria that of the Inn—to surrender Galicia for the aggrandisement of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, that germ of a new Poland—to lose thus 3,500,000 subjects—to pay 100 millions of francs, in addition to 50 millions already paid, and to submit to the humiliation of a limit imposed on the effective of the Austrian army—was a cruel punishment for the last war. Was there no hope of another battle of Essling, or of some help from one of the powers of Europe? But the military men were all agreed as to the impossibility of resisting, and the most painful intelligence was arriving from all parts of Europe. Spain, in spite of the boastings of its generals, was beaten, at least for the moment. England had lost in Walcheren half of her best army; and that expedition had become an apple of discord thrown amongst all parties of her people. Prussia was trembling,

on account of the imprudence committed by Major Schill. Russia alone was erect, and visibly dissatisfied at the rather brilliant figure made by the Poles in the war, and at the aggrandisement which their conduct would have earned for them. But being bound by the French alliance, as she could not once more, as at Tilsit, set the example of a complete reversal of policy effected in twenty-four hours—as she had gained Finland through that alliance, and hoped from it Moldavia and Wallachia—she would not quit Napoleon for Francis; and as a continuation of the war could not but place her in the most extreme embarrassment, since, on the resumption of hostilities, she would have either to break with the French or to march with them, she explained herself categorically at Dotis, and declared that in case of a prolongation of the war she would act decidedly with Napoleon. She expressed herself thus in order the more certainly to put an end to the war between France and Austria, and she succeeded; for the Emperor Francis, borne down by such a combination of circumstances, gave way at last, and authorised MM. de Lichtenstein and de Bubna to consent to the sacrifices demanded, excepting, however, the amount of the indemnity, as to which the negotiators had orders to press still for a reduction. At the most, they were authorised to assent to 50 millions, in lieu of the 100 demanded by Napoleon.

On the 10th of October they met M. de Champagny, and the three following days were spent in shaping and retouching the articles of the treaty. On the evening of the 13th, Napoleon used all his ascendancy over MM. de Bubna and de Lichtenstein, and brought them to assent to a war contribution of 85 millions, exclusive of what had been already received on account of the 200 millions imposed after the battle of Wagram. Prince John, the greatest personage of the court of Austria, took upon him to exceed his instructions, in order to save his country from the disaster of a new campaign. His heroic bravery likewise authorised him to incline openly to peace. In order to prompt his decision, Napoleon told him that this treaty was subject to the ratification of his sovereign, who might reject it if the conditions did not suit him. At last, on the morning of the 14th of October, M. de Lichtenstein signed, with M. de Champagny, the treaty of peace known as the Treaty of Vienna, the fourth since 1792, and destined, to our misfortune, not to last longer than the others. All the allies of France were included in the peace. Austria ceded all we have already stated: in Italy, the circle of Villach, Carniola, and the right bank of the Save, to the Turkish frontier; in Bavaria, the Innviertel, with a line from Efferding to the country of Salzburg; in Poland, New Galicia, with the circle of Zamosc

for the Grand Duchy, and the circles of Solkiew and Zloczow for Russia. The secret articles contained an engagement not to raise the Austrian army above 150,000 men until the maritime peace, and to pay 85 million francs, in discharge of what the Austrian provinces owed; 30 millions of which were to be paid down on the day of the evacuation of Vienna. Only six days were allowed for the ratification.

This double treaty having been signed, Napoleon, in great delight, dismissed MM. de Bubna and Lichtenstein with marks of high favour, and immediately had the act announced by cannon. It was a clever ruse, for the people of Vienna, who wished the war ended, being thus put in possession of the peace they so ardently desired, it would no longer be possible to deprive them of it by a refusal to ratify. Napoleon intended to follow it up with another ruse, still more subtle and hard to parry, which was to set out himself for Paris, leaving Berthier to manage the details incident to the evacuation of the conquered countries. He immediately issued, with his usual activity, the orders rendered necessary by the peace he had signed. He ordered Marshal Marmont to go and establish himself at Laybach, in Carniola, Prince Eugène to go back to Friuli with the army of Italy, Marshal Massena to move from Znaim to Krems, Marshal Oudinot to quit Vienna for St. Polten, and Marshal Davout to quit Brünn for Vienna. The latter was to form the rearguard of the army with his magnificent corps, the cuirassiers and the artillery, whilst the imperial guard was to head the advance. A part of the artillery horses was to be sent to graze in Carniola, another was to accompany Marshal Davout into the provinces of Northern Germany, another was to go to Spain. It was settled that the evacuation should begin on the day of ratification, and should be continued *pari passu* with the liquidation of the war contribution.

Full of the idea of bringing matters forthwith to an end in Spain by sending thither a considerable mass of forces, without, however, withdrawing anything from the organised corps which had executed the campaign in Austria, Napoleon turned towards the Pyrenees all the forces that were on their march to the Danube. General Junot's corps, with the addition of the troops in Swabia and the garrisons in Prussia, might amount to about 30,000 foot, and with the provisional dragoons, the marching regiments of hussars and chasseurs, and the artillery, to about 40,000 men of all arms. The army of the north, when Marshal Bessières should have retaken Walcheren, would comprise 15,000 soldiers of the line, without reckoning the national guards. The dépôts of the centre, Bretagne and the Pyrenees, contained 30,000 fully trained conscripts. Eight new regiments of the guards (four of conscripts, four of tirailleurs) represented

nearly 10,000 young soldiers eager to distinguish themselves. Lastly, the Rouyer division, composed of the contingents of the German petty princes, which Napoleon proposed to send into Spain, would give 5000. All these corps together made not less than 100,000 men, at whose head, after having despatched his affairs in Paris, Napoleon proposed to enter Spain towards the close of winter. So intent was he on bringing his continual wars to a close, that he gave orders for immediately directing to Spain the forces we have enumerated, so that on his arrival at Paris the movement which would take a long time to execute should have already begun. He urged Marshal Bessières to make haste and retake Walcheren with the 15,000 or 20,000 troops of the line and the 30,000 national guards under his command. There had been levied 65,000 of these national guards, which had caused extreme confusion in the northern provinces, and occasioned considerable expense. Under pretext of guarding the coasts of the Mediterranean, M. Fouché went so far as put all the departments of the south in motion. At the same time several retired officers of the Revolution had been called out, some of whom had been dismissed from service for incapacity, others for bad spirit. M. Fouché had not been sorry thus to flatter a certain number of them, and the minister Clarke, for want of better, had not been able to dispense with their services. Napoleon, who was prompt to conceive suspicion, strongly blamed M. Fouché for thus throwing France into commotion for a danger very remote from the present moment, and from the provinces he disturbed by his unseasonable appeals. He said it was all very well to levy 30,000 or 40,000 men in the provinces of the north near the point where the English made their descent, and immediately after that event, but to call for as many as 200,000 men in Provence and in Piedmont, three months after the date of the expedition, *was madness*. He even hinted that he saw in it something else than want of prudence and good sense. He ordered the discharge of the national guard of Paris, composed of young men who had the presumption to suppose that they were not to serve in the ordinary way, but were to guard the emperor's person; and he desired they should be told that to enjoy that honour it was necessary to be able to show four quarters of nobility, that is to say, four wounds received in four great battles, and that he did not want men who disliked danger but were fond of fine uniforms. He desired that most of the officers who had been called out from retirement should be sent home again, and that fit persons should be sought for amongst the majors of regiments, who were all officers of merit. Lastly, having expressed in severe terms his displeasure at the agitation so rashly produced, he gave instructions that before his return everything should

return to its ordinary footing, and that a reflux of the disposable forces should take place from all parts towards Spain.

Having thus arranged everything in twenty-four hours, he made ready for departure without awaiting the reply from Dotis, in order that he might render a refusal to ratify impossible, for it was not likely they would dare to run after him and tell him they refused the peace. An incident which occurred shortly before his departure caused a great sensation among those about him. On the morning of the 12th he was holding one of his grand reviews at Schönbrunn, in which figured the finest troops in Europe, and which were flocked to with as much curiosity at Vienna, Berlin, Warsaw, and Madrid, as at Paris. There was an immense crowd of spectators from the capital, all eager to see their victor, whom they admired, though they detested him. Besides, peace was announced as certain, and a sort of joy was beginning to succeed the just grief of the Austrian nation. Napoleon was quietly watching his troops defile past him with a smile on his lips, when a young man, dressed in a frock-coat, somewhat like a military undress, presented himself and said he had a petition to deliver to the Emperor of the French. He was repulsed, but returned again and again with an obstinacy which was observed by Prince Berthier and the aide-de-camp Rapp, and struck them so much as to induce them to give him in charge to the gendarmes. The officer of that body, having felt something hard under the young man's coat when he laid hold of him, searched him and found a very sharp knife, manifestly secreted for a criminal purpose. With the quiet determination of a fanatic, the young man declared that in placing himself thus armed in the way of the Emperor Napoleon, his intention had been to stab him. The affair was made known to Napoleon, who sent for the prisoner after the review, and interrogated him in presence of Corvisart, whom he had sent for to Schönbrunn, because he was fond of conversing with that celebrated physician, and wished to consult him as to his health, though it was in general good.

The prisoner, who had a mild and rather handsome countenance, and whose bright eye bespoke a mind preternaturally exalted, was the son of a Protestant clergyman of Erfurth, and was named Staaps. He had run away with some money from his parents, giving them vaguely to understand that he cherished some grand design. He was going, he said, to deliver Europe from the conqueror who tormented her, and to emancipate his country. It was a divine mission he declared he had received, and for which he was resolved to sacrifice his life. He had no accomplice, but had brooded in solitary intoxication of mind over his criminal folly. Napoleon having questioned him mildly as to what had brought him to Schönbrunn, he confessed he had

come to strike him a mortal blow. When Napoleon asked him why, he replied that it was to free the world from his inauspicious genius, and particularly Germany, which he was trampling under foot. "But this time at least," remarked Napoleon, "to be just, you ought to have struck at the Emperor of Austria, not at me, for he it was who declared war on me." Staaps proved by his replies that he was not aware of this, and that yielding to the universal feeling, he attributed to the Emperor of the French alone all the woes of Europe. Looking on the young man with good-natured pity, Napoleon had him examined by his physician Corvisart, who declared that he was not ill, for he had a quiet pulse and all the signs of health. Napoleon then asked Staaps if he would renounce his criminal design in case he should pardon him. "Yes," he replied, "if you will give peace to my country; no, if you will not." However, on being taken to prison, the assassin appeared astonished at the mildness and benevolent loftiness of him he had intended to smite, and had to summon all his fierce patriotism to his aid to avoid feeling regret. He prepared himself for death by praying and writing to his parents.

Napoleon appeared little moved by this incident, and affected to say that it was difficult to assassinate a man like him. Besides the difficulty of gaining access to him, he counted on the prestige of his glory, and on his fortune, to which he had so often trusted his life with heroic carelessness. One reflection, however, haunted his mind, namely, that it was no longer the French Revolution, but himself—himself alone—that was becoming the object of universal hatred, as the sole author of the woes of the age, as the cause of the incessant and terrible agitation of the world. Why did he not draw from the lips of that fanatic a deep and lasting lesson instead of a passing impression—partly of pity for his intended murderer, partly of sadness for himself! A violent feeling was manifestly growing up against him, for the police took note of many an expression indicative of murderous thoughts; they even received the depositions of a soldier to whom proposals had been made, in the island of Lobau, that he should kill the emperor.

Napoleon began to feel his moral isolation, and promised himself that he would think of it; but he ordered that no noise should be made about this occurrence, and he had even thought for a while of pardoning the culprit. Reflecting, however, that it was necessary to strike terror into the young German fanatics, he delivered Staaps over to a military commission, and set out on the night of the 15th of October, leaving orders to make known to him at Passau, by means of signals, what was the determination come to at Dotis. A series of flag-staffs was erected along the Danube from Vienna to Strasburg. A white flag was to be the signal that peace had been ratified; its rejec-

tion was to be indicated by a red flag; and in that case he would return forthwith, and resume hostilities. If, on the other hand, peace was ratified, the evacuation was to take place without delay. As the troops withdrew, they were to blow up the fortifications of Vienna, Brünn, Raab, Grätz, and Klagenfurth—a rude way of bidding adieu to the Austrians, but one conformable to the rights of war.

Whilst Napoleon was rapidly travelling up the valley of the Danube, through the columns of his guard, which were already on the march to Strasburg, and which hailed him with their acclamations, the court of Dotis had received, with a sort of despair, the treaty concluded at Vienna. Vainly did MM. de Lichtenstein and de Bubna plead how impossible they had found it to obtain better terms, and the certainty they had acquired that hostilities would be immediately resumed if they did not give way. They were assailed with harsh and violent reproaches. The diplomatists, so often laughed at by the military men for their slowness, revenged themselves by accusing the latter of having been duped. M. de Lichtenstein, in spite of the glory with which he had covered himself in the last campaign, and M. de Bubna, in spite of the favour he enjoyed, were in a manner disgraced, and were sent back to the army. The treaty, however, which was so much abused, was accepted, in order not to have war with Napoleon, and not to snatch from the good people of Austria a peace of which Napoleon had put them in possession by an anticipated publication. A new negotiator, M. de Urbna, grand chamberlain to the emperor, was appointed to be the bearer of the ratifications, and to ask for some changes in the amount and times of payment of the war contribution. His remonstrances, listened to with politeness, but referred to the emperor, were followed by the immediate exchange of the ratifications, which took place on the morning of the 20th of October. Thereupon Prince Berthier, who waited only for that signal to commence the evacuation, ordered Marshal Oudinot to put himself in motion, and follow the imperial guard along the road to Strasburg; Marshal Davout to move from Brünn to Vienna; Marshal Massena to move from Znaïm to Krems; Marshal Marmont, who was encamped at Krems, to take the St. Polten and Lillienfeld route to Laybach; and Prince Eugène to take that to Italy by Edenburg and Leoben. At the same time he gave orders for springing the mines made under the ramparts of the capital; and whilst the Viennese were watching the departure of our troops, with looks no longer indicative of anger, repeated explosions told them of the destruction of their walls. They were keenly affected, and perhaps they might have been spared that last affliction; for as a measure of precaution the act was one of very doubtful utility.

Napoleon had gone first to Passau to give orders for the works by means of which he intended to make that town a great fortress of the Confederation. The signals having informed him that nothing new had occurred, he proceeded to Munich, where he waited in the family of Prince Eugène for the despatches which were to determine his return to Paris or to Vienna. A courier having at last brought him news of the ratifications, he bade adieu to his allies, who had once more been aggrandised by his protection, and set out for France, where an accumulation of weighty affairs demanded his attention.

The most serious and distressing in the list was the affair of Rome, the sad vicissitudes of which it is time we should make known. The reader, doubtless, remembers that when Napoleon resolved to break with the house of Spain and with the Pope, in pursuance of his desire to destroy the old order of things in Europe, he seized the Legations, attached them to the kingdom of Italy under the title of Departments, and caused Rome to be occupied by General Miollis. To justify that occupation, he alleged the necessity of connecting his armies of north and south Italy by the centre of the Peninsula, and also that of protecting himself against the hostile intrigues of which Rome was constantly the theatre. From that day the state of things became intolerable. The Pope having quitted the Vatican for the Quirinal, shut himself up in the latter as in a fortress, and gave occasion there to scenes as deplorable for the oppressing as for the oppressed power. General Miollis, condemned to a most uncongenial office (for that intrepid soldier was a man of highly cultivated mind), strove in vain to mitigate the harshness of his duty. Pius VII., indignant in the highest degree as a pontiff at the violence exercised against the Church, and mortified as a prince by the ingratitude of Napoleon, whom he had gone to Paris to crown, could no longer restrain the feelings that wrought within him, and which, without diminishing the affectionate and religious interest he deserved, made him lose some portion of his dignity. When General Miollis proposed to visit him on New Year's Day, at the head of his staff, he refused to see him. The cardinals, on their part, declined, on the plea of illness, the invitations sent them by the general, and the latter affected to send and inquire after their health. The Pope no longer having the Roman exchequer at his command, and being resolved to solicit nothing, pledged the beautiful tiara which Napoleon had presented to him on his coronation. The relations subsisting between powers so dissimilarly great were already difficult enough without this ignoble complication. It was impossible but that such offensive proceedings should soon lead to acts of violence. As it had been ascertained that the Pope was addressing protests to foreign courts, his couriers were arrested, a fact which suffi-

ciently proves the truth formerly so well understood by the First Consul, that to be independent the Pope ought to be sovereign of the territory in which he resided. Pius VII. then gave it out that he was a prisoner, and would not correspond with any one, least of all with the French government.

The Roman troops, adroitly flattered by General Miollis, who had persuaded them that by becoming incorporated with the French troops they would cease to bear the old nickname of *soldiers of the Pope*, had consented to this incorporation. The Pope wishing to punish them by denationalising them, changed the uniform and the cockade of the Roman troops, and bestowed the new cockade only on the troops that remained faithful to him, that is to say, on the noble guard, and the Swiss guard that occupied his palace. Ere long the young men of family, who formed the noble guard, irritated at the treatment received by their sovereign, braved the French with an arrogance which in their position was courageous and meritorious. The French general, in his turn, giving way to a feeling of offended pride, broke open the doors of the Quirinal, and disarmed the noble guard in the Pope's own palace. After such an outrage as this there was no act of violence which might not be expected. After the loss of Cardinal Consalvi, Pius VII. had successively taken for secretaries of state Cardinal Gabrielli and Cardinal Pacca. The French attempted to arrest the latter in the Quirinal, but the Pope displaying on this occasion all the majesty of his age and his supreme dignity, appeared in his pontifical vestments to protect his secretary, whom the French durst not seize in his presence. From that time he made him sleep in a chamber next his own, and he lived in the midst of some faithful domestics, who kept watch by turns day and night at all the issues of the palace, the doors and windows of which were constantly barred.

Napoleon thus drawn into an obstinate conflict with the old European order of things, a conflict of which the deplorable catastrophe of Vincennes was the first act, the spoliation of Bayonne the second, the captivity of Pius the third, and not the least unhappy, forgot with regard to the pontiff all the respect due to his rank, his age, and his virtues, all the gratitude he owed him for his conduct, and the forbearance with which it became him to treat a power he had re-established, and which he could not overthrow without the most deplorable inconsistency. What occasion for ridicule did he afford, great as he was, to the few philosophers left in Paris, the associates of MM. Sieyès, Cabanis, and de Tracy, who had so much condemned the Concordat! Rather, indeed, than come to such scenes as those witnessed in the Quirinal, they were unquestionably right in desiring that the two powers, instead of entering

into reciprocal relations, and signing treaties, should forget each other altogether, and live on the footing of total strangers!

But Napoleon, blinded by passion, forgetting that after having made himself at Vincennes the rival of the regicides, after having made himself at Bayonne the equal of those who declared war against Europe to establish in it the universal republic, he made himself in the Quirinal the equal at least of those who had dethroned Pius VI. to create the Roman republic, forgetting that he had heaped contempt on all those parties, and that he had obtained the crown by affecting not to resemble them—Napoleon soon put the climax to his monstrous proceedings by resolving to dethrone Pius VII., and take from him the sceptre, leaving him the tiara. That those who devised the civil constitution of the clergy, and created the Roman republic, should act thus, was quite natural, and admitted of the most honourable justification, since they acted upon their convictions. But the author of the Concordat to act thus! It was on his part a proof of self-forgetfulness, most painful to the admirers of his rare genius, alarming to those who thought of the future of France, impossible ever to be explained except by drawing from it the lesson, so often repeated in history, that the greatest man is but a child when passion seizes hold of him.

"There must be an end to this comedy," said Napoleon in one of his letters, and indeed it could not be endured any longer. To kill the pontiff, of which Napoleon's noble heart was assuredly incapable, would have been better than to leave him to fret and degrade himself in the Quirinal. Napoleon resolved therefore to suppress the temporal power of the Pope, and he waited to pronounce that sentence until he no longer needed to put himself under any restraint as regarded Austria. On the 17th of May, after the battles of Ratisbon and Ebersberg, and the entry into Vienna, he decreed at Schönbrunn the suppression of the Pope's temporal power, and declared the States of the Holy See united to the empire. He nominated for the administration of those States consulta composed of Roman princes and citizens, proclaimed the abolition of entails, of the Inquisition, of convents, and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, and applied to the Roman State all the principles of 1789. He left Pius VII. the palaces in Rome, a civil list of 2,000,000 francs, and all the pontifical paraphernalia, saying that the Popes had no need of temporal power to exercise their spiritual mission—that that mission had even suffered from their twofold character of pontiffs and sovereigns; that he would change nothing in the Church, its dogmas or its rites—he would leave it wealthy and respected; only as Charlemagne's successor he withdrew the endowment of a temporal kingdom, which that

emperor had bestowed on the Holy See. All this was said in language imperious, lofty, specious, but very strange in the mouth of the some time First Consul !

The decree was published at Rome on the 11th of June by sound of trumpet amidst a population divided in sentiment ; the lower classes and clergy indignant at the violence done to their pontiff ; the middle classes, though much disposed to do without the ecclesiastical government, looking very suspiciously on what came from the man who had put down the French Revolution. The Pope waited only for this last act to have recourse to the only arms that remained in his hands, those of excommunication. Many a time he had thought of employing them ; but the fear of showing how blunted were weapons formerly so potent, or if they proved of some efficiency against a sovereign of new origin, the fear of driving him to the worst extremities, had made the counsellors of the Holy See hesitate as to that course. They agreed, however, that it should be adopted if the suppression of the temporal power was decreed ; in anticipation of which event the bulls were all drawn up beforehand, transcribed by the Pope's own hand, and signed. They pronounced sentence of excommunication not against Napoleon by name, but against all the authors and accomplices of the acts of violence and spoliation done against the Holy See and the patrimony of St. Peter. No sooner had the publication of the 17th of May taken place than some bold and faithful hands posted up in St. Peter's, and in most of the churches of Rome, the bull of excommunication that dared to strike Napoleon on his throne, and which, not having in its support the force of the religious sentiment, which had long been on its decline, yet found one in the just feelings of mankind, which revolted against the acts of violence and ingratitude committed by the warrior upon the pontiff who had crowned him.

The French police took down those audacious placards, but the bull, being passed from hand to hand, could not fail soon to reach the extremities of Europe. These two acts, one of which corresponded to the other, would naturally exasperate to the last degree the two powers personified in the French general and the Roman pontiff, and it was impossible they should continue to confront each other without coming to physical violence. Napoleon corresponded for the affairs of Rome with General Miollis, and with his brother-in-law Murat, who, as King of Naples, was commander-in-chief of the army of occupation. Foreseeing what might happen, he wrote to the latter on the 17th and 19th of June that if the decree of the 17th of May encountered any resistance, the Pope was to be treated precisely as he would deal with the Archbishop of Paris, and that,

if necessary, Cardinal Pacca and Pius VII. were to be arrested. These instructions, which he afterwards regretted having given, reached Rome through Murat at the moment when the greatest uneasiness prevailed there. There was an English fleet in sight of Civita Vecchia; but the importance of this fact was exaggerated, for it was only a demonstration of the British forces stationed in Sicily. The people of Rome were in great agitation. The abolition of the ecclesiastical government, and the substitution of a provisional civil authority, caused general confusion. Every moment it was said that the tocsin would ring, and at that summons the Trasteverini would fall upon the French, who were but 3000 or 4000, Murat having moved all his forces to the coast to watch the British fleet. It was expected that this would happen on St. Peter's Day, the 29th of June, when it was asserted Pius VII. would issue forth from the Quirinal in pontifical robes, himself pronounce the excommunication, release all the subjects of the empire from their oath of allegiance, and give the signal for a general insurrection in Italy.

There was then at the head of the French police in Rome an officer of gendarmerie, Colonel Radet, a very cunning, bold man, just the person to execute a *coup de main*. Being quartered in the Rospigliosi Palace, near the Quirinal, he had filled the Pope's palace with spies, and placed trusty hands near the belfry of the Quirinal to seize the bell that was to ring the tocsin. Though the rumours we have mentioned were not realised, they excited the imagination of the French authorities, and impressed them with the belief that there remained no safety in Rome so long as they tolerated the presence there of the Pope and his minister Cardinal Pacca, who was reputed to be the chief agent of the extreme ecclesiastical party. To arrest Cardinal Pacca without the Pope, from whom he remained inseparable, was impossible and insufficient, and it seemed absolutely necessary to arrest both. The French authorities, however, were loth to perpetrate this act of violence, the worthy consequence of that of Bayonne, when the letters so imprudently written by Napoleon to Murat, and communicated by the latter to General Miollis, removed all scruples. Nevertheless General Miollis still hesitated, but as Colonel Radet insisted that Rome could no longer be governed unless they made a display of vigour, it was resolved to arrest the Pope, with suitable precautions, and transport him to Tuscany, where a decision should be come to as to what was to be done with that sacred personage, so very embarrassing at Rome, but destined to be embarrassing everywhere, because everywhere he would be the living evidence of an odious and useless violence.

Preliminaries having been arranged, and the gendarmerie

echeloned along the road from Rome to Florence, Colonel Radet assailed the Quirinal on the 6th of July at three o'clock in the morning, the very time when our army was deploying to fight the battle of Wagram. The doors being fast, the garden-walls were scaled with ladders, the palace was entered through the windows, and the intruders arrived at the apartments of the Pope, who, on being informed of the assault, had hurriedly clad himself in his pontifical costume. Cardinal Pacca was beside him with some ecclesiastical and civil members of his household. The pontiff was indignant. His eyes, naturally quick but mild in their expression, shot fire. Seeing Colonel Radet at the head of our soldiers, so odiously travestied into vanquishers of a defenceless old man, the Pope asked him what brought him there by such an entrance. Colonel Radet stammered out an excuse, alleging the orders he was bound to obey, and said he was directed to take him out of Rome. Pius VII., feeling that all resistance would be useless, asked that he might be accompanied by Cardinal Pacca and some of his household; this was granted on condition that he should set out forthwith, and that the persons he wished to have in his retinue should not join him until after the lapse of some hours. The pontiff having resigned himself to these conditions, he was put into a carriage, Colonel Radet mounted the front seat, and they passed through Rome and the first stages without being recognised. They travelled post, without stopping, as far as Radicofani. There, the Pope being fatigued, and his retinue not having arrived, he refused to go any further; besides, he had rather a sharp attack of fever, and it was impossible not to grant him a little rest. After a delay of one day the journey was resumed; they drove through Sienna, through the midst of a kneeling but passive population, and arrived at eight o'clock in the evening at the Carthusian monastery of Florence.

The Grand Duchess Eliza, Napoleon's eldest sister, who took intelligent pains to govern well her beautiful Duchy of Tuscany, and had some difficulty in curbing her subjects, who, like others, were tending to disown the ascendancy of Napoleon, was dismayed at the thought of having such a prisoner to keep, and feared that the mere suspicion of her being an accomplice in such an act of violence would quite alienate the affections of her people. She resolved therefore not to have the Pope in Florence. The promptness of the abduction having outstripped all the orders that might have been expected under such circumstances from Schönbrunn, everybody was free to shift the burden from his own shoulders to his neighbour's. The grand duchess consequently ordered that the Pope should be taken to Alessandria, where he would be in a fortress under the charge of Prince Borghese. He set out on the 9th for Genoa, under the escort

of an Italian officer of gendarmerie, of gentle deportment, likely to be agreeable to Pius VII. The grand duchess gave her best carriage for the use of the august traveller, sent her own physician with him, and supplied all the comforts likely to render the journey less fatiguing. The noble old man, grieving at his removal from Italy, irritated by fatigue, and distressed at meeting new faces, passionately refused for a moment to acquiesce in what was required of him, but was forced, nevertheless, to depart for Genoa. By-and-by he grew calmer, on seeing the deference with which he was treated, and especially on perceiving on their knees around him the people of the country, who were allowed to approach his carriage. There was no great risk in allowing them to do so; for though hatred was beginning to supplant affection throughout the empire, fear still remained entire; and while all condoled with the Pope, no man would have dared to brave the imperial authority for his deliverance. On arriving, however, near Genoa, it became known that the people had turned out to salute the Pope. He was therefore put on board a custom-house boat, at some distance from the town, and taken by sea to San Pietro di Arena, whence he was transferred to Alessandria.

Prince Borghese, governor-general of Piedmont, alarmed in his turn at having such a prisoner to keep, and having no orders, sent the Pope on to Grenoble, where he arrived on the 21st with Cardinal Pacca, who, after a temporary separation, had joined him again at Alessandria.

At Grenoble, the Pope was lodged in the bishop's palace, treated with all respect, but kept prisoner.

When the emperor learned at Schönbrunn the inconsiderate use that had been made of his letters, he blamed the arrest of the Pope, and greatly regretted that such an act of violence had been committed. But being as unwilling to have him in France as Prince Borghese had been to have him at Alessandria, and the Grand Duchess Eliza at Florence, and not being aware that the Pope was already at Grenoble, he named Savona, on the Gulf of Genoa, where there was a good citadel, and a tolerably large house suitable for the reception of the Pope. On receipt of this letter, the minister of police sent off Pius VII. from Grenoble to Savona, a movement which Napoleon likewise blamed when he was informed of it; fearing that these repeated removals from place to place would seem a series of indecent vexations practised upon an august old man, whom he still loved whilst oppressing him, and by whom he was loved in spite of that oppression. He ordered that M. de Salmatoris, one of his chamberlains, should be sent from Paris with a troop of domestics and a considerable quantity of furniture, so as to provide a becoming establishment for the Pope. He ordered

that he should be allowed to do what he pleased, perform all the ceremonies of religion, and receive the homages of the numerous populations that would flock to see him. At the same time he gave directions for the removal to Paris of the cardinals, the generals of the several religious orders, the members of the Roman chancery, the members of the courts of the Dataria and Penitenza, and lastly, the pontifical archives; for he was meditating the design of placing the sovereign pontiff by the side of the head of the new Empire of the West, and thus establishing at Paris the centre of all temporal and spiritual authority—a singular indication of the degree to which his powerful judgment had already become distorted.

Such were the events of all kinds which took place during the short Austrian campaign, and every reader may easily imagine the effect they must have produced on men's minds. That effect had been great and rapid. For a year past, since the beginning of the Spanish business, discontent had continued to grow and feed upon the conviction universally entertained that all might have ended after Tilsit, and peace have prevailed on the continent at least, but for the imprudent act which had overthrown the Spanish Bourbons to put the Bonapartes in their place. Although the court of Vienna had been the first to assume the offensive, everybody referred the Austrian war to the Spanish as its certain and obvious cause. Those incessant wars were looked on with dismay, which perilled France, her greatness, her tranquillity, and her emperor himself; for even while they censured his insatiable ambition, his subjects clung to him as a saviour, and were as much displeased with him for hazarding his own person as for endangering France, as he did every day. Patriotism had almost sunk under the general feeling of weariness, and some of the disaffected, as we have before stated, secretly hawked about translations of the mendacious bulletins issued by Archduke Charles. The doubtful battle of Essling gave still more force to these feelings, which rose almost to a rancorous pitch when Major Schill took the field, and bands of insurgent Germans appeared in Saxony and Franconia. Wagram extinguished these discontents, but Walcheren revived them; and though the discomfiture of the English again effaced the alarm caused by their landing, one might have remarked the reluctance of the national guards to march and their indiscipline, which was so great that General Lamarque was obliged to have some of them shot. The old officers who had been called from retirement to active service had not the less continued to play the part of malcontents in Paris, and had held most objectionable language. Round MM. Fouché, Bernadotte, and Talleyrand had gathered many enemies of the empire, who showed more than usual boldness. The old royalists had

begun to bestir themselves in the Faubourg St. Germain, and the memory of the Bourbons seemed to be somewhat revived amongst them. They flocked to St. Sulpice to the sermons of a preacher, already celebrated, M. de Frayssinous, with an eagerness which was not owing entirely to religious motives. In those sermons were developed, greatly to their satisfaction, doctrines strongly at variance with those of the decree of the 17th of May, which had suppressed the Pope's temporal sovereignty. Their suppression by the police gave occasion to current remarks still more objectionable than the sermons themselves. The clergy were in consternation at the news that after many scandalous scenes things had been carried in Rome to the climax of a forcible abduction of the Pope. Prayers were offered up for him in the churches; the Concordat was laughed at in the salons, in which there still lingered some traces of the old philosophical spirit, and everywhere occasion was found for vituperating and depreciating Napoleon as a politician, though the great captain still commanded universal admiration. Reports of his assassination were even propagated several times, as though the same feelings which prompted some to meditate that crime prompted others to presage it. In short, it was evident that a revolution was already taking place in public opinion, and that the impulse which was arousing Europe against Napoleon was beginning to detach France from him. The late war, however, miraculously brought to a close in four months, the glorious peace by which it was followed, and the continent once more pacified, brought back hope, and with it content, admiration, and the desire to see the imperial reign tranquillised, consolidated, and mitigated and perpetuated in an heir; and although, with all her known frivolity, Josephine was loved as an amiable sovereign, who represented goodness and grace by the side of might, the French desired, with regret for her, another marriage, which should give heirs to the empire. Nor did they confine themselves to wishes on this subject; the fact was indiscreetly announced as already resolved on, by persons who declared their pity for the victim of this sacrifice, and were ready, perhaps, to blame the emperor for consummating it, and to see, according as his choice should fall, in a new union a new act of ambition.

Such was the state of public feeling which Napoleon thoroughly apprehended, but which he did not like to have represented to him in its true colours, preferring to surmise disagreeable things for himself rather than hear them from the lips of others. During the war in Austria, Prince Cambacérès had remained silent, that he might not have to utter them; but Napoleon himself called upon his discreet arch-chancellor to speak out, and the latter told all, with extreme delicacy, but with honest sincerity. Anxious to speak with him, above all men, and in

the fullest detail, on these important matters, Napoleon ordered him to be at Fontainebleau on the 26th of October, the day he himself expected to arrive there.

On the 26th Napoleon did reach Fontainebleau, before his household, the empress, his ministers, and everybody. The punctual arch-chancellor was on the spot at dawn. Napoleon received him with confidence and friendliness, but with a hauteur not usual with him. The more he felt public opinion lapse from him, the more loftily he bore himself towards it, even with regard to those who represented it with so much good feeling for him. He complained to the arch-chancellor of the weakness with which those in Paris had borne the trials of the recent short campaign, the alarms they had so readily conceived on account of a few insignificant efforts made by Major Schill and some other German insurgents, and the commotion into which they had been thrown by the expedition to the Scheldt, which was, he said, an effect of his fortunate star ; he expressed some scorn for the want of firmness displayed under these various circumstances, and complained especially that there had been so much hesitation about calling out the national guards when they might have been of use, and so much indiscretion in calling them out when they could only serve to disturb the country. He manifested more than usual distrust with regard to the old republicans and royalists, and appeared even to extend that feeling to his own kindred. He affected to consider the affairs of the clergy as of minor importance, and talked of settling them now that he was returned in concert with Prince Cambacérès. He spoke with great contempt of death, and of the dangers he had run, affecting to believe, and believing really, that for an instrument of Providence like himself there were no balls or poniards to be feared. He then came to the essential matter, which most engaged his thoughts—the dissolution of his marriage with the Empress Josephine. He loved that old companion of his life, though he was not scrupulously faithful to her, and it wrung his heart to part from her ; but as his popularity declined, he liked to suppose that it was not his faults, but the want of a future, which menaced his glorious throne with premature decay. To consolidate what he felt trembling under his feet was his engrossing thought, as if when a new wife had been chosen, obtained, placed in the Tuileries, and had become the mother of a male heir, the faults which had set all the world against him would have been disarmed of their consequences. It was well, no doubt, to have an indisputable heir, but better, a hundred-fold better, would it have been to be prudent and wise ! However this may be, Napoleon, who, notwithstanding his want of a son, had been unable after Tilsit, at the zenith of his glory and power, to sacrifice Josephine, now at last resolved

to do so, because he felt the empire shaken, and was about to seek in a new marriage the solidity which he ought to have derived from an able and moderate course of conduct.

He spoke then on this grave subject with Prince Cambacérès, declared that there was no prince of his family who could succeed him, cast a sad and searching glance upon the defects of that family, and showed that his brothers were incapable of reigning, intensely jealous of each other, and by no means disposed to obey his successor, unless direct descent constrained them to acknowledge in that successor the continuator of the empire. He manifested, however, a marked preference for Prince Eugène, praised his services, his modesty, his boundless devotedness, but declared that adoption would not suffice to make him accepted after his own death as the heir to the empire; and he added that being certain of having children with another wife than Josephine, he had resolved to divorce her, but had not mentioned the matter to any one, least of all to her who was to be sacrificed, that such an avowal was most painful to him, that he expected the arrival of Prince Eugène, who was to prepare his mother, and until then he desired the matter to remain a profound secret. Prince Cambacérès learned with keen regret this momentous determination, for, like everybody else, he liked Josephine, and felt clearly that in repudiating her Napoleon was about to break still more with the tenor of his own early days, days of sound ideas and moderate designs, days in which were comprised all the men of the Revolution, and from the traditions of which he could not separate himself without breaking with those men too. The same prudence which had made Cambacérès condemn the conversion of the consulate into the empire prompted him to condemn an alliance with any old dynasty, for he was well aware that length of possession was the surest consolidation, and that length of possession depended solely on discreteness of conduct. He made some diffident suggestions founded on the favour Josephine enjoyed in France, the affection borne towards her by the people, and above all, by the army, who were accustomed to behold in her the benevolent wife of their general; on the revolutionary souvenirs connected with her, and on the new step he would seem to make towards the *ancien régime* in putting away the widow Beauharnais to wed a daughter of the Habsburgs or the Romanoffs. To all these remarks, offered with such extreme reserve, Napoleon replied in the tone of an absolute master whose towering will had become, as it were, identified with destiny. He wanted an heir, and that heir obtained, the empire, he asserted, would be established for ever. The first consul's old counsellor, confounded by his master's hauteur, submitted in silence, and was indemnified by an extreme kind-

ness for the inflexibility of the purposes he had endeavoured to bend.* It was settled that silence should be observed until the arrival of Prince Eugène.

The unfortunate Josephine did not arrive until the afternoon at Fontainebleau, already alarmed at not having been the first to be received. Napoleon welcomed her with affection, but with the embarrassment caused by the weighty secret he durst not divulge. Without possessing talent, Josephine had exquisite tact, and the penetration which personal interest gives, and she felt as it were struck to death. Hearing on all sides the crowd of flatterers repeating how necessary it was to consolidate the empire, and seeing all things tend to what was called stability, the tears she had so often shed in anticipation of her sad lot began to flow afresh. Her daughter, the Queen of Holland, rendered unhappy by her husband's sombre jealousy, and separated from him, had come to comfort her mother, and finding her so woe-begone, had at last come almost to wish, for her sake, that this dreadful secret, whatever it was, should be divulged. Fontainebleau was thronged with courtiers, who, the more they had been alarmed by the events in Spain, the more they affected to proclaim the invincibility of him they had thought so near being vanquished. To hear them talk, one would have supposed that nobody had feared, nobody had doubted, nobody had been uneasy. The English had been blunderers—the Austrians madly presumptuous. The Spaniards were sure to be put down. Of the Pope, and the useless and odious violence he had suffered, not a word. Napoleon did not choose the affair to be talked of, so no one said anything about it, that it might be, as he commanded, a thing of no consequence—an affair of priests, not worth the serious attention of the nineteenth century. And then every conversation on public affairs ended with a whispered remark on the misfortune of seeing the throne occupied by a very engaging but barren female sovereign. No one could presume to fathom the thoughts of the omnipotent emperor; but it was not possible he should not think of completing the edifice he had raised by giving an heir to the empire. All the thrones of Europe would be eager to offer the mother of that future master of the west, and when the child was born the empire would be eternal. In short, whilst Paris was beginning to talk and object, though still

* Cambacérès speaks of this conversation as follows: "We were alone for several hours, as the emperor had desired, in order that he might have leisure to talk with me on several matters. . . . During the interview Napoleon appeared to me preoccupied with his own greatness; he had an air *as though he were talking about amidst his glory*. There was a haughtiness in what he said that made me fear I should no longer prevail on him to use any of those delicate artifices that he himself had owned to be necessary towards ruling a free people, or one that wishes to appear such."

admiring, at Fontainebleau people were silent, unless it was to say in servile, low, insipid language, what they had descried in the imperious looks of Napoleon.

His whole family had asked leave to come and expiate, some their failings or their partial disobedience, others certain sayings and doings of which they had been the involuntary cause. Jerome, King of Westphalia, had mismanaged the few military movements he had been required to execute; he had expended too much on his pleasure and not enough on his army. Louis, King of Holland, not to indulge his own taste for luxury, but to gratify the parsimonious spirit of the Dutch, had not maintained troops enough, and he had favoured, or at least not put down, the contraband trade with England. Murat, removed from the army to reign in Naples, where he strove to flatter all classes of his subjects, had, probably without knowing it, given occasion for remarks which were transmitted by the police to Schönbrunn. People said that in anticipation of a catastrophe on the Danube, fatal to Napoleon's life or fortunes, MM. Fouché and Talleyrand had turned their eyes on Murat, and arranged to have relays ready on the road from Italy which were to bring him from Naples to Paris. After all, it was not so much to his own ambition as his wife's that these reports had reference. Napoleon received Jerome indulgently, though the sacrifice of business to pleasure was in his eyes the worst of all faults. But he could pardon a great deal in consideration of his brother's affection, and he allowed him to hope for an advantageous arrangement respecting Hanover. He was more severe with Louis, whom he esteemed, but whose sombre independence and extreme obsequiousness to the wishes of the Dutch were becoming an actual defection as regarded the policy of France. He gave the King of Holland reason to apprehend the most unfavourable resolutions relative to his territories. As for Murat, whom he had not seen for a long time, and whose name, present to the minds of all intriguers, offended him at times, he signified his displeasure not so much against him as his wife, whose restless mind presaged many a capital fault. Though friendly as ever towards his kinsfolk, he affected in a greater degree towards them the bearing of a master. As he advanced in life, he saw deeper in them, as in all around him, to the bottom of human affections; and in approaching, as he sometimes foreboded, the term of his greatness, he seemed to have conceived towards all the world some hidden bitterness, which the fortunate and prompt termination of the war in Austria had not been sufficient to remove, and which manifested itself by an expression of more absolute authority.

Napoleon's family were not the only comers. The kings, his allies, having all some interest to discuss or thanks to offer,

had begged permission to visit him: these were the King of Saxony, the King and Queen of Bavaria, and the King of Wurtemberg. The emperor replied most courteously to their requests, and everything announced for the end of autumn the most brilliant assemblage of crowned heads in Paris. Meanwhile a series of magnificent fêtes took place at Fontainebleau. Theatrical performances, balls, and hunting parties followed one another without intermission. Hunting the stag seemed to be Napoleon's favourite pastime. He spent whole hours on horseback, and had the fact stated in the public journals, because, during the last campaign, rumour had questioned the stability of his health as well as his fortunes. The circumstance that he kept Corvisart, the physician, with him, as much to enjoy his conversation in his leisure moments at Schönbrunn as to consult him about some obscure pains, the forerunners of the disease of which he died twelve years afterwards, had given occasion to much idle talk about his health. To refute such rumours, he galloped from morning till night, boasting of his strength, which was still great, and wishing that it should be believed. His personal appearance had undergone a great change at that time. His face, which had been dark and thin, had grown open and full without becoming less handsome. From being taciturn he had become an abundant talker, always listened to with rapt attention by some, with cringing docility by others. Formerly abrupt and dry, he had become impetuous, voluble, sometimes stern, though always calm in danger, and kind when he saw others suffer. In short, his mighty nature had completely bloomed, and it was now about to fade, like his fortunes, for nothing is stationary. Amidst the ladies who eagerly thronged his court, he had particularly distinguished one or two, and he took no pains to conceal his inclinations, in spite of the fits of jealousy of the Empress Josephine, whose feelings in that respect he mortified, as if he wished to prepare her to renounce him, or himself to draw from domestic disagreements the courage to break from her which he had not. Such was his life on his return from the war in Austria; and its lustre was not less than after Tilsit, for it seemed that every one sought by boundless obsequiousness to make him forget the doubts for a moment entertained as to his prosperity.

Always attentive to business, however, in the midst of pleasures, he issued orders from Fontainebleau upon a great number of matters. He accelerated the organisation, mustering, and movement of the corps destined for Spain, which consisted, as we have seen, of that of General Junot, dispersed from Augsburg to Dresden, that of Marshal Bessières employed on the recovery of Walcheren, the reserves prepared in the centre and west of the empire, the provisional dragoons, and the young regiments

of the guard. The English having at last withdrawn entirely from the mouth of the Scheldt, after blowing up the docks and works at Flushing, Napoleon gave the troops of the line of that corps the route for Spain, and dissolved the national guards, except some battalions composed of the small number of men who had taken a liking for the service. He had caused the evacuation of Austria to be continued step by step as the payments were made, and directed Marshal Oudinot's corps to Mayence, Marshal Massena's to Flanders, and Marshal Davout's to those parts of Germany which still remained to France, such as Salzburg, Bareuth, and Hanover. He dissolved Marshal Oudinot's corps, consisting of fourth battalions (excepting the old St. Hilaire division), and sent those battalions to their several regiments. He reinforced the fine divisions of Massena's corps, to which he entrusted the coasts of the continent from Brest to Hamburg. Marshal Davout's corps he reunited with the cavalry, and proposed to make it live in Hanover, either at the expense of that country, or at that of King Jerome, if he gave Hanover to him. He directed Marshal Marmont's corps to the camp at Laybach, to be quartered on Carniola. Thus he sought the best contrivances not to diminish his forces, and at the same time to render them less costly, for the Austrian war had not brought him in what he expected (it had produced about 150 millions), and the Walcheren expedition had cost him much money for the equipment of the national guards. Finance was then the object of Napoleon's most anxious care, and the cause of most of his determinations. Wishing to bring the affairs of the continent to a close, he treated with Bavaria for the pacification of the Tyrol, the partition of the territories of Salzburg, Bareuth, &c. ; with Westphalia for the cession of Hanover ; with Saxony for the gift of Galicia. Of some he demanded dotations for his generals ; of others, means to maintain his armies ; of all, a definitive arrangement which should put an end to the extraordinary military occupations, and at last confer upon the continent an aspect of peace and stability. There was no difficulty in the way of any of these arrangements, for Napoleon was giving away territories, and might therefore name what conditions he pleased. The recipients could not fail in any case to be satisfied.

Napoleon had no serious difficulty except with his brother Louis. He was incensed to the last degree at the facilities afforded by the latter to the contraband trade, as a punishment for which he required from him the territory comprised between the Scheldt and the Rhine from Antwerp to Breda, hoping to guard himself better against smuggling when he should have that line, and threatening even to take all Holland if the abuses he complained of were continued. He organised the extraordinary domain, directed by M. Defermon, and formed with the

army treasury, and the properties of all kinds he had reserved in various countries, in order that the fortunes of his servants might rest on durable bases. Lastly, Napoleon gave his attention to the Church, and thought of a new establishment which would place its head in the position of the patriarchs of Constantinople with regard to the emperors of the east. He had caused the Pope to be very well treated, and to be surrounded with all the state of a sovereign. Pius, who had recovered his usual serenity after a few days' anger, but persisted in his resistance, remarked that mere necessities were enough for him, and that pomp would be unbecoming in his new situation; sovereign he was no longer, and as a prisoner, it would be mockery to surround him with magnificence; a moderate entertainment, such as was afforded to prisoners who were respected, would be enough for himself and his servants.

These objections were not attended to, and the Pope's establishment continued to be princely. As for the affairs of the Church, Pius refused to meddle with any of them so long as he was kept without a council of cardinals and a secretary of state of his own choosing. He was equally obdurate as to the institution of bishops, always a matter of great urgency. Previously, and even subsequently to the entry of General Miollis into Rome, Pius VII. had consented to institute the bishops nominated by the imperial government, on condition of the omission of a formality merely implying deference for the emperor. Thus he had granted the bull which institutes the bishop accepted by the Church, that which is addressed to the clergy, and that which is addressed to the faithful of the diocese; but he had refused that which is addressed to the temporal sovereign in whose dominions the new prelate is to exercise his functions. Napoleon proposed that things should remain on that footing for the future; but the Pope had even refused that compromise since his captivity at Savona. Dispensations and all ordinary acts were granted in Rome by Cardinal di Pietro, who had been left in the metropolis of the Church to fulfil the functions of the spiritual governor according to the usual custom in the absence of the Pope. Napoleon made light of these difficulties, and flattered himself he should remove them when he had Pius VII. near him. His project was to bring him to Fontainebleau, soothe and win upon him, and then make him accept a magnificent establishment at St. Denis, where the sovereign pontificate should be surrounded with as much splendour as at Rome itself. Convinced that with might on one's side one may do everything, Napoleon imagined that after some resistance the Pope would yield when he saw that nothing was to be got by holding out; that the cardinals and high dignitaries of the Church, brought after the Pope to Paris, and sumptuously treated, would likewise end by preferring

an opulent and respected position to persecution ; and that the Romans, for whom he destined a court the most brilliant in the world, next to his own (what that was we shall see by-and-by), would freely forego a pontificate which subjected them to the government of priests ; that the Catholics of France would be flattered at having the Pope among them ; those of the rest of Europe, reduced to far other sacrifices, would resign themselves to his residence in France, and so there would be an end to those old Catholic habits, of all habits the most deeply rooted, inveterate, and unyielding among the European populations, just as to one of those frontiers which he changed at will by writing a new treaty article with the point of his sword on the day after a victory. He renewed the order for removing to Paris the cardinals sitting in Rome, of whatever nation they were, the generals of orders, Dominicans, Barnabites, Servites, Carmelites, Capuchins, Theatins, &c., and the members of the Dataria and the Penitenza. He further ordered that the precious archives of the Roman court should be sent to Paris in one hundred waggons. The minister of public worship was sent to St. Denis to inspect the buildings, and have them fitted for the reception of a vast establishment. However, as the consciences of the faithful did not accommodate themselves so readily as Napoleon had anticipated to these innovations, and as the clergy, not venturing to resist openly, had recourse, as an indirect mode of exhaling its discontent, to extraordinary missions, which were flocked to by the royalists of the south and of Bretagne, he absolutely interdicted all missions both within and without the bounds of the empire. "For the service of religion at home," he said, "the ordinary clergy is sufficient. I presume enough upon its lights and its zeal to believe that it has no need of itinerant preachers to help out its deficiencies. As for foreign countries, I have no proselytising zeal. I am content with protecting religion in my own dominions. I have no ambition to propagate it in those of others." Cardinal Fesch having represented that such an interdiction would alarm the faithful more than all besides, Napoleon enjoined him to abstain from all reflections, and to set the first example of obedience, for a mere appearance of resistance would be more severely visited on him than on any one else.

Whilst Napoleon, mingling business with pleasure, the sage resolutions of a grand administration with the illusions of a blind policy, was reposing in the beautiful residence of Fontainebleau from the fatigues and perils of war, the arrival of the allied sovereigns in Paris called him thither to receive them. There were in the capital the King and Queen of Bavaria, the King of Saxony, the King of Wurtemberg, and the Kings and Queens of Holland, Westphalia, and Naples. Napoleon made his entry

into Paris on horseback on the 14th of November. He had not appeared there since his departure for the army on the 12th of April. The rejoicings for peace coinciding with an unexampled assembly of sovereigns, Paris enjoyed a brilliant autumn, which was much wanted after a spring and summer which had presented only loneliness and gloom.

But amidst these gaieties Napoleon was maturing the grand resolution which was to be so painful to his heart, so pleasing to his pride, and of so little service to his power—we mean the divorce, and the marriage by which it was to be followed. The scenes of jealousy which had grown worse in proportion as the unfortunate Josephine began to suspect that something more serious than an infidelity was concealed from her, irritated Napoleon, without giving him the courage to come to a rupture. He tried to do so by becoming colder, more reserved, and sterner. But this state of things was insupportable for him, and he was impatient to put an end to it. He sent off a courier to Milan with orders to Prince Eugène to come instantly to Paris, where he detained Queen Hortense, in order that Josephine might have her children about her at the trying moment. He sent for the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès and M. de Champagny, and communicated to them separately, and to them only, the resolution he had finally adopted, and to the fulfilment of which they were required severally to contribute. He conferred with Cambacérès about the form of the divorce. He told him that Josephine suspected what was coming, but that he awaited the arrival of Prince Eugène to avow all to her: until then he desired the most absolute secrecy, and he would finish the business immediately afterwards. He repeated his reasons for the divorce, and declared his intention to surround the act with forms the most affectionate and the most honourable for Josephine. He would have nothing that could resemble a repudiation; nothing but a mere dissolution of the conjugal tie, founded on mutual consent—a consent itself founded on the interests of the empire. It was arranged that after a family council, in which the two consorts should express their intentions to the arch-chancellor, a *senatus-consulte* passed in due form should declare the civil contract dissolved, and should secure a magnificent provision for Josephine. She was to have a palace in Paris, a princely residence in the country, an income of three millions of francs, and the first rank among the princesses after the future empress-regnant. He intended to keep her near him as his best and most affectionate friend.

In all these arrangements Napoleon forgot the spiritual tie, the dissolution of which was likewise necessary to the completion of the divorce. He did not seem to attach much importance to it, counting that the secret had been kept by Cardinal Fesch

and Josephine as to the religious consecration which had been given to their marriage on the eve of their coronation. But Cardinal Fesch had talked of it to Cambacérès, and the latter submitted to Napoleon that the foreign courts with which he thought of connecting himself might attach an importance to the religious question which he himself did not attribute to it; consequently that the spiritual tie ought to be dissolved as well as the civil. Napoleon was very angry with Cardinal Fesch. He said that the ceremony performed without witnesses in the chapel of the Tuileries was of no value, that it had taken place solely to quiet the Pope's conscience, and that to think of raising up such an obstacle against him at that moment was a perfidy on the part of his uncle the cardinal. It was settled, however, that as soon as there was no more need of secrecy, the arch-chancellor should get together some bishops, and find out some means of dissolving the spiritual union without having recourse to the Pope, from whom nothing was to be expected under existing circumstances.

The next question concerned the princess whom Napoleon would put in Josephine's vacated place on the throne of France, and on this point he made M. de Champagny his sole confidant. It was requisite that the new marriage should not only serve his policy as the founder of an empire by giving him an heir, but should also serve his foreign policy by consolidating his system of alliances. He might choose a consort either from among the lesser courts or the greater, as do the more powerful sovereigns. In taking their consorts from the great courts, they strengthen themselves by the good-will of the great States, but not for a long while, as experience proves, since great States are necessarily jealous of each other, and family alliances are but truces to their jealousies. In allying themselves with the smaller courts they attach to themselves more firmly the only ones that can be faithful to them, if their interest is fully satisfied, since they have no reason to be jealous. If Napoleon would take his new bride from a secondary court, his choice might naturally and honourably fall on the daughter of the King of Saxony, the German sovereign who was most attached to him, who owed him most, and deserved the most esteem. The princess was of mature age, of a good constitution, and irreproachable character. Everything was easy and sure in that union, though it had no brilliancy.

Among the great courts Napoleon could only choose between Russia and Austria. Nothing could be nobler, nothing nearer to what is called legitimacy, than an alliance with Austria; and that alliance was possible, for the representatives of the court of Vienna had insinuated in a hundred ways that that court would desire nothing better than to be united with Napoleon. But the ill-will between them was very recent! To embrace and marry

so soon after the battles of Essling and Wagram—would not this shock the good sense of both people? Besides (and this was the main consideration), it would be a renunciation of the Russian alliance, which had been the foundation of the policy of the empire since Tilsit. Napoleon had, during the last six months, many causes for coolness towards Alexander, especially in the last war, in which he had been so ill seconded by him; but he still regarded the Russian as his principal alliance, as that one which, even though it amounted to no more than neutrality, would yet enable him to keep the continent enthralled and England isolated. He wished, therefore, to preserve it, though he did not fail to tell the Emperor Alexander wherein he had reason to be satisfied with him or otherwise. A marriage connection with the court of Russia was naturally indicated by all that had gone before. At Erfurth Napoleon had brought the Emperor Alexander to talk to him about his possible union with a Russian princess, the Grand Duchess Anne. The czar had appeared quite disposed, as far as he was concerned, to consent to the marriage, and seemed only to foresee difficulties on the part of his mother, an estimable princess, but proud, and filled with the prejudices of the European aristocracy. She had married the Grand Duchess Catherine, a princess remarkable for beauty and mental endowments, and of an age quite fit for marriage, to a plain Duke of Oldenburg, in order to avoid a demand which she foresaw and disliked. It was therefore to be feared that she would hardly be disposed to bestow her second daughter on Napoleon, after having disposed thus of her eldest to avoid a marriage contrary to her own wishes. Alexander nevertheless had promised his good offices, and held out almost a certainty of success, without, however, pledging himself, because he was resolved not to do violence to his mother's inclinations. Therefore, as we stated in its place, the two parties had separated in perfect mutual satisfaction. After this it was impossible to think of any other union without breaking off the alliance, which Napoleon did not choose to do. He hoped, too, that such a marriage would restore to the Russian alliance all the warmth it had lost, and all the influence over Europe which he expected from it.

In consequence he ordered M. de Champagny to write in cipher, with his own hand, a despatch to St. Petersburg, which M. de Caulaincourt was himself to decipher, and which was to be kept secret from everybody, even from M. de Romanzoff, and to be communicated only to the Emperor Alexander in person. In that despatch, dated the 22nd of November, M. de Champagny said:—

“Mention of a divorce had reached the ears of the Emperor Alexander at Erfurth, who spoke of it to the emperor, and told him his sister the Princess Anne was at his disposal. His

majesty desires that you enter upon the question frankly and simply with the Emperor Alexander, and that you speak to him in these terms:—

“‘Sire, I have reason to think that the emperor, urged by all France, is disposed for a divorce. May I send him word that he may count on your sister? Will it please your majesty to think over the matter for two days, and give your answer frankly to me, not as the French ambassador, but as a person passionately devoted to both families. It is not a formal demand I present to you, but a disclosure of your intentions I solicit. I venture, sire, to take this step, because I am too much accustomed to say to your majesty what I think to fear that your majesty will ever compromise me.’

“You will not mention the matter to M. de Romanzoff on any pretext whatever; and when you shall have had this conversation with the Emperor Alexander, and that which is to follow it two days afterwards, you will forget entirely the communication I make to you. It will remain for you to make known to me the qualities of the young princess, and particularly the period at which she may be in a condition to become a mother; in the present calculations, a difference of six months is an object. I have no need to recommend to your excellency the most inviolable secrecy; you know what you owe in this respect to the emperor.”

This despatch having been sent off, and everything being prepared for the dissolution of the marriage with the Empress Josephine, and the formation of a new alliance with a Russian princess, Napoleon was impatiently waiting the arrival of Prince Eugène to disclose all to Josephine, when the terrible secret escaped, as it were, in spite of him. Every day the unfortunate empress becoming more sad, more agitated, and more importunate in her complaints, Napoleon lost patience, and cut short her reproaches, telling her that after all he must think of other ties than those which united them, that the welfare of the empire demanded a great resolution on their part, that he counted on her courage and her devotedness to consent to a divorce, to which he himself had the greatest difficulty in making up his mind. No sooner had he uttered these terrible words than Josephine burst into tears and fell fainting. Napoleon immediately called M. de Beausset, the chamberlain on service, bid him help him to raise the empress, who was labouring under violent convulsions, and they both carried her in their arms to her apartments. Queen Hortense was sent for, and found the emperor distressed and angry at the obstacles opposed to his designs. He told the young queen bluntly and almost sternly that his determination was fixed, and neither tears nor cries could change a resolution which was become inevitable, and

necessary to the welfare of the empire. He put on a stern demeanour, as if to stop the tears before which he felt his courage ready to give way. Queen Hortense, whose pride suffered at that moment both on her own account and her mother's, hastened to assure the emperor that as for tears and cries he should have none to complain of; the empress would not fail to submit to his desires, and descend from the throne as she had ascended it in obedience to his will; whilst her children, content to renounce grandeurs which had not made them happy, would gladly go and devote their lives to comforting the best and fondest of mothers. The unfortunate wife of King Louis had many reasons to speak thus. But as Napoleon listened to her, the real emotion he felt at the bottom of his heart broke through the show of harshness he affected, and he began himself to weep, and to express to his adopted daughter all the grief he felt, all the violence he was obliged to do to his own nature to pursue the course he had adopted, and all the cogency of the motives that had determined him to act thus. He entreated her not to quit him, but stay by him with Prince Eugène to help him to console their mother, and render her calm, resigned, happy even whilst becoming a friend instead of a wife. Napoleon then recounted all he intended to do for her, so as to disguise as much as possible the change which her situation was to undergo. Palaces, châteaux, a magnificent income, the first rank at court after that of the empress-regnant—all this, little as it was in lieu of a throne, was something, nevertheless, for a person of Josephine's light and frivolous mind. Queen Hortense, who tenderly loved her mother, tried what she could to console, or at least assuage her sorrow, and many were the tears they wept together. Josephine, however, was calmer on the following days. She expected her son; until his arrival, so long as no formal act had intervened between her and her consort, she still hoped; and indeed, Napoleon's kindness towards her, now that the terrible secret was revealed, was such as almost to confirm her fond illusions.

Meanwhile, Josephine's lamentations being heard by the servants of the palace, the tale soon spread through the Tuileries, and thence through Paris. The Bonaparte family, too, always jealous of the Beauharnais, could not conceal their joy, the involuntary ebullitions of which would alone have been enough to reveal all. Already an ungrateful court forgot the dethroned empress, and busied itself in curious conjectures about the future empress, whom it sought on all the thrones of Europe. Napoleon anxiously awaited the arrival of Prince Eugène to put an end to this painful state of things.

That excellent prince arrived in Paris on the 9th of December. His sister threw herself into his arms, and acquainted him with

their mother's sad lot. Until then he had been in a state of uncertainty, and instead of foreseeing a misfortune, he had inclined to the opinion of his wife, the Princess Augusta, who told him he was perhaps sent for to be declared heir to the empire. His successes in the last war had conduced to this short-lived illusion. But he was a prince of moderate desires, and on learning the truth, he was grieved most on his wife's account, for it was evident that if Napoleon had a son to succeed him, he would not diminish the inheritance of that son by detaching from it the kingdom of Italy. He had therefore to renounce not only the throne of France, to which he had never aspired, but also that of Italy, which, from long possession, he had come to look on as his destined patrimony. He waited, however, on the emperor, resigned to everything, and grieving for those who were near and dear to him much more than for himself. Napoleon, who loved him, pressed him in his arms, explained his motives, showed him the impossibility of leaving him, Beauharnais, to reign over the refractory Bonapartes, and unfolded to him the plans he had formed for preserving to the Beauharnais an existence in accordance with the few years of greatness they had enjoyed. He then led Josephine's two children to their mother. The interview was long and painful. "Our mother must go away," said Eugène, as the Queen of Holland had said already; "and we must go with her, that we may all three expiate in retirement an ephemeral greatness which has troubled rather than embellished our existence." Napoleon, intensely affected, and shedding tears like them, told them that, on the contrary, they must stay with him, with their mother, in all the lustre of the position in which he wished to maintain them, in order to manifest that Josephine was neither repudiated nor disgraced, but sacrificed to a necessity of State, and recompensed for her noble self-sacrifice by the grandeur of her children, and the tender friendship of him who had been her consort. After many exaggerations—for exaggerations assuage sorrow just as tears do—some degree of tranquillity succeeded these violent agitations; but they left on Napoleon's noble countenance deep traces, which greatly struck those who thought him capable of conceiving in his imperious soul only strong volitions, but no tender affection. The sacrifice having been made, it was now to be rendered irrevocable. The 15th of December was the day chosen for dissolving the civil contract according to the formalities arranged with the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès.

On the evening of the 15th of December the whole imperial family assembled in the emperor's cabinet in the Tuileries. There were present the empress-mother, the King and Queen of Holland, the King and Queen of Naples, the King and Queen

of Westphalia, the Princess Borghese, the Chancellor Cambacérès, and Count Regnaud de Saint Jean d'Angely, the two latter as *officiers de l'état civil* for the imperial family. Napoleon, standing up, holding Josephine by the hand, who was in tears, and himself having tears in his eyes, read the following speech:—

“My cousin prince arch-chancellor, I sent you a closed letter of this day's date, ordering you to present yourself in my cabinet, that I might make known to you the resolution which I and the empress, my very dear spouse, have come to. I was very glad that the kings, queens, and princesses, my brothers and sisters, brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, my step-daughter and my step-son, become my adopted son, should be present at what I had to make known to you.

“The policy of my monarchy, the interest and the necessity of my peoples, which have constantly guided all my actions, require that I should leave after me to children, inheritors of my love for my peoples, this throne on which Providence has placed me. For many years, however, I have lost the hope of having children by my marriage with my well-beloved spouse the Empress Josephine; this it is that induces me to sacrifice the dearest affections of my heart, to hearken only to the good of the State, and desire the dissolution of our marriage.

“Arrived at the age of forty, I may conceive the hope of living long enough to bring up, after my own mind and my own views, the children it shall please Providence to give me. God knows how much such a resolution has cost my heart; but there is no sacrifice too great for my courage, when it is demonstrated to me that it is for the good of France.

“I cannot conclude without saying, that far from having ever had reason to complain, I have, on the contrary, only encomiums to bestow on the attachment and tenderness of my well-beloved spouse. She has embellished fifteen years of my life; the memory of this will always remain engraved on my heart. She has been crowned by my hand: it is my desire that she retain the rank and title of empress, but, above all, that she never doubt my sentiments, and that she always hold me for her best and dearest friend.”

Napoleon having ended, Josephine, holding a paper in her hands, tried to read. But her voice was choked with sobs, and she handed the paper to M. Regnaud, who read as follows:—

“With the permission of my august and dear spouse, I must declare, that retaining no hope of having children who may satisfy the requirements of his policy and the interests of France, I have pleasure in giving him the greatest proof of attachment and devotedness that was ever given on earth. I owe all to his bounty; it was his hand that crowned me, and on this

throne I have received only manifestations of affection and love from the French people.

“I think to evince my gratitude for all these sentiments, in consenting to the dissolution of a marriage which is now an obstacle to the good of France, which deprives it of the happiness of being one day governed by the descendants of a great man, so evidently raised up by Providence to efface the evils of a terrible revolution, and to re-establish the altar, the throne, and social order. But the dissolution of my marriage will make no change in the sentiments of my heart: in me the emperor will always have his best friend. I know how much this act, commanded by policy and by such great interests, has rent his heart; but we both of us glory in the sacrifice which we make to the good of the country.”

After these words, the noblest ever uttered under such circumstances, for never, it must be owned, did vulgar passions less prevail in an act of this kind, the arch-chancellor drew up a minute of this twofold declaration, and Napoleon, embracing Josephine, led her to her own apartments, where he left her almost fainting in the arms of her children. He repaired immediately to the council-hall, where, conformably with the constitution of the empire, a private council had met to draw up the *senatus-consulte* declaratory of the dissolution of the marriage between Napoleon and Josephine, which was to be taken to the Senate on the following day.

That great body assembled by the emperor's orders to receive the declaration of the two august spouses, and act thereupon. The sitting began with the reception of Prince Eugène as senator. He had been nominated at the time of his departure for Italy, and had not yet taken his seat. He delivered some becoming and simple words, which had been prepared for him, on the occasion of the new *senatus-consulte*.

“My mother, my sister, and myself,” he said, “owe everything to the emperor. He has been truly a father to us; he will find in us at all times devoted children and obedient subjects.

“It is important to the happiness of France that the founder of this fourth dynasty should grow old surrounded by a direct lineage, which shall be a guarantee to us all, as the pledge of our country's glory.

“When my mother was crowned before the whole nation by the hands of her august spouse, she contracted the obligation to sacrifice all her affections to the interests of France. She has with courage, nobleness, and dignity fulfilled this first of duties. Her soul has often been affected at witnessing the painful conflicts endured by the heart of a man accustomed to master fortune, and always to march with a firm step to the

accomplishment of his great designs. The tears which this resolution has cost the emperor sufficiently proclaim my mother's glory. In the situation in which she is about to be placed, she will not be a stranger in her wishes and her feelings to the new prosperities that await us ; and it will be with mingled pride and satisfaction she will behold all the happiness that her sacrifices shall have produced for her country and her emperor."

The *senatus-consulte* was passed in the same sitting. It pronounced the dissolution of the marriage contracted between the Emperor Napoleon and the Empress Josephine, maintained the latter in her rank as crowned empress, assigned her an income of two million francs, and rendered obligatory on Napoleon's successors the appointments he should make in her favour on the Civil List. These appointments were the gift of an annual pension of one million payable by the Civil List, independently of the two millions payable by the State treasury, and the absolute property of the châteaux of Navarre and Malmaison.

On the following day, December 17, all the documents were inserted in the *Moniteur*, and the dissolution of the marriage was known by the public. Josephine was pitied, for she was liked for her goodness, and even for her defects, which were in conformity with the national character. But the sympathy she excited was soon absorbed in curiosity to know who was to be her successor. Opinion was divided between a Russian and an Austrian princess, but generally inclined to the former rather than to the latter. As for the unfortunate Josephine, she retired to Malmaison, where her children stayed with her, and tried, with but little success, to comfort her. Napoleon went to see her the day after her arrival, and continued to visit her on the subsequent days. He thought he ought to invest himself in a kind of mourning, and quitting the illustrious guests who had come to his court, he retired to Trainon, to hunt, attend to business, and wait the result of the negotiations he had begun. Fresh despatches were sent to St. Petersburg on the 17th (the day the *senatus-consulte* appeared in the *Moniteur*), pressing the court of Russia for an immediate reply, Yes or No. They stated that all the conditions would be accepted, even those relating to religion—that the only point on which there could be any difficulty was the age and health of the princess, for before all things an heir was wanted. If, however, her age and state of health were such as gave promise of children, and if her family consented to the proposed union, the reply must arrive without any delay, and the desired alliance must be celebrated immediately, as France could not be kept longer in uncertainty.

The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès had been instructed to procure the dissolution of the spiritual tie, in order to remove the scruples of the Catholic courts if a princess of that religion

were to be chosen. With regard to the spiritual as well as the civil tie, the annulling of the marriage on the grounds of informality or of great public interest was preferred to an ordinary divorce, as more honourable to Josephine, and more conformable to the prevailing religious ideas. It was also resolved to do without the Pope's intervention. The arch-chancellor, who was very expert in these matters, and generally in all those which required knowledge, prudence, and a great fertility in expedients, assembled a commission of seven bishops, to whom he submitted the case in question. These were the Bishop of Montefiascone (Cardinal Maury), the Bishop of Parma, the Archbishop of Tours, and the Bishops of Vercell, Evreux, Trèves, and Nantes. These learned men, after a searching investigation, concluded that whereas for the dissolution of a regular marriage, in consideration of a great interest of State, the only competent authority was the Pope, the authority of the diocesan was sufficient to annul an irregular marriage like that in question. Now, the occult ceremony which had been celebrated in the chapel of the Tuileries without witnesses,* and without sufficient consent of the contracting parties, could not, whatever Cardinal Fesch might say, constitute a regular marriage. Its annulment on the ground of informality was therefore to be sued out before the diocesan court in the first instance, and before the metropolitan authority in the second.

In consequence of this opinion, canonical proceedings were instituted without noise at the instance of the arch-chancellor, representing the imperial family, to obtain the annulment of the religious marriage between the Emperor Napoleon and the Empress Josephine. Cardinal Fesch, and MM. de Talleyrand, Berthier, and Duroc, were heard as witnesses, the first-named as to the forms observed, the three others as to the nature of the consent given by the parties. Cardinal Fesch declared that he had delivered to him by the Pope dispensations for the non-observance of certain forms in the accomplishment of his functions as grand almoner, which, in his opinion, justified the absence of witness and of curé. As to the title, he affirmed its existence, and thus rendered useless the precaution which had been taken to withdraw from Josephine's hands the certificate of marriage which had been delivered to her by Cardinal Fesch, and which her children had with much difficulty obtained from her. MM. de Talleyrand, Berthier, and Duroc affirmed that Napoleon had repeatedly told them he had consented only to a mere ceremony in order to reassure Josephine's conscience and

* It was on the erroneous authority of a contemporaneous manuscript memoir that I stated in Vol. III. that MM. de Talleyrand and Berthier were present as witnesses at the religious ceremony of marriage secretly performed in the Tuileries on the eve of the coronation.

the Pope's, but that his formal intention at all times had been not to complete his union with the empress, being, unhappily, certain he should soon be obliged to renounce her for the interests of his empire. These witnesses related certain details which left no doubt on the matter.

The conclusion come to by the ecclesiastical authority was that there had not been sufficient consent; but from respect for the parties, it would not dwell specially on that ground of nullity, but upon others quite as important, derived from the fact that there had been no witnesses, and no *proper priest*, that is to say, no parish clergyman (the only minister accredited by the Catholic religion to give authenticity to a marriage). It declared that the dispensation granted to Cardinal Fesch in a general manner as grand almoner could not have conferred on him the curial functions, and consequently the marriage was null, through defect of the most essential forms. The marriage was therefore broken before both the diocesan and the metropolitan jurisdictions, with suitable decency and the full observance of the canon law.

Napoleon was then free, without having had recourse to what has dishonoured in history the reputations of princesses, without having had recourse to the form of divorce, which is scarcely conformable to our habits, and with all the delicacy due to the unfortunate spouse who had so long shared and embellished his life, as he himself said. He now awaited with impatience the reply from St. Petersburg.

The communication with which he had commissioned M. de Caulaincourt was delicate and difficult, and though the great favour he enjoyed with the Emperor Alexander afforded him great facilities, yet the circumstances were not happily chosen for success. The last war had greatly deteriorated the alliance between the two courts. In the first place, although things had proceeded somewhat better this year in Finland, though a revolution we will speak of by-and-by had overturned the throne of Sweden, and brought about peace and the cession of Finland to Russia, the events in the east were less favourable to Russian ambition; and since the Emperor Alexander had been allowed entire freedom with regard to Turkey, he had scarcely made any progress on the Danube, so that Moldavia and Wallachia, though conceded by Napoleon, had not yet been won from the Turks. They were therefore not quite so well pleased at St. Petersburg with the French alliance, though they had only themselves to complain of, and not that alliance, which had granted them everything. Secondly, Napoleon, being dissatisfied with the little aid he had received from his ally, had treated him with some negligence during the campaign, had not written to him until it was ended, and had with marked haughtiness,

but without complaining of it, pointed out the inefficacy of the Russian aid. Alexander, being obliged to confess either the insufficiency of his government, or his own want of goodwill, and much preferring the former alternative, had suffered severely from mortified vanity. "What would they have had me do?" he often said. "My affairs in Finland and Turkey have not gone better than those of the Emperor Napoleon in Poland. Could I do for him what I have not done for myself?" And he alleged in excuse for the smallness of the services he had rendered Napoleon, the disturbances, the seasons, and the inferiority of the Russian administration as compared with the French. But what had most of all displeased him was the terms of the treaty of peace concluded with Austria, and the aggrandisement of nearly two millions of subjects granted to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. To him, and still more to others in St. Petersburg, this had appeared a certain presage of the speedy re-establishment of Poland, and for a fortnight the court of Russia rang with invectives against France, so that M. de Caulaincourt durst hardly show himself. The gift to Russia of a lot of 400,000 subjects had seemed but a lure intended to cover the re-establishment of Poland, which the opponents even said was completely realised by the junction of Galicia with the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Alexander had never ceased complaining since the last treaty of Vienna, and asking for guarantees against the future evils which those about him predicted.

He had received from Napoleon a very reassuring letter, which he communicated to the chief personages of the court of Russia, but the declarations it contained being, as they said, mere words, he had been obliged to ask for something official. His wish was complied with, and M. de Caulaincourt, at his urgent request, was authorised in a general way to sign a convention relative to Poland. He let himself be drawn into signing one which subsequently proved a most embarrassing tie upon Napoleon. In that convention it was stated that the kingdom of Poland should never be re-established; that the names of Poland and Pole should disappear in all acts, and be no more employed thenceforth; that the Grand Duchy should not be enlarged at any future time by the addition of any part of the old Polish provinces; that the Polish orders of knighthood should be abolished; and lastly, that all these engagements should be binding on the King of Saxony, as Grand Duke of Warsaw, no less than upon Napoleon himself.* This strange convention, which put Napoleon in such a singular position with regard to the Poles, was wrung from M. de

* These very important facts have never been known. We relate them from M. de Caulaincourt's authentic correspondence with Napoleon.

Caulaincourt by the importunities of the Emperor Alexander, who seemed resolved on breaking the alliance if it was not ratified.

It was in this situation, shortly before the final arrangement of the above-mentioned convention, and whilst its conditions were still under discussion, that the demand supervened which M. de Caulaincourt was commissioned to make to the court of Russia. Having received the first despatch from Paris on the 8th or 9th of December, he could not immediately see the Emperor Alexander, who was absent from St. Petersburg; but he had an audience of him on his return. The Emperor Alexander, though rather surprised, did not deny the sort of engagement he had entered into at Erfurth, namely, to use his influence with his mother to obtain the hand of the Archduchess Anne. He expressed his desire and even his strong hope of succeeding, but he required time, and to be free to set about the matter in his own way. Whether he was sincere in the great deference he affected for his mother, or that it was a way of providing himself with excuses if necessary, he said he would not speak in the name of the Emperor Napoleon, but in his own; that he would not represent the demand as actually made, but as possible—probable, even; and that he would try to obtain his mother's consent by alleging his own political interests rather than the wishes of the Emperor of the French. With a profusion of polite messages for Napoleon he postponed his answer, promising to give it as speedily as possible.

That the Emperor Alexander, who loved his mother and was loved by her, though a certain jealousy on the score of authority subsisted between them, should make a mystery towards her of a matter so important to the imperial family, was not very likely. Probably he wished that in case the family alliance with Napoleon should not be found suitable, the self-love of the two courts should be less implicated in the matter, his mother being supposed to have given a refusal to the Emperor Alexander, and not to the Emperor Napoleon, who would not have figured in the negotiation. It is probable, above all, that he wished to retain a greater degree of freedom, so that he might put a higher price on his consent, and that price was the convention as to Poland.

M. de Caulaincourt wrote to Paris on the 28th of December that his overtures had been most favourably received; that he had every hope of success; but that there would be requisite a vast amount of finessing and a little patience. Pressed by M. de Champagny's despatches, which followed each other without interruption, he availed himself of the latitude allowed him, and acquainted the court of Russia that all the conditions

would be accepted, including even those relating to the difference of religion. He again saw the emperor, who appeared satisfied with the result of his first overtures, spoke of his mother's consent as almost certain, whilst that of his sister, the Grand Duchess Catherine, was already obtained, and would be soon followed by the general and official consent of the whole imperial family. Nevertheless Alexander still demanded some days before he gave his final answer. It was evident he would consent at last, since he spoke of his mother and sister, the only persons about whom there was any difficulty, as acquiescent; it was evident that he would not venture to offer on his own account a refusal, which, by hurting the sensitive pride of Napoleon, would bring about a rupture of the alliance, a total change of policy, the loss of his dearest hopes with regard to the east, and an alarming alliance of France with Austria. The aristocratic objections that might be entertained to an alliance with a new dynasty, greatly attenuated, indeed, by the incomparable glory of Napoleon, were certainly not worth the sacrifice of the empire's best interests. There was no doubt, then, as to the ultimate consent; but the convention relative to Poland was the manifest motive which still made Alexander hang back. The terms of that convention had, after difficulties of all kinds, been at last agreed on, but until it was ratified he would not pledge himself to the marriage; he wanted first to have in hand the price he bargained for, namely, the convention which should relieve him from the danger of seeing a new kingdom of Poland erected upon his frontiers. At first he had asked for ten days, then he asked for ten days more, and promised that his answer should be forthcoming in the latter half of January. The first overture dated from the middle of December.

Napoleon, who had written on the 22nd of November, and counted on a reply by the end of December or the beginning of January (the couriers then took twelve or fourteen days to go from Paris to St. Petersburg), was very impatient to know the issue, and already somewhat offended at the delays he encountered. He regarded himself as superior to all the sovereigns of his time, not only in genius (about this there was no question), but by reason of the position that genius had won for him. He thought that his hand ought to be accepted as soon as he consented to offer it, and these affectations of difficulty about an old princess, who in reality depended on Alexander, put him in no good humour. What particularly disposed him to take amiss the real or pretended hesitation of Russia was the eagerness manifested by the other courts with which he might ally himself.

The house of Saxony, of course, desired nothing better. The

old King of Saxony seemed actuated rather by personal regard than by political motives in consenting to give him his daughter, a princess of somewhat advanced years, but whose constitution gave promise of a healthy progeny. Her father had, indeed, conceived a real attachment for Napoleon.

The demonstrations on the part of Austria were not less favourable. Prince Schwarzenberg, who had quitted the embassy to St. Petersburg for that to Paris, had just arrived in France, and felt it an annoyance to represent there a beaten court, and one which would be still more so if the alliance of France with Russia became closer. It was that alliance which had frustrated the last levy of bucklers on the part of Austria; the continuance of that alliance would keep it in a state of complete nullity, if it did no worse. A marriage with France, though it should replace Austria in a very strong position, would at least put an end to the alliance between France and Russia, would secure the peace which was so much needed, and would dissipate the fears, whether well or ill founded, with which the event at Bayonne had inspired all the old dynasties. Hence all the Austrian negotiators, both civil and military, had thrown out hints on this respect which had not been accepted by Napoleon, who was then full of the idea of a Russian marriage, but which had dwelt in his memory. M. de Metternich, now prime minister in the place of M. de Stadion, having been familiar at Paris with the princes and princesses of recent origin, and entertaining against them none of the prejudices of the old courts, would naturally have desired to inaugurate his ministry with a marriage of such great political consequence, and Prince Schwarzenberg, knowing the prime minister's dispositions, was as desirous as he of substituting Austria for Russia. But on arriving in Paris he had the mortification of seeing Prince Kourakin caressed and flattered as the representative of the court with which the marriage was about to be contracted, and his own situation, which was unpleasant enough in consequence of the late war, made still more so in consequence of the approaching union. The Austrian ambassador's feelings became known through M. de Floret, the secretary of legation, who talked of them to M. de Semonville, and the latter, who busied himself as much as he could about everything, repeated to M. Maret what he had learned from M. de Floret. There was, besides, a Frenchman very intimate with M. de Schwarzenberg; this was M. de Laborde, son of the celebrated banker of the 18th century, established in Austria during the Revolution, and recently returned to France. M. de Laborde was very well known to M. de Champagny, who employed him to ascertain the exact disposition of Austria in this matter. Prince Schwarzenberg imparted to M. de Laborde his uneasiness, and his

dislike of the post he occupied at Paris, which was becoming most disagreeable, especially as the marriage with a Russian princess was to all appearance a settled thing. M. de Laborde reported all this to M. de Champagny, who authorised him to insinuate that Napoleon's choice was by no means irrevocably fixed, that what was said in public was stated very much at random, and that it was not impossible the emperor's policy would soon bring him back towards an Austrian alliance. These words repeated, without official character, but with much address, as rumours gathered from good authority, gave great satisfaction to Prince Schwarzenberg, who immediately wrote to Vienna to know what he was to do, should a demand in marriage be addressed to him.

During the negotiations with the court of St. Petersburg, and the secret communications with the court of Vienna, the belief in a Russian marriage was general in Paris, but the public desire was much divided between a Russian and an Austrian princess. Most of those about Napoleon formed their opinion in accordance with their own position, their past history, and their interests, some few in accordance with their disinterested forethought. All those who had any affinity with the *ancien régime*, like M. de Talleyrand, for instance, and who saw in an Austrian marriage another backward step, were for a daughter of the Emperor Francis. M. de Talleyrand, moreover, had an invariable leaning for Austria against the powers of the north, and he had connections with that court which had often been suspiciously regarded by Napoleon. M. Maret, whom M. de Talleyrand treated with extreme disdain, was this time in accord with him, and their language was the same. M. Maret had no other reason for this than that he had been the recipient, through MM. de Semonville and Floret, of the first confidential communications made on the part of Austria. In the imperial family the whole Beauharnais section inclined to Austria, and on a question which ought never to have elicited any opinion on their part they hastened to have one, and to express it with strange vivacity. Their real motive was the desire of a lasting peace in Italy and Bavaria, which was a matter of great interest to Prince Eugène and his father-in-law. Though the former was not destined to reign in Italy if Napoleon had a direct heir, he would have to govern that kingdom as viceroy during Napoleon's life, some twenty or thirty years, as he calculated, and he wished that there should be no danger of seeing the Austrians at Verona as in the late war. Josephine, who indemnified herself for her fall by her zeal in serving the interests of her children, made the most unseemly overtures on this subject to Madame de Metternich, who had not quitted Paris.

On the contrary, all who leaned to the Revolution, all who

disliked the *ancien régime*, all who feared a too complete return to the past, all likewise who had some military and political forethought, wished for a marriage with Russia. The Murat family, swayed by the Queen of Naples, feared that an Austrian princess would introduce into the imperial court a pride of birth injurious to the princes and princesses of the Bonaparte family, who had not, like Napoleon, their personal glory to uplift them. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, who, from inclination and good sense, had remained attached to what was fundamental on the Revolution of 1789, fearing always Napoleon's ambitious propensities and the weaknesses concealed beneath his greatness, shared the dislike of the Bonapartes for an Austrian marriage, which was a sort of alliance with the old *régime*. Moreover, his peculiar tact in apprehending the spirit of the country made him forebode no advantage for Napoleon in resembling in any respect Louis XVI., and his political sagacity enabled him to foresee that of the two powers that one whose alliance was rejected would soon become an enemy. If it was Austria, there would be nothing new or very formidable in this; if it was Russia, the matter would be more serious, for though the way to Vienna had been found twice, that to St. Petersburg had not been found yet. But strange to say, it already needed some courage to counsel Napoleon in favour of the Russian marriage, so much did a secret instinct tell every one that a marriage with an Austrian archduchess was the one which would most flatter the self-love of an emperor who was not legitimate (according to the language of those he wished to resemble), and who desired to become so otherwise than by glory.

While these contradictory opinions prevailed around Napoleon, he himself remained in a state of uncertainty, which induced him to summon a privy council in the Tuileries, that he might hear what everybody had to say, desiring almost, he who was usually so resolute, to find in the opinions of others reasons for determining his own.

The council was suddenly convoked on Sunday, the 21st of January, immediately after mass. There were present the grand dignitaries of the empire, the minister of foreign affairs, Maret, the secretary of state, who acted as secretary of the council, and the presidents of the Senate and the Legislature, MM. Garnier and de Fontanes. Napoleon, grave, impassible, seated in the imperial chair, had on his right the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, King Murat, and Prince Berthier; on his left, the Arch-Treasurer Lebrun, Prince Eugène, MM. de Talleyrand, Garnier, and de Fontanes; M. Maret, closing the circle, was seated at the end of the council-chamber, opposite the emperor.

"I have assembled you," said Napoleon, "to have your advice upon the greatest interest of State, upon the choice of the spouse

who is to give heirs to the empire. Listen to the report of M. de Champagny, after which you will please to give me each of you your opinion." M. de Champagny presented an elaborate report on the three alliances between which the choice lay—the Russian, the Saxon, and the Austrian. He affirmed that the three were equally possible, the three courts being equally well disposed (an assertion somewhat exaggerated as regarded Russia, but near enough to the truth to be presented to the council). He then compared the personal advantages of the three princesses. The Saxon princess was a model of all virtues, somewhat advanced in age, but of a fine constitution. The Austrian princess was eighteen years old, of an excellent constitution, an education worthy of her rank, and gentle and engaging disposition. The Russian princess was rather young, about fifteen, endowed, it was said, with qualities desirable in a sovereign, but of a religion not that of France, a circumstance which would occasion some trouble, particularly that of having a Greek chapel in the Tuileries. As for political advantages, M. de Champagny spoke without ambiguity. He saw none, he pointed out none, except in the alliance with the court of Austria. On this subject he spoke like an ex-ambassador of France to Vienna.

After the report there was a long silence, no one venturing to speak first, but each waiting a call from Napoleon to open his lips. Napoleon then resolved to take the sense of the council, beginning on the left, the side where lay the less weighty opinions, though M. de Talleyrand sat there. The Arch-Treasurer Lebrun, an old royalist, who had remained such at the imperial court, though very much devoted to the empire, roused himself from a sort of dosing state that was habitual to him, to express an opinion that was not wanting in sense. "I am for the Saxon princess," he said; "that princess does not implicate us in anybody's policy, does not embroil us with anybody, and comes, moreover, of a good stock." The arch-treasurer said no more. Prince Eugène, speaking next after Prince Lebrun, stated in simple and modest terms the reasons alleged by the partisans of the Austrian policy; and these were repeated with more force, though with sententious brevity, by M. de Talleyrand, who next to the arch-chancellor was the most competent judge in such matters. He said that the time for securing the stability of the empire was come; that the policy which inclined to Austria had more than any other that advantage of stability; that alliances with the northern courts had a character of ambitious and changeful policy; what was wanted was an alliance which would make it possible to contend against England, and the alliance of 1756 was there to show that it was only in an intimate union with Austria that the continental security had been found which was necessary to a great display

of naval force; and lastly, that the head of a new empire, wedded to an archduchess of Austria, would have no need to envy in any respect the honours of the Bourbons. The lordly diplomatist spoke in a tone and style such as the French noblesse might have used had they to deliver an opinion on the marriage of Napoleon. The senator Garnier gave his voice for that middle term, which compromised no interest, the Saxon alliance. M. de Fontanes inveighed with literary warmth, and even with a sort of royalist bitterness, against northern alliances. He spoke as they used to speak at Versailles when Frederick the Great and Catherine the Great were seated on the thrones of the north.

Contrary to usage, M. Maret, a mere secretary, whose business was to hear and record the opinions of others, was allowed to give his own, which, however, was not regarded as of much importance by the council. He voted for the Austrian princess. On passing to his right, Napoleon encountered different sentiments. He heard, indeed, M. de Champagny repeat what he had said in his report, and Prince Berthier, who liked Austria, declare in its favour, so that there was a strong majority for the archduchess. But Murat and Cambacérès remained to be consulted. Murat was extremely animated, and expressed in that council of the *grande*s of the empire all the old revolutionary sentiments that remained in the army. He maintained that this marriage with an Austrian princess could only awaken inauspicious recollections of Marie Antoinette and Louis XVI., recollections which were far from being effaced, far from being agreeable to the nation; that the imperial family owed everything to the glory and power of its head; that it needed not to borrow anything from foreign alliances, and its approximation to the *ancien régime* would alienate many hearts that were attached to the empire without winning the hearts of the French noblesse. He inveighed against the partisans of the family alliance with Austria, affirming that such a scheme could not have been devised by the devoted friends of the emperor. As he spoke, it seemed as though the Bonapartes stood behind him inciting him against the Beauharnais, and M. Fouché against M. de Talleyrand. After the fire of the King of Naples came the cool prudence of the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, expressing itself in simple, clear, moderate, but positive language. He said the first thing to be considered was the procuring of heirs for the empire, and it behoved to know was the Russian princess capable of bearing them; if she was, the course was obvious. As for what regarded religion, the court of Russia would certainly allow itself to be prevailed upon to forego conditions that might give offence to France; and as for policy, a doubt was inconceivable. Austria, deprived in

this century of the Netherlands, Swabia, Italy, Illyria, and lastly, of the imperial crown, would be an enemy for ever irreconcilable; her natural inclinations, too, rendered her incompatible with a new monarchy, whilst Russia, on the contrary, had in that respect fewer prejudices than any other court (which was true then). She had in her territory and her remoteness reasons of all kinds for being the ally of France, and none for being her enemy. If rejected, she would not fail to become hostile; a war with her would be infinitely more hazardous than with Austria, and to neglect her would be to abandon a possible and facile alliance for a false and impossible alliance. He concluded then, in a most formal manner, in favour of the marriage with the Russian princess.

These two opinions, the last especially, proceeding from the gravest man of his time, strongly counterpoised those in favour of the Austrian alliance. But as it was only a consultation Napoleon had required, the matter was not put to the vote. He himself, remaining calm and impenetrable, nothing in his countenance allowing it to be guessed which way he inclined, thanked the members of the council for their excellent advice. "I will weigh your arguments," he said, "in my mind. I am convinced that whatever difference there may be between your views, the opinion of each of you has been determined by an enlightened zeal for the interests of the State, and by a faithful attachment to my person."

The council was immediately dismissed, and in spite of the reserve which Napoleon imposed on all those about him, without, however, always observing it himself, all the opinions uttered in the council were eagerly canvassed in the palace. The Murat family even believed for a while that the cause of the Russian alliance was won, and said so to Prince Cambacérès with great signs of joy. But the decision of the question was to depend much more on events than on the personal opinion of Napoleon.

A courier from Russia was impatiently looked for. Then, on the 6th of February, came despatches from M. de Caulaincourt, calculated to prolong the uncertainty that had existed for six weeks. The last delay of ten days asked for by the Emperor Alexander expired on the 17th of January, and on the 21st he had not replied. Evidently he wanted to gain time, and obtain the ratification of the treaty relative to Poland, before he pledged himself irrevocably. He had repeated to M. de Caulaincourt that the empress-mother did not refuse her consent, that the Grand Duchess Catherine likewise gave hers, and that things would go as Napoleon wished, but that he still required a little time before he gave his final answer. A more serious matter was the health of the young princess, which did not quite correspond to the impatient desire of an heir to the empire, and

also the obstinacy of the empress-mother in insisting upon a chapel with Greek priests in the Tuileries. M. de Caulaincourt further stated that he expected a formal answer in a short while, and he doubted not it would be favourable. Napoleon's impetuous character could not accommodate itself to such a state of uncertainty. Whether the delay arose from a repugnance to a union with him, or from a wish to gain time in order to wrest from him a treaty, both irksome at present and imprudent with regard to the future, in either case it was disgusting to him. It was, moreover, supremely disagreeable to him to remain longer the common subject of gossip, like one of those rich heirs whom everybody provides with a wife. He therefore gave way to one of those impulses which he could not control, and which ended by deciding his destiny; he resolved to break with Russia, and to take the dilatory behaviour of that court for a refusal, which disengaged him with regard to it. He had not been insensible, moreover, to the arguments advanced in favour of Austria and against Russia, to the inconvenience of having a wife who would, perhaps, make him wait two or three years for children, who would not be present at the ceremonies of the national religion, and who would have her own priests—a secondary consideration, but irksome among a nation like the French, which, without being devout, exhibits all the punctiliousness of the most lively devotion. He had conceived, too, a better opinion of the Austrian army since the last campaign, and considered it as serious a matter to have to do with it as with the Russian army. These reasons being backed by the most powerful of all, offended pride, he made up his mind at once with the incredible promptitude which formed the distinctive trait of his character. After having read M. de Caulaincourt's despatches, he sent for M. de Champagny and ordered him to write to St. Petersburg, and declare that very day to M. de Kourakin that the delay to reply to him released him not from an engagement (there had not been any at Erfurth), but from the preference he had thought due to the sister of a monarch, his ally and his friend; that to wait longer was impossible in the state of anxiety prevailing among the French; and that, moreover, the information conveyed to him regarding the health of the young princess did not correspond with the motive which had made him dissolve his old marriage to contract a new one. For these reasons he decided for the Austrian princess, whose family, far from hesitating, met him spontaneously with an alacrity to which he could not be insensible.

As to the convention relative to Poland, he explained himself still more energetically, and in a manner which showed more plainly how much the choice he had just made was influenced by the desire to escape from the importunate demands addressed

him. "To enter," he said, "into an absolute and general engagement that the kingdom of Poland shall never be re-established, were an imprudent and undignified act on my part. If the Poles, taking advantage of favourable circumstances, should rise up of themselves alone, and hold Russia in check, must I then employ my forces against them? If they found allies, must I employ all my forces to combat those allies? This would be asking of me a thing impossible, dishonouring, and, moreover, independent of my will. I can say that no co-operation, direct or indirect, shall be furnished by me towards an attempt at reconstituting Poland; but I cannot go further. As for the suppression of the words *POLAND* and *POLE*, it is a barbarism I could not commit. I can abstain from employing these words in diplomatic acts, but it is not in my power to expunge them from the language of nations. As for the suppression of the old Polish orders of knighthood, this can only be consented to upon the death of the existing knights, and by ceasing to confer new titles. Lastly, as to the future aggrandisements of the Duchy of Warsaw, I cannot bind myself against them except in consideration of reciprocity, and on condition that Russia pledges herself never to add to her dominions any portion detached from the old Polish provinces. On these bases," said Napoleon, "I may consent to a convention, but I cannot admit any others." He had a new draft of the convention drawn up in accordance with these observations, and ordered M. de Champagny to despatch it forthwith. All this eventually could not fail sooner or later to prove the end of the alliance, and the origin of a fatal imbroglio.

Having broken with one of the powers between which he had wavered, Napoleon desired to enter into a contract that same day with the other. Secret communications had been constantly kept up with M. de Schwarzenberg through M. de Laborde. It was known that in reply to his inquiries his court had authorised him not only to accept any offer of marriage, but to do what he could, without compromising the dignity of the Emperor Francis, towards determining Napoleon's choice in favour of an archduchess. He was asked that same evening, February the 6th, if he was ready to sign a contract of marriage. On his replying in the affirmative, the articles were drawn up, and an appointment was made with him for the next day in the Tuileries. Napoleon again summoned a council of the grand dignitaries in the Tuileries, laid the question definitively before them—but for form sake only, since his mind was made up—and made every arrangement to the end that on the following day his lot might be definitively united to that of the Archduchess of Austria.

Next day his purpose was accomplished. His contract of

marriage was, with the exception of some differences of language which he thought the time and his dignity demanded, an exact counterpart of that of Marie Antoinette, which he had caused to be taken from the archives of the Foreign Office. Thus he would have no mention of a dowry, nor any security for its payment, and desired that everything should be marked with the stamp of his own greatness. Berthier, his friend, the interpreter of his will in war, was to go to Vienna to demand the hand of the princess, and was to display the utmost magnificence. As it is the monarchical custom that when a sovereign marries by proxy that proxy must be a prince of the blood, Napoleon made choice of his glorious adversary the Archduke Charles to represent him in the marriage ceremony. Records were consulted as to what had taken place at the marriages of Louis XIV., Louis XV., the grand-dauphin father of Louis XVI., and Louis XVI. himself. The latter marriage was the model to which everything was to conform, although the cruel fate of that monarch and his unfortunate spouse was a melancholy omen. But the more melancholy it was, the more did it enhance by contrast the advantages of the present. Napoleon would have the glory not only of having raised up royalty from martyrdom to the loftiest grandeur, but of having restored even its system of alliances. The measure of his glory and his services was the difference between the scaffold which Marie Antoinette had ascended and the dazzling throne to be mounted by Marie Louise. The oldest nobles of the old court were consulted, particularly M. de Dreux Brézé, formerly master of the ceremonies, as to how all things had been arranged at the marriage of Marie Antoinette, in order to reproduce them exactly, or with no other difference than increased magnificence. Mention was left, for form sake, of a mean jointure of some 100,000 francs in favour of the future empress, should she become a widow, and Napoleon ordered that the amount stipulated for her should be four millions of francs. The richest jewels were prepared. So impatient was Napoleon that he arranged so that when the news of the consent arrived by telegraph in Paris, Berthier could set out that very day, demand the princess in marriage on the day of his arrival, celebrate the marriage on the following day, and bring home the new consort to Paris forthwith, so that the marriage might be consummated by the middle of March. Prince Schwarzenberg consented to everything, and despatched his courier on leaving the Tuileries, after having taken upon him to sign for the Archduchess Marie Louise a literal transcript of the marriage-contract of Marie Antoinette.

The courier despatched from Paris on the 7th of February arrived on the 14th at Vienna, and caused the liveliest satis-

faction there. The war party, defeated in the person of the Stadions, and confounded by the result of the last war, had given place to the peace party headed by M. de Metternich. The idea of seeking tranquillity, security, and restored influence for the future in an alliance with France, which would lead to the dissolution of the alliance of France with Russia, was eagerly welcomed in Vienna. M. de Metternich found the Emperor Francis perfectly well disposed to the marriage, both as a sovereign and a father. As a sovereign, he saw in it a happy arrangement for his policy, for the crown of the Habsburgs was guaranteed, and the union of Russia with France destroyed. As a father, he saw secured to his daughter the finest fortune imaginable, and could even hope for her happiness, for Napoleon had the repute of being facile and good-natured in domestic life, independently of all there was in him to excite the imagination of a young princess. M. de Metternich, who had lived in Paris among the imperial family, could perfectly reassure the Emperor Francis in that respect. The latter, however, loving his daughter much, and not wishing in any degree to constrain her, ordered M. de Metternich to go and speak himself to her on the subject, which he did. The young princess was eighteen, of a good figure, excellent health, and a fair German complexion. She had been carefully educated, had some talent, and a placid temper—in short, the qualities desirable in a mother. She was surprised and pleased, far from being dismayed at going into that France where but lately the revolutionary monster devoured kings, and where a conqueror, now mastering the revolutionary monster, made kings tremble in his turn. She accepted with becoming reserve, but with much delight, the brilliant lot offered her. She consented to become the consort of Napoleon, and mother to the heir of the greatest empire in the world.

All haste was now made at Vienna to satisfy Napoleon's impatience. The contract of marriage, signed in Paris by Prince Schwarzenberg on the 7th of February, was accepted, on condition of certain additions containing sundry stipulations usual in the house of Habsburg. Napoleon's idea was adopted of copying in all points the forms observed upon the marriage of Marie Antoinette, only with greatly increased magnificence. But with every wish to satisfy him it was impossible to proceed as rapidly as he desired without omitting many imposing ceremonies, which it would have been contrary to his design to neglect. The Archduke Charles was accepted as Napoleon's proxy to wed the princess, and Berthier as his ambassador extraordinary to demand her in marriage. The ceremony was appointed for the beginning of March.

The news of the reception given to his proposals delighted

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Napoleon and his court. Gaiety prevailed universally. The clouds raised by the late war dispersed as if by magic. Hope and enthusiasm returned. The old malcontent nobility of the Faubourg St. Germain were infected with the common feeling, and many of them came over to the new *régime*, thinking it no shame to serve under him whom the greatest reigning family in the world consented to adopt as a son-in-law. Such was the increase of these convertites that their numbers gave rise to a danger of an opposite kind, that of obfuscating the recent grandeurs born of the revolution and the empire. Napoleon displayed consummate tact in forming the household of the empress by choosing for her first lady of honour the Duchess of Montebello, widow of Marshal Lannes, killed at Essling by an Austrian cannon-ball! Everybody approved of this act of gratitude, and the person chosen, by her conduct and by her distinction, not hereditary but personal, deserved the high position assigned to her. Magnificent presents were ordered, and Berthier hastened his departure so as to arrive in Vienna in the beginning of March. The Queen of Naples also quitted Paris with a brilliant court for Braunau, there to receive the new empress on the frontiers of the Confederation of the Rhine.

Berthier arrived on the 4th of March 1810, and made his public entry into Vienna on the following day, amidst an immense concourse of nobles and people. The whole court went to meet him with the equipages of the crown, which were to convey him to the palace. The people of Vienna, in an excess of delight, wanted to take the horses from his carriage and draw it themselves, and there was much difficulty in preventing that tumultuous manifestation.

The 6th and 7th were spent in festivities. On the 8th, according to the usages of the court of Austria, and to what had been practised at the marriage of Marie Antoinette, Berthier made a formal demand of the hand of the Archduchess Marie Louise, which was accorded with the most pompous forms. The following days were devoted to fresh formalities and fresh rejoicings. On the 11th a marriage was solemnised amidst a vast concourse, with a splendour which surpassed all that had ever been seen, and with a joy that equalled all the popular gladness. The archduchess, wedded by the Archduke Charles, was immediately treated as Empress of the French, and even took precedence of all her family, by an excess of courtesy on the part of the Emperor Francis and the empress, his second wife.

The 13th was the day appointed for the departure of the Empress of the French. The people of Vienna followed her with acclamations and with affectionate feeling that were mingled with uneasiness at the last moment, for the thought

of the unfortunate Marie Antoinette came upon them unbidden. The whole court accompanied Marie Louise.

The Emperor Francis, who loved his daughter, wished to embrace her once more, and he set off secretly for Lintz to surprise her there, and bid her a last farewell.

She was at Braunau on the 16th of March. Everything had been prepared there as it had been for the marriage of 1770. Three reception-rooms, connected together, the first reputed Austrian, the second neutral, the third French, had been erected to receive the young empress. She was taken from the Austrian into the neutral room by her father's household, and there delivered to Prince Berthier, the emperor's representative, with her dowry, her jewels, and the contract of marriage; and lastly, she was led into the French room, where Napoleon's sister, the Queen of Naples, received and embraced her. From Braunau she was conveyed to Munich, from Munich to Strasburg, everywhere accompanied by the acclamations of the German and French populations through which passed that strange spectacle of the daughter of the Cæsars going to wed the fortunate soldier who had conquered the French Revolution and Europe. To the fever of war had succeeded a fever of joy and hope.

On the 23rd of March the Empress Marie Louise entered Strasburg, hailed by the same popular enthusiasm. She passed through Luneville, Nancy, and Vitry. It was at Compiègne she was to see Napoleon for the first time, surrounded by his whole court; but to spare her the embarrassment of an official interview, Napoleon set out from Compiègne with Murat to meet her on the road. He took her in his arms, and seemed pleased with the kind of beauty and capacity he thought he perceived in her at first sight. A woman of good constitution, good-tempered, simple, becomingly educated, was all he desired. He appeared perfectly happy on entering with her into the château of Compiègne on the evening of the 27th of March.

They remained there until the 30th, when he set out with his new empress for St. Cloud, where the civil marriage was to be celebrated. The ceremonies which had taken place in Vienna, in conformity with the usages of the old courts, sufficed to render the marriage complete and irrevocable. The repetition at Paris was only a formality due to the nation over which the new sovereign came to reign. It took place on the 1st of April, in presence of the whole imperial court, in the grand gallery of St. Cloud, through the ministry of the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès. The repetition of the religious marriage was to take place for the people of Paris on the 2nd of April, in the Tuileries.

On that day Napoleon, preceded by his guard, surrounded by his marshals on horseback, and followed by his family and his court in a hundred magnificent carriages, made his entry into

Paris by the triumphal arch de l'Etoile. That monument, the foundation of which had but recently been laid, was erected in a temporary way, almost as it appears at this day. Napoleon passed through the arch in the coronation carriage, the glass panels of which showed him seated by the side of the new empress. He traversed the Champs Elysées through a double range of sumptuous decorations and an immense assemblage of people.

He entered the palace of the Tuileries by the garden. The nuptial altar had been erected in the grand saloon, where are now assembled the finest works of art, and which is arrived at through the longest and richest gallery of pictures in the world, which connects the Tuileries with the Louvre. All the opulent population of Paris, splendidly dressed, sat on two rows of benches along that gallery. Napoleon, leading the empress by the hand, and followed by his family, walked along it to the grand hall, where, in a chapel dazzling with gold and light, he received the nuptial benediction. Enthusiastic cries hailed the close of the ceremony. That day there was a nuptial banquet in the great theatre of the Tuileries. The following days were employed in elegant and magnificent fêtes. All classes took part in the joy which effaced the sombre impressions made by the late war. On seeing Napoleon again all-powerful and happy, people forgot for a while that he had nearly ceased to be so. Seeing him so well married, they believed him definitively established. They put aside the momentary forebodings that crossed their minds as importunate and baseless dreams. They began again to believe in the infinite and everlasting greatness of the empire, as though they had never doubted it. In fact, the victory of Wagram, though not equalling those of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland in the grandeur of its trophies—while it was yet on a par with them as to the genius displayed—the victory of Wagram, completed by the marriage with Marie Louise, replaced Napoleon at his highest degree of power, and if prudence gradually repaired the grand fault of the war in Spain, the last illusions sprung from that marriage might be realised. But that this should be so, something must have been changed which is less changeable than destiny—the character of a man must have been changed, and that man was Napoleon.

BOOK XXXVIII.

CONTINENTAL BLOCKADE.

NAPOLEON, vanquisher at Wagram, of Austria, and the last efforts of Germany, enriched by new territorial spoils in Galicia, Bavaria, and Illyria, lavishing on his Polish, German, and Italian allies the provinces torn from his enemies, having extended yet farther towards the east his empire, already so vast in the north, the west, and the south, and husband of an archduchess, seemed to have arrived at that summit of human glory from which his enemies hoped and his friends feared he must now fall. The world, which judges by that which is external, was yet for a time dazzled, and had good reason to be so, for with the exception of Russia, where Napoleon was still regarded with much respect, and of Spain, where a vast popular insurrection disputed with him the extremities of the Peninsula, the whole continent displayed towards him a profound submission, and the humility of peoples as well as of kings appeared to be without bounds—England alone, protected by the ocean, continued to escape from this widespread subjection.

Struck by this spectacle, the royalist and religious party, of all parties the slowest to see clearly and to submit, perceived that its strength was well nigh gone. It began to attach itself to the imperial dynasty, and many of its members accepted places at court—spreading, either because they believed them or because they sought some excuse for their weakness, the most extraordinary reports. According to these, Napoleon, allied to Marie Antoinette since his marriage with Marie Louise, was about to set aside the proceedings of the past, to reinstate gloriously the memory of Louis XVI., to drive the regicides from the government, perhaps even from the country, and to surround himself with the old court. To these reports a new one was added even more singular; which was, that Moreau, who was very popular amidst the friends of the Bourbons, was about to be recalled from exile and raised to the dignity of marshal, with the title of the Duke of Hohenlinden. As for the republicans, it would have been difficult to gather any of their expressions of opinion, for they seemed no longer to exist.

A few of them only just survived, hiding both their errors and excesses in darkness and oblivion. But in their place arose a certain disposition both to inquire and to blame, which presaged a state of public feeling very different from that which then prevailed. As yet, however, this germ of an independent spirit was scarcely perceptible, and the prestige which had so long enveloped Napoleon appeared to be completely re-established.

But there were not wanting reflective minds which could discern some dangerous elements beneath this outward splendour. Napoleon, by espousing an Austrian princess, had banished all appearance of probability from his project of overturning the old dynasties, and in some degree assuaged the bitter hatred with which the Austrians regarded him; but he had not recompensed them for the losses which he had compelled them to endure during fifteen years; he had not consoled Prussia for her reverses, nor made Germany forget her humiliations. He had wounded Prussia incurably in the proceedings with respect to his marriage, and by his loyal but haughty refusal of the convention with respect to Poland; and his Austrian marriage had provided it with a most fertile source of suspicions. Italy remained cruelly lacerated by his seizures of territory; the war in Spain was a constantly bleeding wound, and the hatred of England a source of hostilities to which there appeared no limit. To meet these various difficulties, it was necessary to maintain in the north, the east, and the south innumerable troops, the support of which was thrown by the peace entirely on France, and to supply which every French household was filled with grief and desolation. To crown all, although there was not as yet any direct schism between them, Napoleon was engaged in the most complicated disputes with the Pope. This state of affairs, which was visible to his enemies, who rejoiced in it, unperceived by his friends, who were unwilling to see it, and comprehended in all its bearings by those wise spirits alone, who are always so rare, and so rarely attended to, was by no means wholly concealed from the discernment of Napoleon; and presented no insurmountable difficulties, if only a moderation which was foreign to his proud and passionate character, and a determination to complete the designs on hand before entering on new ones, had aided him in his struggle with the circumstances by which he was surrounded.

If, for example, he had devoted his utmost attention towards deriving from his recent marriage the advantages which it offered; gradually instilling a feeling of confidence into Austria, inspiring it with hope, and restoring to it, as the price of a sincere alliance, the Illyrian provinces, which were of no advantage to himself; if he had appeased Germany by a com-

plete evacuation; if he had rather restricted the limits of the empire than extended them by continual additions; if, whilst he was endeavouring to render the continental blockade more vigorous, he had not made it a pretext for fresh invasions; if he had thrown into Spain an overwhelming army, and that mightiest of all his forces, himself; if he had refrained from every war until that had been concluded; if he had inflicted on England such a blow in the Peninsula as would have forced her to sue for peace; if he had known how to manage those religious parties which he had only flattered for his own ends, and to bring Pius VII. to an arrangement which he desired from the bottom of his heart; if, having secured the empire from danger without by a general peace, he had known how to grant some liberty to the spirit which was beginning to arouse itself from within—he might have hindered a great catastrophe, or at least have prolonged the existence of the too vast edifice which he had raised; we say prolonged, for to have rendered it enduring, he must have courageously removed acquisitions which the very nature of things condemned, he must have renounced the prefectships at Rome, at Florence, and at Laybach, and have confined his dominions to those limits between the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees, which Europe at that period would not have been inclined to dispute with us, and how magnificent an empire would that have been which would have comprised Genoa, Mount Cenis, the Simplon, Geneva, Huninguen, Mayence, Wesel, Antwerp, and Flushing.

It is said that before it hurls men to destruction, Providence, even as an indulgent mother, warns them and invites them to reflection and amendment. At Eylau, at Baylen, at Essling, Providence had clearly indicated to Napoleon the bounds beyond which he should not attempt to pass, and in granting him the victory at Wagram after the difficult Austrian campaign, in bestowing upon him a wife of the blood of the Cæsars to bear him an heir to his new empire, it seems to have been granting him time to retrace his steps, and to attain a position of safety. Napoleon's rare penetration perceived the true value of the moment, and was anxious to seize the good it offered; since his return to Paris he had devoted himself to reassuring Europe, of appeasing Germany, of putting an end to the war in Spain, of disarming or of vanquishing England, of arranging the French finances, silencing religious disputes, and in short, of bestowing repose upon an exhausted world. Unhappily, he set to work to remove these difficulties in the same spirit as that in which he had aroused them; instead of untying the knot, he strove to break it, and from this period his genius, always vast, was less happy in its movements and less adroit.

One of his first acts after his marriage was to address a circular to the diplomatic agents of the empire, from which they were to take their official tone. "This circular," wrote Napoleon to the minister of foreign affairs, who was charged with its compilation, "will not be printed, but it will serve as a text-book to my agents. You will say in it that one of the principal means which the English make use of for the purpose of reviving the flame of continental war is a supposition that I intend to overthrow the dynasties. Circumstances having placed me in the position of having to choose a spouse, I have been anxious to deprive them of this terrible pretext for exciting nations and sowing anew those seeds of discord which have already covered Europe with blood. Nothing has appeared to me more calculated to calm these disquietudes than a demand by me in marriage of an archduchess of Austria. The brilliant and distinguished qualities of the Archduchess Marie Louise, of which I have had particular information, have induced me to act in conformity with my policy. My demand having been made, and agreed to by the Emperor of Austria, the Prince of Neufchatel has, &c. I have been much rejoiced at this opportunity of reconciling two great nations, of giving a proof of my esteem for the Austrian nation and the inhabitants of the city of Vienna. You will add that I desire that their language should be consistent with the ties of kindred which unite me to the house of Austria, without, however, uttering any expression which could affect my intimate alliance with the Emperor of Russia."

All the policy of Napoleon at this moment was directed to these ends. To enter into an alliance with Austria, to which bonds of kindred now attached him, without becoming alienated from Russia, which he had not ceased to make the groundwork of his system of alliance, was for some time his chief object. He hastened to effect the evacuation of the Austrian States, showed an accommodating disposition in respect to the payment of the war contributions, consented to a loan which Austria desired to open at Amsterdam, and even favoured it by an indirect intervention; and listened complacently to some vague discourse with reference to the final settlement of the Illyrian provinces, the restitution of which would have been a handsome marriage-gift for the court of Vienna. The most gracious reception was accorded to M. de Metternich, whom the Emperor Francis had sent to Paris to arrange the new relations between the two countries, which would be the result of the marriage.

M. de Metternich, on entering the Austrian cabinet, in which he remained for almost forty years, introduced a policy which differed much from that of his predecessors—that of

a good understanding with France. In order to prepare the way for this, he was anxious to visit Paris: firstly, to guide the first steps of the young empress in a court of which he knew all the intricacies; and secondly, to obtain certain knowledge whether the conqueror was about to adopt pacific views in the midst of the sweets of a brilliant marriage, or only intended to make it the starting-point for new and vaster enterprises. Some weeks devoted to this twofold object would not be time lost, and the Emperor Francis had consented that his future minister, before entering on his duties, should undertake at Paris this important mission.

Napoleon received Metternich most graciously, and made every effort to please him. He was above all things anxious that he should witness the happiness of the young empress, and be able to calm the anxiety which the Emperor Francis felt with regard to the fortunes of his daughter. One day, indeed, M. de Metternich having demanded an interview with the emperor at a time when he happened to be with the empress, he was immediately conducted to the private apartments of the palace, and Napoleon himself led him to the chamber of Marie Louise, saying, "Come and see with your own eyes the wretchedness of your young archduchess and the state of continual terror in which she passes her days;" and then, after a few moments, he added, leaving the room, "I leave you with madam, that you may receive her confidences, hearken to her complaints, and be able to report them to the Emperor Francis!" M. de Metternich, surprised and almost embarrassed by such freedom, remained with the empress, who appeared perfectly happy in her new position, and said to him with more spirit than she was in the habit of showing, "I suppose you think at Vienna that I live in great awe of my redoubtable husband! Ah, well, you may tell my countrymen that he is more afraid of me than I of him." And indeed, when Marie Louise happened to be guilty of some inadvertence, which was very excusable in the midst of persons and circumstances which were equally strange to her, Napoleon scarcely dared to speak to her on the subject, and gave her by the mouth of M. de Meneval or the arch-chancellor the advice which he hesitated to give in his own person.

The conversation of M. de Metternich with Marie Louise had continued almost an hour, when some one tapped at the door, and Napoleon entered, saying gaily, "Ah, well, madam, you have told it all? you have laid bare your whole heart? And this marriage is much to be regretted, is it not, as regards the happiness of the woman whom it has made my wife? Write all that you have heard to the Emperor Francis without scruple and without reserve." He then carried off M. de Metternich to

discuss with him those weighty matters which would naturally employ the interviews between Napoleon and a person who was destined soon to become the first minister of the court of Vienna. Unfortunately in the midst of all this ostentatious suavity, Napoleon, when serious affairs came to be discussed, when this or that power was the subject of his discourse, would give way to sallies of haughtiness, rancour, and ambition, which terrified him whom he was so anxious to conciliate. Thus this lion, which at one moment slumbered beneath the hand which caressed it, would at the next arouse itself with roars, if any unexpected object had excited its terrible instincts.

The relations with Russia were still in an unsettled state, disturbed as they had been by Napoleon's abrupt withdrawal from the projected marriage, by the tone which he had adopted towards that country immediately upon his alliance with Austria, and his rejection of the convention relating to Poland. With respect to the projected marriage, indeed, Napoleon had instructed M. de Caulaincourt to assert at St. Petersburg, that the hesitation of the Russian court, and above all, the extreme youth of the princess, had forced him to accept the Austrian archduchess, in whose person were united all those qualifications which were most calculated to effect, and had already effected, a sincere intimacy between the courts of Paris and Vienna, whilst there was nothing in this marriage which could cause any alteration in the political system of alliances which remained based, as it ever had been, on an intimate union between the two empires of the east and the west; that Napoleon earnestly desired that the Russians might be victorious over the Turks, and that the Emperor Alexander might secure possession of the left bank of the Danube, namely, Moldavia and Wallachia, in conformity with the secret stipulations of Tilsit; that with regard to Poland, he was at all times ready to sign an agreement not to favour any attempt to re-establish the ancient kingdom of Poland, but that he could not enter into any general, absolute, and too presumptuous engagement that Poland should never be re-established as a kingdom. "That," to use his own words, "depends neither on the Emperor Alexander nor on me, whatever may be our greatness, but on God, who is more powerful than either. I can undertake not to provoke, yea, even not to assist the designs of Providence, but I cannot promise to fetter them!" Exquisite modesty! which once more came to his aid, and which was always of such great use to him as a shield against the arguments of his adversaries! But the point of the sword gleamed out from amidst all this complaisance, as he added expressions of the deep regret with which he saw that Russia desired to pass beyond the line of the Danube, and further expressed an earnest hope that in return

for Finland, which was already, and for Moldavia and Wallachia, which were about to be annexed to her dominions, she would maintain the most rigorous hostility towards England. All which was said in a mingled tone of courtesy, friendship, and haughtiness, which would not have wounded a power entirely friendly, but was ill calculated to reassure an ally partially estranged. M. de Romanzoff at St. Petersburg, and M. de Kourakin at Paris, listened to these explanations with an appearance of great satisfaction, for Alexander was unwilling to show any dissatisfaction he might feel, lest it should be attributed to the failure of that matrimonial treaty to which he had only assented in the hope that it might secure to him the acquisition of the left bank of the Danube; and to fulfil this part of his duty to the utmost of his power, M. de Kourakin, although attacked with gout on the day of the marriage ceremony, caused himself to be carried, covered with gold and precious stones, to the chapel of the Louvre, that he might display, in the midst of his anguish, an expression of joy which was sufficiently laughable, and exhaust himself in praises of the beauty of the young empress, so far as to embarrass M. de Metternich himself, who, not knowing how to reply to the Russian's repeated compliments, at length said: "Yes, she is fair, but not pretty."

Always active, Napoleon lost no time in arranging matters with a view to his wise intention of evacuating Germany. By the last treaty of peace he had preserved the two Tyrols, the German and the Italian, and acquired Salzburg and some districts upon the right of the Inn. Of his former conquests there remained to him the principality of Bareuth in the high palatinate, Hainault and Fuld in Franconia, Erfurth and many other districts in Saxony, Maidenbourg in Westphalia, and Hanover in the north of Germany. These various territories he now resolved to distribute, and after having extorted part of their value in the shape of money or gifts to his generals, to withdraw from them all the troops which were not necessary for the defence of the new kingdom of Westphalia.

Napoleon, as was natural, transferred to Bavaria all that he had acquired on the Inn and in Upper Austria, and resigned to it L'Innviertel, Salzburg, the German Tyrol, and a part of the Italian Tyrol, reserving to the kingdom of Italy that portion which was necessary to give it a good border line. He granted, moreover, to Bavaria the principality of Ratisbon and the principality of Bareuth. All which liberality went far to indemnify Bavaria for its exertions and expenses during the last war; and whilst these various arrangements sufficiently enlarged the territories of his allies, they rendered their boundaries more convenient. Ulm fell to the lot of Wur-

temberg, whilst Ratisbon and Bareuth were transferred to Bavaria.

As the price of these concessions of territory, Napoleon demanded that no recompense should be required for the support of his armies whilst in Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden. To Marshal Davout, whose well-known energy and probity were the best of guarantees, was entrusted the due execution of the evacuation.

Napoleon demanded also of Bavaria that the grants which had been made to soldiers of all grades in the ceded provinces should be confirmed, or redeemed at a fixed rate; and further, that it should advance a sum of thirty million francs in repayment of the vast expenses to which he had been put by this campaign. But even under these conditions Bavaria obtained advantages which fully balanced the sacrifices she was called upon to make. Napoleon recommended her to bestow upon the Tyrol, the possession of which was now fully confirmed to her, a satisfactory constitution, as he had, in ceding to Baden the various parts of the palatinate, demanded fair treatment for the Catholics; for it was a remarkable trait in his character, that when the hero was not misled by his passions, the wisdom and humanity of the statesman were alike visible.

Our allies of the south of Germany having been satisfied and their territories evacuated, Napoleon bestowed all his attention upon its central and northern territories; and took into consideration the fortunes of the prince-primate, late elector and archbishop of Mayence, who had become chancellor and president of the Confederation of the Rhine, and whose endowment was partly in the principality of Ratisbon, which had been lately granted to Bavaria, and partly in the tolls of the Rhine navigation, which produced a very variable and uncertain revenue. Napoleon desired to show favour to this prince, who was devoted to his interests, and bestowed upon him the principalities of Fulda and Hainault, on condition that he should cede some portions of territory to the Duchies of Hainault and Hesse-Darmstadt, Ratisbon to Bavaria, and the Rhine dues to the treasury extraordinary.

By this arrangement a new advantage accrued to Napoleon, which had reference to the fortunes of Prince Eugène, who remained without princely endowment in consequence of the Austrian marriage. There was no longer any hope of an act of adoption in favour of the viceroy, since there was every expectation that Napoleon would have children; and as it never entered into Napoleon's views to separate the kingdom of Italy from the empire, the Prince Eugène, possessed for the term of his own life of the viceroyalty of Italy, had no territory descendible to his heirs. Of a sweet and submissive tempera-

ment, this prince was very dear to Napoleon, who was the more anxious to treat him with no neglect, as he had already caused him deep pain by the repudiation of his mother the Empress Josephine; and moreover, the Princess Augusta of Bavaria, whom the viceroy had espoused, a lady worthy of her rank, and endowed with a remarkable strength of character, attacked him with earnest remonstrances, reminding him of the duty he had imposed upon himself by taking her from one of the most ancient thrones in Europe to make her the wife of a man who had neither princely birth nor patrimony; and she urged that he ought not to leave her in the midst of this distribution of crowns without some endowment for her children. These remonstrances of the princess, and the pining grief of the Prince Eugène, touched Napoleon, and he bestowed upon them the reversion of the new grant which he was creating in favour of the prince-primate, under the title of the principality of Frankfort; the feeble health of the primate affording a fair expectation that he would not long withhold its enjoyment from the family of the Prince Eugène.

In his desire to hasten the distribution and evacuation of the German territories, Napoleon proceeded to arrange with King Jerome various territorial and financial disputes which were still pending, and were the source of much uneasiness to the two brothers. King Jerome had caused some dissatisfaction to Napoleon during the last war, not from want of energy when in action, but from a certain dilatoriness in the conduct of the campaign; besides this, his administration had expended more in the service of luxury than in objects of utility, his system of government was not such as pleased the Germans, and he had permitted those of the French donees who had received grants of territory in Westphalia to suffer such vexations as Napoleon in his zeal for the welfare of his soldiers would never have allowed them to endure. Nevertheless, as King Jerome alone of all his brothers possessed a truly military spirit, and was always submissive and devoted, he continued to treat him with indulgence, although sometimes showing towards him, as towards all his family occasionally, an extreme severity.

He resolved, therefore, to bestow upon him Magdeburg and also Hanover, which was a large and fair portion yet unappropriated. Nor did this arrangement present any great additional obstacle in the way of a peace with England, for she seemed to have adopted a feeling that Hanover was not English, and it was sometimes even said that she was rejoiced at its loss. In return for this gift, King Jerome undertook to maintain during the whole continuance of the war an army of 18,500 French troops, to be quartered in Westphalia; to pay the extraordinary contributions to the war which were still due from Hanover,

and to recognise all the grants made in that country to the French soldiers.

Under these conditions King Jerome was declared sovereign of Hesse, Westphalia, and Hanover, having Cassel for his capital, and Magdeburg for his citadel, and becoming second only to the King of Prussia in the order of German sovereigns.

These arrangements having been made, there remained in our possession only the town of Erfurth, together with some tracts of country destined for the King of Saxony, Grand Duke of Warsaw; and the affairs of Germany were now settled in a manner calculated to endure just so long as the French empire.

In the preceding arrangements it will be observed that the support of a body of French troops was the price to be paid for the cession of Hanover; a condition which was at variance with Napoleon's idea of propitiating Germany by the withdrawal of his armies. But two reasons induced him to defer the complete execution of this plan, the one being founded on the state of Prussia, and the other having reference to the execution of the decrees of Berlin and Milan, which constituted what is called the continental blockade. The conduct of Prussia had been at times most unhappy and inconsistent, for nothing is more inconsistent than the agitated movements of distress. Whilst protesting its submission to the hard conditions signed at Tilsit, whilst affecting the greatest resignation, and manifesting an eager desire to repress the revolt of Schill, it sympathised most ardently with the patriotic struggles which it undertook to suppress, and for a moment indulged in the hope that it might be able to escape from the yoke which had fallen upon Germany. Nothing could be more natural, and, let us add, more legitimate than this feeling; but unhappily for herself, Prussia had mingled these sentiments with actions of the gravest imprudence. She had recruited her regiments, bought horses, and collected certain bodies of troops, under pretext of preparing the contingent promised to France; a pretext which was little calculated to blind a vision so keen as that of Napoleon. Prussia had, moreover, in further pursuance of this line of conduct, made great delay in the payment of the contributions due from her, having permitted almost at the commencement of the war of 1809 bills to the amount of twenty-two millions, which she had subscribed to the treasury extraordinary, to be protested. At first Napoleon had appeared to allow this delay to pass unnoticed, but after the peace of Vienna he had demanded the fulfilment of the obligation in a tone too peremptory to be disregarded; for although the Prussian court persisted in dwelling at Königsberg, partly from chagrin and partly from policy, it was no less in the power of Napoleon, and it found itself compelled to pay something, if not the whole. "You have lost the opportunity," said Napoleon,

“of rising, which was open to you by the exercise of simple good faith towards France. Had you been able to foresee that the last rising in Austria would lead only to defeat and fresh confiscations of territories, you would, without being compelled to augment the number of your troops, or to increase your expenses, have closely allied yourself to me, have furnished me with the contingent of 15,000 men which you promised, have honoured your signature, paid the twenty-two millions, and proved that you had frankly adopted the policy, which must always be yours, of a French alliance. I should then, most probably, have freed you from the remainder of your obligations, have exalted your position, enlarged your territories, and replaced you in the elevated position from which you have fallen. The adoption of this course would, it is very likely, have obtained for you Magdeburg, or even Hanover. But instead of aiding, you have threatened me; instead of spending money in the payment of your debt to me, you have expended it in arming against me. I am the victor, and it is time that you should expiate your errors, not by fresh losses of territory, but by the performance, at least, of your engagements; by the delay of which you force me to leave garrisons on the Oder, and as a support to these garrisons to maintain troops on the Elbe. This continued military occupation of territory burdens me with heavy expenses, and, which I much regret, forces me to make in the bosom of Germany a military demonstration which is an interruption to my political plans. You have deprived me of the revivifying repose for which I longed, and have done me as much moral as material injury. It is necessary that this state of things should come to an end, or I will take measures for paying myself; I will seize one of your provinces, Silesia perhaps, and give it to any one who will pay me what you owe!”

Such was the language which Napoleon held towards Prussia, accompanying it with detailed accounts, of which he demanded the settlement. Prussia, ever since the reduction of her debt, had remained a debtor of eighty-six millions, and Napoleon insisted that this debt should be satisfied by a payment of forty-eight millions, in monthly instalments, whilst the remaining thirty-eight millions were to be supplied by means of a Dutch loan. Terrified, Prussia promised full satisfaction of his demands, whilst she secretly determined to escape from the necessity of obeying them. Napoleon, perceiving that if he abandoned the military posts which he held as pledges, his debt would never be paid, resolved to continue to occupy them with French and Polish troops; the latter having become, by training in our school, most excellent soldiers, and although nominally belonging to the King of Saxony, being in reality entirely devoted to the French cause. Glogau, Custrin, and Stettin

received Saxon Polish regiments, and as the French artillery and engineer corps of these places formed no more than a fifth part of the effective strength, the garrisons appeared to have lost their French character. To the troops in Stettin, which was of most importance, and was on the shore of the Baltic, Napoleon added a regiment of infantry borrowed from the division of Marshal Davout. Dantzic had become a sort of Hanseatic town, endowed with a fictitious independence, and by treaty bound to receive, when a maritime war should render it needful, a French garrison. Under the specious and well-grounded pretext, that the English would be eager to possess themselves of a town which was precious on account of its port and its situation on the Vistula, he established there a garrison similar to those on the Oder, but of greater strength. And thus in a time of perfect peace Napoleon took possession, with a force, which under the appearance of being Polish, was in reality French, of those important places, the possession of which gave him complete command of the Oder and the Vistula.

These military occupations were, there can be no doubt, irreconcilable with the peaceable spirit which Napoleon's policy had for the moment assumed, but they served to control Prussia, and would be a formidable base of operations against Russia if ever hostilities should be renewed with that power. Besides the Prussian debt, the threatening presence of the English in the Baltic, and the necessity of occupying the shore of this sea for the sake of watching the execution of the laws of blockade, offered sufficient explanation of the presence of the French troops to prevent their prolonged stay from destroying entirely the good effect produced by the evacuation of the rest of Germany. Besides these measures it was necessary to take others for the support of the garrisons on the Vistula and the Oder, to compel the Hanse towns to renounce commercial intercourse with Great Britain, and to coerce Holland, which paid no more attention to the continental blockade than as if it had been governed by a German or English prince. Even when the governments attempted to keep good faith the communities under their charge were little affected by the existence of the blockade, and pursued a contraband trade which the most vigorous measures failed to prevent. The circumstance that the English trade was scarcely at all cramped with Holland, which had become a French monarchy, sufficiently proved the difficulty of maintaining efficiently the continental blockade, and Napoleon, having just now both leisure and troops at his disposal, determined to conduct in person this kind of warfare, which was certainly the most effective he could possibly have directed against England.

Having carried the policy of evacuation to the furthest extent, Napoleon distributed his troops with great ability, and with strict

regard to the various objects of calming the apprehension of Germany, supporting the garrisons of the Vistula and the Oder, occupying the coasts of the Baltic, the North Sea and Holland, of reassembling an army at the camp of Boulogne, of despatching considerable reinforcements to Spain, and finally, of putting in force that system of economy which the state of his finances rendered so necessary. He had sent to Laybach the army of Dalmatia, which had come from Zara to Vienna under the command of Marshal Marmont, and he decided that it should be supported by the Illyrian provinces. He had sent the army of Italy to the plains of Friuli, Venice, and Lombardy. He had from time to time turned back towards Spain all the reinforcements which had been marched upon the Danube, during the negotiations which were to put an end to the Austrian war. There remained the three corps of the Marshals Davout, Massena, and Oudinot, which constituted the strength of the grand army at Ratisbon, Essling, and Wagram. Withdrawn successively from the Austrian base of operations in Bavaria and Swabia, they had subsisted during the treaty upon the provinces intended for the allies, the cost of their maintenance being defrayed to these monarchs in advance, in the shape of ceded territories. Napoleon finally adopted the following mode of distribution. The corps of Marshal Oudinot, which was composed of a division of old regiments under the brave General St. Hilaire, and of two divisions of the fourth battalions, was broken up and distributed along the coasts of France. The regiments of St. Hilaire's division were divided between Cherbourg, St. Malo, and Brest, as a menace against England; and the two divisions of the fourth battalions, which belonged to the regiments engaged in the war with Spain, were quartered in the neighbourhood of Rochefort and Bordeaux, to be ready to throw themselves upon the Pyrenees if the 100,000 men already sent thither should prove insufficient. The corps of Marshal Massena, more distinguished for its valour than its numbers, passed from Swabia to Franconia, and descended the Rhine to occupy the camp at Boulogne, Brabant, and the frontiers of Holland; the chief division being established at Embden, to be in connection with the Hanse towns.

Napoleon determined that the corps of Marshal Davout, which was altogether the finest and best disciplined, should supply the troops for the occupation of the north of Germany; and he had many reasons for this choice. By always fixing the residence of this corps in northern climates, he hoped to preserve to it its vigorous temperament, its warlike manners, and to almost entirely destroy its remembrance of its native soil. Its troops, moreover, as sober and steadfast as their chief, were exactly suited to a kind of service which exposed those who were charged with its

execution to a dangerous corruption. And finally, if it should ever become necessary to give a decided blow to the great empire of the north, this corps would serve as the head of the weapon ; for, we must unhappily repeat, Napoleon cherished in the midst of projects for a sincere peace those warlike ideas which were sooner or later to overthrow the most pacific resolutions.

The three divisions, Morand, Friant, and Gudin, although almost completely organised, yet underwent some modification. One of the regiments of the St. Hilaire division was annexed to them, together with General Bruyère's division of cuirassiers, the light cavalry division of General Jacquinot, and a vast park of siege artillery. The expenses of this superb corps were divided between the kingdom of Westphalia, the Hanse towns, and the places held in pledge. General Gudin was directed to watch Hanover, General Morand the Hanse towns, and General Friant Magdeburg and the Elbe. To Marshal Davout fell the duty of occupying himself under the cold climate of the north with the instruction of the troops and the rigorous application of the laws of blockade.

The divisions of heavy cavalry which had habitually served under Marshal Davout re-entered France, with the exception of the Bruyère division, which remained in the north. The cuirassiers of Spain, now the cuirassiers of Padua, were put upon a peace footing and quartered in Normandy, where fodder abounded. The carabiniers and the cuirassiers, formerly St. Germain, were spread over Lorraine and Alsatia. The men past service returned to their homes with rewards ; the young soldiers were sent back to their dépôts to receive further instructions. The cavalry regiments were reduced from the effective force of 1000 horses to that of about 600. The horses of the artillery, always a source of great expense, were partly sent to Illyria, where they were fed at the cost of a conquered province ; partly to Alsatia and Lorraine, where Napoleon had sometimes thought of entrusting them to the peasants ; partly to Spain, where it was necessary to provide vast parks of artillery for the siege of the fortified places. Finally, the useless staffs were dissolved ; that attached to Davout's corps alone being retained upon a war footing.

Napoleon, willing to grant some repose to the population of the empire, and to permit it to taste the sweets of peace, had resolved to levy no conscription in 1810. He calculated on a double saving, by the reduction of the standing army, and the relinquishment for the present year of the expenses of the equipment of recruits. He had proposed to send to Spain, independently of the guard, which he wished to forward in all its completeness to the Pyrenees, a reinforcement of 100,000 men,

to be followed by a reserve of 30,000, for the supply of which the levies of the preceding and the current years were sufficient. We have seen that the provisional demi-brigades, formed of fourth and fifth battalions, at first led towards Swabia, Franconia, and Flanders, and subsequently turned towards Spain, had been definitely forwarded to the Pyrenees. Napoleon supplied them with all that the dépôts afforded, in order that they might arrive in the Peninsula as complete as possible. He took all the disposable strength to be found in the dépôts of the light cavalry to the twelve regiments of chasseurs and hussars which were still in Spain. He had broken up during the Austrian campaign the twenty-four regiments composing the dragoon force, the third and fourth battalions, in order to conduct them to the Danube in temporary groups. When peace had been concluded, he sent them towards the Pyrenees, drafting into their ranks all the conscripts of the last levies who were suitable for service in this arm; in this manner all the dragoons had been thrown into Spain.

By these various contrivances, in the employment of which he excelled, Napoleon had preserved the nucleus of a powerful army in the north, had surrounded the Hanse towns with a network of troops of observation, had lightened as far as possible the expenses of his armies, and thrown upon the Peninsula all his disposable forces. Spain, he said, must pay the expenses of the war of which she is the theatre and the cause. Napoleon entertained an angry feeling with respect to this war, which made itself felt not only by the country, but by King Joseph himself; for the latter, living in a state of humiliating subjection, and discontented with the arrogance of the French generals towards himself and their excesses against the Spaniards, either affected to, or really did believe, that if left to his own course he could do more by means of his own persuasions towards effecting the pacification of Europe than Napoleon would ever do by his armies, and had drawn upon himself both blame and suspicion.

Napoleon, irritated at the immense expenses which yet left our armies in want of every necessary, wrote to Joseph the most severe and peremptory letters. "The whole revenue of France will not suffice for the expenses of the Spanish army, unless I put to them some limit. My empire is drained of men and money, and I am compelled to pause. The last Austrian war has cost me more than was estimated; the Walcheren expedition has drawn from my treasury the most considerable sums, and if I continue this extravagance my treasury will be completely exhausted. It is necessary, therefore, that the war in Spain should support itself, and that the king should furnish the chief part of the expense of the artillery, the remounts

for the cavalry, of the hospitals, and of the subsistence of the troops. All that I shall be able to afford will be a supply of two millions a month for the pay. I can do no more. Spain is a wealthy country, and well able to bear the expenses of which she is the cause. The king is fond of cherishing at Madrid the favourites to whom he owes no gratitude; let him take care of the soldiers to whom he owes his crown. Should he not do this, I will deprive him of the administration of the Spanish provinces; I will govern them by the hands of my generals, and take care to collect from them, as from all the other countries in which my troops have been quartered, the necessary expenses. Let these intimations be attended to, for my determination is irrevocable, and it is irrevocable because it is founded on unavoidable necessity."

Napoleon had good reason to be uneasy with respect to the finances; for to preserve well organised and well provided the numerous armies by means of which he controlled Europe, from the Vistula to the Tagus, from Calais to the borders of the Save, he had to expend as much gold as men, and in carrying on an actual campaign he was in as much danger of exhausting his treasury as of depopulating the country. He had for many years passed the proper limit of expenses by about fifty millions in time of peace, and about eighty or a hundred in time of war. The last Austrian campaign had cost even more than this last amount, and had been maintained out of the treasury of the army, known by the title of the treasury extraordinary; and this, although very considerable, was now seriously diminished, for it was from this source that Napoleon rewarded his soldiers, furnished grand monuments for the capital, and aided distressed populations. This treasury was reduced, as has already been said, at the moment of the Austrian war, to 292 millions. This war had increased it by 170 millions, the sale of the Spanish wools had added to it ten millions, a cession of the treasure upon the Mount Napoleon, ten millions more, and it had thus reached the amount of 492 millions. Napoleon had borrowed of it eighty-four millions for the Austrian war, twenty-eight for the Louvre and various public buildings, twelve for dotations, four for some extraordinary expenses of the crown, and it was left at 354 millions.

It must be added that this sum did not wholly consist of actual treasure, for it was partly made up of charges on the vanquished States, and the chief of these consisted in the eighty-six millions owed by Prussia, the payment of which Napoleon had some difficulty, as we have seen, in obtaining. And we must observe that the eighty-four millions borrowed of this treasury for the Austrian campaign do not represent

the whole expense of that war, which had amounted altogether to a total of 480 millions.

It was necessary then to husband this treasury extraordinary. Napoleon knew very well that with armies maintained in Illyria, Italy, Germany, Holland, and Spain, although a portion of them were supported by the occupied countries, the sum of 350 millions granted to the two ministers of war would not suffice. He foresaw that an excess of forty or fifty millions would disturb the fictitious balance of the revenue, and he had provided more than one resource by which to supply this amount. These resources consisted, first, of the possessions of the great Spanish families, prosecuted as guilty of high treason, and secondly, of the numerous seizures of the goods of the false neutrals who had thronged all the ports, both of the empire and its allies, which also amounted to several hundred millions. Napoleon hoped, therefore, by observing a rigid economy, to be able to meet the expenses of those armies which the state of Europe, quiet but not resigned, and the Spanish war, successfully prosecuted, but not terminated, required.

We are now able to form some idea on the projects which Napoleon had conceived for putting an end to his long conflict with Europe. The troops which were to evacuate Germany were still to hold the north of the continent in check, and to guard the coasts against British commerce, whilst the young recruits which the Austrian war no longer required were to be incorporated with the old Spanish army, which they would complete and invigorate. He proposed to join his own guard, which he had sent forward in the spring of 1810, after having given it some months of repose, to gather under his own command a hundred thousand men to drive the English into the sea, and by the infliction of a terrible disaster to give an irresistible preponderance to the peace party in the English parliament.

Besides the infliction of a great blow on the English army, Napoleon had resolved on another efficacious means of obtaining peace, and this was the rigorous observance of the continental blockade, which had been maintained with rigour in the ports of old France alone, had been much relaxed in the ports of new France, and had been totally disregarded in the allied States, such as Hanover, Holland, the Hanse towns, and Denmark. His ardour for this kind of warfare was not less than that which he felt for that which is waged on the battlefield. To inflict a great blow on England, it was not only necessary to drive from the continent her cotton fabrics or metallurgical products, but also her colonial merchandise, such as sugar, coffee, unmanufactured cotton, dyes, woods, &c., which constituted the money

with which the inhabitants of the West and East Indies paid for the manufactured products of Manchester and Birmingham. Indeed, not only did its own colonies pay in colonial merchandise, but also the French and Dutch colonies which it had become possessed of, and it was obliged to dispose of this in Europe before it could obtain the price of its commercial and industrial operations. For the disposal of this merchandise, the English had put in practice some sufficiently ingenious contrivances. Thus, besides the great depôt of London, where all the neutrals were obliged to touch to take in a part of their cargo, they had established other depôts at Acre, Malta, and Heligoland, where they accumulated enormous heaps of merchandise, and whither the contraband traders went to obtain the materials for their clandestine traffic. At Heligoland, for example, they had formed a singular establishment. Heligoland is an island situated in the North Sea, opposite the mouth of the Elbe, divided into a low part, where it is easy to disembark from ships, and a high part, with which the only communication is by a ladder of two hundred steps, which could be easily destroyed in a few moments. Six hundred English, provided with a numerous artillery, defended this high part and the magazines which were established there, containing merchandise of the value of three or four hundred millions. An English flotilla cruised constantly about the low part of the island to defend the approaches. It was from them that the contraband traders obtained the merchandise which they carried into the continent in spite of the laws of Napoleon. The farmers who cultivated the lands along the coasts were the receivers of these smuggled goods, which were taken from them during the night and spread abroad far and wide; and this kind of fraud was practised not only in the Hanse towns, but throughout the whole of Holland, notwithstanding its connections with France. The populations of these various countries aided the contrabandists to the utmost of their power, joined with them in assailing the custom-house officers, in disarming them, and seducing them from their duty.

Independently of this contraband trade, almost open smuggling was carried on by pretended neutrals, who introduced the interdicted products in abundance into the ports of France or its allies.

To understand the part played by these false neutrals, we must recall to recollection the English and French decrees, so often cited in this history, and composing then the maritime legislation. The English had in 1806 declared all the ports of France, from Brest to the mouths of the Elbe, in a state of blockade, although they had not sufficient force to close them. Napoleon had immediately replied to this fictitious blockade by a general blockade of the British Isles, had prohibited all

communication with them, and interdicted access to his ports, not only to all English ships, but to all that had touched at her shores or those of her colonies.

To this decree England had replied by those famous orders in council of 1807 which forbade any neutral ship from sailing on the seas which had not touched at the port of London, at Malta, or certain other British ports, for the purpose of having its cargo examined, of paying enormous tolls, and taking out a licence of navigation. It was to this extraordinary assumption of authority over the ocean that Napoleon had replied by his decree of Milan, which declared denationalised and fair prizes whatever ships should have submitted to the rules of this odious legislation.

Between these two tyrannies, therefore, the unhappy mariners of neutral nations found themselves; compelled on the one hand to visit London for the sake of obtaining the required licence, and exposed on the other hand to capture by the French for having taken it. It is impossible to urge any excuse for either of these tyrannical enactments; unless it may be alleged in extenuation of the second of them that it was provoked by the first. The English pushed their demands to the extent that all the naval commerce of the Mediterranean was compelled to touch at Malta, and all that of other seas at London, to obtain the licence without which a vessel was liable to seizure. The Dutch, for example, who obtained the salt which they required for their salted provisions on the coast of France, were forced to pay in London for permission to import this important element of their chief branch of trade.

The Americans, indignant at this double violation of the rights of neutrals, which they chiefly attributed to the fault of the English, whom they considered to have given the first provocation, had passed an act, called the law of embargo, by which they had prohibited their vessels from navigating between France and England, and even from entering Europe. They had thus confined their commerce to their own coasts, and had formed a resolution to manufacture their own cotton, and declared liable to seizure every French or English ship which should touch on the American coasts.

The American owners of privateers, however, less proud than the American government, had to a large extent infringed these laws, which were more dictated by feelings of honour than those of interest. As, therefore, the embargo only referred to those which had entered the ports, the greater number of these persons had kept their vessels afloat on the open sea, in the hope that the new regulations would only last for one or two years, and they went from port to port on account of the houses by which they had been chartered. Almost all

proceeded to England, where they took in cargoes of the colonial produce with which the warehouses of London overflowed, and sometimes on their own account, but more frequently on the account of English, Dutch, Hanseatic, Danish, or Russian merchants, taking out licences, had themselves conveyed by the British fleets, entered Cronstadt, Riga, Dantzic, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Amsterdam, even touched at Antwerp, Havre, and Bordeaux, presented themselves in all these ports as neutrals on the ground of being Americans, declared that they had had no communication with England, were readily believed in Russia, Prussia, at Hamburg, and in Holland, where there existed a great willingness to be deceived, and found little difficulty at Antwerp, Havre, and Bordeaux in setting at defiance the vigilance of the officers of government, who were seldom able by the most minute search to establish the fact of communication with England or submission to its laws.

In the Mediterranean the Greeks, who then laid the foundation of their commercial prosperity under the Ottoman flag, went to Malta for sugar, coffee, and English cottons, which they transported to Trieste, Venice, Naples, Genoa, and Marseilles, giving themselves out to be neutrals on the ground of their being Ottoman, and there was as much difficulty in proving this fraud as in the case of the Americans.

France had a great interest in putting an end to this illegitimate commerce; for if England should be unable to dispose in Europe of the colonial produce which she received from her own colonies, or that which she received in payment for her manufactures from the colonies of other nations, her immense commerce must instantly come to an end. The enormous number of bills, founded on this colonial merchandise, which were deposited in the Bank of England, would have been protested to a greater or less extent, the credit of the bank would have received a blow, and its notes, which, since the suppression of payments in silver, were the only, or at least the chief medium of exchange in England, would have been struck by an immediate discredit. And the exchange on England, which was already very low, the pound sterling, which was usually worth twenty-five francs, being now worth no more than seventeen francs, would have fallen still lower, the bank note would have been at a discount of thirty per cent., the pound sterling would have been worth on the continent no more than fourteen or fifteen francs, and all affairs, both public and private, would have been thrown into confusion. And how, in that case, would it have been possible to procure those productions of which English luxury was unwilling to be deprived even in time of war? How, moreover, could a maintenance have been provided for the English armies in the Peninsula,

which were unable to obtain either bread or wine except by payment? If we consider also that there were in England two political parties, whose strength, generally unequal, was nevertheless frequently balanced on certain questions, and that one of these was eager for war whilst the other was as desirous of peace, we shall be easily able to understand that to add to great military reverses a fresh commercial blow would have been to have given the victory to the peace party, and to have arrived at that moment when, peace prevailing both by sea and land, Napoleon's work would have been at length accomplished.

However violent were the means which Napoleon found himself compelled to employ, we can scarcely fail to excuse them when we reflect on the importance of the ends he had in view. We must even be convinced that his chief mistake consisted in not having sufficiently persevered in carrying out these views. Perceiving immediately that it was scarcely possible to discover whether the pretended neutrals had or had not submitted to the English regulations, he took an important step which at once cut short the difficulty. He was unwilling that either Ottoman or American vessels should be received into the French ports, and determined, with respect to the former, that they should be only received provisionally, that their papers should be sent to Paris, inspected by the director of the customs and by himself, and that they should only be exempted from confiscation on passing satisfactorily this rigorous examination. There was little inconvenience to be feared from treating with severity the Greek pretended Turks, for the Porte interested himself but little in their favour, and was, moreover, held but in little esteem.

With respect to the Americans, the difficulty was greater. They not only visited France, but also Holland, Germany, Prussia, and Russia, countries in which a command to be obeyed required to be supported by plausible reasons and great influence. The American belonged, moreover, to a powerful nation, which required judicious treatment, as there was some chance that by right management it might be induced to declare war against Great Britain. Napoleon prohibited the reception of Americans in the French or quasi-French ports, and insisted that they should not be permitted to enter those of Prussia or Russia, alleging very justly that those who attempted to do so could not but be false Americans. Some of those who took the title had, indeed, assumed it without any just claim, and others were men who, having renounced their own country for a greater or less time, and adopted in its stead the British masts, had no longer any right to the support of their government. It was possible, therefore, to contest their right to the protection of the American flag. In putting an

end to their traffic, the commerce of Great Britain was demolished and reduced to the nocturnal smuggling which took place along the badly watched coasts.

Napoleon went even farther in respect to them, and not contented with closing against them the ports of the continent, ordered their seizure in the ports of France or its dependants, and energetically implored a similar treatment of them in Prussia, Denmark, and Russia; alleging in support of his demand a reason to which he pretended to give more weight than it really had with himself, namely, the seizure in America of the French vessels which, touching at the ports of the Union, had violated the laws of embargo. There were, indeed, three or four which, having had the boldness to venture on the Atlantic, had violated, either consciously or not, this American law, and had been seized; there were these three or four, we say, against the hundreds of American vessels which, having entered the French ports, were seized and sequestered. "It is a real injury," said the American minister, who was charged with the duty of defending at Paris his countrymen—"it is a real injury to us for an imperceptible one suffered by France." "The extent of the injury is nothing," said Napoleon, "the honour of the flag is everything. You have laid your hands on French vessels, under the protection of my flag, and a single touch is sufficient to justify me in seizing the whole American marine, were it in my power." But this was merely an ostensible reason, and Napoleon was not so incensed about the matter as he pretended to be.

He merely sought some specious pretext for seizing in Holland, France, and Italy the numerous American vessels which carried on a fraudulent traffic for the English. He had, in truth, sequestered a considerable number, and found in them what supplied his treasury almost as abundantly as the war contributions which he imposed upon the vanquished. But nevertheless perceiving the advantage he might derive from attaching the Americans to himself, he opened a negotiation with General Armstrong, who represented at Paris the government of the United States, and did not hesitate to admit that his decrees of Berlin were in the nature of an outrage, but an outrage which an outrage had provoked. He maintained that he had no other way of replying to the insolent pretensions of Britain to levying a toll upon the seas, and declared that he was ready to withdraw his decrees as far as the Americans were concerned, if they would undertake to resist British tyranny, and to oblige the British cabinet to withdraw its famous orders in council by the threat of a declaration of war. On this condition, he said, he was ready to restore to the Americans all the rights of neutrals.

This seizure of American vessels was not difficult in France, nor even in the Hanse towns at the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser, where there were encampments of French troops; but it was difficult in Holland, where King Louis opposed the wishes of his brother, and in Denmark, which served as a *depôt* for prohibited merchandise, and distributed it over the continent by the Holstein frontier; in the ports of Prussia, which felt no great anxiety to annoy its own people for the sake of securing a triumph to Napoleon over England, and in the parts of Prussia, which, having an extreme need of commerce with Britain for the disposal of its agricultural products, the sole wealth of its great noblemen, carried on under the American flag a part of that traffic which she had promised at Tilsit and at Erfurth completely to resign.

That he met with resistance in Denmark, in Prussia, and in Russia, Napoleon admitted with scorn and anger; but when he found in Holland, a country vanquished by the arms of France, and bestowed as a kingdom upon one of his brothers, an ill-will more decided than in any other part of the European coast, he could not endure it with patience, and every instant threatened with some overwhelming blow those rash ones who had dared to brave his wrath.

The simple announcement of this source of vexation to him will sufficiently inform us of the motive which led him, in the recent distribution of his troops, to place a part of his ancient division Massena about the frontiers of Holland. Perceiving that he could not prevent the Dutch from engaging in contraband trade, he had issued a decree prohibiting all commercial intercourse with them. This was striking them a death-blow, for being half separated from England by the war, and alienated from the continent by our laws, they were condemned to die of hunger. King Louis had then cast himself at his brother's feet, and promising to alter his line of conduct, had obtained the withdrawal of the decree. But these promises had been broken immediately, and the Americans, despite our proclamations, admitted into all the Dutch ports. At this new act of disobedience, Napoleon, no longer able to restrain himself, had renewed the decree of separation, and openly avowed his intention of reuniting Holland to France.

During some time, indeed, this idea had occupied his mind; for finding that even under his brother's government he was unable to obtain from Holland either efficient naval aid or genuine obedience to his commercial regulations, he prepared to reabsorb it in his empire. The sad and bitter language employed by King Louis was not calculated to make him change his project. His family, however, some remains of affection, and Europe still restrained him. A person of whose

merit he had taken much notice, and who was well acquainted with himself without being less attached to his country, Admiral Verhuel, took pains to prevent so shameful an affair, and entreated the two brothers to meet. Napoleon was averse to this from a fear that he might permit himself to be turned from his purpose when in his brother's presence; and King Louis dreaded no less that he might fall in Paris under a too powerful hand, and was, moreover, unwilling to meet the Queen Hortense, his wife, from whom he lived separated. However, at the instance of Admiral Verhuel, who took for each of the brothers the steps which neither was willing to take for himself, King Louis had quitted the Hague and come to Paris, and as a first act of submission, had consented to the seizure of the American vessels which had entered the ports of Holland.

Napoleon had then employed himself in putting into execution the decrees in the other States of the north. To admit pretended neutrals in order to seize them, was a method which much pleased his unscrupulous spirit in the choice of means; he had had them seized by his own agents in the Hanse towns, and urged both Denmark and Prussia to allow them to enter their ports that they might be able to seize them, reminding them that they would only be seizing English vessels falsely pretending to be American. Denmark and Prussia timidly objected to this demand, that if there were many fraudulent traders there were also many honest ones, and that they took particular care, by a rigid examination of papers, to discover those which had touched at the English coasts. But Napoleon denied that it was possible to make any such distinction, for the least culpable had at any rate violated the American law, which prohibited American ships from visiting Europe. Some sufficiently bad reasons were murmured in answer to this; and a promise was given that his laws should be observed. There was little excuse for Denmark, for England had behaved towards her with implacable enmity, and France, on the other hand, with faithful friendship; the case in question regarded, moreover, the most sacred rights, for every State was interested in resisting the legislation which England desired to establish over maritime commerce. But Prussia, which was vanquished and oppressed, and had little interest in maritime questions, he readily excused for her unwillingness to forward the success of the political combinations of her vanquisher, and for a disinclination to contribute to it by enormous sacrifices. She did not positively refuse, however, to conform to Napoleon's wishes, but evaded explanations, and in fact, admitted the American vessels without detaining them. Napoleon, who himself perused the correspondence of his consuls, and maintained the dispute in person, had proposed to Prussia an agreement worthy of

the contrabandists against whom he waged war. Having heard that a numerous convoy of vessels sailing under the pretended American flag was about to enter the ports of old Prussia, "Let them enter," said Napoleon, "and then detain them; deliver up to me their cargoes, and I will receive them on account of the Prussian debt." And this strange agreement was on the point of succeeding.

Of all this northern coast there remained open to the Americans only Swedish Pomerania, which Napoleon intended to give up to Sweden, in consequence of a revolution which suddenly burst forth, but might have easily been expected under the government of a king whose continual extravagances compromised at times both the dignity and safety of his country.

We have seen how foolishly Gustavus IV. directed his forces in the war of Finland. Enraged against Denmark, instead of turning his attention towards Russia, with whom he might have long disputed the possession of Finland, he had carried the chief part of his forces towards Norway, for the purpose of invading it, and towards the Sound, for the sake of threatening Copenhagen. The Swedes, exasperated at seeing themselves deprived of Finland by this unhappy disposition of their brave troops, revolted against their foolish king. The faithful servants of Gustavus in vain entreated him to make the necessary sacrifices to the wishes of a nation justly enraged. He then fell into a kind of frenzy, cast his sword at an aide-de-camp, and had finally been disarmed, and confined as a madman. In this extremity, the States, in an extraordinary assembly, declared him incapable of reigning, and called to the throne his uncle, the Duke of Sudermanie, a wise and gentle prince, who, during the minority of the dethroned king, had already governed the kingdom with great prudence. To avoid the most imminent misfortunes, the new monarch immediately concluded peace with Russia and France.

Finland was the cost to Sweden of peace with Russia; but peace with France obtained for her, on the other hand, the restitution of Pomerania, and of the port of Stralsund, taken by the French in 1807, and occupied by them during the next three years. But Napoleon had made this restitution on condition that English vessels should be absolutely denied entrance into the Swedish ports, especially that of Stralsund, the most important of all, since it was situated on the German continent, and was in a position to neutralise the whole system of continental blockade. Unhappily it happened that after the loss of Finland, Sweden could feel no sacrifice more severely than that of the English commerce. At this epoch almost all the peoples of the Baltic, rich in agricultural products, and in things essential to maritime commerce, such as iron, wood, hemp, pitch,

and tar, were unable to do without both England and France, and certainly required commercial intercourse with either the one or the other. To be embroiled with France left them at liberty to trade with England, and rendered them, moreover, the medium of a profitable contraband commerce. But to be embroiled with England closed against them the British ports, without opening to them those of France, which were in a strict state of blockade, so that a misunderstanding with England was equivalent to a rupture with both these powers. The Swedes, after having promised to Napoleon to break with the English, effectually closed against them the great depôt of Gothenburg, so conveniently situated for contraband purposes. But they had immediately permitted them to transfer this depôt to the isles in the neighbourhood of Gothenburg, and following the example of all the humble dwellers on the shores of the Baltic, involved themselves in embarrassments with France by means of forced promises perpetually violated.

Napoleon, who received very exact information from his consuls, was excessively displeased on learning that he was deceived in Sweden, as in the case of other nations, reiterated the motives which had induced him to declare war against Gustavus IV., and to conclude a peace with the Duke of Armaine, and announced his determination to reoccupy Swedish Pomerania, and to declare war once more against Sweden itself, whatever might be thought of it by the northern cabinets, if his injunctions with respect to British commerce were not exactly observed.

Of all the northern cabinets, one only, that of Russia, made a show of resistance. This cabinet, dissembling its displeasure at the proceedings of Napoleon in respect to the marriage question, and at his refusal to ally himself with her in respect to the Polish question, and dissembling also the uneasiness with which it viewed the recent intimacy which had sprung up between France and Austria, had good reasons for doing so for a time; for she was anxious to put an end to the war with the Turks, and to ensure the acquisition of Moldavia and Wallachia. But yet, although resolved to endure much, Alexander sustained the pride of a great nation, as well as that which filled his own heart.

Offended at the sovereignty which Napoleon pretended to exercise over all the coasts of the north, from Amsterdam, Bremen, Hamburg, as far as Riga, and even to St. Petersburg, Alexander yet submitted to it patiently that he might keep the more clearly in view the objects of his eastern policy; but a sentiment of self-respect which was easy to be aroused, and agricultural and commercial interests which could not be so readily brought forward, made him desirous that Napoleon

should behave with some moderation in respect to the ports in his own States. He urged, therefore, in reply to the French cabinet, the reason which had been adduced by all the other powers, and which availed nothing as long as the American law of embargo was in force, namely, that all the American vessels were not sailing under false colours, that there were amongst them some which traded in good faith, that he admitted them alone into his ports, and that being entirely deprived of all commerce with Great Britain, he was especially anxious to continue that with America. This argument was faulty, because the law of embargo rendered every American vessel trading in Europe a contraband trader; and it was, moreover, a matter of notoriety that the English did not permit a single vessel to escape without paying the navigation toll, or being freighted with English merchandise.

Unhappily Napoleon, from his immediate desire of laying hold of every possible advantage, had, by granting licences of communication with Great Britain, put a very plausible argument into the mouths of those who nullified the continental blockade. These exceptions of his to his own system brought him into a position not a little embarrassing.

The English were in great need of corn towards the end of 1809, and were at all times in want of the dockyard materials procured from the north. They had therefore permitted all vessels, whether of a hostile country or not, to bring them corn, wood, hemp, pitch, and tar, levying a toll upon them, which ultimately fell upon themselves, as it raised the price of these materials which were so necessary to them. In consequence of this interested toleration, there could be seen upon the quays of the Thames vessels from Belgium, Holland, the Hanse towns, Denmark, and Russia, all which countries were at war with England. Napoleon, perceiving the absolute necessity to the English of the materials which they procured in so exceptional a manner, had formed the plan of deriving a profit by forcing them to purchase French products, and had accordingly granted free passage to vessels which, whilst they carried wood, hemp, and corn, made up their cargo with silks, woollens, wines, brandy, cheeses, &c. He permitted them to bring in return certain fixed articles, not the tissues of Manchester, or the hardwares of Birmingham, not coffees or sugars, but certain things which our manufacturers wanted, such as indigo, cochineal, fish oils, leather, &c. As, therefore, French vessels were to be seen in England, so were English vessels to be seen in France, trading under the protection of passports called licences. The French ships, in fact, being compelled to carry silks with their cargoes of corn, transferred them at the mouth of the Thames to the contrabandists who undertook this clandestine

introduction into the country. The English, in their turn, presented themselves in our ports with the permitted articles only, having entrusted to the smugglers on our coasts the cotton stuffs with which they had also been charged. This was a species of traffic which tainted commerce with corruption, habituating it to falsehood, and even to forgery, for there were in London persons who prosecuted the trade of manufacturing false ships' papers. Very great inconveniences resulted, moreover, from this system, in exchange for very slight advantages, for in France the trade under the protection of licences did not exceed 20,000,000, exports and imports together, from 1809 to 1810. But the great misfortune of this species of commerce was that it placed France in a contradictory position with respect to her own decrees, which was perfectly unsustainable in the presence of those from whom she demanded the most rigorous observance of the laws of the continental blockade.

"You require," remonstrated Russia, "that I should forbid my subjects to have any communication with Great Britain; that I should prevent them from selling their cereal products, and the dockyard materials, for which they can only find purchasers in the British merchants; that I should refuse them permission to receive in exchange the sugars, coffees, and woven fabrics, of which they are in the utmost need; whilst you, on your part, do not hesitate to carry over to England your silks, cloths, and wines, and to receive in return the sugars and coffees which are so strictly excluded by your laws from the rest of the continent. Be not, then, so rigorous towards others, so indulgent to yourselves, especially since the others have scarcely any interest, and you have an immense one in the universal observance of this system!"

This argument had a force which Napoleon in vain attempted to ignore, and he replied to it with anger, being unable to meet it with good reasons. "All that is said of my system of licences is false," he said, in answer to Russia; "I do not introduce sugar and coffee into France; but the English having need of our corn, I turn their wants to our profit by obliging them to receive silks, cloths, and wines, and I receive in return articles indispensable to French manufacturing industry, especially 'guineas,' which are exported by smugglers, and the loss of which must materially help to deteriorate the English exchange."

There was a certain amount of truth in this answer, but such as it did contain only proved how insignificant was this trade which was carried on under the protection of licences, which produced little profit and much inconvenience, and furnished the numerous opponents of the continental blockade with the most embarrassing arguments.

In the meantime Napoleon, persisting in his system, watching

himself the coasts of France and the allied countries, reading every day the statements of the arrival and the departure of ships, demanding the admission of French custom-house officers and troops into Holland, charging Marshal Davout with the duty of watching Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck, making preparations for the reoccupation of Swedish Pomerania, forcing Prussia to close Colberg and Königsberg, urging Russia, without, however, pressing her too closely, to close Riga and St. Petersburg, was on the point of obtaining the most important results from his plans. It was, no doubt, possible that there might still remain some half-open outlets for the products of British industry; but these products being obliged to ascend to distant northern points by sea, that they might be conveyed overland to the south, would arrive at their destination so burdened with costs of conveyance that the sale of them would be impossible. The continental blockade, thus enforced, could not fail, as we shall presently see, to reduce Great Britain to a state of insupportable distress, had it been maintained with perseverance, but also without provoking a war with the north.

Whilst Napoleon endeavoured to force the English to peace by means of a great reverse in the Peninsula, and by a ruinous system of attacks on commerce, he was not less active in the meantime in the conduct of the internal affairs of his empire. At length he grappled with the great religious question, which was not the least of those which drew forth the fiery impetuosity of his character.

The Pope, transported to Savona, was still a prisoner, and obstinately refused to perform the functions of the apostolic chair. There was no schism, as in the last period of the Revolution, when the clergy, divided amongst themselves and causing divisions amongst the faithful, avenged themselves by the perplexity which they caused to the State for the persecutions which it had caused them to suffer. The clergy of the present time were united, tranquil, submissive, kept to a uniform method of religious worship, were ignorant of, or feigned to be ignorant of the bull of excommunication hurled against Napoleon, and were tolerably unanimous in blaming the Pope for having recourse to this extreme measure, which must necessarily either expose the weakness of the spiritual arms, or cause a quarrel with government, which, despite all its faults, they regarded as still necessary to the security of all. Nevertheless those who held those opinions disapproved very strongly of the seizure of the Pope, deplored his imprisonment, and desired the end of a state of things which was afflicting to all good Catholics, and must sooner or later degenerate into schism. There was a unanimous wish that the Pope and the emperor should come to an understanding, and that the former should obtain such

an establishment as was suitable to the head of the Church, whilst there existed neither any expectation nor even desire that he should obtain the re-establishment of his temporal power, now regarded as utterly overthrown. A singular state of things! Under the control of an all-powerful government, the Church, forgetting at the moment how far the temporal power of the papacy was necessary to the independent action of their spiritual power—the Church, once so exacting, was willing that the Pope should renounce his States, and content himself with a considerable establishment, which, however magnificent, could only be as that of the ancient patriarchs who resided with the emperor at Constantinople.

Such was the advice of the great majority of the clergy. But there was a zealous minority which had resisted the Concordat, which shared all the hatreds of the ancient royalists, portrayed in dark colours the sufferings of the Pope, and was active in promulgating the bull of excommunication. It maintained that to lay hands on the domain of St. Peter was to attack the faith, that the Pope whilst imprisoned ought to refuse to perform any pontifical act, and that the clergy, deprived of intercourse with their head, should refuse to administer the sacrament. In short, as formerly the parliaments, for the purpose of vanquishing the crown, pretended to stop the course of public justice, so now this portion of the priesthood was anxious, as a means of embarrassing Napoleon, to suspend the exercise of the religious offices.

On the very day even of his marriage Napoleon met with an example of the annoyances which these malcontent priests, leagued with the old royalists, were able to cause him. He had, as we have already said, summoned to Paris the greater part of the dignitaries of the papal government, and had already assembled around him twenty-eight cardinals, who assisted almost every Sunday in the performance of mass in his chapel, although he was excommunicated. On the day of his marriage thirteen out of the twenty-eight cardinals failed to attend the ceremony. The motive of this absence was not given, but it was intended to intimate to the people that without the Pope's concurrence Napoleon was unable to obtain a divorce, and that as the first marriage was still binding on him, this second was irregular. But this motive rested on no real foundation, for the divorce which was refused by the Church could not have been pronounced by the Pope, and every species of ecclesiastical jurisdiction having been exhausted, the marriage with Josephine had been annulled by the ordinary jurisdiction. But although false, this motive, rather pointed at than alleged, tended to nothing less than to place the august princess whom the court of Austria had bestowed upon Napoleon in the position of his

concubine, and to render illegitimate the heir of the empire whom France was expecting with so much impatience.

Napoleon, whose eye nothing escaped, had perceived during the nuptial ceremony that all the red robes, as he called them, were not present. "Count them," he said to a prelate of his chapel; and having become certain that thirteen of the twenty-eight were absent, he cried out half aloud, with a vehemence which he could not restrain: "The fools! they are always the same! ostensibly submissive! secretly factious! . . . But they shall find to their cost what it is to jest with my power!" The ceremony was scarcely concluded, when he sent for the minister of police, and ordered him to arrest the thirteen cardinals, to strip them of their purple (whence they were afterwards known by the name of the black cardinals), to scatter them amongst the various provinces, to place them under the surveillance of the police, and to sequester not only their ecclesiastical revenues, but also their private property.

In this most violent manner was met this most imprudent and blamable opposition. Amongst the thirteen cardinals was Cardinal Oppizoni, whom Napoleon, notwithstanding certain stains upon his private character, had made Archbishop of Bologna, cardinal and senator. The ungrateful prelate, being threatened with the severest penalties if he did not give in his resignation of all his dignities immediately, resigned. Overwhelmed with terror, he resigned all that he was required with torrents of tears, and immediately quitted Paris to be partly an exile, partly a prisoner, in the retreat which was assigned him.

The day following these deplorably violent proceedings, the secret instigators of the whole affair rejoiced in the accusation of adultery which it in some degree threw out against the marriage, the fruit of which was to inherit the empire, and in the outrageous exercise of power which it had excited, and flattered themselves that these events would furnish an infinite number of sources of annoyance to the detested government. That portion of the clergy which was not yet blinded by party spirit was equally grieved at the cause of offence and at the chastisement which had followed it, and was exceedingly anxious to see the end of a state of things which was very likely to produce the most disastrous consequences. But it was difficult to incline the emperor to moderation, the Pope to submission; and the solution of this difficulty offered the only means by which some agreement could be come to between these two spiritual and temporal chiefs.

The Pope at Savona, although closely watched, found means to communicate with the zealous Catholic party, and well comprehending the tactics of the moment, refused to perform any

political act. He would neither consent to institute the new bishops appointed by Napoleon, by which twenty-seven chairs were already vacant, nor continue to the existing bishops the power of granting certain licences, especially marriage licences; and thus, as far as he was able, checked the exercise of religious worship in France—a state of things which would either turn to the injury of religious worship itself or to the injury of the government, according as the people took the part of the Pope or the emperor. Pius VII. living in the episcopal palace of Savona, passing the days in saying mass and in giving his benediction to those who often came from afar to receive it, received politely, but sadly, the authorities, and replied, when urged to perform the most indispensable of the pontifical functions, that he was not free, and moreover, lacked counsel, since the cardinals were prisoners, or assembled around the imperial throne, that in this state of isolation he was unable to perform any act that would avail anything, and that he was even unable to err, so completely was he deprived of the lights of the Church.

Napoleon, informed of all that the Pope did and said, was not behind him in finesse, and declared that he was willing to wait until the Pope became reasonable, and would continue to manage the affairs of the Church in a manner which was certainly only temporary, but which would amply suffice for some time to come. He then ordained silence respecting ecclesiastical affairs, and for the space of a twelvemonth abstained from any interference with them, and this not only from policy, but also because he was quite unable to attend to all the affairs which were constantly accumulating on his hands, even since the conclusion of the Austrian war. Nevertheless he was anxious to put an end to his quarrel with the Pope, and to extend to the Church that peace which he desired to bestow on Europe.

The Pope, who in the midst of his most fervent prayers felt the weight of his chains, saw an innumerable number of important questions solving themselves, and beheld the progress of a long train of treaties, divorces, and marriages, began to be impatient, and at length almost flew into a passion. "They think of everything," said he, "except God! busy themselves about every kind of business except that of the Church. But even they have some temporal importance, and it will be discovered when once the course of prosperity is checked. They wish to push me to extremity! Ah, well, I will employ a new species of weapon, and have recourse to those means which God has placed in my hands for the salvation of His Church." . . . And without explaining himself further, the unfortunate pontiff intimated in threatening terms that he would provoke a schism

by a solemn appeal to consciences, and would place the imperial government in the embarrassing position in which the revolutionary government had found itself, for where schism is, civil war is not far off. After the utterance of these threats he fell back into his dejected and gentle manner, engaged in long conversations with the prefect, and constantly asked how it was that this General Bonaparte, to whom he had shown so much affection, whose elevation he had so assiduously favoured, and for whose sake he had braved so much opposition in order to go to Paris to consecrate him, could repay his services by such gross ingratitude; oppressing and humbling that Church which he had formerly so courageously re-established by the glorious act of the Concordat? . . . And he displayed the most profound astonishment at such opposite modes of acting. M. de Chabral offered him consolation, calmed his excitement, and persuaded him to hope that everything would be soon arranged, without particularising the conditions, but leaving him to guess that they would consist of the resignation of his temporal power. Of this the Pope took no notice, pretending that it was respecting his spiritual power alone that he felt any solicitude.

It was necessary, however, that some arrangement should be come to. Napoleon was well aware that the temporary arrangements for the government of the Church were very insufficient, and obstinately opposed. Twenty-seven of the bishoprics of the empire had become vacant since the rupture with Rome; and it need not be said, the absence of the bishop or his representative not only throws the ecclesiastical business of the diocese into confusion, and leaves its clergy ungoverned, but also suspends certain civil processes, since amongst Catholics the progress of civil life is conducted under the consecration of religion. But a more serious case than the absence of a bishop is that of the presence of one who is not recognised by the faithful. And this was, in fact, the danger threatened by the vacancy of these twenty-seven vacant dioceses, for Napoleon, who was not disposed to let his prerogatives lie idle, had lost no time in providing new incumbents. He had proposed to the Pope that he should confer canonical institution upon these nominated prelates, with the understanding that the pontiff might be at liberty to omit in the bulls of institution the name of the sovereign whose acts he thus confirmed. Napoleon could indulge in this modesty without endangering his authority, but he was unwilling, and with reason, that the Pope should employ for these cases the forms which he used when the twofold right of nomination and institution united in his own person—the form, namely, entitled *de propria motu*. It was this form which the Pope had used in the case of M.

de Pradt when he was transferred from the bishopric of Poitiers to that of Malines. Napoleon rejected these bulls, which did not only omit but negatived his authority, and desired that the twenty-seven prelates whom he had nominated should, although not yet instituted, enter upon the government of their dioceses. He discovered an expedient which might enable them to do this in the ancient usages of the Church, and had them endowed with the rank of vicars capitular.

When a bishopric became vacant by the death of the bishop, the chapter of the diocese used to elect, by the title of vicar capitular, a temporary administrator of the affairs of the diocese, who should fulfil the episcopal functions even to the installation of a new bishop, but who, nevertheless, was to limit himself to those acts, the performance of which was absolutely necessary, whilst he enjoyed none of the episcopal honours. In former times the person who had received the nomination to a bishopric was sometimes elected vicar capitular, and thus entered at once on the immediate possession of his see. Napoleon being unable to obtain the necessary bulls, was anxious that the objects of his nomination should be thus elected vicars capitular; but he had met in almost every quarter with the most determined resistance. The chapters had generally elected their vicar capitular before the arrival of the emperor's nomination. This previous election was put forward as a reason against proceeding to a second, or in some bolder instances it was objected that the method of proceeding was but an indirect means of usurping the papal functions, and it was denied that the rules of the Church would permit the nominated bishops to take the character of vicars capitular. Good or true or not, this allegation suited the purpose of those who saw that in complying with the provincial administration of the ecclesiastical affairs they were depriving the Pope of his most effectual means of checking Napoleon in the course he was now taking. But the means adopted were perilous, for it was no easy matter to oppose a man like Napoleon; and to disturb the exercise of religious worship was not very consistent with piety. In vain did some enlightened priests, recalling the fact that Henry VIII. had been able, for his own shameful reasons, to drag from the bosom of the Catholic Church one of the greatest nations of the globe, declare that Napoleon might bring greater evils on the faith than were ever caused to it by the English monarch, especially since there was more to be feared from an age that was indifferent than from a hostile one. But the instigators of the clerical opposition, blinded by their passions, and caring little for the danger of religion, made Paris itself the theatre of this perilous conflict.

The circumstances which took place with respect to this important diocese present the most striking picture of the state of the French Church at this period, and of the relations in which Napoleon stood towards it.

The archbishopric of Paris had become vacant, and Napoleon had nominated to it the Cardinal Fesch, his uncle. Scarcely had the cardinal's nomination taken place when he, as Napoleon's brothers on their thrones, had devoted himself, not to showing his gratitude to his nephew, but to making himself popular in his diocese. He had, as we have elsewhere said, suddenly changed from being simply a contractor to the army to a most zealous Catholic and austere prelate, and was eager to make himself the idol of the clergy, as Louis was of the Dutch, Joseph of the Spaniards, and Murat of the Neapolitans; and whilst he displayed the utmost submission in the presence of his terrible nephew, he never failed to groan behind his back over the misfortunes of the Church, and to swear that he would rather endure martyrdom than the dictates of tyranny. Napoleon, indignant at such presumption and ingratitude, treated him with severity; and especially when he was parading his recently acquired theological knowledge, would the emperor inquire how he had come by his learning, and whether it were the result of his speculations in the soldier's bread! "Bring to me," he would say, "l'Abbé Emery or M. Duvoisin; they know what they are talking about, and are worth the trouble of being listened to." The Abbé Emery, a clever priest, full of fervour, which did not darken his understanding, having refused every mitre which had been offered to him, that he might continue to be superior of the seminary of St. Sulpice, was the beloved head of the establishment which had supplied almost all France with clergy and prelates. He was at least a royalist and the enemy of Napoleon, who knew the fact without caring much about it. M. Duvoisin, the Bishop of Nantes, was a prelate faithful in the performance of his duties, profoundly learned, and endowed with a keen intellect. It was his opinion that instead of striving to weaken the emperor's power, the clergy should rather seek to moderate its exercise, give it a right direction, and turn it to the advantage of the Church. Napoleon liked to listen to M. Emery, but he only followed the counsels of M. Duvoisin; and as for his uncle, he never paid the least attention either to his words or his advice.

After having nominated Cardinal Fesch, who was already Archbishop of Lyons, to the archbishopric of Paris, he desired that he should enter upon his see, and govern it as though regularly instituted. The cardinal hesitated to take this step, from the twofold reason that he was unwilling to displease the clergy, and was also anxious to remain for some time in pos-

session of the two archbishoprics, which were the richest sees in the empire. This plurality of sees was not without precedent; but the Pope had refused to sanction it, and had demanded that the cardinal should choose between either Paris or Lyons, whilst he refused him institution to either, as he had refused it to the other newly nominated prelates.

The cardinal determined to keep the archbishopric of Lyons, to which he had been both nominated and instituted, persisted in calling himself Archbishop of Lyons, and simply administrator of the diocese of Paris. And to render the position which he had assumed the more manifest, he declined to inhabit the archiepiscopal palace of Paris, preferring to lodge in an hotel which he possessed in the Rue du Mont Blanc. Whilst Napoleon permitted the affairs of the Church to languish uncared for, he acquiesced in the cardinal's equivocal conduct. But when the moment arrived in which he gave his serious attention to matters ecclesiastical, he happened to go to Notre Dame on some business or other, and not being able to find the cardinal there, felt the inconvenience of the position taken up by his uncle, and said that when he honoured the clergy of the metropolis with a visit, he expected to find the archbishop at the foot of the towers of Notre Dame. He then caused the cardinal to be asked which of the two benefices he had decided upon keeping. Obligated to make a choice, the cardinal uncle decided, in accordance with his policy of conciliating the orthodox clergy, upon retaining the see of Lyons, as being that with which he had been canonically invested. Immediately a cry was raised in all the sacristies of France in praise of a prelate so disinterested, so faithful to the Church, so courageous and self-denying. The reply of Napoleon to all was the choice of a successor, which could not fail to excite his uncle's jealousy to the utmost. He nominated Cardinal Maury to the archbishopric of Paris.

This illustrious defender of the Church, who, in the constituent assembly, had displayed so great an amount of eloquence, spirit, and courage, and who by his sallies of wit and sang-froid had defended the clergy as a gentleman of the school of Voltaire might have defended the aristocracy, had retired to Rome, where during the space of fifteen years he had consoled himself for his exile by the enjoyment of the belles-lettres. He accepted with gladness the opportunity of revisiting his country, and because he showed towards Napoleon some gratitude for this permission to return, he lost in a single day the glory of the splendid struggle he had maintained; and he who had been the idol as well of the clergy as the royalists, became at once the object of their disdain, and even hatred. His character had some of those defects which are frequently found in the company of talent, and even of piety; he was addicted to the pleasures of the table, and

enjoyed free conversation. His residence in Italy had not cured him of these defects, and they furnished some hypocrites with subjects of slander against him. He had, moreover, notwithstanding his energy and fame, but little influence with the clergy. Cardinal Fesch, in particular, cherished against him the liveliest dislike.

This nomination had been scarcely signed, when Napoleon demanded that Cardinal Maury should be invested with the administration of the diocese; and this demand the chapter did not dare to oppose, but they accompanied their compliance with an amount of shuffling and trickery which was as degrading to the imperial authority and the clergy as to the cardinal.

Cardinal Maury hastened to write to the Pope, appealing to his old friendship, and endeavouring to obtain, in default of bulls, at least a provisional institution into the see of Paris. The Pope's reply was awaited without much expectation that it would be of a favourable nature.

It was very manifest that all kinds of difficulties arose from this provisional administration of sees, but Napoleon cared little for this, as he believed that he was on the point of coming to a speedy arrangement with the Pope; to overcome labour by the resolutions which he had already taken, and from which no one could hope that he would recede, he hastened to convert into an organic law the annexation of the Roman States. The Duchies of Parma and Placentia were already united under the title of the department of Taro, and that of Tuscany under the titles of the departments of the Arno, the Ombrone, and the Mediterranean. On this occasion the Roman States were arranged as the departments of Thrasimene and the Tiber. In the *senatus-consultum*, one of the most celebrated and the most remarkable of the time, he declared Rome the second city of the empire; and decreed that the heir to the throne, whose approaching birth he announced as though he were acquainted with the secrets of nature, should bear the title of King of Rome, and be consecrated successively in Notre Dame and St. Peter's. He decided, moreover, that a prince of the blood should always hold a court at Rome; that the Popes should reside near the emperors, should hold their sees in Rome and in Paris alternately, in the enjoyment of a rich endowment, and should swear fealty to the empire; and that all the establishments of the Roman Chancery were to be transferred to Paris, and become institutions of the empire. Having made these decisions, Napoleon gave orders for the immediate commencement of preparations at the archi-episcopal palace at Paris, at the Pantheon and St. Denis, for the reception of the pontifical government and the pontiff himself. He projected also works at Avignon, that the Pope, although generally

residing at Paris, near himself, might be able occasionally to visit the various ancient residences of the papacy.

It is difficult to persuade ourselves that we are not dreaming when we listen to the recital of what the Church itself was far from considering as impossible. But Napoleon believed that after some few days' wonder, people would become accustomed to the new state of things; that the Pope, residing near him, would become more tractable; that the cardinals, dwelling in France, would become imbued with a French spirit; and that, in short, the world, dazzled by this prodigious spectacle, which recalled in so striking a manner the Empire of the West, would involuntarily salute him with that title for which he was so eager, in exchange for which he was willing to sacrifice everything, even his empire itself—the title of Emperor of the West.

Strongly imbued with this idea, Napoleon, whose only anxiety was now respecting an arrangement with the Pope, which he believed to be now at hand, devoted himself to ecclesiastical affairs, and hastened to arrange the ecclesiastical establishment which it would be necessary to leave at Rome; so setting aside what was old, and establishing what was new, that the Pope, finding at the commencement of the conferences that all the new plans had been carried out, should be compelled to accept as irrevocably accomplished those changes which he most disliked.

There were in the Roman province thirty sees for a population of 800,000 inhabitants, many of which, under the name of *Sièges Suburbicaires*, furnished titles and endowments for the principal members of the sacred college. Besides these there were an immense number of richly endowed convents and benefices. Napoleon made no delay in abolishing all the sees of the Roman States, with the exception of three, which were each endowed with an income of thirty thousand francs; he suppressed the monasteries and nunneries, granting annuities to the members of the suppressed establishments, required the oath of fealty from all incumbents of benefices, and sent into exile all who refused to take it. He ordered likewise the suppression of the religious orders of Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia, sparing only some nunneries and some establishments devoted to the cause of benevolence; sequestered the whole ecclesiastical property of Rome, which amounted to 250 millions, devoting 100 millions to the payment of the Roman debt, the maintenance of hospitals, the foundation of new sees, the support of the clergy who had been retained in their benefices, and incorporating the remaining 150 millions with the State property.

These decrees, which were issued with incredible prompti-

tude, were sent to Rome to be put into execution. Three columns of infantry were directed towards Rome from Ancona, Bologna, and Perouse, to afford General Miollis a reinforcement of 9000 or 10,000 men, in case he should require it, to keep in check a population completely under the influence of the monks. He received instructions to act with decision. "By reason of the peace," said Napoleon, "I have both leisure and troops at my disposal, and I intend to employ both to put an end to the present unsettled state of affairs. Within two months I will treat with the Pope, and it will be necessary that, whether willing or unwilling, he should see reason to assent to the changes which I have made in the Church establishment.

Napoleon had intended to send some cardinals and bishops to Savona, to convince the Pope that it was time that an understanding should be come to, since the most sacred interests received injury from the protracted dissensions; to assure him that the dogmas of religion were not in the least interfered with, and to express a conviction that a Pope truly attached to the faith would not compromise its welfare on account of interests purely temporal; to declare that it was impossible not to see that Napoleon was appointed by Providence to re-establish the Church, to guard it well, and to extend its influence as well by the creation of new curés as by the establishment of a religious element in education; to hint that the contest between the Pope and the emperor was not regarded as a religious but as a political one, and that wherever the faith prevailed the Pope would be blamed for sacrificing its interests to his own temporal principality; and finally, that it would be to his advantage, before Napoleon was provoked to follow the example of Henry VIII. and to declare himself the head of the Church, to sacrifice his temporal power, which was already irretrievably lost, to the preservation of his spiritual power, which was not yet threatened, and by accepting the same position as that which was held by his predecessors under the emperors of the west, to retire from an obstinate course which might lead to the withdrawal from the bosom of the Church of two-thirds of Europe. Such were the reasons which Napoleon wished to be urged with the Holy Father, and they appeared so plausible that the greater part of the European clergy considered them not only maintainable, but even conclusive. Napoleon selected the Cardinals Spina and Caselli, who were supposed to be in favour with the Pope, to visit him and to make the first overtures to an agreement, if they found him in a well-disposed mood; but if the Pope should display an inflexible obstinacy, Napoleon determined to have recourse to a means which was in common use in the ancient Empire of the West, namely, the convocation of a council, which he

flattered himself would be entirely submissive to his will. He would take this method of giving such a peace to the Church as he had given to Europe, tracing its conditions with the point of his sword.

Such were the efforts which Napoleon made at this moment to carry on the Spanish war with vigour, and to enforce the strict observance of the continental blockade, that by the one means or the other might be obtained the maritime peace which was so essential to that of Europe. Such were his endeavours to appease religious differences, to give a settled organisation to his vast empire, and so to arrange all things that at length with the crown of Charlemagne on his brow he might sit on the throne of a peaceful Empire of the West.

Whilst he was prosecuting these various undertakings his brother Louis arrived in Paris, and the serious question respecting Holland, which was to be for Europe the drop of water which would make the vase overflow, began to demand serious attention. King Louis arrived in France with a disposition to ill-humour, which nothing he would meet with there was at all likely to dissipate. This singular prince, endowed with a noble spirit, loving the right, but regarding it with a distorted vision, liberal in theory, but despotic in temperament, brave and yet not warlike, of simple tastes and yet consumed with the desire of reigning, distrustful of himself and yet full of the most irritable *amour propre*, possessing the energy natural to a Bonaparte, and turning it to his own ceaseless torment, believing himself devoted to unhappiness, and indulging in the idea that his whole family was engaged in a conspiracy against him, and still further steeped in this depression of spirits by the bad state of his health, was entrusted with the government of a kingdom which was destined sooner or later to be the source of the greatest misfortunes to the empire, and which was in a condition as miserable as his own; but whose miseries had an earlier date than either the continental blockade, the French empire, or the French Revolution.

The Dutch, established on a region which was neither sea nor land, had with admirable art converted sandy tracts into ample pastures, and were by turns fishermen, agriculturists, graziers, and merchants. Carrying for sale in all directions by means of their ships the fish which they caught upon their coasts, and the produce of their farms, they formed business connections with the most widely distant countries, and soon became the commercial agents of all nations, conveying to each the products of the others, furnishing the south with the wood, iron, corn, and hemp of the north, and from the south receiving in return wine, oil, silks, and cloths; traversing every sea in their maritime enterprises, carrying to the Indies the

industrial products of Europe, and bringing to Europe the Indian spices. They thus became the earliest merchants, and in the course of time the keenest and the richest. Very courageous and determined to defend their wealth by sea and land, republican, free and eloquent, but capable of keeping their passions in subjection, fond of the arts, and practising them with an originality due to their soil and habits, they had displayed all the phases of war, liberty, and civilisation; and after having shaken off the yoke of Spain, checked the dominion which France was extending over Europe, and contended with Louis XIV., who had humbled them, and whom they had humbled in their turn, they had finished by giving to England for kings those princes whom she had only condescended to make stadtholders.

But from nations as from individuals all things pass away—youth, glory, fortune, power. Salt fish and cheeses, which were the origin of the enormous Dutch commerce, were not sufficient to furnish an enduring foundation. Their industry had been employed in the conveyance of the industrial products of one nation to another, and Cromwell had inflicted upon them a mortal injury by his navigation law, that one nation should only convey to another its own productions. This principle being soon generally adopted, the Dutch, whose vessels had only entered foreign ports laden with foreign products, saw their commerce rapidly decline; for whilst England was thus closed against them, the heaviness of the dues in their ports turned the trade with Germany to the towns of Bremen and Hamburg, which were less exorbitant in their demands, and conveniently placed upon the Wesel and the Elbe. And as the wars which had been waged between Frederick the Great and his powerful allies had been carried on without the intervention of Holland on either side, its importance had suffered much diminution, and its political power had fallen as low as its commercial power.

But if everything suffers change, the change is not necessarily sudden. Its ancient wealth had not departed from Holland without leaving considerable opulence and abundant sources of prosperity. It possessed numerous colonies, an active commerce in colonial products, and an immense capital, the fruit of economy. The sugar and coffee trade was in their own hands. Whoever had any to sell was sure to find amongst the vast warehouses of Rotterdam and Amsterdam purchasers who would pay in ready money, and could afford to wait until a rise in the price made its resale profitable. The Dutch thus became the greatest speculators of all the world in colonial produce; they were thence led to manipulate the articles of which they possessed such immense stores, and became the best refiners of sugar, and

the most expert dressers of tobacco; and finally, turning to advantage the immense wealth which their economy had gradually amassed, and which was exceeded by the requirements of their commerce, they made loans to the governments of all nations, until at length the making of loans became the chief element of their mercantile activity.

By these means the population of Holland had succeeded in maintaining a considerable degree of opulence up to the period of the French Revolution, at which time it was composed of two classes—an upper bourgeoisie, entirely devoted to the government of the stadtholder, and to the English, whose manners it imitated, and filled with prejudices against France which had their origin in the time of Louis XIV.; and a lower bourgeoisie which detested the stadtholders, disliked the English, and had a strong feeling in favour of the French, which was chiefly grounded on their having escaped in 1789 from the double bondage of royalty and English supremacy.

But the favour with which France had been regarded by the Dutch democracy was of short duration, and entirely vanished when it beheld her passing from a state of sanguinary liberty to subjection beneath a soldier's rule—especially as in the new state of affairs Holland became her subject. Almost the whole commercial vigour of the country had suddenly failed; the maritime war had almost entirely stopped the progress of commercial navigation. The intercourse which Amsterdam and Rotterdam had held with England, and which was so necessary to them, could now only be continued clandestinely; speculations in colonial produce and sugar-refining had become almost valueless. The traffic in tobacco had received what was nearly a death-blow by the French regulation, which gave to France its exclusive sale. The fisheries, already greatly injured by the English, had completely failed from want of the salt necessary to the curing of their products, since it had to be taken to London for the payment of the navigation tolls. And if, in spite of so many hindrances, some neutral vessels, or those which pretended to be so, brought to Holland the products of the Dutch colonies, the French privateers lying hidden in the entrance to the channels of the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Zuyder Zee, seized them, and deprived the needy merchants of Amsterdam and Rotterdam of the remnant of profit which might be derived from the transport and manipulation of the little merchandise which escaped the British blockade. The business of money-lending had suffered equally with all others from the general state of distress. Spain had been declared bankrupt; Austria could scarcely pay the interest of her debt; England managed it by means of a depreciated paper money; Prussia paid with difficulty; and Russia paid its creditors with an exactness

which nevertheless left them injured. There was not a Dutchman who had not lost fifty per cent. by means of the loans to foreign States.

The State finances, no less involved than those of private persons, and involved to serve France, showed 110,000,000 of revenue, to meet expenses amounting to 155,000,000, amongst which the debt alone presented an item of 80,000,000. And even to obtain these 110,000,000 of revenue, which were after all so insufficient, it was necessary to have recourse to imposts the most severe and vexatious. The works in the timber-yards were abandoned, the workmen and sailors fled to England, the naval officers were steeped in poverty. In the midst of such a state of things it is easy to conceive how readily might arise once more the ancient hatreds which after the time of Louis XIV. represented the French as frivolous politicians, bad sailors, and intolerant Catholics, alliance with whom was only likely to lead to defeat; and as troublesome neighbours, who were as encroaching by land as the English by sea, and equally to be distrusted.

King Louis had no sooner arrived in Holland than he followed the example of his brothers, and showed a desire to reign for himself and his people rather than for France and Napoleon. He took care to provide the emperor with as few troops and vessels as possible, and to let the laws restrictive of commerce become a dead letter. This was natural enough, and Murat at Naples, Jerome at Cassel, Joseph at Madrid, and Louis at Amsterdam remonstrated with Napoleon with some reason, that to do him honour, those whom he had made kings should render their subjects happy, and lay a safe foundation for lasting dynasties; as otherwise he would be involved in perpetual wars to support them on their thrones. "Without doubt," replied Napoleon, "I have made you kings that your government may be to the advantage of your subjects, but also that you may comprehend with clearness what is really to their advantage, and that having been elevated to your positions not by your own merit, but by the arms of France, you may remain her faithful ally. You live by France, and you must live for her. It is in the highest degree to your interest that the power of England should be subdued, for if France does not prevail against her in this struggle, Murat will lose Sicily, Joseph will lose America, and Louis the Indies. You will lose, moreover, the freedom of your commerce and the honour of your flag. It is necessary, therefore, that you should see in my policy the true interest of your subjects, and make them see it also; that you should render yourselves popular, not by compliance with their weaknesses, but by the display of economy, prudence, industry, and courage; and that you should show much con-

sideration for the French party which is in every country the democratic party, and endeavour to gain its attachment. But you have, on the other hand, surrounded yourselves with great lords, who detest both France and me, and alienated by your folly the only party whose affection we might have gained. And this, too, when there is not one of you who could retain your thrones a single day, a single hour, after I lost a battle."

There is no doubt that Napoleon might reasonably have asked of the nations, his allies, whom he had entrusted to the government of his brothers, moderate sacrifices, proportioned to their resources, and employed exclusively in the protection of the common welfare; but when, to satisfy his ambition for a universal empire, he would condemn them to perpetual war, to an indefinite privation from all commerce, and to an overwhelming burden of expense, he demanded what it was impossible that they could grant, and whilst he had cause to blame the weakness of his brothers, he afforded them reasons for resisting his policy. It is at all times only too difficult to obtain from allies the efforts which the common welfare requires. But to deform the cause of the common welfare by an unbridled ambition, by the demand from friendly nations of unreasonable sacrifices, and the subjecting them to the rule of foreign things, is to aggravate the difficulties which exist in all alliances, to convert the most natural friendships into the bitterest hatreds, and to prepare the way for such cruel mischiefs as those which arose from the dissensions of Napoleon and his brother Louis in respect to Holland.

The accusations which Napoleon brought against his brother were as follows. He complained that Holland was of no more assistance to him in maritime warfare or the suppression of contraband traffic, under the sovereignty of his brother, than it had been when still under republican rule, or even under the government of the grand pensionnaire Schimmelpenninck. He pointed out the fact that he had at that period at Boulogne and Texel double the flotilla which he now possessed at those places. He declared that the whole of Holland was a vast port as open to English commerce as in time of peace; that American vessels had been received into its harbours, in spite of his precise orders, on pretence of their being neutrals; that a hostile feeling towards France existed amongst all classes of its inhabitants, and displayed itself almost as freely as in London; and that King Louis had imprudently strengthened this feeling by showing favour to the aristocratic party, whilst he alienated the democratic by reinstating the old noblesse and adding new members to its ranks, by burdening the treasury with heavy expenses for the support of a royal guard which was useless in Holland, by the creation of marshals, who were as useless, and

by the grant of dotations which were without motive in a country where no one had obtained victories.

Resting his case upon these causes of dissatisfaction, Napoleon made no attempt at concealing his intention of annexing Holland to the empire, if they were not fully atoned for by compliance with the following conditions. A considerable flotilla was to be maintained in the two Scheldts, a squadron of ships of the line stationed at Texel, and 25,000 troops on the coast. The royal guard, the marshals, and the dotations were to be suppressed, and the debt was to be reduced to a third of the existing capital, for this debt, being 80 millions upon a budget of 150, rendered the carrying on of the public service impossible. Nor was this all; for he demanded that the contraband system should be rigidly suppressed, and that, to ensure the vigorous action of the French cruisers, questions respecting prizes should be referred to his own tribunals, and that all the American vessels which entered the Dutch ports should be delivered up to him to be disposed of for his own profit. Finally, without explaining himself clearly, Napoleon added that the recent English Walcheren expedition had shown on the line of the frontiers of Holland and France certain defects, to obviate which would require certain rectifications in the direction of the two Scheldts, and perhaps in that of the Rhine itself.

King Louis replied to his brother's complaints very completely on some points, and very incompletely on others. He declared that the flotilla was equal now to what it had been at the time to which Napoleon referred—that the greater part of it guarded the Eastern Scheldt, and that it was absolutely necessary to watch it, lest the French troops occupying the Western Scheldt should be turned, and that the remainder occupied the numerous bays of Holland. He made no satisfactory answer relative to the reduction of the fleet at Texel. As for the troops of the line, he asserted that there were more than the required number of 25,000 men, for that 3000 had been sent to Spain, and that besides the many thousands which were shut up in the fortified places, and the numbers that were sick of the Walcheren fever, there remained about 15,000 employed in guarding the immense line of coast which extends from the mouths of the Scheldt to those of the Ems. He alleged no reason that was even specious to justify the expense of a royal guard, of marshals, and of other creations of a like nature. Respecting the reinstatement in their honours of the ancient noblesse, and the creation of a new noblesse, he announced that he had re-established the ancient aristocracy as a reward for its attachment to his government, and that he had created the new as a means of acknowledging the friend-

ship of some personal friends of his own; with regard to the dotations, he asserted that they took too little from the public domain to raise any question; and finally, that if he held somewhat aloof from that which was called the French party, and had ingratiated himself with that which was asserted to be an English party, it was simply because he had endeavoured to rally around him all those persons who were of the most importance in the country.

Louis might have added that he had only followed the example of his brother at Cassel, Naples, and Madrid, of his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, amongst the clergy, and even that of Napoleon himself in France. But through all these disputes the simple truth was apparent, that Napoleon was determined not to leave in his brother's hands the performance of what he could do so much better himself, and that he had both the desire and the means of showing that he was master. It mattered little what were the arguments which one or the other brother might bring forward; the only question was whether the weaker would obey the commands of the stronger. King Louis promised obedience, or at least undertook, besides the maintenance of a flotilla, the equipment of a squadron of the line at Texel, the rigid suppression of the contraband trade, and the exclusion of American vessels from the Dutch ports. But to reduce the debt to two-thirds, to recall the decrees already promulgated with regard to the noblesse, to take away the titles which he had conferred, to deprive his marshals of their batons, to resign the rights of the Dutch crown so far as to send the questions respecting prizes to the Paris tribunals, and to give up to confiscation the American vessels which had been brought into his ports in reliance on his good faith, appeared to him a species of humiliation worse than death, and we are compelled to agree with him. Napoleon, however, with terrible threats insisted upon obedience to his commands, and the unfortunate King of Holland, already overwhelmed with melancholy, began at last to look upon his brother as a tyrant, upon all his relations as selfish cringers before the head of their family, and upon his wife as an accomplice in all the miseries with which he was afflicted. The praise of the Dutch, who were aware of his resistance to his brother, excited him still more, and he permitted himself to cherish the most outrageous plans. Sometimes he determined upon raising the standard of revolt against his own brother, to put the whole country under water by breaking down the ditches, and to throw himself, in short, into the arms of the English, without whose help all resistance to Napoleon was manifestly impossible. He even went so far, on quitting his kingdom, as to make arrangements with the minister of war

M. de Krayenhoff, for the preparation of means of defence against France, and gave orders to the governors of the frontier fortresses of Brabant, such as Bois-le-Duc, Breda, and Bergen-op-Zoom, to refuse admission to the French troops, should they seek to obtain it.

On arriving at Paris, King Louis was anxious to avoid either residing with his wife or at the Tuileries, or with any of the members of his family, and expressed his intention of taking up his residence in the hotel of the Dutch embassy. When, however, it was pointed out to him that this conduct would increase Napoleon's irritation, he consented to accept the hospitality of his mother, who resided in an immense hotel on the Faubourg St. Germain. His first act on his arrival was to demand a separation from his wife, and to call together a meeting of his family to decide on the subject. It was agreed, however, that the couple should live apart, and the scandal of a separation be avoided. And now, these family questions being settled, the affairs of Holland engrossed all attention.

The relations of King Louis, especially his mother and sisters, spared no pains to induce him to lay aside his sullen air of defiance and to become reconciled to Napoleon, and were anxious that the subjects in dispute should not be discussed between the brothers personally. Louis was gloomy, excitable, and obstinate; Napoleon, quick and imperious by nature, and strengthened in these qualities by the habit of command. There was cause, therefore, for dreading some serious quarrel should these two come into personal contact; and it was arranged that they should meet only in the family circle, and have but little discussion on public affairs except through the intervention of M. Roell, minister of foreign affairs for Holland, and M. de Champagny, Duke of Cadare, minister of foreign affairs for France.

An important personage, whose career was disadvantageously entangled with these affairs, and whose ability was, as we have already said, much weakened by his mania for interfering with everything, M. Fouché, minister of police, perceiving just now an opportunity of mixing himself up with the private disputes of the imperial family, as well as with the most important affairs of the empire, assiduously frequented the dwelling of the empress-mother, to hold interviews with King Louis, and to become negotiator between him and Napoleon. But there was little chance of his being accepted in this character, for King Louis, who distrusted even the men most worthy of confidence, had little inclination to be frank with M. Fouché, and Napoleon, although superior to any feeling of distrust, did not care to encourage this officiousness of an over-officious man.

In the meanwhile, however, Louis, from the want of some

support in the present emergency, and Napoleon, from a feeling which consisted as much of disdain as of esteem, permitted the interference of this self-constituted mediator; and thus M. Fouché became with M. de Champagny the daily negotiator in this long negotiation, which was sometimes carried on by word of mouth, and sometimes by letters,* although all the persons concerned in it resided in Paris.

Napoleon was, as usual, very precise in the expression of his wishes, and declared his intention of demanding of Holland three things in particular—the energetic repression of contraband trade, an active co-operation in the maritime war, and the reduction of her debt. And he added, that since he was firmly convinced that he should obtain from his brother neither compliance with these nor some other necessary demands; that his brother would neither dare to embroil himself with the commercial world of Holland by taking measures for the suppression of the contraband trade, nor venture to displease the capitalists by taking measures for the reduction of the debt, and providing for the expenses of the fleet; but would, on the contrary, on his return to Holland, permit everything to go on in the old way; he therefore thought, he said, that it would be better that this state of things were put an end to at once by the annexation of Holland to France; and that as his brother was constantly complaining of the burden of a crown, it would be well that he should indulge his tastes by accepting that honourable and calm retreat which the Emperor of the French was well able to grant to him. That he might be quite at ease as regarded the fate of Holland, for that its union with France would assure to it a glorious position in time of war, and a prosperous career in time of peace. And that, in short, it would be well to lose no time in considering the subject of the annexation, which offered the only solution of the questions on hand, which was simple, decided, and not likely to cause disastrous results.

This firm and decided expression of the emperor's will filled King Louis with consternation. For although he was unceasing in his declaration of the fatigues of the cares of government, he was most anxious to continue to bear them. And this, not only from a natural ambition of governing, but also from a feeling of *amour propre*, which, as naturally, made him very unwilling to resign a kingdom after having shown himself incapable of governing it or of observing fidelity to France. Always regarding himself as a blighted being, as the only unhappy one in the midst of the happiest family in the world, he saw in this

* These letters are very numerous, especially those of King Louis and Napoleon. They have been preserved, and it is from their infallible records that I have composed this account of the subject of which they treat.

project of dethroning him a frightful fulfilment of his destiny, and felt especially that it would be a withering condemnation pronounced by a judge whom the world would regard as both just and well informed. Rather than endure such a humiliation, then, he was ready to brave every extremity.

At first he deplored his journey to Paris as a sort of wilful murder, and was anxious to depart suddenly for Holland, to declare war against his brother, with the English for allies. But he believed that he was watched, and despaired of reaching the frontiers of the empire without falling again into the hands of an irritated brother, whom his flight would have enlightened as to his plans of resistance. He then yielded to another set of ideas, and casting himself, as it were, at the feet of Napoleon, declared himself willing to do all that was demanded of him, and promised compliance on all the contended points if his brother would only grant him one more trial.

Napoleon answered that Louis would not keep his word, but after having made the fairest promises, would no sooner have returned to Amsterdam than he would fall into the hands of the contrabandists and Dutch capitalists, and have no strength of mind to keep one of his engagements. Moved, however, by his brother's grief, and influenced by the prayers of his mother and his sisters, who were all urgent with entreaties in favour of Louis, and believing in his integrity, Napoleon at length showed himself disposed to grant conditions which, while they placed all the real power in his own hands, would permit Louis to retain the nominal sovereignty, at least during the war.

A certain amount of reconciliation arising from this last turn of the negotiation, it became a little less indirect between the two brothers, and they met. Napoleon received Louis at the Tuileries, explained his plans to him, and repeated that his chief wish, because it was his chief necessity, was to obtain peace with England; that on this peace depended both the glory of his own family and the greatness of France; that in his efforts to obtain it no ally could be more serviceable to him than Holland, and that he was determined, therefore, to obtain from it, either by the exercise of his own power, or by the hands of his brother, all the assistance which its resources could afford; and that this motive, and not the desire to increase an empire which was already too large, had sometimes induced him to entertain the subject of its annexation. Enlarging upon this theme, with his accustomed force, and even with great good faith, for he was at this moment far more intent upon vanquishing England than aggrandising himself, he said in one of his interviews with Louis: "I attach so much importance to a maritime peace, and so little to Holland, that if the English would open a negotiation, and come to a candid understanding

with me, I should neither wish to annex your kingdom, nor to encumber you with distasteful conditions; I would leave Holland tranquil, independent, and intact." Then, as though hurried away by his subject, he would add, "These English perpetually force me to aggrandise myself! Had it not been for them, I should have annexed neither Naples, Spain, nor Portugal to my empire. I have wished to extend my coasts that I might increase my resources. If they continue in their present course, I shall have to annex to my empire, Holland, the Hanse towns, Pomerania, and perhaps even Dantzic. It were well that they should know this, and you should endeavour to make them know it. Employ the opportunity which is offered by the connection of the merchants at Amsterdam with English houses of informing England that nothing is more imminent than the annexation of Holland, which will be to her a source of the greatest injury, and that by treating for peace alone could she hope to preserve your independence and ward off this serious danger from herself." After having conceived the idea of this discourse, Napoleon formed the project of sending immediately M. Roell to Amsterdam, to summon together the ministers, to associate with them some of the members of the Dutch Legislative Body, to induce them to deliberate upon the state of affairs, and to despatch in their name a safe man to London, to inform the British cabinet of what was taking place, and to implore it to spare Europe the misfortune of seeing the annexation of Holland to the French empire.

Louis, dazzled by his brother's project, was anxious to put it into execution without loss of time. It was impossible to conceal the present state of the negotiation from the Duke of Otranto, who was determined not to be left out of it, and he was accordingly informed of everything. His mind forthwith became inflamed with the idea that he also would contribute to the bringing about a state of peace by proceeding according to his own fashion, and putting some little force, if it were necessary, even upon Napoleon himself. Proud of the step he had recently taken in arming the national guards at the time of the Walcheren expedition, and flattered by the encomiums which declared him an audacious genius whose personal importance might bear comparison with that of Napoleon himself, he thought that it would be a little increased should the attainment of a general peace, which the whole world longed for, be attributed in a great degree to his exertions.

M. Fouché had for some time had M. Ouvrard under his charge, had permitted him to leave Vincennes to arrange his affairs, and had been so weak as to listen to his observations on all subjects; nor did he listen only to M. Ouvrard, but also to

certain royalist writers, who, in submitting plans to him, offered to devote themselves to the great man raised up by Providence to effect a change on the face of the universe. It is necessary, said they, to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the marriage with Marie Louise to conclude a peace which shall embrace both sea and land, both the old world and the new; which shall pacify all nations, dynasties, and parties, and enable its fortunate contrivers to have given satisfaction to all interests, even to those of the Bourbons.

To arrive at this advantageous position of affairs, it was necessary to divide the Peninsula, to leave the largest portion to Joseph, and to surrender the remainder to Ferdinand VII., who must marry a Bonapartist princess. The independence of the Spanish colonies which they had already asserted for themselves was to be confirmed, but confirmed under a monarchical form, for they were to receive as their king (can it be believed?) Louis XVIII., who was regarded by the royalists as the legitimate heir to the crown of France, and who would be very happy, it was supposed, to emerge from his retreat to ascend the throne of the new world!

Such were the projects of the financiers and idle writers to whom M. Fouché listened, and which would be too puerile to be recited had they not been the source of very serious consequences.

Full of these ideas and impatient to contribute to the arrangement of a peace, M. Fouché had already sent a secret agent to London to sound the British cabinet, and had done this without Napoleon's knowledge. As soon as he had heard of the new project, he had hastened to mix himself up with it, and had sought for some one whom he might use as an agent in the secret negotiation which he was determined to open. M. de Labouchère, the head of the first banking-house in Holland, partner and son-in-law of Mr. Baring, who was, on his part, head of the chief banking-house in England, happened to be in Paris on business affairs. M. Ouvrard, who had sold him piastres at the time of his great speculations with Spain, and had by his means realised some millions in America, had introduced him to the Duke of Otranto, who had received him with the respect due to a banker who was rich, talented, and honest. The commencement of negotiations with England had scarcely been spoken of, than M. Fouché thought of M. de Labouchère, and proposed him as the agent. M. de Labouchère was accordingly chosen as the person exactly suited for this office, which required a person who was without any official character which would attract notice, and who yet had sufficient importance to command a ready reception and attentive hearing.

M. Roell and M. de Labouchère, then, were despatched to Amsterdam, and in the meantime all resolutions with respect to

Holland were suspended. Louis was anxious to take advantage of this interval to return to his kingdom; but Napoleon, who was unwilling to let him depart until a full understanding had been come to upon the affairs of Holland, detained him at Paris until some information should have been received from M. de Labouchère.

There was some difficulty in deciding upon the manner in which this negotiation should be conducted, and in the name of what authority the agent should present himself in London. After mature reflection it had been decided that the Dutch ministers and the members of the Legislative Body could not be assembled together without publicity being given to the whole affair, and that there would be some inconvenience in representing the chief members of the Dutch government as speaking of the political annihilation of their country as inevitable, and almost as a natural consequence, if England did not hasten to prevent it by making some sacrifices. It had therefore been judged more expedient to send M. de Labouchère, not in the name of King Louis, who could not enter into direct correspondence with England, but in the name of two or three of the principal ministers, such as MM. Roell, Vanderheim, and Mollerus. It was impossible that such a man as M. de Labouchère should not meet with attention when he declared that Napoleon's recent marriage had changed his views, and that such a peace might easily be obtained from him as would put a final stop to those invasions which were no less to be lamented for the sake of Europe than they were injurious to England herself; and whilst he was not to specify any particular conditions, he was authorised to declare, that should England show a disposition to make some sacrifices, France would not hesitate to make such on her side as would satisfy the honour and dignity of each country.

Everything having been finally arranged, M. de Labouchère embarked finally at Bruille, soon arrived at Yarmouth, and lost no time in proceeding to London. We have said that he was the partner and son-in-law of Mr. Baring; we should add that Mr. Baring was one of the most influential members of the East India Company, and a great friend of the Marquis of Wellesley, formerly Governor-General of India, and brother of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who commanded the English armies in Spain. M. de Labouchère had therefore but to present himself to be both heard and believed. The success of his mission depended upon the offers which he was authorised to make, and on the position in which the British cabinet might be at the time. And this position was for the moment one of great difficulty.

After the resignation of Lords Grenville and Grey, who had continued the alliance formed between Mr. Fox and Mr. Pitt, a

resignation which had been caused by the Catholic question, the exaggerators of the policy of Mr. Pitt had succeeded under the premiership of the Duke of Portland, and during their possession of the government received numerous blows. First of all Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning, the first firm, diligent, and able, but deficient in eloquence, the second, on the other hand, as superior in powers of oratory as the first was in the conduct of affairs, had given vent to the jealousy which each felt for the other in insults, which led to their retiring from the cabinet to fight a duel. They did not re-enter it. Lord Chatham had fallen in consequence of the Walcheren expedition, and the Duke of Portland was dead. Two persons possessed influence in the cabinet—Mr. Percival and the Marquis of Wellesley. The former, a clever barrister, endowed with some eloquence, inflexible firmness of character, and imbued with the blind prejudices of the Tory party. The latter, on the contrary, who replaced Mr. Canning at the foreign office, together with a most enlightened mind, possessed a perfect freedom from prejudices, and the rare talent of expressing himself with elegance and simplicity. He had less influence with the Tory party than Mr. Percival, because he had less passion; but he was held in high consideration, which was every day increased by his brother's growing fame.

The position of the English ministry was not, although it possessed the majority in the houses of parliament, very firm. It had experienced an alternation of success and the reverse. Although the victory of Talavera was a doubtful victory, and had been followed by a retreat on Estramadura, it had resulted in two advantages to the English—the first being that it caused the French army to hold aloof from Portugal, and the second, that it enabled them to maintain theirs in the Peninsula in the face of the whole power of Napoleon. It had been, on the other hand, a great reverse for them when they failed before Antwerp with 40,000 men, and lost 15,000 by death or incurable sickness. Thus the position of the ministry was as undecided as was the opinion of the country on its policy. The opposition, having at its head two eminent persons, Lord Grenville and Lord Grey, declared that the war was carried on against all reason; that every year of its continuance had but given increased stature to the colossus which it was intended to overthrow; that it had caused the loss, if not of Portugal, certainly of Spain and Naples; and that by its prolongation all the northern coasts would be lost up to the mouths of the Oder; that the Peninsular War, in particular, was extremely dangerous, since that if Napoleon should throw himself upon the English army with 100,000 men, not an English soldier would return; that the only force capable of being used in defence would thus

be destroyed; that every day England lost some ally; that she had recently lost Sweden, and was threatened with speedily losing America; that the finances were loaded with frightful burdens; that the paper money and the exchange every day suffered fresh depreciation; and that, in short, to persist in such a policy was ruinous. Such was the substance of the daily remonstrances of Lords Grenville and Grey; and it must be acknowledged that there were sufficient reasons wherefore all those who could not foresee the mistakes into which Napoleon would shortly be hurried, should be desirous of peace. Nevertheless, save the millions which it cost to maintain so long a struggle, and the number of men who perished in Lord Wellington's army, which was not after all very considerable, and was made up by volunteers, the British population felt few of the consequences of war, and had in a manner become used to it. It had not as yet suffered much in its commerce; for if it had lost the continental markets, it had found others in the Spanish colonies. It was only threatened with serious damage when Napoleon determined to shut out completely from the continent colonial produce. But even in that direction it maintained, in spite of his endeavours, an immense activity. Its manufactures had received an enormous development; it ceased to feel any anxiety for its troops, whom it found able to keep their ground so well in the Peninsula; and finally, with the exception of some complaints which were sometimes levied rather against certain peculiarities of the income-tax than against the tax itself, it tacitly approved of the policy of the government, without, however, blaming the opposition for demanding peace. The slightest cause, therefore, was sufficient to incline it to the one side or the other.

Amongst the ministers Mr. Percival was notorious for his desire to prosecute the war with all the blind fury of a Tory. The Marquis of Wellesley, on the other hand, who was both an enlightened and a moderate man, and carried no obstinacy of temperament into the cabinet, was not unmindful that whilst the continuance of the war might procure large additions to the glory of his family, it would also surround both it and England with many dangers. He was therefore inclined to peace, should a serious offer of it be made, and acceptable terms proposed in respect of Spain. But to agitate the public mind by insignificant conferences, to turn aside popular opinion from its present peaceful current into a directly opposite direction without being certain that there would be any advantageous result from the change, to turn its warlike attitude into a peaceful one without any certainty that peace would be really obtained, seemed to him to be a serious imprudence, which he, for his part, would not be guilty of. He had already behaved

in a manner conformable to these ideas towards the agent sent by M. Fouché, and had given him an answer as evasive as the mission with which he was charged. An old officer in the army of Condé, and having some relations in England, the agent of the Duke of Otranto, had been presented by Lord Yarmouth, with whom he was acquainted. The Marquis of Wellesley received him politely, and replied to his message that England had not determined upon prosecuting an eternal war, and would listen to overtures of peace, when brought by ostensible agents, properly accredited, and charged with propositions reconcilable with the honour of each nation.

Mr. Baring having announced the arrival of M. de Labouchère, and that he was the bearer of important communications, the Marquis of Wellesley hastened to receive him, showed him the greatest respect, and listened to him with profound attention. But after having heard him, he displayed extreme reserve, confining himself to general pacific declarations, and repeating that if France were really desirous of peace, England was quite willing to grant it. But he expressed the great doubts he entertained with respect to the real sentiments of the French cabinet, and gave as the source of these doubts the doubtful character of the present mission, which was secret in its form, and charged with vague proposals, which left everything in a state of uncertainty. He did not conceal that he had already received an overture of the like nature, borne, it was true, by a person of much humbler pretensions than M. de Labouchère, but exactly similar in its main points, since that also declared a pacific disposition without producing any proof, however slight, of the existence of such disposition. No clandestine mission, he said, no doubtful propositions, nothing which did not give a well-grounded hope of attaining a peace which would be honourable to England, would be listened to. As regarded Holland and the danger it was in of annexation to the French empire, the Marquis of Wellesley seemed little concerned. Whilst Napoleon found Holland too English, the British minister found it too French, and seemed to think that between its actual state and its annexation to France there would be very little difference. As for the commercial inconveniences with which it menaced England, he seemed neither to have a clear idea of them, nor to foresee their extent, and repeated that every imaginable act of tyranny had been long expected along the whole European coast, and that Great Britain was already resigned to it.

These declarations, which were as vague as the overtures with which M. de Labouchère was charged, were accompanied with the greatest testimonies of affection towards himself, and assurances that if any person should present himself in London

as the bearer of ostensible powers and of acceptable propositions, he would certainly be received and permitted to open negotiations.

The Marquis of Wellesley, so reserved with M. de Labouchère, was less so with Mr. Baring, and told him almost the plain truth. He and his colleagues, he said, had not determined upon prosecuting an eternal war, they cared little for re-establishing the Bourbons upon the throne of Louis XVI., and were ready to treat with Napoleon; but they distrusted his sincerity, and suspecting an intention on his part of exciting public opinion in England by a feigned negotiation for peace, had decided upon not aiding him in his designs. Influenced by these motives, they would only enter upon a negotiation which was both official and sincere. Resolved, as they were, neither to abandon Spain to Joseph, nor Sicily to Murat, nor to yield up Malta, they hoped that any envoy sent to negotiate would be furnished with such powers as would give a hope of agreement on these essential points.

Mr. Baring, who was a clever man, repeated these observations to M. de Labouchère, told him that England was resigned to the war, and even habituated to it; that she had not yet suffered sufficiently from it to feel inclined to yield; that while she had been very anxious with respect to the fate of the army, she was now reassured by finding that this army maintained its footing in the midst of the Peninsula; that such a reverse as was little likely to occur was necessary to induce her to decide on peace; that it would never for a moment entertain the idea of surrendering Spain to a prince of the house of Bonaparte; and that no illusion must be indulged in on this point. Speaking with perfect freedom, and discussing all the various possible combinations, Mr. Baring represented as possible, but by no means certain of acceptance, and as solely emanating from himself, an arrangement which, while it left Malta to England, would give Naples to Murat, Sicily to the Bourbons of Naples, and Spain to Ferdinand, with the exception of the abandonment to France for the expenses of the war of the province as far as the Ebro.

Very certain that he should make no further progress in the objects of his mission by a prolonged stay in London, M. de Labouchère departed for Holland, and reserving his communications respecting the result of his mission for King Louis in Paris, he maintained an impenetrable reserve on the subject towards the rest of the world. It was now evident, after these attempts at negotiation, that Spain was the real obstacle to peace; and that, having already obscured Napoleon's glory, having exhausted both his armies and his finances, she would continue to be in every subsequent negotiation for peace an

obstacle perfectly insurmountable, unless a decisive triumph over the English could be obtained upon her soil.

Unhappily Napoleon had become as habituated to the war in Spain as the English to the maritime war which she maintained against the universe. He resigned himself to it as to one of those serious maladies which one is able to endure by virtue of a strong constitution, from which one suffers in certain moments, which one forgets in others, and accompanied by which one lives on, endeavouring to deceive oneself respecting its serious nature. From the moment when he received the answer brought by M. de Labouchère he ceased to expect that the resolves of Great Britain would be shaken by a threat of annexing Holland to France, and he resolved at once to put an end to the disputes between himself and his brother. Being unwilling, however, to give up entirely the indirect negotiation opened by M. de Labouchère, he dictated a note, of which the following was the import. If England, it said, was habituated to the war and suffered little from it, France was also habituated to it and suffered little less. Victorious, rich, and prosperous, France was condemned to pay dear for sugar and coffee, but she was not compelled to go without them. She was, in fact, indemnified by the new sugars which chemistry had discovered for her. A period of temporary suffering would be succeeded by one of unheard-of prosperity. Naples, Spain, and the Levant had brought her cotton sufficient to supply her manufactories, and if the sea were closed against her vessels, the whole continent offered an immense market for her silks, her cloths, her muslins, and dyed fabrics. She would be able, therefore, to maintain herself for a long period in the position which she held. As for Spain, the war had lasted two years and a half, because Napoleon, having had to march yet once more to Vienna, had been unable to devote to it sufficient attention. But he was now no longer occupied with Austria, and was preparing for the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and the English a cruel surprise. He was not distressed by an interruption to maritime commerce, which gave a vast development to French manufactures, nor by the continuance of a war which, by drawing the English to the continent, furnished him with the occasions he so ardently desired of matching army against army. And if he desired peace it was because, having made a marriage which tended to reconcile him with the old Europe, he was inclined to terminate the struggle which had been carried on between the ancient order of things and the new. With respect to the kingdoms which he had created, it was not to be supposed that he would sacrifice one. He would never dethrone his brothers Joseph, Murat, Louis, Jerome. But the fate of Portugal and Sicily was still undecided; and these

two countries, together with Hanover, the Hanse towns, and the Spanish colonies, afforded materials for liberal compensations. But besides all this, if it were found difficult to come to an understanding upon these points, it would be at least possible to give at once a more humane character to the war. The English had issued orders in council, to which Napoleon had replied by the decrees of Berlin and Milan, and the sea had thus been converted into a theatre of warfare. England had a greater interest than France in putting an end to this state of things, for a war between her and America was very likely to result from it. If she agreed with this opinion, she had only to repeal her lines of blockade, and France on her side would repeal hers; Holland and the Hanse towns should remain independent and free; the seas would once more be open to neutrals, the war would lose its bitter character, and it was possible that this first return to moderation might be followed by a complete reconciliation between the two nations whose conflict divided, agitated, and tormented the whole world.

Such were the subjects of consideration which M. de Labouchère was instructed to submit to Mr. Baring, that they might eventually, by any means that should be found most suitable, be brought to the notice of the Marquis of Wellesley. For this purpose M. de Labouchère was authorised either to correspond with, or, if he thought it necessary, to make another journey to England.

Napoleon was anxious that the questions respecting Holland should have an immediate solution, that the complete closure of the coasts of the North Sea might be immediately enforced; he still persisted in regarding the annexation of Holland to France as the surest means of obtaining that result, but perceiving his brother's distress, and yielding to the entreaties of his mother and sisters, he was disposed to give up a part of his demands. He had already, from affection for the Queen Hortense and for the Empress Josephine, bestowed the fair Duchy of Berg, which had become vacant by the advance of Murat to the throne of Naples. Louis, far from regarding this as a proof of affection, had persuaded himself, on the contrary, that it was the result of a desire to offend him, by depriving him of the education of his son, who, having become the sovereign, under age, of a principality dependent upon the empire, passed to the guardianship of the head of the imperial family, who was, of course, Napoleon. In spite, however, of these foolish self-deceptions, touched by his brother's state of anguish, he consented to entertain some other arrangement than that of annexation; some arrangement which, by a change of frontier line, and entrusting to French authority the guard of the Dutch coasts, would produce some of the important results which he had in view.

France having possessed, up to this time, Belgium without Holland, the frontier line had quitted the banks of the Rhine below the Wesel, passed the Meuse between Grave and Venloo, left Southern Brabant on the outside, and rejoined the Scheldt below Antwerp, giving to Holland, consequently, not only the Waal, but the Meuse and the Eastern Scheldt. Napoleon wished, in leaving Holland in his brother's possession, to rectify this frontier, to make the Waal the line of separation, and to adopt the Dutch Diep and the Krammer for the extreme limit, which arrangement would transfer to the sovereignty of France, Zeeland, the isles of Tholen and Schowen, Southern Brabant, a part of Guelders, the isle of Bommel, the important places, Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, Gertruidenberg, Bois-le-Duc, Gorcum, and Nimeguen, that is to say, a fifth part of the population of Holland, and positions more important still than the 400,000 persons thus made subjects of the empire.

Besides this change of the frontier line, Napoleon desired that until the conclusion of the maritime war the Dutch commerce should be carried on under licences granted by himself; that all the Dutch ports should be guarded by an army of 18,000 men, of whom 6000 should be French and 12,000 Dutch, commanded by a French general; that all questions with regard to prizes should be tried in Paris; that a squadron of nine ships of the line and six frigates should be under sail off Texel by the 1st of July of the current year (1810); that all American cargoes carried into Holland should be given up to the French treasury; that the imprudent measures which had been taken with regard to the noblesse should be immediately retracted; that there should be no more marshals; and that the native troops under arms should never number less than 25,000 men. Amongst these conditions, which were at least as hard to bear as the loss of a throne, there were many which affected more particularly Napoleon's unhappy brother, who was now paying the penalty of having played the king for a few years: the chief of these was the loss of the territory on the left of the Waal, which would to the greatest extent distress Dutch patriotism, and thoroughly impoverish the finances, which were already so involved; a second was the transfer of the jurisdiction with respect to prizes to the French courts, which involved in a manner the total destruction of authority in Holland; and a third was the subjection of the Dutch army to a French general, which was at the same time to take away all sovereignty from Louis, and to subject him to a cruel humiliation. Louis entreated for less hard conditions, and falling back in his despair upon his dreams of resisting his brother's authority, sent off advices to the ministers Krayenhoff and Mollerus to fortify Amsterdam, and those parts of Holland which were most

capable of being put in a state of defence. He renewed also his order that admission into the Dutch fortifications should be refused to the French troops.

But in the meantime the ancient corps of Massena, commanded by Marshal Oudinot, had descended the Rhine and invaded Brabant, under pretence of protecting the country against the English. General Maison having presented himself before the gates of Bergen-op-Zoom, had found them closed, and having insisted on their being opened to him, had caused the governor to show him the king's letter, which enjoined him to refuse admittance to the French troops. Fearing to overstep his duty if he came to a collision, General Maison paused under the cannon of the place, awaiting further orders. In the meantime information came from Amsterdam that its fortification was being actively proceeded with.

When information of these facts reached Napoleon, he was filled with indignation. He sent successively the Duke of Otranto and the Duke de Feltre to his brother to demand that all the gates of Holland should be opened to his forces, and to threaten that if they were not he would force them. He laid to the account of Louis and his ministers all the bloodshed that would ensue, and even demanded that the ministers who had given these orders should be delivered up to him.

The Dukes of Otranto and of Feltre (in the latter of whom Louis had great confidence) painted in such vivid colours Napoleon's anger that the unhappy king in a fit of terror yielded every point, gave orders that the French troops should be received into the fortified places, and consented to the dismissal of the two ministers who were accused of having advised the measures of resistance. "Sire," he wrote to his brother, "I send off this night a courier bearing the dismissal of the ministers Mollerus and Krayenhoff, who are alone to blame for the matters of which your majesty has complained. If you desire the dismissal of any other, I am ready to obey." Overwhelmed with suffering and chagrin, Louis also addressed the following note to his brother, which gives us a fair impression of the state of affairs at this period. "There has been no Empire of the West hitherto," he wrote, "but it is most probable that there very soon will be. And then your majesty will be very certain that I shall be no longer able to make mistakes or to be disaffected." (Louis alluded to the state of well-defined vassalage, which would be the result of this state of things, and render obedience easy to each inferior.) "Consider that I have been thrown, without experience, into a difficult country; permit me, now that I am on the point of losing both your friendship and your support, to entreat you to forget the past. I promise to observe faithfully all conditions you may impose on me."

The submission of Louis was complete, and there would no longer be any difficulty in the arrangement of the affairs of Holland. All the conditions insisted on by Napoleon were included in a treaty, by which Napoleon on his side engaged to maintain the integrity of the kingdom of Holland, or at least so much of it as remained. King Louis was only excused the reduction of the national debt to a third. To conceal them from the Dutch, the arrangements relating to the command of the Dutch army by a French general, to the seizure of American merchandise, to the abolition of certain dignities, and the dismissal of certain ministers, were included in secret articles. Amongst these secret conditions, one, which was not a little singular, was that Louis should have no ambassadors either at Vienna or at St. Petersburg. Napoleon, suspicious of the relations which his brothers might enter into in these capitals, which he knew to be thoroughly hostile to him, had imposed the same condition on Murat, under the pretext of economy.

When these sacrifices were consented to, Napoleon wrote to Louis a letter, which perfectly showed what were his real views.

“To the King of Holland.

PARIS, *March 13, 1810.*

“Every political reason urges me to annex Holland to France; but seeing how much this would distress you, I now for the first time turn aside from my true policy to oblige you. At the same time, be well assured that you must make a complete change in your mode of government, and that the first cause of complaint I have against you will make me do that which I have now hesitated to do. My causes of complaint against you have reference to two subjects: the continuance of commercial relations between Holland and England; and speeches and edicts contrary to what I have a right to expect from you. It is necessary for the future that your whole course of conduct should tend to impress Holland with a friendly feeling towards France, and not to be of a nature to excite its enmity, and foment a natural hatred in its population. So far from taking away Brabant, I would have augmented Holland by the addition of several millions of people, if you had pursued that course which it was reasonable to expect from my brother and a French prince. But the past was irrevocable. Do not think that I am to be deceived; I read all the documents myself, and you will probably give me credit for knowing the force of ideas and phrases. You have written to me respecting the isle of Java. This subject must remain as yet in abeyance, for considering the powerful maritime resources of the English at the present time, it is necessary before we engage in new enterprises to augment our naval forces. I calculate upon your being able to aid me almost immediately, and upon your maritime armaments acting in concurrence with mine.”

When this agreement, the conditions of which we have shown,

was settled, there was a sort of reconciliation between the two brothers. Napoleon loved Louis, to whom he had acted as guardian in his youth, and was loved by him when his spirit was free from the clouds of melancholy which so frequently oppressed it. They passed in each other's company all the period of the marriage fêtes, and in April Louis departed to explain to his subjects the terms of the arrangement which had been come to, and to make them understand that he had been placed between the alternatives of submitting to the sacrifices which had been demanded of him, or of acceding to the total loss of the national independence. He had chosen well both for them and for himself, for as long as Holland preserved the vital principle of its political existence, it would be grounds for hoping that the day would come when all its losses would be recompensed; especially as the greater part of the stipulated conditions, with the exception of those which referred to the change of frontier, would cease to be in force upon the attainment of peace. With regard to the loss of territory, Louis had entreated Napoleon to make it up by a grant of German territory, and he had intimated that he would do so, should Holland render herself deserving of it by her conduct. That the appearance of reconciliation might be the more complete, Napoleon desired that the Queen Hortense should conduct her eldest son, the Grand Duke de Berg, into Holland, and pass some time with her husband there. Her presence, although but temporary, would help to persuade the public that all difficulties had been surmounted, and the delicate state of her health would be sufficient reason for her almost immediate departure.

Louis therefore left Paris for the Hague, whilst Napoleon hastened to give those orders which were called for by the new arrangements. He appointed to Marshal Oudinot to occupy Southern Brabant and Zeeland, as far as the Waal, to take definitive possession of these provinces, and to seize upon the spot all the English merchandise and colonial manufactures he could lay hands on. As Holland had been the great dépôt, and the frontier provinces, which had been acquired by the late conditions, had been the road by which they had entered France, there was a great probability that they would be found in considerable quantities.

Napoleon next ordered Marshal Oudinot to pass the Waal, and with three regiments of infantry and two of cavalry to advance into the northern part of Holland left to Louis; whilst General Molitor, concentrating his division towards l'Ost-Frise, would be ready to enter from the east if events required it. General Oudinot was to establish his headquarters at Utrecht, to be joined by a number of custom-house officers, and to occupy the navigable channels. He was desired to demand

the surrender of the American cargoes, and to convey them by the inland channels to Antwerp, where was to be established the depôt and market for the seized merchandise. Besides the effect which Napoleon hoped to produce by these measures on commercial credit in England, and thus again on public opinion, he also hoped to obtain by means of them a large addition to the extraordinary treasury, and thus unite financial advantages with political ones.

In the midst of these various occupations, Napoleon found himself at the end of April (1810), the most favourable period for military operations in Spain, and that at which it was necessary that he should set out, if he intended to direct in person that decisive campaign which he had determined should take place this year in the Peninsula. But in spite of his desire to set out, a desire so earnest, indeed, that he had already sent beyond the Pyrenees the greater part of his guard, a multitude of reasons still detained him in the bosom of his empire. Married on the 2nd of April, it was scarcely fit that he should so soon leave his young bride to go to lead armies. The continental blockade, from which he expected such great results, were it only rigorously enforced, was only likely to be so by the influence of his own personal care. The disputes with his brother Louis, although temporarily set at rest, demanded a constant vigilance and unrelaxed firmness on his part, that the waters of Holland might not be suddenly opened to British commerce. The commercial system, much complicated by the grant of licences, required the publication of new regulations, which took up much of Napoleon's time, for he entrusted this business to no one, believing, as he did, that he should eventually vanquish Great Britain as much by means of commerce as by his troops. And finally, although he had little hope of any successful result from the negotiation opened by M. de Labouchère, he was unwilling to close it entirely by his own absence from Paris. A commissioner had indeed arrived at Morlaix to arrange the exchange of prisoners, who was charged with instructions which revealed a considerable change in the dispositions of the British cabinet. It was easy to believe that the last overtures had had some effect in bringing about this change.

There were many reasons to induce Napoleon to remain in Paris, besides his desire that any one should conduct the war in the Peninsula rather than himself; and this, not because he feared the assassination which the reports of the police showed he was in danger of there, but because he could not see in Spain, as he had in Prussia, Poland, and Austria, any opportunity of putting an end to the war by one brilliant manœuvre, by one great battle; and did see that the campaigns there must

consist of innumerable little conflicts, of sieges rather than battles, and form a methodical war, which could be as well directed from a distance as on the spot. The English alone were in a position to offer occasions which would demand important operations; but there was one amongst the marshals of the empire who, uniting with a rare energy the highest talents of a general, and having been covered with additional glory in the recent campaign, appeared to be exactly suited for the conduct of this war; and this was Marshal Massena. Napoleon fixed upon him as the man whom he would match against the English. The campaign opened by the siege of the fortified places which lay on the boundary-line which separated Spain and Portugal, and many months were likely to pass before the commencement of offensive operations. Napoleon would at any time be able to throw himself upon the point at which he might think his presence necessary. He forced the old warrior, who was suffering both from fatigue and illness, but was not ungrateful for the rewards which had been showered upon him, to depart for Portugal, to direct the operations against the English army; gave him the best staff that could be got together; placed under his orders the wise Regniér, the brave Junot, the intrepid Ney; appointed to the command of his cavalry the best officer of this arm of the service who was then living, General Montbrun, besides brilliant lieutenants; promised him 80,000 men, and dismissed him, when still suffering from his former exertions, overwhelmed with caresses, and followed him with the most sanguine hopes. Who could imagine, indeed, that the most brilliant of our generals, Napoleon alone excepted, at the head of a superb army, would not be able to overwhelm a handful of English, who were as inferior to our soldiers in numbers as they were in every military quality, except bravery? We shall presently see how destiny had decided.

After having made these arrangements, Napoleon proposed to make a journey to Belgium, taking advantage of the unusually fine spring weather, to show his young wife to the populations which were impatient to see her, to influence favourably the Belgians, whom it was important to attach to the French empire, to make a personal inspection of the scene of the last English expedition, to order those works which would render a second expedition of the same kind impossible, to inspect the fleet at the Scheldt, to take a little nearer view of his brother's conduct in the new stage of his career, and to advance to meet rather than to withdraw from the negotiation with England.

The negotiation with England took, at this period, a most extraordinary direction, and one which we could scarcely believe possible, did not incontestable documents exist to prove it.

Napoleon had shown much reserve in regard to the degree

in which M. de Labouchère was authorised to continue the negotiation opened with Great Britain. He had pointed out that France was still able to carry on the war with the endurance of very little suffering on her part, had distinctly signified the particulars in which France would never yield, and given some intimation as to those in respect to which she was disposed to make sacrifices. In the state of public feeling at that time in England these hints furnished but slight materials with which to prolong the negotiation, much less to bring it to a successful issue. M. Fouché thought thus, and had the good sense to wish for peace; but whilst he had the good sense to wish for peace, he was foolish enough to desire that it might be procured by means of his own exertions, and if not in spite of Napoleon, at any rate independently of him, flattering himself with the idea of presenting it to the emperor in almost a complete state, and dazzling him with the glory of so great an achievement. This was a kind of undertaking which would have been unwise under any government, and was most unwise under that of one so absolute and vigilant as Napoleon; and is inexplicable on the part of so clever a man as M. Fouché, except by that passion for interfering with everything which increased upon him with his age and his importance, and, we may say in his excuse, with the increasing manifestation of the perils of the empire. M. Fouché was urged on in this course by those persons with whom he was surrounded, and whom we have mentioned as promulgators of such projects as, that a portion of the Peninsula should be restored to the Bourbons of Spain, that the Spanish colonies should be resigned to the Bourbons of France, &c. . . . to which projects some others were added, such as, for example, that in case Napoleon should be unwilling to deprive his brother Joseph of his kingdom, Ferdinand should be presented with the Spanish colonies, and the Bourbons of France receive a recompense, which was a sufficiently strange one, consisting of nothing less than North America, the United States themselves! Let us observe the source of this notorious idea: the United States by their law of embargo had embroiled themselves at the same time with both France and England; they were republicans, ungrateful to France and odious to England, whom Louis XVI. had erred in enfranchising, and whom Napoleon, curer of all the evils caused by the Revolution, would replace under monarchical and European authority. England could not but be rejoiced at seeing the United States confined to their territories, checked in their enterprise, and punished for their revolt.

M. Fouché had too much good sense to believe in such chimeras; but pressed by M. Ouvrard, whom he had the folly to initiate in so grave an affair, he consented to his departure for Amsterdam, for the purpose of seeing M. de Labouchère,

and directing the correspondence of the latter with London, in such a manner as to continue the negotiation, and not in such a manner as to break it off. M. Fouché was persuaded that by moderation and patience, and the war in Spain offering no better results, they would succeed in bringing Napoleon to sacrifice Joseph's kingdom, of which he was greatly disenchanted, perhaps the kingdom of his brother Louis, with which he was still less enchanted, and that by care England might be brought to a point at which reconciliation with them would be possible, or peace become negotiable; but this, according to his opinion, was without Napoleon's interference.

M. Ouvrard set out in consequence, full not only of the ideas of M. Fouché, but, what was much worse, of his own, quite delighted to be mixed up with so great an affair, and flattering himself that he should recover by a signal service the long-lost favour of Napoleon. Scarcely arrived at Amsterdam, he spoke in the name of M. Fouché, from whom he held several letters, was considered by M. de Labouchère as the direct and accredited representative of this minister, and in consequence as the representative of Napoleon himself. Thence M. de Labouchère found himself encouraged, by that which he heard and that which he read, to send to London new communications of a nature much more likely to satisfy British politics than those theretofore sent. M. Ouvrard in effect had told him that in respect to Sicily, Spain, the Spanish colonies, Portugal, and Holland, Napoleon would not be peremptory in his wishes, and that he must not depict him as such in London; that he wished sincerely for peace; that his inclination was misunderstood in England; that besides there was at that moment a point in common between him and the British cabinet—the desire of punishing the Americans for their conduct. M. Ouvrard touched on all these subjects in a manner more or less precise, and wrote several notes, pressing M. de Labouchère incessantly to transmit them to London. M. Fouché having the imprudence to second this extravagant negotiation, had recourse to a strange device, such as the police can imagine, to give credit to M. de Labouchère with the British government. An unknown person who called himself Baron de Kolli, and appeared to belong to the English police, had presented himself at Valencay to contrive some method for the escape of Prince Ferdinand. They had arrested him, and thought that they had made an important capture that would greatly annoy the British cabinet, whose intrigues would be publicly disclosed. M. Fouché authorised M. de Labouchère to write to the Marquis of Wellesley that, if he desired it, this person should be sent back to him. This would be at once a proof of good faith towards the British cabinet, and a way of greatly accrediting M. de Labouchère.

The communications with England were then both rare and difficult, not only on account of the bad state of the roads, but also on account of the war. It required fourteen or fifteen days to send a letter from Amsterdam to London and receive a reply to it, so that this singular correspondence might still last a very considerable time without any definite solution being arrived at. In the meantime M. Ouvrard in writing to M. Fouché represented the negotiation to him as making a progress which it did not make, and M. Fouché, in his turn deceiving M. Ouvrard, represented to him that Napoleon was instructed and satisfied with these parleys, which were absolutely false, for M. Fouché, in deferring as long as he could an unpleasant avowal, waited for the matter being sufficiently advanced to be avowed to Napoleon.

During this time the emperor left Paris with a brilliant court, composed of the empress, the King and Queen of Westphalia, the Queen of Naples, of Prince Eugène, of the Grand Duke of Wurzburg, the uncle of Marie Louise, of the Prince of Schwarzenberg, the ambassador of the Austrian court, of M. de Metternich, the first minister of that court, and of the greater part of the French ministers. Napoleon intended to visit Antwerp, Flushing, Zeeland, and Brabant, all provinces newly ceded to the empire, then to return by Picardy, and through Normandy to Paris.

The populace, tired of the monotony of their life, are always eager to run after princes whoever they may be, and often applaud them on the eve of a catastrophe. When Napoleon appeared anywhere the feeling of curiosity and also of admiration sufficed to collect a crowd, and in the moment when he had just fulfilled his great destiny by his marriage with an archduchess, the eagerness and enthusiasm were likely to be great. Wherever, indeed, he appeared, the transports were lively and unanimous. Besides, his presence always announced the commencement of numerous works, and in him they applauded not only the great man, but the benefactor. Leaving Compiègne on the 27th of April, he arrived the same day at St. Quentin. Besides the re-establishment of the manufacture of shafts, this town was indebted to him for the great works of the canal of St. Quentin, continued and finished since the consulate. The subterranean passage which united the waters of the Seine to those of the Scheldt was illuminated, and Napoleon passed through it with his court in elegantly decorated barges, and, so to speak, in open day. He granted, during the passage, to M. Gayant, the engineer who superintended these beautiful works, a pension of considerable amount, with a grade in the legion of honour, and then set out for Cambray and the Château of Laeken. He was not to visit Brussels until his return.

On the 30th of April, he embarked on the great canal which runs from Brussels until it joins the Ruppel, and by the Ruppel the Scheldt itself. All the boats of the great fleet of the Scheldt, decked with a thousand colours, and worked by the ships' crews, came to fetch him, and transported him along the submissive waters of Belgium with the quickness of the wind. Decrès, the minister of marine, and Admiral Missiessy, who had shown so much coolness during the Walcheren expedition, commanded the imperial flotilla. They arrived soon in view of the Antwerp squadron, created by Napoleon, and recently removed from the reach of the English torch. All the vessels, frigates, sloops, and guns lined the way; Marie Louise passed under the harmless fire of a thousand cannon, which conveyed to her agitated senses the testimony of the power of her husband. The imperial court made its entry into Antwerp in the midst of a Belgian population assembled to meet it, and which had forgotten its feeling of hostility in the presence of so great a spectacle. Napoleon had a great deal to do at Antwerp, and stayed there several days. The continental peace enabled him to devote himself to his projects for the navy of the empire, and of the allied States. He had this year about forty vessels to dispose of: nine for the Texel, promised for the 1st of July; ten actually under sail at Antwerp, two at Cherbourg, three at Lorient, seventeen at Toulon, one at Venice; in all, forty-two. He calculated to have seventy-four in 1811, 100 or 110 in 1812, capable, when the necessary quantity of frigates and sloops should have been added, to embark, in case of need, 150,000 men for any destination.

In order to reach this number it was necessary to add nine more at Antwerp in the space of one year. To do this, it was indispensable to augment the basins, and to bring wood and workmen to this chosen port.

Napoleon gave the proper orders, and had a vessel of eighty guns launched in his presence, which entered majestically into the Scheldt under the eyes of the empress, and in the midst of the benedictions of the clergy of Malines, invited to this naval fête. Napoleon had near to him Prince Eugène, to whom he desired to show all that he did in the canals of Flanders, that he might excite him to the like in the canals of the Adriatic. "When one has land one can have sea," he exclaimed, "provided one wishes it, and one takes the necessary time." Time! exactly that which is procured by wisdom only, and of which Napoleon would soon deprive himself.

His brother Louis came to see him, and although less agitated, always seemed extremely melancholy—melancholy with his own sadness, and with the sadness of his people, whom so many afflictions had struck at once. Napoleon

endeavoured to inspirit him by showing him all that he had done at Antwerp, and all that he still proposed to do there, again urgently ordered him to have his fleet ready for the Texel for the 1st of July, unfolded to him his vast maritime projects, and announced to him that his troops were about to be brought on the coast, and that in a short time he should have at the mouth of the Scheldt, at Brest and at Toulon, vast expeditions ready to carry entire armies, that Massena would march on Lisbon with eighty thousand men, that in two months the English would be sharply pressed at all points, and that the war, of which they seemed to have made a habit, would soon be rendered insupportable to them, above all, if by rigorous observance of the blockade a severe blow were struck at their mercantile interests.

With reference to this subject Napoleon conversed with his brother Louis on the negotiation of Labouchère. By a singular accident he had just encountered M. Ouvrard on his way, returning in all haste from Amsterdam to Paris, in consequence of the strange communications going on between Holland and England. Napoleon, with his ordinary promptitude of mind, had foreseen that M. Ouvrard, enjoying the favour of the Duke of Otranto, and connected in business with M. de Labouchère, had come to mix himself in that which did not concern him, to endeavour to detect some secret of the negotiation, perhaps to give counsels which were not required, and perhaps also to establish some speculation on the probabilities of peace. Full of a singular presentiment, he caused M. de Labouchère to be forbidden to hold any intercourse with M. Ouvrard, demanded from him all the letters exchanged between Amsterdam and Holland, and added an order that all such letters should be sent to him during his journey wherever he might be. Louis set out again for Amsterdam without having wished to assist at any fête, above all, at a moment when Napoleon was about to enter into the territory recently taken away from Holland. Napoleon, after having employed five days in directing the necessary works, and especially the new defences which were to render Antwerp impregnable, ordered the fleet to descend on Flushing, and to give the necessary time he went to visit the new territories acquired between the Meuse and the Waal, as also the several places of Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, Bois-le-Duc, and Gertruidenberg. At Breda he received, with the civil and military authorities, the Protestant and Catholic clergy. In these newly acquired territories of the empire the Catholics found themselves enfranchised from the Protestant domination, and yet they were far from seeming satisfied. Whilst the chief Protestant minister came in his robe of state, the vicar apostolic, on the contrary, presented himself in a plain black

dress, as if he feared on such an occasion to put on a holiday costume. Napoleon, by the simple attitude of the bystanders, had divined all their sentiments, and the bad habit of not being able to contain himself each day increasing, he gave himself up to a transport of anger, in part sincere, and in part the result of calculation. Feigning at first not to see the vicar apostolic, he heard with benevolence the Protestant minister, who, speaking with much simplicity and modesty, addressed him in a few words of resignation, the only words proper in the mouths of citizens who were just torn from their ancient country to be attached to a new country which, though great, was foreign. "Sire," said the representative of the Protestant clergy, "in us you see the ministers of a Christian community, whose custom is to worship in all that happens the hand of Providence, and to render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's." "You are right," instantly replied Napoleon, "and you will find that you do well in so doing, for I wish to protect all kinds of worship. But why, sir, are you dressed in the costume of your ministry?" "Sire, that is the order." "It is then the custom of the country," replied Napoleon. Then turning towards the Catholic clergy he said: "And you, sirs, why are you not here in your sacerdotal habits? Are you solicitors, notaries, or physicians? And you, sir," addressing himself to the representative of the Roman Church, "what is your title?" "Sire, vicar apostolic." "Who nominated you?" "The Pope." "He has not the right. I alone in my empire nominate the bishops charged with the administration of the Church. Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's. The Pope is not Cæsar; I am Cæsar. God has not given to the Pope the sceptre of the sword, but to me. You Catholics, for a long time placed under the dominion of the Protestants, have been enfranchised by my brother, who has placed all kinds of worship upon an equal footing. You are about to be indebted to me for a still more complete equality, and you commence by showing a want of respect for me! You complain of being oppressed by the Protestants! by your conduct it would seem that you have merited it, and that it is necessary to place the weight of a strong authority upon you. Be sure that this authority will not be wanting. I have here a present proof that you do not desire to obey the civil authority, and that you refuse to pray for the sovereign. I have already caused two refractory priests to be arrested, and they will remain in prison. Imitate the Protestants, who, in remaining steadfast to their faith, are citizens submissive to the law and faithful subjects. Ah! you do not wish to pray for me!" continued Napoleon, with an accent of increasing anger. "Is it because a Roman priest has excommunicated me? But who gave him the right to do

so? Who below can unbind subjects from their oath of obedience to a sovereign instituted by law? No one, you should know it, if you know your religion. Are you ignorant that it was your culpable pretensions which drove Luther and Calvin to separate from Rome a part of the Catholic world? If it had been necessary, and if I had not found in the religion of Bossuet the means of assuring the independence of the civil power, I also should have enfranchised France from the power of Rome, and forty millions of men would have followed me. I did not wish it because I thought that the true principles of the Catholic faith were reconcilable with the civil authority. But give up all thought of putting me in a convent, and shaving my head, as Louis the Debonnaire, and submit yourselves, for I am Cæsar! Otherwise I shall banish you from my empire, and disperse you like the Jews over the surface of the earth." In pronouncing these last words the voice of Napoleon was raised and his eye flashed. The unfortunate priests who had provoked this burst were trembling. "You are," he added, "of the diocese of Malines; go and present yourselves to your bishop, obey the Concordat, and I shall then see what I shall have to ordain for you."

This scene, calculated for effect, produced a great one. The words of Napoleon, taken down at the moment, and repeated by the permission of the police in the greater part of the newspapers of the country, produced a great effect.

Encompassing all things in his activity, Napoleon passed rapidly to other objects. He visited Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, Gertruidenberg, and Bois-le-Duc, and everywhere took wise resolutions, dictated by his profound knowledge of war and of administration. On seeing these countries so fertile in flax and hemp, he decreed that a prize of a million francs should be given to the inventor of a machine for spinning flax. He found also in these provinces manufactories which produced common cloth at a very low price, and well adapted for troops, and decided to use it to a considerable extent for that purpose.

Arrived on the banks of the Waal, which presents so strong a frontier and so excellent a means of communication in the interior, he felt all the ardours of his ambition for France re-kindled, and conceived a regulation which should ensure to French boatmen the exclusive navigation of the Rhine. He decided that every boat not being French which entered the Rhine should, at Nimeguen if it came from Holland, and at Mayence if it came from Germany by the Maine, deliver its cargo to French boats, which alone could navigate this great river. Napoleon thus treated the river waters as the English treated the waters of the ocean.

Anxious to have timber proper for shipbuilding for Antwerp, he ordered that all wood of this kind brought along the Rhine should be obliged to pass into Belgium instead of going into Holland, whither it had been usually drawn by the great wealth of the inhabitants. He drew up at the same time several regulations to induce unoccupied workmen to come from Brest, where they built but little from want of wood, for employment at Antwerp.

After having visited the frontier places, and been conveyed successively to the islands of Tholen, of Schouwen, of North and South Beveland, in short, of Walcheren, he decided, on account of the terrible fevers of these countries, that those posts only which were indispensable should be maintained, taking care to choose them well and to provide them with every defensible force of which they were capable. At Flushing he ordered immense works to shelter the garrison from the fire of vessels, and to overwhelm with destructive projectiles any hostile squadron which should endeavour to pass the great channel. At the sight of the ruins of Flushing he showed himself more just towards the unfortunate General Monnet, who had recently fallen in defending the place, and gave the most requisite orders to prevent the past being renewed again in the future. According to an observation often made that men of a ripe age and acclimated are less susceptible of fever than young men newly arrived, he decreed an organisation by virtue of which the defence of these islands should be reserved for the veteran and colonial battalions. He desired that a numerous flotilla of gunboats might always be joined to the fleet, and that the basins of Flushing should be prepared to receive twenty vessels of the line. Whilst he directed these things, his court gave and received fêtes, and occupied itself with the frivolous part of the journey, of which he reserved for himself the useful part.

His stay in these parts was prolonged until the 12th of May. He reascended the Scheldt, and this time only passed through Antwerp, visited Brussels to show his wife, again descended to Ghent and to Bruges to conclude the necessary works on the left of the Scheldt, and from thence west to Ostend, where an English army in disembarking might have marched straight upon Antwerp. Napoleon here decided on works which could give sufficient strength to the place, and then set off for Dunkirk, where he ordered several necessary repairs, chastised the idleness of several engineer officers in fault, visited the camp at Boulogne, the abandoned theatre of his first projects, and held several reviews there, to cause uneasiness to the English; gave two days to Lille, and at last proceeded to Havre, where he occupied himself attentively with the defence of this

considerable port. On the evening of the 1st of June he returned to St. Cloud, satisfied with what he had done and ordered, with the reception everywhere given to the empress, and the hopes which the nation seemed to place in the young sovereign. However, notwithstanding the numerous satisfactory subjects which this journey had procured for him, he returned with a profound irritation, of which the Duke of Otranto was the principal object. King Louis, as Napoleon had ordered him, had demanded from M. de Labouchère all the papers relating to the communications with England, who, firmly believing that in continuing, at the instigation of M. Ouvrard, the overtures commenced, he acted according to the orders of the Duke of Otranto, and in consequence of the emperor himself, had delivered over without dissimulation all that he had written to London, and all the replies which he had received. Napoleon, reading during the journey these papers transmitted to him by his brother, learned for certain that the negotiation had been continued unknown to him, and on a basis which was far from being agreeable to his purposes. These papers did not disclose all that had passed, for the correspondence of M. Ouvrard with M. Fouché was wanting, but what was sufficient to prove to Napoleon that they had negotiated without his orders and after other indications than his. He surmised, without being quite certain, that M. Fouché had taken a principal part in these singular intrigues, and he wished to enlighten himself on the point immediately. On the morning after his arrival, that is, on 2nd of June, he called the ministers to St. Cloud; M. Fouché was present. Without any preamble, Napoleon asked for an account of the going to and fro of M. Ouvrard in Holland, of the continued parleys with England, as it appeared without the sphere of the government. He asked him besides, one after another, if he knew anything of this strange mystery, if he had sent or not M. Ouvrard to Amsterdam, if he was an accomplice or not of his inexcusable manoeuvres. M. Fouché, who had reserved himself to speak at a late period to the emperor of what he had dared to attempt, surprised by his sudden revelation, which he did not expect, and pressed irrefutably by these embarrassing questions, stammered some excuses for M. Ouvrard, saying that he was an intrigant who meddled in everything, and whose proceedings should not be attended to. Napoleon was not to be satisfied with these reasons. "These are not," he said, "insignificant intrigues which should be despised; to permit oneself to negotiate with an enemy's country unknown to one's own sovereign, and on the conditions of which that sovereign is ignorant, and will not perhaps admit, is an unheard-of treason. It is a treason which the weakest of governments ought not to tolerate."

Napoleon added that he looked upon that which was just passed as so serious that he desired that M. Ouvrard should be immediately arrested. M. Fouché, fearing that his arrest would lead to a discovery of the whole affair, in vain attempted to appease Napoleon's anger, but the result of his efforts was only to increase Napoleon's suspicions, and attract them towards himself. Napoleon, who was fully resolved that M. Ouvrard should be arrested, had avoided entrusting the execution of his will to M. Fouché, lest he should find some means of evading it, and had chosen for this duty Savary, who had become Duke de Rovigo, and was entirely in his confidence. Within two or three hours M. Ouvrard was cleverly arrested, and all his papers seized. At his first examination it was discovered that the negotiation had been carried farther than had been suspected, and that M. Fouché had taken as large a part as any one in the singular intrigue which had been discovered.

Napoleon had been very dissatisfied with the restless spirit of this minister, who already on various occasions had officiously taken the initiative, or exceeded the bounds of his instructions, as for example in the matter of the divorce, in the excessive extension of the national guard, and especially in this negotiation with England. Napoleon had not failed to remark his rash spirit of enterprise, and that ambition of his to make himself of importance, which was very likely to prove in the course of time exceedingly dangerous. He perceived in Fouché's eagerness to conclude a peace in spite of himself an indirect censure on his policy, and a wish to acquire credit at his own expense. We may add, moreover, that he had begun to conceive a vague feeling of discontent against all his old servants, for they all, especially the most distinguished amongst them, appeared, each in his own manner, to express disapproval of his actions. M. de Talleyrand gave his reproofs the form of sarcasm, the wise Cambacérès blamed him by his silence, and M. Fouché by the exertions he had made to bring about peace. He had in reply made Talleyrand feel the weight of his temper, and maintained a rigid reserve towards Cambacérès, which chiefly injured himself, as it deprived him of precious counsels. With regard to M. Fouché he was resolved to give full scope to his anger.

The letters found in the possession of M. Ouvrard showed very plainly what part had been taken by the Duke of Otranto in the second Labouchère negotiation. The following day, the 3rd of June, fell on a Sunday; and all the chief dignitaries had gone to hear mass at St. Cloud, and to assist at the emperor's levee. After the celebration of mass Napoleon had the dignitaries and his ministers, with the exception of M. Fouché, summoned to his presence, and addressed them thus:

“What would you think of a minister who, without the cognisance of his sovereign, should open negotiations with foreign States, conduct them on principles arranged only by himself, and thus compromise the whole policy of the State? What punishment is awarded by our laws for such a fault?” As he uttered these words Napoleon scrutinised narrowly each of those who surrounded him, as though he would ask of them such an answer as would enable him the more easily to pour his full vengeance on the head of the Duke of Otranto, for he felt in the midst of all his power that to punish him severely was no light thing. The complaisant courtiers easily read the meaning of his glances, and exclaimed that such a crime would be of the deepest dye. M. de Talleyrand, who was not this time the object of the imperial wrath, smiled carelessly; and the arch-chancellor, who guessed that M. Fouché was alluded to, and resolved to persist in declaring himself the friend even of his enemies, answered that there could be no doubt that the fault was a grave one and deserved a severe punishment, unless it were committed only through an excess of zeal. Napoleon hereupon exclaimed that an excess of zeal which should lead a man to act in the way he had described would be as strange as dangerous, and he proceeded to repeat with vehemence all that he knew of M. Fouché; concluding by announcing his irrevocable determination to deprive him of his office, and requesting the advice of those present with respect to the choice of a fit person to succeed him.

This was a source of great embarrassment to all. It was difficult to make a choice, for to the post of minister of police belonged an immense importance, which was the consequence of the arbitrary powers belonging to it, and which M. Fouché had known how to increase and to identify with himself. Each, moreover, feared to make any choice which might be repugnant to Napoleon's own secret determination, and to contribute, even indirectly, to the deprivation of a minister who was dreaded even in disgrace. All were eager to declare that serious deliberation was necessary before fixing on the man who would be a worthy successor to M. Fouché. But M. de Talleyrand, after having looked about him for some time in silence, and with an ironical expression flitting over his impassible countenance, at length said, turning to his neighbour, in a voice sufficiently loud to be heard by all around: “M. Fouché has certainly committed a great fault, and I will name the one man who alone ought to be his successor—it is M. Fouché himself!” Vexed that this assembly of great persons should have not only failed in giving him any advice worth having, but should have been the means of exposing him to a stroke of Talleyrand's raillery, Napoleon

abruptly retired, taking with him the arch-chancellor, and saying to him: "Much advantage have I gained from consulting the gentlemen! You see what useful advice they have given me! But my choice is made, and the Duke de Rovigo will be my minister of police." Napoleon had had occasion to prove the skill and boldness of the Duke de Rovigo, had remarked his devotedness to himself, and felt very confident that he would not imitate M. Fouché's example of taking to himself the credit of every act of grace, and attributing to the emperor all those of a contrary character. The appointment of the Duke de Rovigo to this post would, moreover, be a source of general consternation, and this was by no means contrary to Napoleon's inclination. It was a choice, however, which filled the arch-chancellor with uneasiness, for whilst doing full justice to the merits of the Duke de Rovigo, he felt that an ill effect would result from a military air being given to the police, and hinted that public opinion, being somewhat estranged, was scarcely likely to be conciliated by the appearance of a minister of police in military uniform. To this Napoleon replied: "So much the better! The Duke de Rovigo is resolute and cunning, and as he will be feared, may afford to be gentler than another!" There was no answering this; and it may be observed of the Duke de Rovigo that he was intelligent, crafty, and unscrupulous, and yet free from malice, and perfectly capable of speaking the truth to his master's face. But the truth, unfortunately, in whatever guise it may reach a sovereign's ears, if he be not inclined to receive it, is but an empty sound, and begs for admission at a gate which will not be opened to its entreaties.

The course of affairs thus led to the removal in less than three years of the two most important ministers of State—the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of police, M. de Talleyrand and M. Fouché. With respect to the ministry of foreign affairs, although filled with modesty, prudence, and discretion by M. de Cadore, it had seemed to be vacant since it had passed from the hands of M. de Talleyrand. Of polished manners and a pleasing exterior, M. de Bassano, a man who was devoted to the emperor, and desired to serve him well, but too apt in a spirit of complaisance to give up his own opinions for those of the emperor, aspired to the ministry of foreign affairs, and as a means of rendering his attainment of this post the easier, would have wished to place in the ministry of police a friend of his own. This friend was M. de Semonville, a man at once cynical, daring, and supple, fraught with all the unscrupulous doctrines of a minister of police, but not possessed of the necessary judgment, tact, and vigilance. M. de Bassano had contributed to the fall of M. Fouché by giving currency to more than one damaging

report, and had paved the way for the elevation of M. de Semonville by extolling above measure some inferior services rendered by him in the course of the negotiations respecting the Austrian marriage. But if it were possible for complaisant mediocrity to gain access to Napoleon, as is the case with all great men, there was but little chance of his being imposed on by small artifices, especially when the matter in question was no less than in the choice of a minister of police. Indeed, whilst M. de Bassano had sent for M. de Semonville to St. Cloud, that he might be ready at the favourable moment, urgent and repeated messages were sent to the Duke de Rovigo to present himself in the emperor's cabinet. The ante-chambers were filled with the curious, and those who had gone to St. Cloud in the hope of assisting at some great change in the high ministerial appointments. The Duke de Rovigo arrived at length, and was much surprised at the announcement which Napoleon made to him without any preface. "You are minister of police, take the oath, and begin your work!" The new minister murmured some modest objections to his fitness, to which Napoleon paid no attention, took the oath, and passed through the imperial apartments, which echoed with the news that the Duke de Rovigo was made minister of police, and the Duke of Otranto in disgrace. The effect of this news was disadvantageous; for M. Fouché, who, after having performed great services by means of his knowledge of men, and by his considerate manner of treating party spirit, both appeasing and diverting it, had undoubtedly detracted from the merit due to these services by his own officiousness, was nevertheless regretted by the public as one of the men who had been Napoleon's counsellors in his most prosperous years. He was regretted as Talleyrand and Josephine were regretted; with a regret which regarded them as witnesses of, and actors in a time which had been glorious, and which, it was feared, would not be equalled in prosperity by the future.

Napoleon did not, however, intend to disgrace M. Fouché without giving him some compensation; and he made him governor of the Roman States, where his tact and experience in revolutions would find ample and suitable employment. Previously to this he sent two letters to the ex-minister: one of them public and full of gratifying testimonies of esteem; the other private and more severe. We quote the second, because of the two it is the one which is the most conformable to the truth.

"ST. CLOUD, *June 3, 1810.*

"MONSIEUR LE DUC D'OTRANTE,—I have received your letter of the 2nd of June. I am fully aware of all the services which you have rendered me, and I have perfect confidence in your attachment to

my person, and your zeal for my service. I should, however, be wanting in what is due to myself did I any longer leave you in possession of the portfolio. The office of minister of police is one which demands that perfect confidence should be reposed in him who holds it, such a confidence as I can no longer place in you, since in the most important matters you have compromised my tranquillity, and that of the State; conduct which is not excused in my eyes by the legitimacy of the motives which led to it.

"A negotiation has been opened with England, conferences have taken place with Lord Wellesley. This minister has known that he was treating with you, when he ought to have believed that it was with me; from this results a total confusion in all my political relations, and if I should endure it, a stain would be upon my character which I am determined not to endure.

"Your peculiar opinions regarding the duties of the minister of police are not consistent with the good of the State; and although I have full confidence in your attachment and fidelity, I am forced to a perpetual surveillance which fatigues me, and which I can no longer bear. This surveillance is rendered necessary by the number of things which you have done of your own head without knowing whether they agreed with my wishes or views, or were consistent with my general course of policy.

"I wish to inform you by my own hand of the reasons which induce me to deprive you of the portfolio of police. I have no hope of your changing your mode of acting, since during several years the most decided and reiterated evidences of my dissatisfaction have not altered it, and because you have been determined not to understand that it is possible to do much harm whilst attempting to do much good.

"Apart from this, my confidence in your talents and fidelity is complete, and I desire to find some occasion of employing them in my service."

M. Fouché, on quitting his post, had taken care to burn all the papers relating to it, and felt a malicious pleasure in withholding from his successor's hands all the innumerable threads composing the finely spun web of the system of police. The Duke de Rovigo, therefore, suddenly appointed to the head of this department whilst completely ignorant of its details, and moreover, without means of communicating with the secret agents whom M. Fouché declined to point out to him, was at first surprised and then terrified at his new position. But he speedily became reassured, and saw clearly where all had at first appeared confused and intricate. One by one crept up to him those mysterious secret agents, which are so necessary to a minister of police, and whose use is measured not by their own disposition but by that of the minister who employs them; a sort of timid and famished animals such as are all those which habitually live in the shade, flying at the least alarm, but quickly driven forth again by the pangs of hunger

towards the hand which offers them food. These persons soon made the Duke de Rovigo acquainted with those secret plots, generally rather puerile than dangerous, which it was necessary to watch without appearing to make them of too much importance; and it was not long before the new minister found himself well able to conduct the affairs of his office, although he never acquired the authority of M. Fouché, to whose piercing eyes had been almost attributed omniscience.

Of all the secret proceedings which it was now the office of the Duke de Rovigo to trace out, Napoleon felt the most interest in the singular negotiation which had been pursued in his own despite. He wished to know the several parts which had been taken in it by M. Fouché, M. Ouvrard, and M. de Labouchère. M. Ouvrard frequently underwent examination and maintained a rigorous silence; M. de Labouchère was summoned to Paris, and ordered to bring with him the papers relating to the matter which he still had in his possession. By means of these and by interrogating M. de Labouchère, the real facts of the case were speedily discovered to be as we have described. M. de Labouchère was considered to have behaved with discretion and sincerity, and to have only intermeddled with the negotiation in accordance with what he believed to be the wishes of the government.

M. Ouvrard and M. Fouché were found to have revived a negotiation which had been half abandoned, and to have completely disregarded the instructions of the emperor in showing a disposition to sacrifice that which he was resolved not on any consideration to resign. But the chief source of annoyance to Napoleon was the idea that he might be suspected in England of duplicity, and of being willing to traffic with the kingdoms given to his brothers, especially that of Spain. An additional circumstance which came to light caused him particular alarm, and made him resolve to convert the almost nominal disgrace of M. Fouché into one both public and severe. It was discovered that independently of the communications which had been carried on by M. de Labouchère, and which were but the revival and protraction of an authorised negotiation, there had been others which had no such foundation, and which had been solely the idea of M. Fouché himself. M. Fouché had in November, as we have said, selected an agent named Fagan, formerly an officer in an Irish regiment, well connected in England, and a friend of Lord Yarmouth, who had introduced him to the Marquis of Wellesley. There was reason to suppose that written communications had passed in the course of this affair, and Napoleon sent to M. Fouché, demanding that he should deliver up all such as were in his possession, and threatening the severest penalties in case he should hesitate to obey.

The agent had brought from London only a few unimportant papers, and these M. Fouché had burned, partly because they were of little interest, and partly because prudence counselled the destruction of the least traces of so rash an undertaking. When a message to this effect reached him, Napoleon surrendered himself to the most violent paroxysms of rage, for he feared that this obstinacy of M. Fouché concealed some important secret; he deprived him of the governorship with which he had just invested him, and exiled him to Aix in Provence.

The alarming suspicions, however, which had arisen were soon set at rest. The agent who was the object of so much inquietude appeared, frankly answered all the questions that were put to him, said that he had seen the Marquis of Wellesley, and had from him the only written document that he had received; and that this was a note containing about six lines, and simply repeating the ordinary declaration of the British ministers, that they were ready to take part in a sincere formal negotiation which should comprise all the allies of England, and especially Spain.

The result of the inquiry into this strange affair seemed, in fact, merely to show that M. Fouché had been guilty of an act of great temerity, and that the emperor might possibly be considered in England more accommodating than he really was. Napoleon soon saw the matter in its true light and grew calm, but he still left M. Fouché in disgrace and exile. Fearing, however, to be accused of lightly sacrificing his old servants, he had an account of the whole affair drawn up and communicated to those ministers and great persons who had been witnesses of the bursts of passion to which it had excited him. "It is right that they should see," he said, "that I do not permit myself to be causelessly and arbitrarily severe towards my old servants."

This attempt at negotiation showed very clearly that without the sacrifice of Spain, which Napoleon was determined not to sacrifice, peace was impossible; and that it only remained to prosecute the war with vigour, and to enforce with the utmost possible rigour the continental blockade. In the latter measure the assistance of Holland was indispensable, and therefore became the object of increased attention.

Had King Louis had a judicious and clear-sighted understanding, he would have acted a manly part in the position in which he found himself, and since he had determined to resign, for the sake of preserving the safety of Holland, a portion of his territory, he would have endeavoured to instil submission into the hearts of his subjects. The most sensible of them, in truth, needed no persuasion; they were well aware that resistance was unavailing whilst they were under the hand of

Napoleon, who, after all, was not an enemy, but a rather exacting ally, who taxed them severely for the common good. But King Louis had unfortunately a cankered heart. Softened for a moment by the expostulations of the members of his family, on his return to Amsterdam all his usual bitterness of soul returned, aggravated by the sacrifices which he had been compelled to make. On entering his capital he seemed to read on every face reproaches for his having resigned the fairest provinces of the kingdom, and he hastened to show himself the most distressed of all. The queen, who followed him, displayed a countenance as full of gloomy meaning as his. This was not the way to please at Paris, nor to lead to that resignation at Amsterdam which could alone prevent some terrible outbreak. But unhappily the actions of the king were even more imprudent than either his looks or his language.

He commenced by writing the most affectionate letters to the two ministers whom he had shown himself so ready to sacrifice at Paris; by giving titles of nobility to those who were now to lose their rank as marshals, a method of compensation which was very convenient perhaps, but quite at variance with the policy which he had promised to pursue; by degrading the burgomaster Vander Poll, who had opposed the putting Amsterdam into a state of defence. To these acts he added one which was more serious still. Having taken a dislike to the French ambassador, M. de Larochefoucauld, whom he regarded as being a spy upon his conduct, he was anxious to take advantage of his absence to receive the corps diplomatique, and only have to receive M. Sérurier, a simple chargé d'affaires. M. Sérurier was a prudent and reserved man, who only concerned himself with the punctual performance of the duties laid upon him by his court. There was no reason why he should not be treated at least with politeness. The king passed before him without either word or look, and overwhelmed with civilities the Russian envoy beside him. This scene became the source of much remark and anxiety in Amsterdam, and was reported in Paris by the French agent, who could not maintain silence on subjects which excited general attention.

The difficulties which had their foundation in the personal character of the king were accompanied by others which were the result of circumstances. The last treaty exacted severe sacrifices from the Dutch. In the first place all those American cargoes which had entered the Dutch ports under the flag of the United States, and had been seized at the instance of the French government, had to be given up. Now, these cargoes were either the property of Dutch houses, or of English houses which had commercial connections with Dutch merchants; and all these houses opposed the execution of this measure; those of

the one class alleging that these cargoes were composed of Dutch merchandise conveyed under the American flag from the colonies of Holland; and those of the other contending that they consisted of true American merchandise brought over in American vessels. King Louis attempted to deliver up in the place of these cargoes those which had been seized by our cruisers, and belonged to them. But the delivery of these cargoes was one of the articles of the treaty, on the exact performance of which Napoleon most strenuously insisted, either because he would thus strike a blow at the principal branch of the contraband trade, or because he was anxious to enrich the treasury extraordinary at the contrabandists' expense. This question, therefore, became the subject of the most animated and bitter communications.

The establishment of a French custom-house service along the coasts of Holland presented another great difficulty. There had come from Boulogne, Dunkirk, Antwerp, Cleves, Cologne, and Mayence, legions of French custom-house officers, who did not speak Dutch, were accustomed to a most rigorous surveillance, and brought to the exercise of their functions a sort of military honour, which rendered them almost proof against corruption. The Dutch were thus compelled to endure on their coasts and in their ports the presence of foreign functionaries, and to submit to their minute investigations; a state of things well nigh unbearable by a people who were almost exclusively mercantile, and who had always been accustomed to the utmost commercial freedom. And had it been necessary to endure this restraint only on the exterior frontier, the annoyance, though still great, would have been less severely felt. But the configuration of Holland rendered its presence necessary at its very centre; for besides being traversed by a multitude of rivers and canals, it is penetrated by an arm of the sea called the Zuyder Zee, which affords the most convenient possible means of communication between all parts of the country. Had this Zuyder Zee had but one outlet, that might have been watched, and the interior navigation of the country been left unimpeded; but as there were many in various positions, it had been found necessary to subject the interior of the country to an intolerable surveillance; and in addition to this, commissions were established composed of French custom-house and military officers, to pass summary judgment on all offences and offenders against the laws of blockade. Louis had not reckoned on this infringement on his sovereign rights, and he ordered the liberation of all the individuals arrested under the authority of these tribunals.

But far beyond all these difficulties in gravity was that which arose from the military occupation, and which increased

as the French advanced posts drew nearer to Amsterdam. Marshal Oudinot, who commanded the combined forces which were to guard the avenues of Holland, had his headquarters at Utrecht. He had established military posts from Utrecht to the mouth of the Meuse, and ascending the coasts of North Holland, from the mouths of the Meuse to the extremity of the Hague. But it was necessary to rise still higher, if the Zuyder Zee and Amsterdam were to be closed against the contrabandists. But this, either swayed by his own wishes or the secret partisans of a revolt, Louis was determined not to suffer; for whilst they were only at Utrecht or the Hague it was still possible, by opening the sluices and cutting off North Holland, to dispute with Napoleon Batavian independence, as two centuries since it had been disputed with Louis XIV. But to preserve the ability to effect this it was necessary to prevent the ascent of the French troops beyond Leyden.

Besides this reason, King Louis was especially anxious to prevent the appearance of foreign troops in his capital, since their presence would have reduced him to the rank only of a royal prefect. He urgently insisted, therefore, with Marshal Oudinot that the French troops should not ascend higher than Leyden, declaring that it was contrary as well to his honour as his dignity to permit troops which, although friendly, were nevertheless foreign, to be quartered in the city of his royal residence. And in fact, an advanced guard having presented itself before Haarlem, it was denied admission, and the imperial eagle was forced to retire.

In addition to these greater or less infringements of the treaty, was the neglect of one of its articles, on the performance of which Napoleon laid particular stress, namely, that which related to the armament of the flotilla of the Texel. Some vessels had been assembled under Admiral Winter, but they had scarcely a quarter of the proper number of men; and this condition of the treaty, which was the most easy to comply with, the most fitted to appease Napoleon's anger, and the fulfilment of which must have been advantageous even in the event of resistance being determined on, was left unsatisfied from want of financial resources. All accounts from the Texel concurred in stating that the armaments which had been announced were illusory.

All these numerous disputes became known, in the common course of things, to the public, receiving a heightened colour from those who wished Holland to throw itself into the arms of England, and being deplored by those sensible persons who foresaw their inevitable consequences, and regarded by the suffering masses as so many proofs of an insupportable tyranny to which it was intended to subject them. And Louis, as

much excited as the humblest of the crowds of the labouring classes who collected every day on the empty and desolate quays of Amsterdam, so far from attempting to appease the public emotion, excited it, on the contrary, both by word and gesture.

Matters had at last arrived at that pitch that the least thing was capable of causing an explosion; and one Sunday one of the servants of the French embassy walking in his livery through some public place, was recognised, first hooted, then mobbed, and finally only rescued with great difficulty from the hands of the excited populace.

At any other period such an incident would have been but of slight importance; but occurring when it did it was sure to bring matters to a crisis. The facts we have just related having been reported without any exaggeration to Napoleon by Marshal Oudinot and M. Sérurier, had filled him with rage. That his chargé d'affaires should have been insulted, his eagles forced to retire from before Haarlem, and the livery of his ambassador outraged, seemed to him to be an accumulation of unbearable affronts, especially since the essential conditions of the treaty were either left unperformed or executed only in part. He had his passport sent to M. Verhuel, who was the Dutch ambassador at Paris, and although he held him in high consideration, ordered him to quit France without delay. He prohibited M. de Larochefoucauld from returning to his post, and M. Sérurier from reappearing at the court of Louis. He demanded that those who had been guilty of the outrage against the livery of the French embassy should be instantly given up to him; desired that the burgomaster of Amsterdam should be reinstated in his affairs; that the gates not only of Haarlem, but also of Amsterdam itself, should be reopened to the French troops, who were to enter with drums beating and colours displayed; that the American cargoes should be given up without exception; that the French custom-house officers should be everywhere received; and that an explanation should be given with respect to the armament of the fleet promised for the 1st of July. He concluded by declaring that if one of those demands remained unexecuted, he would speedily put an end to what he called the ridiculous comedy, and take possession of Holland, as he had taken possession of Tuscany and the Roman States; he enforced his threats by actions. The troops of the division Molitor which were at Embden were commanded to enter Holland by the north, and those which were in Brabant were directed to enter it by the south, with a view to the reinforcement of Marshal Oudinot.

The news of these startling proceedings fell, blow after blow, upon Amsterdam, and the alarm occasioned was increased

by the declarations of Admiral Verhuel, who had quitted Paris in accordance with the injunctions he had received, and who perfectly well understood what were the intentions of Napoleon. He urged upon those who were at the head of affairs the absolute necessity of coming to some determination, of either adopting a course of resistance which would most probably end in disaster, or of making that absolute submission which could alone avert the peril. King Louis had recourse to a great consultation, to which he summoned not only the ministers in office, but also ex-ministers, and the principal officers both of the navy and the army. With the exception of some madmen, and those who were devoted to the interests of England, all those present were of the same opinion. Much as they detested the yoke of France, they considered that that of England, which was the only alternative offered, would have been still less endurable. Moreover, that whilst the greater portion of the Dutch territory would have to be resigned in a contest with Napoleon after having suffered frightful ravages, the least portion could only be preserved from his hands by drowning it, and by giving up to the English the timber-yards, arsenals, and fleets. No one who retained the least portion of common-sense or patriotism could pronounce in favour of a measure so rash. All the sensible persons present at the consultation expressed both by word and look their opinion of the utter uselessness of any attempts at resistance, and King Louis found himself deserted by those even on whose devoted support he had most confidently reckoned. Besides, although some exalted families might have a strong leaning towards England both from interest and sentiment, and the populace might attribute to us the wretchedness they endured, and the bourgeoisie be alienated from us by their commercial sufferings, the latter began to perceive the perils which surrounded Holland, and which threatened to cast her desolate and ruined at the feet of the English aristocracy, and raised their voices against the imprudent conduct of the government. In the midst of this state of affairs, Louis, who had pledged himself not to suffer the presence of the French in Amsterdam, finding himself deserted by those of his subjects whose passions he had too warmly abetted, knew not what course to take, and fell into a state of the utmost mental distraction.

In this position of perplexity it occurred to him, as it already frequently had, to offer entire submission to his brother's will, and to avoid a contest which it would be impossible to maintain. He summoned to his presence M. Sérurier, the French chargé d'affaires, to whom he had a few days previously shown so great a slight, received him very civilly, asked his advice, promising to follow it most faithfully, offered to have the

individuals who had insulted the livery of the French embassy prosecuted, to reinstate the burgomaster of Amsterdam, to deliver up the American cargoes, to submit to the French custom-house officers, and to hasten the armament of the fleet; naming as the only condition in return for those acts of submission, that the French troops should not enter his capital: this, he said, would be a humiliation he could not endure. This unhappy prince had, in fact, so often declared that he would not permit the presence of foreign troops in the city of his royal residence that he believed their actual presence there could not but overwhelm him with shame. We must add, moreover, that from the midst of his profound and incurable distrust had sprung up an idea that Napoleon had resolved to depose him, and that immediately on the arrival of the French troops in Amsterdam he would be dethroned without even having in his power the honourable though sad alternative of abdicating. He was very eager, therefore, to delay their advance upon that city.

But the orders of Napoleon had been so positive that neither Marshal Oudinot nor M. Sérurier dared to defer a measure which they had been peremptorily desired to carry out. M. Sérurier entreated the king not to be alarmed at the presence of the French soldiers, who were his fellow-countrymen, who had raised him to his throne, who always regarded him with the respect due to the brother of their emperor, and who were, moreover, ordered to conduct themselves towards him as was fit towards a royal ally. But he could not modify the marshal's instructions, and was obliged to permit the advance of the French troops, whilst he hastened to send word to Paris of what was taking place in Amsterdam.

Situated between the Dutch who were averse to a resistance which could only prove ruinous to their country on the one hand, and the French troops who continued to advance upon Amsterdam on the other, and seeing no other way of preserving some show of dignity, the king resolved voluntarily to resign his throne. He called together his ministers, and informed them in secrecy that he was about to abdicate in favour of his son, and to confide the regency to the queen; since one who was a woman, a mother, dear to Napoleon, and willing to do all that he desired, would by her very feebleness disarm his anger, and be able to submit to him without degradation. His ministers listened to him in silence, and expressed some regret at losing a king so devoted to the welfare of Holland; but they did not insist on this point very strongly, for they were well aware that, at the pass to which things had now come, the reign of an infant under the regency of a woman offered the only combination which could prolong for a time the existence of Dutch

independence. Upon the king's earnest request, they promised to keep his intentions secret, until he should have time to abdicate, and to retire in freedom whither he might choose. This precaution, inspired by his habitual distrust, was superfluous, for neither M. Sérurier nor Marshal Oudinot could have prevented him from abdicating, or had any intention of infringing his personal liberty.

Forty-eight hours only were devoted to the preparations for this abdication. The French chargé d'affaires and general-in-chief had no intimation of it. It was arranged that the king should depart unattended and in a disguise, through which recognition would be impossible; that the act of abdication should be then immediately carried to the Legislative Body; that the ministers, as a council of regency, should assume the functions of government in the name of the young king until the return of the queen, who had only remained a few days in Holland, and that this princess should be invited to Amsterdam to take upon herself the regency and the education of the heir to the throne. The necessary documents were signed on the 2nd of July 1810, and immediately after having signed them King Louis, throwing himself into a carriage, set out, leaving his most confidential ministers in ignorance as to his intended place of retreat. On the morning of the 3rd of July the city of Amsterdam, to its surprise and disquietude, and the French army and embassy to its profound astonishment, learned the extreme step which had been taken by the emperor's brother.

The ministers first went to pay their compliments to the infant who was now a king, and then proceeded to make the Legislative Body acquainted with the events which had taken place. During the course of the afternoon the French army, which had already arrived at the gates of Amsterdam, was received by the old burgomaster Vander Poll, who had been reinstated in his office, and by the Dutch military authorities. The reception was almost amicable. The populace made no show of resistance. The great bulk of the inhabitants, while regretting Louis, considered that it was now necessary to place all their reliance on Napoleon, and to seek in a reunion with the vastest empire in the universe a recompense for the loss of independence and the sufferings which must fall on them from the rigorous application of the continental system. The resolutions which should be taken at Paris with respect to these affairs were awaited with a species of breathless expectation.

M. Sérurier had instantly despatched an attaché of the embassy to inform Napoleon of the king's strange abdication; but on the very day of the arrival of this messenger in Paris, the 6th of July, a report was presented to Napoleon, which had been drawn up with the view to the explanation of the reasons

which called for the annexation of Holland to the empire. His resolution, therefore, had been come to before his brother's abdication. Nevertheless, determined as he was, Napoleon had perceived in the very moment of converting intention into action the full gravity of the measure he was about to take. In fact, immediately after the treaty with Vienna and his marriage with Marie Louise, he had directed all his thoughts towards the attainment of peace, and had manœuvred his forces with a view to the evacuation of Germany, and to quieting the anxieties of the continental powers. But how would all Europe be alarmed by his seizure within the space of three months of Brabant, Zeeland, and the whole of Holland, thus adding two millions of souls to his empire, and extending its frontiers from the Scheldt to the Waal, from the Waal to Ems. This incessant spirit of acquisition, which had been made the ground of so much reproach against France, would once more manifest itself in the most alarming guise. And how would England, who held in her hands the power of granting that last and most desirable peace, namely, a maritime peace—how would she endure, in addition to the annexation to France of Antwerp and Flushing, the annexation also of Helwoet-Sluis, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and the Helder? Napoleon perceived all these difficulties; but delighted at the idea of adding to France such territories, such bays and ports, and of closing, moreover, many a broad avenue against British commerce, and considering that the annexation was excused by the position in which he was placed by his brother's abdication, he declared Holland to be annexed to the empire of France. Receiving the information on which he founded it on the evening of the 6th, the arrangement of the conditions of this annexation occupied but two days, and on the 9th July 1810 it was decreed.

The motive publicly assigned for this annexation was, that Holland being without a king, and it being necessary to prevent its falling into the hands of the English, Napoleon had found himself compelled to bring it under the vigilant and vigorous administration of the empire; and further, that Holland, thus annexed, would give important naval assistance to the common cause, and add largely to the extent of coast closed against British commerce. But the reason which was chiefly urged with the Dutch themselves was, that placed between a sea closed against them by the English and a continent closed against them by the French, they must speedily have perished, or at least have been utterly crushed under the weight of an enormous debt; but that being, on the other hand, annexed to the most powerful empire in the world, they would have the continent open to them during the war, and during peace both sea and land; that under this latter condition of circumstances

their commerce would become more vigorous than it had ever been at the period of their most brilliant prosperity; that their maritime power, at present almost annihilated, when incorporated with that of France, would bring back the glorious days of Tromp and Ruyter, and dispute with Great Britain the dominion of the seas; that they themselves, placed on an equality with the inhabitants of France, would be amply recompensed by the acquisition of a new and powerful country for the country they had lost.

With a surprising audacity of language, Napoleon decreed that *Holland was annexed to France!* and decided, moreover, that Amsterdam should be the third city of the empire; Rome having been four months previously declared the second. He arranged that Holland was for the future to send six members to the Senate of the empire, six deputies to the Council of State, twenty-five to the Legislative Body, and two members to the Cour de Cassation. A tempting bait was thus offered to every kind of ambition. He confirmed the naval and military officers in their various ranks, incorporated the royal guard of Holland with the French imperial guard, and ordered that the Dutch regiments of the line should have rank in the French army in order with the regiments already existing, and in accordance with their numbers. What could be more flattering to the Dutch troops than such an affiliation as this?

The kingdom was divided into nine departments, namely, the departments of the mouths of the Scheldt, of the mouths of the Rhine, of the Zuyder Zee, of the mouths of the Meuse, of Upper Yssel, of the mouths of the Yssel, of Friesland, of Western Ems and of Eastern Ems. The existing system of taxes was to be maintained until the 1st January 1811, when the French imposts, much less burdensome than the Dutch, were to be established throughout the nine departments.

It was in its finances, together with its commerce, that Holland had most seriously felt the consequences of its isolated position. It was now evidently necessary to take some steps with respect to its debt. In a budget of about 155 millions of expenses set against 110 millions of revenue, the interest of the debt alone was set down at 80 millions. It was impossible that such a state of things should continue, and this was made sufficiently apparent by the fact that the interest of the debt had not been paid either in 1809 nor in 1808. The treasury bills were discounted at a considerable loss; and this deficiency had been both the cause of the annihilation of the Dutch navy, and that three thousand of its seamen had emigrated to England for the sake of obtaining a subsistence.

Napoleon, considering that these first moments of agitation in Holland were the most convenient season for the infliction

of a painful operation, and comparing its present situation with that of France after the Revolution, made it one of the clauses of the act of annexation that the national debt should be reduced to a third part. But he ordered the immediate payment of the dividends in arrear of the years 1809 and 1808, which to many of the small fundholders was an immense consolation. Napoleon hoped, by cutting off the amounts paid to certain princes, enemies of France, such as the princes of Hesse and Orange, to make twenty millions suffice for the payment of the interest of the debt after its reduction to a third; by the suppression of many portions of it which the annexation had rendered useless, to make fourteen millions suffice for the expenses of the civil service; and that thus, twenty millions being devoted to the army and twenty-six millions to the navy, the annual expenses should only amount to eighty millions. The Dutch had always had a predilection for maritime pursuits, and Napoleon hoped by affording them the means of indulging it, and giving orders for the immediate commencement of operations in the dockyards, to rouse their drooping spirits and inspire them with a favourable idea of the annexation.

The commercial affairs of Holland next claimed his attention. The removal of the line of French custom-house officers between France and Holland would, of course, have been an immense commercial advantage; but as it had already taken possession of the ground, Napoleon decided that it should remain until the 1st January 1811, at which period was to take place the complete fusion of the interests of the two countries. An immediate impulse would nevertheless be given to Dutch commerce, as well as a great gratification to French consumers, by permitting the influx into France of the immense stores of sugars, coffees, cottons, and indigoes which had been amassed at Amsterdam and Rotterdam; and the dispersion of these stores, whilst affording much relief to the commercial classes of Holland, would also make the duties of the custom-house service far lighter. But as the price of colonial produce in Holland, on account of the facility with which it was brought in, never reached a quarter of that which prevailed in France, the grant of full liberty of importation to the Dutch merchants would have been to them an enormous advantage which they could never have expected, and on the other hand, a serious blow to the French merchants, who had founded their arrangements on a very much higher scale of prices. To avoid this, Napoleon imposed a tax of fifty per cent. upon all colonial produce imported from Holland into France, and this, whilst it left a large margin of profit to the Dutch merchants, placed those of France on a much more equal footing with them, and was also the means of pouring large sums into the imperial treasury.

Such were in general the measures which accompanied the decree of the 9th July. There were some others whose purpose it was to soften still more the disfavour with which the Dutch might regard the annexation of their kingdom. In order that Amsterdam might not be immediately deprived of a court, he arranged that there, as at Turin, Florence, and Rome, some high personage should reside, whose duty it would be to exercise the imperial authority, and represent it with considerable state. As there was at the moment no prince of his family ready for the post, or capable of managing the financial and administrative details of the annexed kingdom, and as, moreover, none such could decently replace King Louis, Napoleon determined to appoint to it the Arch-Treasurer Lebrun, a man of a gentle, conciliating spirit, very skilful in matters of finance, and who knew how to bring the truth before his master's eye under the guise of good-natured and amiable pleasantry. Napoleon could not have chosen a representative more suited to the Dutch character. The arch-treasurer himself was anxious to decline an office of such great difficulty; but Napoleon, without listening to his remonstrances, hastened his departure, bestowing upon him an ample revenue and extensive powers. He associated with him M. Daru to take possession of the public properties, the arsenals, and magazines; M. d'Hauterive to take charge of the archives relating to foreign affairs; M. de Las-Cases to take necessary measures with respect to the maritime projects; and the talented engineer, M. de Ponthon, to inspect the roadsteads, gulfs, and ports from Flushing to Embden. He hoped within the space of fifteen days to have received all their reports, and to have given the necessary orders as well for the rigorous enforcement of the continental blockade as for the defence of the new territory annexed to the empire, and the revival of the Dutch marine. And finally, he sent General Lauriston, his aide-de-camp, to take possession of and bring to Paris the prince-royal, who was to receive the title of Grand Duke de Berg in exchange for his crown.

General Lauriston lost no time in proceeding to Amsterdam, arrived there on the 13th July, and obtained possession of the prince, who had been treated with most respectful care, but had not been regarded as a king. The Arch-Treasurer Lebrun arrived on the 14th, and was well received. The royal guard, the national guard, and the civil authorities assembled to meet him at the city gates. The royal guard, gratified at becoming a portion of the imperial guard, raised some cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* The populace maintained a calm silence. The various functionaries, anxious to keep their appointments, saluted the new master, as new masters are generally saluted in all times, in all countries. The next day they took the oaths, and it was

one of the new Dutch ministers who reminded Prince Lebrun, who was always a little forgetful, that he had neglected to order a form of prayer to be read in the churches for the emperor. The arch-treasurer told this story himself to the emperor, remarking with a little malice that he was not the most zealous of his subjects in Holland.

The Dutch are calm and reserved, and of a character which has a good deal of keenness and prudence mingled with its integrity. As a people they were not desirous of quarrelling with the man who had become their master as he had become the master of so many other countries, and perceived, moreover, that they would derive some considerable advantages from the annexation of their country to the empire. The isolated and troubled existence which had been theirs during the reign of King Louis, more Dutch than the Dutch themselves, of course could not continue. So situated between France and England, that it appeared inevitable that they must be subject to either the one or the other, they resigned themselves to their annexation to France, in the hope that when peace should be established they would become the commercial agents of the vastest empire in the world. This was the substance of all the opinions expressed by sensible men on the subject. The change might pain their hearts, but it did not disturb their minds. The fundholders were, it is true, distressed at the loss of two-thirds of their dividends; but in general the affairs of these little capitalists gained little attention, for they were neither sufficiently rich nor sufficiently numerous to attract it. The inhabitants of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, habituated to the possession of command and influence, had been favourably inclined by the immediate opening of the dockyards. Admiral Winter, who was generally beloved by the seamen, had endeavoured, as far as possible, to inspire them with confidence in the intentions of Napoleon, and an expectation of the speedy revival of the Dutch navy. All classes, therefore, found some reason for being pleased with the change. But it remained to be seen how they would bear the presence of foreign troops, the conscription, impressment, the prolonged closure of the seas, and in short, all the annoyances resulting from subjection to a foreign government, which would send its orders from a distance, and express them in a language which was not the national one.

Napoleon had scarcely received the first reports of his agents when he determined on his projects with respect to the Dutch navy. He decided on the formation of three fleets—one to be built at Antwerp, another at Rotterdam, and a third at Amsterdam. He ordered that the construction of vessels should be immediately commenced both at Rotterdam and Amsterdam, and that all the vessels yet capable of service should

be repaired. He had seamen levied, and although a considerable number were in the English service, he yet hoped by the offer of good pay to obtain a sufficient number to man the fleets. There was an abundance of shipbuilding material in Holland; and funds were as plentiful as material, since the tax of fifty per cent. upon colonial produce, and the sale of American cargoes, filled the coffers of the Dutch departments.

The annexation, therefore, succeeded better than could have been expected, and the continental blockade was enforced as far as the mouths of the Ems. As for King Louis, who had in a manner fled after his abdication, it was discovered that he had arrived at the baths of Toeplitz. Napoleon instructed his diplomatic agents to treat him with the utmost respect, to attribute all that had passed to his bad state of health, and to place at his disposal such funds as he might require. Thus, for the moment, all the difficulties attending the annexation seemed to vanish; but Napoleon, after his marriage, had experienced extreme anxiety to set at rest the uneasy suspicions of the various governments, to evacuate Germany, and to turn aside from all other enterprises, to carry on against the English a vigorous war, both commercial and military; and yet he had already, with a view to enforcing the continental blockade and increasing his maritime power, extended his territory from the Scheldt to the Waal, from the Waal to the Meuse, from the Meuse to the Helder, from the Helder to the Ems. Where was he to pause in this career? and how could he justify to the European powers these dangerous aggressions?

Napoleon, in fact, in his eagerness to attain the two great objects of his desire, had almost forgotten his intention of reassuring Europe; and scarcely deigned to submit to the various governments a few insignificant reasons in explanation of this vast addition to his empire. He instructed M. de Caulaincourt to let fall at the court of Russia the observation that Holland had scarcely changed masters in consequence of its annexation to the empire, since that it had always in reality belonged to France whilst it was under the government of King Louis; that his brother's abdication, in consequence of the state of his health, had left the emperor no alternative but to take possession of it; that it was a country of such a nature that its resources could be employed to the injury of England alone; that its incorporation with the empire of France was the only means of rendering the continental blockade really effectual, of increasing the naval forces of the allies, and obtaining that peace which all the world desired.

The observations which Napoleon addressed to Austria on this subject were even briefer, and he scarcely mentioned it to the other governments. Those cabinets which received such

communications on the annexation as he chose to favour them with made no reply, for they had in fact nothing to say. They saw, pondered on what they saw in silence, and awaited the as yet unforeseen opportunity of expressing the very strong opinions they had on the subject. We may notice also that Austria, very sensitive on the subject of Trieste, was exceedingly indifferent with respect to Amsterdam, and that Russia did not consider the Helder sufficiently near to Riga to induce her to display any great zeal in behalf of Holland.

It was at this period that M. de Metternich finally quitted Paris to place himself at the head of the Austrian cabinet; as will be remembered, he came to France with a secret mission to the emperor after his marriage with Marie Louise. Under pretext of serving as a guide to the young princess through the first months of her residence in Paris, his real office had been to watch Napoleon, to endeavour to discover whether his marriage had laid at rest the spirit of conquest within him, or whether it had but delayed for a moment the execution of his designs upon Europe. M. de Metternich adopted the second of these suppositions.

Whilst awaiting the results of his encroaching policy, which he loved to dissemble, even in his own eyes, Napoleon directed his whole attention to the employment of his new territories as far as possible in the enforcement of the continental blockade. In spite of the most rigorous surveillance, and the infliction of the most severe penalties upon contrabandists, a certain quantity of colonial produce and English manufactures still reached the continent; but as this contraband traffic was only carried on at a cost of forty or fifty per cent., the English merchants suffered considerable loss; the goods accumulated in their warehouses underwent a rapid depreciation in value; and the manufacturers on the continent who devoted their attention to the spinning and weaving of cotton, to the extraction of sugar from grapes or beetroot, potash from sea-salt, and dyes from various chemical combinations, found sufficient encouragement in the state of the markets to induce them to persevere. Thus the manufactories on the continent, especially those of France, were in a state of great activity; and a twofold advantage was attained—expansion was given to new branches of French industry, and the elements of English commercial wealth were depreciated.

Nevertheless that state of affairs was not altogether satisfactory which compelled the people of Paris to pay a premium of fifty or sixty per cent. to the contraband traders of all nations, and to purchase at a dearer rate than any other persons, sugar, coffee, cotton, and indigo; these articles decreasing in price in proportion to the increase of the distance from Paris; and the

cause of this commercial phenomenon simply was, that the surveillance became less vigilant the farther it was removed from the centre of administration. The occupation of Holland, and the presence of Marshal Davout with his troops on the shore of the North Sea, diminished this difference to a great extent; but it still existed.

The existence of this state of things was a source of the extremest annoyance to Napoleon, and what he saw taking place in Holland suddenly suggested to him the proper manner in which to treat it. Being willing that the Dutch should reap some benefit from the annexation of their country, he had permitted the importation into France of the colonial produce accumulated in their warehouses, on condition, however, of the payment of a duty of fifty per cent., that their long insubordination might not be followed by too great a commercial prosperity, and that the admission of their stores into France might not be too disadvantageous to those French merchants who had bought their goods at a much heavier price. This restricted liberty had gratified the Dutch, and brought a considerable sum to the treasury.

Napoleon, while glancing over the papers of the departments of customs which revealed these facts, was suddenly struck by an idea. He held two councils of commerce in the week, and in these he was perpetually importuned with the remonstrance that the contrabandists forced his frontiers, whatever provisions he might make to the contrary, and levied an exorbitant premium which fell more severely on French consumers than on any others. "Ah, well," he said, one day, "I have thought of a plan by which I shall be able to disappoint the calculations of the English and the contrabandists. I will permit the importation of colonial produce at a very exorbitant duty, say fifty per cent.; I shall thus preserve between the depôts of London and the markets of the continent the obstacle which renders the price of colonial produce in London at least fifty per cent. lower than what it is in Paris, Hamburg, and Amsterdam. Far from relaxing in the rigour of my surveillance, I will render it still stricter, permitting no importations but what shall have first paid this duty, in order that the English, whilst selling their colonial produce, as they do already, will be able to sell them no dearer since the conditions will remain the same, and the only alteration will be that they will pay the duty on the importation of their goods to my custom-house officers instead of to the contrabandists; and whilst maintaining the depreciation in the value of their stores, I shall keep up for the produce of our own manufactories the high prices by which they are encouraged. And besides this, as my treasury will receive those profits which are now obtained by the contrabandists, I shall

thus compel the English to bear the expenses attending the re-establishment of my navy."

Napoleon found, after due inquiry, that fifty per cent. would, in fact, maintain in London that depreciation in value which ruined the English merchants, and upon the continent those high prices which gave vigour to the French manufactories; and that, moreover, the high prices which the war imposed upon all consumers on the continent would by this plan be rendered equal for those of Paris, Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Switzerland. Besides this, there was great hope that the new tariff would prove a fruitful source of supply to the impoverished treasury; and this last consideration had more weight with Napoleon than all the others.

Resolved to levy this duty upon all colonial produce, but being nevertheless unwilling to infringe by the execution of his new plan the system of the continental blockade, Napoleon maintained in complete theoretical vigour the prohibition against holding any communication with the English, or receiving the produce either of their colonies or their manufactories; and repeated his determination respecting the seizure and confiscation of all such produce as could be proved to have its origin from English colonies or manufactories. But there was colonial produce which had other origin, and this was called *origines permises*; as, for example, that found in vessels which had been taken by our privateers or the privateers of our allies, that which formed the cargoes of licensed vessels, and that conveyed by vessels *bonâ fide* neutral. Napoleon decreed that the colonial produce imported by either of these means should be allowed free sale on payment of fifty per cent. As, however, these sources could be by no means sufficient for provisioning the continent, nor bring in very large receipts to the treasury, it was intimated to the officers of customs that they were to allow to pass for genuine the *certificates of origin* which had been fabricated in London or given by corrupt consuls, of whom unfortunately there were by no means few; and as the payment of so heavy a duty before the sale of the goods would be a matter of great difficulty, it was arranged that it might be paid either in money, by bills, or in kind; in the latter case half of the goods themselves being surrendered in liquidation of the duty.

This principle once established, all colonial produce would have to pay the duty wherever it might be found, and if it could not be proved to have paid it, would be declared contraband and seized; and Napoleon gave orders that in all places to which his power extended sudden searches should be made for colonial produce, to enforce the payment of the duty on that which had been openly declared, and to confiscate that

which was contraband. It is easy to perceive what must have been the result of such a measure, enforced throughout almost the whole continent at the same moment, and what consternation it must have caused amongst the numerous accomplices of British commerce. It was not only in Holland that there were found vast stores of colonial produce which were the accumulations of contraband traffic, but also at Bremen, at Hamburg, in Holstein, Pomerania, Prussia, Dantzic, in the great commercial towns of Germany, such as Leipzig, Frankfort, Augsburg, in Switzerland, throughout almost the whole of Italy, of Venice, at Genoa, at Leghorn, and Naples.

But whilst Napoleon was willing to permit the importation of the produce of the English colonies, on conditions as disadvantageous to British commerce as they were advantageous to the French treasury, he was especially anxious to depreciate the value of all the productions of British manufactures; he determined to wage against them a war of extermination, and with this intention gave orders that wherever they might be discovered, and in whosever possession, they should be confiscated and publicly destroyed.

This system was established by a decree of the 5th of August; and scarcely had the decree been issued, when Napoleon despatched his couriers through all the States of the Confederation of the Rhine, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Prussia, and Russia, forcing adoption of this system upon some of these States, and representing to the others the advantages of its adoption in glowing terms.

Napoleon hastened to put his system into execution, and to make seizures. But there was not much likelihood of its being fruitful in any great degree in the interior of the kingdom, for the customs officers had not left much colonial produce in that quarter to be affected by it. The contraband depôts were most generally situated on the frontier; and in consequence of this, Napoleon had the audacity to declare that as every such dépôt established within four days' journey from the frontiers of France was manifestly intended as an injury to her, he should consider himself perfectly authorised in treating them as though they had been within the territory. He ordered, therefore, the generals who occupied the north of Spain to institute searches in all suspected places; and commanded Prince Eugène to send unexpectedly six thousand Italians into the Canton du Tessin to seize a dépôt from which English colonial produce was furnished to the whole of Italy. As for that portion of Switzerland which bordered France, he was unwilling to employ French troops in its search, and confined himself to sending thither a French officer of customs to direct the Swiss troops in the proper method of

conducting it. He directed the seizures to be made at Frankfurt by the troops under Marshal Davout. At Stuttgart, Baden, Munich, Dresden, and Leipzig, the decree of the 5th of August was adopted and put into immediate execution. At Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck, Napoleon discovered and seized, without taking the least notice of the authorities, immense stores of the prohibited produce. He pursued the same course of action at the Prussian towns Stettin and Custrin, and at the Polish town Dantzic; all of which places, we may remember, contained French garrisons. Prussia, whose government had assented to the decree, was informed that all the merchandise seized upon her territory would be sold and accounted for in part discharge of her debt. Denmark, which, although faithfully preserving her position as a neutral, had admitted a considerable amount of contraband goods into Holstein, under the guise of sales of the contents of vessels taken by her privateers, gave her adherence to the decree; but Napoleon, not having any great confidence that it would be very strictly enforced in that country, and considering that Holstein, which was filled with the prohibited produce, had a frontier very difficult to watch, ingeniously determined to allow two months for the diffusion through Germany of its contraband stores, on condition of the payment of the very productive duty of fifty per cent. The depôts then became exhausted, and a very considerable amount of duty obtained.

Napoleon reiterated to Sweden his threatening and serious declaration, that he would break the peace so recently concluded, and reoccupy Swedish Pomerania, if new depôts of prohibited merchandise were permitted to be formed at Stralsund. All the States, in fact, required to submit to the decree of the 5th of August yielded to it, with the exception of Russia. This latter country, without opposing the decree, contented herself with intimating that, excellent as it might be for adoption by other States, there was no occasion for its adoption by her; and that, still faithful to her allegiance, and engaged in strenuous warfare with Great Britain, she would not fail, even for her own interests, to throw all possible obstacles in the way of British commerce. At the same time she expressed a little distrust at perceiving the extension of the French troops along the coasts of the north seas, even up to Dantzic. These remarks, however, were made in a tone of extreme moderation, and with all the discretion of a power which was in an attitude of expectation and not of hostility.

The French customs officers made numerous seizures in the north of Spain, Italy, Leghorn, Geneva, and Venice, and especially in the Tessin. The Swiss, disturbed in their

fraudulent traffic, raised some outcry; but Napoleon replied to them that he could not permit a country which he had restored to tranquillity and independence to become the accomplice of his enemies. The stores on which the duty was levied, or which were confiscated at Frankfort, Bremen, Hamburg, Stettin, and Dantzic, were also of considerable extent; and as a fifth part of the seizures was bestowed on the customs officers and the soldiers by whom they were made, they performed this part of their duty with considerable zeal.

The treasury, independently of its money receipts, which reached a very considerable sum, suddenly became proprietor of an immense amount of merchandise, which had accrued to it, partly from the payments in kind of the fifty per cent. duty, and partly from the confiscations of stores. That portion of this merchandise which was seized in Holland was sent to Antwerp, and that which was gathered in the north of Germany to Magdeburg; and Napoleon intended that the artillery waggons returning to France should convey it to Strasburg, Mayence, and Cologne. A sale by auction, at which assembled all the merchants of the empire who were engaged in the colonial trade, was commenced at Antwerp, and carried on during many weeks, with the most profitable results. The same thing took place at Mayence, at Strasburg, at Milan, and Venice; and whilst colonial produce was being seized throughout almost the whole of the continent, and becoming the property of the treasury, was sold by public auction, all English woven fabrics were publicly destroyed wherever discovered. There was an immense amount of these tissues in Germany, and their destruction by fire was a source of much consternation to the agents of contraband commerce.

The effect of these measures upon England was great, and was rendered still greater by an accidental circumstance. Contrary winds had detained for some time numbers of English vessels at the entrance of the Baltic, more than six or seven hundred assembled within sight of Denmark and Sweden, anchoring wherever they could under the protection of the British flag. On receiving information of the new vigorous measures, they all, almost simultaneously, endeavoured to retrace their path, although Napoleon, in the hope of enticing them in, had relaxed the surveillance at the entry of the ports; some of them became prizes to our privateers, and the others added their cargoes to the mass of unsold merchandise with which England was overburdened, and which made her experience poverty in the midst of abundance. Desirous of reducing British commerce to the last extremity, Napoleon prepared with the utmost secrecy, at the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser, a little naval

expedition, which was to proceed rapidly to Heligoland and carry off the riches with which at this moment it was stored.

As insatiable in his desire for the success of French industry as he was for that of its armies, and in administration, as in war, neglecting no means by which it appeared probable that he could gain his ends, Napoleon set himself to contend with other rivals besides the English. The Swiss had displeased him, both because they were extensively engaged in the contraband trade, and because they were, next to the English, the most formidable rivals of our manufacturers. Their cotton fabrics were not so good as those of France, but they were produced much more cheaply, partly on account of the less dearness of labour amongst their mountains, and partly on account of the fraudulent methods by which they obtained the raw material in a cheaper market; and the cotton tissues of their manufacture they sold as English in Germany and Italy. Napoleon, therefore, forbade Prince Eugène to permit this sale in the latter country, writing to him, that Italy might well make some sacrifice in return for all that France had done for her; and that, moreover, if she behaved as Holland had done, she should receive the same treatment. In addition to this, as Italy exported a considerable quantity of raw silk, which reached England through the north of Germany, and was there woven for exportation to the Americans, Napoleon raised one-third the export duty upon raw silks when they were conveyed by Switzerland and the Tyrol, in order to direct them away from England and throw them into France by Chambéry and Nice. He hoped by these means to render Lyons the greatest silk market in the world, and to enable the Lyonese to add to their unrivalled skill in manufacture the power of having the best materials.

In his eagerness to subject everything to his purpose, Napoleon extended his system of licences, and applied it to every branch of commerce. Originally only a certain class of vessels had made their voyages under the protection of licences; but from this time every ship which navigated the oceans or the Mediterranean Sea was compelled, to avoid being liable to seizure by our privateers, to take out a licence, in which was to be stated the place from which it set out, that to which it was bound, and the nature of its cargo. By virtue of these licences, vessels were even permitted to visit England, notwithstanding the decrees of Berlin and Milan, provided they exported national products, such as grain, woven fabrics, Parisian objects of luxury, and wines, and brought back in exchange dockyard materials, American cottons, indigoes, cochineal, dye-woods, rice, and tobacco. Sugar and coffee were, of course, prohibited articles. Thus the whole system of commerce was regulated by decrees, and, in short, almost brought to a dead-

lock ; and the results which Napoleon really obtained by these singularly violent but efficacious means was the infliction of a heavy blow at British credit, by the depreciation of all that merchandise which was a pledge of the value of the British bank paper. It was impossible to say how far the effects of those important measures would extend if persevered in.

Whilst Napoleon was waging this ceaseless and ruinous war with England, he was preparing for her an additional peril, in the shape of a rupture with America. On the occasion of his seizing certain American vessels, on the ground that some French ships had been seized in America by virtue of the law of embargo, he had reiterated to the United States' government his readiness to repeal in favour of America the decrees of Berlin and Milan, if she would compel England to respect her neutrality also ; a declaration which he repeated in a decree of the 1st November 1810.

Nothing was better planned than this policy, for the Americans, treated as neutrals by France, could not but demand to be similarly treated by England, even to the extent of threatening war in case of her refusal to do so, and affairs seemed to be tending in this direction. We have seen how America, having equal cause of complaint against each of the belligerent parties, had prohibited her citizens from navigating the seas of Europe, and had forbidden entrance into her ports to either the French or the English, unless driven into them by stress of weather. But as this law punished themselves for the faults of others, they substituted for it another, by which communication with France and England was alone interdicted, and by which it was also declared that this interdict would be withdrawn in respect to that of the two powers which should put a stop to its violent conduct towards the neutral powers. England, anxious to gain the good-will of the Americans, immediately revoked her orders in council in their favour, and dispensed in their case with the visit to the Thames for the sake of paying toll ; but she substituted for this navigation tax the famous paper blockade, and declared that neutrals might freely visit every part of the world, save the ports of the French empire, which were blockaded from Embden up to Spain, from Marseilles to Orbitello, from Trieste and Venice to Pesaro.

But the Americans observed, with much reason, with regard to this regulation, that to release them from visiting the Thames and the payment of toll was nothing, if they were to be prevented by a fictitious blockade from touching at vast countries which could never be blockaded in reality. In vain England replied that the revocation in their favour of the orders in council was an immense concession, and that Napoleon was so.

far from intending to put into execution his fair promises that he had recently intimated in secrecy to the British cabinet intentions of a very different nature towards the United States. The Americans were not to be thus persuaded. Having received Napoleon's decrees which declared commercial relations fully re-established with the Americans on the 1st of November, provided they enforced due respect towards their flag, the President of the Union announced by a proclamation that if England had not by the 2nd February 1811 revoked all its measures, including the fictitious blockade, the commercial interdict would be withdrawn with respect to France, and maintained with the utmost rigour against England. From the interruption of commercial relations between England and America to a state of war between these two countries was but a step, for it was tolerably certain that the English would prevent the American vessels from entering the French ports, and even capture them on their way, and that America could not fail to take measures for avenging the outrages thus offered against her honour and safety.

Such were the means employed by Napoleon during the year 1810 to ruin British commerce, whilst his generals were employed in the Peninsula in driving the English armies into the sea; and these means, which displayed at once the extent of his genius, the profundity of his calculations, and the vehemence of his passions, were fitted for the attainment of the end he had in view; but they were also capable of leading to other far different results. It was necessary, therefore, that a state of things so odious to all the world should not be prolonged, and that by the devotion of his whole resources to the prosecution of the war in Spain, he should inflict so heavy a blow upon Great Britain as together with her commercial sufferings should oblige her to agree to peace and to assent to the transformation of Europe. It was Spain, therefore, which was to decide, and which did decide, as we shall see, the destiny of Europe, for it was absolutely requisite to strike heavily and swiftly in this direction, if the patience of the whole world were not to be worn out by a state of things which, before becoming insupportable for England, was very likely to prove to be so for the constrained allies of France, for her sincerest friends, and even for herself.

BOOK XXXIX.

TORRES VEDRAS.

AFTER the battle of Talavera, and the loss of the bridge of Arzobispo, the English and the Spaniards had fallen back with precipitation from the Tagus upon the Guadiana. Although its issue was indecisive, this battle, having drawn the French forces around Madrid, had had for them all the effects of a defeat, for it had forced them to retreat into the heart of the Peninsula, leaving behind them their wounded, their sick, and even part of their stores. The Spaniards fled into Andalusia behind the Sierra Morena; Sir Arthur Wellesley took up a position in the environs of Badajoz. Then, complaining, as was his wont, of the feeble co-operation of the Spaniards, and above all, of their negligence in supplying the commissariat, as though they could provision his troops when they were unable to procure food for their own, surrounded by a rich country, with a safe retreat open to him towards Portugal, he resolved to make no more rash incursions into the Peninsula, estimating at its full value his late almost miraculous retreat. Attributing his inactivity to the intense heat, he advised the Spaniards to avoid great battles, and to enlist upon their side the lapse of time, always a great enemy to invasion.

There was much wisdom in these counsels, but they were easier to give than to follow, and expressed, moreover, in a manner little calculated to gain attention, or to be of much use to the Spaniards, whom a devoted loyalty had thrown into a revolution almost as violent as that into which a passion for liberty had hurried the French some twenty years before, and who laboured under the task, at the same moment, of governing themselves, and of repelling a formidable invasion. But whatever bitter reproaches Sir Arthur Wellesley might direct against them they transferred to the central junta, which had replaced the regency of Aranjuez, and on which it was the custom to heap the blame of every misadventure.

If the English were discontented, if their wants could not be satisfied, if the heat of the weather or the policy of their leaders held them inactive, if undisciplined troops led by monks were unable to hold their ground against the veteran bands of Napo-

leon, the cause was in every case attributed to the bad spirit and the incapacity of the central junta. The provincial juntas likewise overwhelmed it with reproaches, and that of Badajoz perpetually demanded the convocation of the Cortes, which was the new remedy expected to be a cure for every ill.

Nothing would have been easier than to yield to this wish, and the central junta, worn out with its distressing and perilous duties, would have gladly resigned its duties into the hands of the Cortes, had the desire for their assembly been unanimous; but it was not so. Although Spain had not commenced its revolution, as France in 1789, by an explosion of liberalism, but had commenced it, on the contrary, by an explosion of loyalty, it had soon taken a very similar tone, and discussed the same questions which had been discussed in the constituent assembly. There was one party in the country which thought that the temporary absence of royalty afforded a good opportunity for the execution of necessary reforms, and that by the adoption of these reforms Napoleon would be deprived of the pretended object of his invasion, the regeneration of Spain. This party was not composed exclusively of the bourgeoisie, but numbered also amongst its ranks many members of the Spanish aristocracy, and those clear-headed men who are to be found in all ranks, and whom circumstances had now united in a party which the progress of events rendered powerful. But the holders of the opposite opinions were also of all ranks, and consisted of the less enlightened portion of the noblesse, of the clergy, the magistracy, the army, some part of the bourgeoisie, and of a certain number of enlightened men whom the French Revolution had filled with terror. Whilst the one party, desiring a complete reform of the monarchy, demanded the assembly of the Cortes as the only possible means of effecting a social revolution, the other, which desired no revolution, demanded the immediate readoption of a royal regency, which consisted of five or six high personages chosen from amongst the generals, the superior clergy, and the ancient ministers of the monarchy. At the head of this last party were the Palafoxes, the defenders of Saragossa, the Duke del Infantado, General Gregorio de la Cuesta, a singular character, the Count de Montijo, a noble who lived amongst the people, and delighted in arousing their passions, the Marquis de la Romana, who commanded the armies in the north of Spain, and the old minister Florida-Blanca. At the head of the opposite party were the celebrated M. de Jovellanos, and many such men, as MM. de Tareno, Arguelès, and others, who were less known at this period than they afterwards came to be, and who were anxious to bestow upon their country a government worthy of a civilised nation.

After a long struggle between the two parties, an unexpected

event brought matters to a crisis. A discovery was made of a kind of conspiracy formed by the heads of the party opposed to any kinds of reform, the object of which was to dissolve the central junta, to seize the reins of power, and to govern monarchically and without reform. Desirous of obtaining the support of the English, the members of this conspiracy had made overtures to Henry Wellesley, the English ambassador, and brother to Arthur Wellesley, the general of the British army. The ambassador, although England regarded with little favour either the central junta or a system of general reform, in a spirit of good faith gave information of the affair to the members of this junta. The conspiracy was thus baffled; but the central junta, perceiving how impossible it was that they should maintain their ground, were anxious to give place to really national representatives, and decreed that the Cortes should be convoked for the commencement of 1810, reserving to themselves the power of fixing the time, mode, and place of their meeting, according as the events of the war might render advisable. Feeling at the same time the necessity of some more concentrated authority, it established an executive commission of six members, which was to exercise all the functions of government, and retained only for itself the duties of legislation. Amongst the members of this commission was the Marquis de la Romana, a man of a restless spirit, and much given to boasting, but who had as yet accomplished nothing, save his escape from Denmark with his division. He had been transferred from Old Castille in Andalusia for the purpose of reorganising the troops in this part of the Peninsula.

The Spanish armies were divided at this period into the army of the left, which disputed with the French generals Old Castille, the kingdom of Leon, the Asturias, and Galicia; the army of the centre, comprising the troops which guarded Estramadura, La Mancha, and Andalusia; and the army of the right, composed of the troops which, under Generals Reding and Blake, had attempted during the whole of the year 1809 to snatch Catalonia from General St. Cyr, and Aragon from General Suchet.

The plan formed by the new executive commission was to collect a vast army, and to endeavour to snatch Madrid from King Joseph, who had at his immediate command eighty thousand of the first troops in the world. In vain Sir Arthur Wellesley advised them to risk no great battles with the well-trained French troops; the new heads of the government paid little heed to his counsel, and energetically proceeded with the assembly of their vast army. They brought together the troops which, under Gregorio de la Cuesta, had been vanquished at Talavera, and those composed the armies of Estramadura and

La Mancha; to these was added a detachment of Valencians. They hoped to form an army of 50,000 or 60,000 men, provided with an excellent cavalry and the best artillery in Spain. The proud Gregorio de la Cuesta was to be at the head of this army; but the junta regarded him with little favour, and upon his sending in his resignation, which he was constantly in the habit of doing, in the manner of a threat, he was taken at his word, and General Eguia was appointed as his successor. It was proposed, as soon as the weather should have become cooler, to act on the offensive against the troops which Joseph had assembled around Madrid, and that in the meantime the armies of the left and right should press upon the rear of the French to force them to retreat northwards.

In the meantime events of considerable importance were occurring in Catalonia and Aragon on the one side, and in Old Castille on the other. In Catalonia, General St. Cyr had carried on a contest during the year 1809 with the Catalans and the troops of General Reding, which he had ended by driving back into Tarragona. He had then fallen back upon Barcelona to reorganise and provision his army, and to relieve it of the prisoners made in the four battles which he had gained in Catalonia. He had conducted those prisoners to the frontier, and then commenced the siege of Girone, which Napoleon had assigned to him as an easy task, which would be the crowning achievement of his glorious services. General Verdier was charged with the conduct of the actual attack, and General St. Cyr reserved to himself the duty of covering the besiegers. It was not at that time sufficiently well understood, even after the taking of Saragossa, that sieges in Spain were great military operations, more difficult to conduct than battles. But terrible and famous examples were soon to teach us the lesson.

General St. Cyr, leaving with General Verdier all the forces he could spare, and taking with him only twelve thousand men, skilfully took possession of the fertile plain of Vich, by which means he secured an ample supply of provisions both for his own troops and those of General Verdier, and held a position in which he would be able to check the advance of the forces which would, in all probability, be sent to the aid of Girone.

The heavy artillery, after having been long expected, having at length arrived, General Verdier commenced operations. The city of Girone, situated on the bank of the Ter, at the foot of fortified heights, encompassed with regular works, filled with a fanatical population, the very women of which took an active part under the title of the company of Sainte-Barbe, defended by a garrison of 7000 men, and an heroic governor, Don Alvarez de Castro, had declared that its resistance should render it immortal, and we shall see how well it kept its word. The

long interval of time, moreover, which was occupied in preparing for the attack, and which had been protracted by the difficulty of transport, had afforded ample opportunity for making every preparation for defence.

General Sanson, an able officer, who had the conduct of the engineering operations, having decided that it would be necessary to commence by taking the heights, the trenches were opened in front of the Fort de Montjouch, and after some time a breach was effected; but as, unfortunately, some days were allowed to elapse between the moment of its becoming practicable and the assault, the enemy were enabled to prepare an energetic resistance and repulse our troops; an event which filled the whole city with intense exultation.

The point of attack against the Fort de Montjouch appearing to have been ill chosen, the works were opened in another direction; a course of proceeding little calculated to increase the ardour of the French troops, or to diminish the fanatic zeal of the inhabitants. At length another breach was declared practicable, and the Spaniards, perceiving that they could no longer hold Fort Montjouch against us, evacuated it during the night. And thus we gained possession of this fortification after the lapse of a period equal to what had sufficed for the greatest sieges.

Weary of the delay occasioned by these preliminary operations, our soldiers determined to attack the town itself, and descending to the banks of the Ter, took up a position under the plunging fire of the heights which yet remained in the enemy's position. Operations were directed against the enceinte of the town, and a practicable breach having been effected, it was directed to carry it by assault. Don Alvarez de Castro, at the head of the garrison, and supported by the whole population, male and female, had sworn to die rather than surrender, and if the French cannon overthrew their walls, to keep out the enemy with others built of their dead bodies. Our soldiers rushed to the assault with vigour, were repulsed, and again advanced with fury under the fire from the town itself and from the heights, and amidst the clanging of bells and the wild cries of the inhabitants. Many times our troops obtained the summit of the wall to find there an impenetrable mass of infuriated men. Priests, women, and children threw themselves into the breach, and mingled with the combatants; and it was at length found necessary to retire before the noble delirium of Spanish patriotism, and to convert the siege into a blockade; a means of attack which was most likely to be attended with success, as fever and famine had already seized upon the heroic defenders of Girone, and the governor himself was dying.

To prevent any kind of relief from reaching the garrison

now afforded the only chance of success, and became the care of General St. Cyr; for although he had been deprived of his command and succeeded by Marshal Augereau, the marshal, after having eagerly sought the appointment, showed less eagerness in fulfilling its duties, and it was therefore necessary that General St. Cyr should remain at a most critical moment at the head of an army the command of which he was to resign within a few days.

At the same time General Blake, knowing that Girona was in danger of being compelled to surrender by famine, collected the remnants of the armies of Catalonia and Aragon, and advanced to its relief with a thousand beasts of burden. General St. Cyr hastened to take up a position in front of the point in the line of blockade which was the weakest and most liable to attack. For three days the hostile forces remained opposite to each other in the midst of a thick mist, which entirely concealed them from each other's view. At length one of the French divisions engaged in the siege allowed itself to be surprised, and the Spanish general threw into Girona, besides the convoy of provisions, a reinforcement of 4000 men; this latter succour being rather disadvantageous than otherwise, for it was not men but food that was required.

The unhappy Alvarez de Castro, whose resources had been little increased by this operation, sent an earnest request to General Blake for new succours; and the latter again approached the city by remote routes with an immense convoy. But General St. Cyr, entrusting this time the necessary measures to no one but himself, having placed his troops in ambush, permitted the enemy's troops with the convoy to arrive at the very gates of the city, and then suddenly taking them in flank and rear, obtained possession of many thousand beasts of burden and some thousands of prisoners. The wretched inhabitants of the besieged city, thus deprived of the succour of which they had such urgent need, decimated by fever and famine, and deprived of the services of their commandant, who was at the point of death, found themselves compelled to surrender, which they did on the 11th of December, after an ever-memorable siege of six months.

Such were the events which took place in Catalonia during the latter part of the year 1809. The events in Aragon had also been important. After the surrender of Saragossa, the 5th corps, under Marshal Mortier, had advanced upon the Tagus, and the 3rd, exhausted by the terrible siege of Saragossa, had remained in Aragon. Fortunately, this corps received a wise, talented, and firm leader in the person of General Suchet. His corps was composed of three old regiments of infantry, of four new, of three regiments of Polish infantry, of

the 13th cuirassiers (the only regiment of this arm in Spain), of some light cavalry and excellent artillery. He devoted the utmost attention to his troops, and endeavoured to inspire them with a feeling of duty and of resignation to a war which the siege of Saragossa had rendered hateful to them. After having allowed them a certain period of repose, he led them in front of the enemy. General Blake, who commanded the army of the right, had formed the project of taking advantage of the departure of the 5th corps to throw himself upon Aragon and retake Saragossa. General Suchet was unwilling to await his attack, and proceeded towards Alcanitz to meet him; but the French general soon perceived that fatigue, disgust, and an insufficient organisation had affected his troops more vitally than he had at first supposed, and he was compelled to lead them back. Fortunately General Blake neglected to seize the favourable opportunity, and gave him time to concentrate his forces at Saragossa, to recruit the regiments with fresh troops drawn from Navarre, and thoroughly to reorganise and refresh them; and there General Suchet, his soldiers being inspired with an entirely new spirit, awaited at Maria, in an advantageous position, the arrival of General Blake. The Spaniards exhausted their ardour in a furious attack upon his position, and being attacked in their turn, were routed with considerable loss. Pursued by the French forces to Belchite, they once more ventured to give battle, and were again beaten, leaving in the hands of the victors the whole of their artillery, and many thousand prisoners.

Completely master of Saragossa and the fertile plains of Aragon, General Suchet devoted his attention to tranquillising the country, freeing it from the guerilla bands, and obtaining from its resources the necessary subsistence for his troops in the manner least burdensome to the inhabitants, and to immense preparations for the siege of the hostile fortifications. Knowing from experience that the subsistence of an army, although undoubtedly a heavy burden to a country, need not be a ruinous one, if instead of being seized by a rough military grasp it be provided for by the hand of an intelligent and just administration, he called together the former members of the provisional government, and declared to them his anxiety to cause the maintenance of his army to fall as lightly as possible upon the inhabitants, and asked them to assist him in carrying out these views. The man's whole air and manner convinced those whom he addressed both of his ability and of his sincerity, and they resolved to comply with his requests to the utmost of their power. Saragossa considered that it had done its part towards maintaining the independence of Spain by its heroic defence, and now, its more passionate and implacable spirits having

either perished or been scattered, the remainder of its inhabitants was anxious for repose. This disposition accorded well with the intentions of General Suchet, and within the space of a month Saragossa appeared to have arisen from its ashes.

The French general re-established the old imposts, the accustomed authorities, and ordering that all the revenues should be paid into the treasury of the province, gave up a large portion of them to the service of the province itself, reserving the surplus only for the necessary expenses of his army, and reiterating his promise, which he scrupulously observed, to respect both the persons and property of the inhabitants. In the meantime he made every preparation necessary to the siege of the important places of Lerida and Mequinenza, which it was necessary to take before the army of Catalonia could advance upon Tortosa and Tarragona.

The guerilla bands were the only obstacle to the complete pacification of Aragon. Whilst the central junta of Spain employed itself in the formation of regular armies which were always vanquished, there arose spontaneously irregular troops, which, without either officers or commissariat, led only by instinct, and acting according to the circumstances of the moment, supplied themselves with everything they required, whilst they rendered their enemies destitute; were always present at the precise moment when least expected, dispersed if the hostile troops were in force, and reappeared as soon as they were scattered in piquets or escorts of stores; never attempted to vanquish their foes in mass, but cut them off man by man, showing no more humanity than was to be expected of the Spanish people, or of any people perfidiously invaded, and sparing neither the wounded nor the sick; and this was a system of attack which could not fail, if persevered in, to overcome the most valiant armies, for a constant part of the operations of an army consists in the appointment of detachments to the duty of foraging, escorting stores, and conveying the sick, the wounded, and recruits; and an army from which these detachments are incessantly cut off must languish, wither, and die, as a tree deprived of its branches.

These guerilla bands, which had always been troublesome, had increased immensely since the dispersion of the Spanish regular troops, and it was difficult to say whether the Peninsula were more effectually defended by the English army, or these bands which snatched from the French the fruits of their victories, and rendered their defeats disastrous.

Sometimes it was an officer whom the dispersion of the Spanish armies had left without employment, sometimes a restless monk, a pastor who desired to defend his village, or a farmer anxious for the safety of his fields, a student who was glad to

exchange his books for a new kind of life, or a shepherd weary of his flocks, who, inspired either by patriotism or religion, the spirit of adventure or that of self-aggrandisement, collecting here and there a few peasants, a few fugitives from the vanquished armies, or prisoners escaped from the hands of the French, either by themselves or in the train of some leader already renowned, established their quarters in some district where they obtained either from the sympathy or terror of the inhabitants all that they needed, transported themselves hither and thither as the movements of the enemy or their own plans rendered advisable, and so harassed the invaders that the victorious troops of the latter became as wretched, wearied, and destitute as those whom they had vanquished. Whilst the interior of Aragon had been subdued by the arms and the policy of General Suchet, all its borders were overrun with hardy and numerous bands of guerillas. One body, under the command of an officer named Renovalès, was established in an almost inaccessible convent, in the valley on the south of the Pyrenees; another, under Mina, a young student nineteen years of age, completely intercepted the road from Pampeluna to Saragossa; in the south of the province, an old officer named Villacampa, with a troop composed of soldiers and peasants, commanded the environs of Calatayud; in the mountains of Montalvan, at the celebrated convent of Notre Dame del Aguila, was Colonel Raymon-Gayan, at the head of about 3000 men; and the famous l'Empecinado, at the head of 2500 insurgents, infested the road between Saragossa and Madrid.

Against these guerilla bands General Suchet at length prepared to take active measures; Mina was pursued and taken, and sent as a prisoner to Paris; Renovalès was deprived of his convent stronghold; and the bands of Villacampa and Raymon-Gayan were vanquished and dispersed. By these successful operations the Valencian and Madrid routes were rendered free, and good expectation was obtained, that when once the fortifications of Lerida and Mequinenza were taken, and after them, those of Tortosa and Tarragona, the province of Aragon, and even that of Catalonia, would be reduced to peace.

But these happy results, which were as much due to the administrative ability of General Suchet as to his military skill, were far from being equalled in Biscaye, the two Castilles, and the kingdom of Leon. In vain the French generals pursued the guerilla bands in these countries, which were especially given to this irregular mode of warfare, and peculiarly adapted by local circumstances for its pursuit. Besides this, the sufferings which the inhabitants had to endure from the exactions of the guerilla bands, and the supplies which they had to provide for the French troops, frequently drove them to revolt.

Generals who were unendowed with the wisdom of General Suchet cared not how they obtained what was necessary for their troops, and frequently seized it in a manner which rendered utterly destitute the already ruined inhabitants; and if, unhappily, they chanced to have been hardened by twenty years of warfare, to have been exasperated by suffering, and irritated by crimes committed against our troops, they shot unfortunate wretches who were guilty of no fault, or who, at the most, had attempted to preserve bread for their children; shot them in revenge for the assassinations committed by the guerillas. And these latter, on the other hand, frequently seized soldiers of our detachments and hung them on the trees, often side by side with Spaniards who had been accused of favouring the French. Thus there prevailed throughout these unhappy provinces a feeling of despair; and the excesses of our soldiers and the crimes of the Spaniards themselves were equally laid to our charge.

In certain districts the guerilla bands were innumerable. El Pastor in Guiposcoa, Campilla in Santander, Porlier in the Asturias, Longa between Aragon and Castille, Merino in the neighbourhood of Burgos, Capuchino and the curé Tapia in the plains of Castille, El Amar at La Rioja, Duran in the mountains of Soria, Don Camillo Gomez in the environs of Avila, Don Julian Sanchez (a brave warrior whom the death of his parents and his sister had driven from his fields, and almost goaded to madness) in the environs of Salamanca, and a host of others too numerous to mention, crept amongst the mountains and scoured the plains. Sometimes uniting in masses to engage in important expeditions, sometimes dispersing to avoid our pursuit, and frequently, when pressed too closely by the French troops, embarking in English vessels to descend on other coasts. They were guilty of horrible crimes and enormous ravages. They murdered our sick and wounded, stopped despatches, the delivery of which was often of the utmost importance, kept all our agents in a state of perpetual terror, completely crippled the exertions of our commissariat, and impeded the reinforcement of our armies by compelling battalions and squadrons to remain in the north, and exhaust themselves in fruitless movements, before they had been able to join the regiments they were intended to recruit.

These detachments consisting of raw recruits, and commanded by officers wanting both in experience and talent, no sooner arrived at Pampeluna, Tolosa, Vittoria, Burgos, and Valladolid, than they were sent to chase the indefatigable guerillas, and being unaccustomed to fatigue, and individually inferior to the bandits they pursued, found in this kind of warfare a fatal apprenticeship to their trade of war. The

greater number of them, after a week or two, went to perish in the ill-provided hospitals, and of the reinforcements intended for the armies in the field, scarcely a fourth part reached their destination. The destruction of the horses was as rapid as that of the troops themselves, and it was of ordinary occurrence that a troop of three hundred cavalry should lose within the space of a few days two-thirds of their horses. Almost at the first moment of arrival at these first stations of the army of Spain, both soldiers and officers breathed in with the infected air a feeling of deep discouragement, and regarded themselves as destined to a useless and inglorious death; and this feeling was not a little increased by the conviction that they would never come under the eyes of Napoleon himself.

The generals commanding at the various stations, being left entirely to their own imaginations, proposed various methods, some of them odious and some ridiculous, for the destruction of the guerilla bands, such as cutting down the woods within a certain distance of the roads, and burning or decimating those villages of which any of the inhabitants had become guerillas. The most sensible of them, General Kellermann, not knowing to what measures to have recourse, addressed the following reflections to Major-General Berthier:—

“The force which I command is manifestly inadequate, and independently of the hostile troops, against which it is necessary to make head, is scarcely large enough to protect itself against the swarms of brigands, and the strong, organised bands which infest the country, and which by their activity, but more especially by means of the sympathy of the inhabitants, elude all pursuits.

“Permit me then, prince, frankly to express to you my opinion—that the Spanish war is no ordinary affair, and that whilst we need fear no disastrous reverses, this nation will destroy the French army in detail. It is in vain that the heads of the hydra are cut off on one side, they arise again on another, and if there be not some change in the sentiments of the inhabitants, it will be long before this vast Peninsula is brought to submission, and in the meanwhile it will absorb both the population and the wealth of France. Its object is to conquer us by the aid of time and perseverance. Its submission can only be obtained by the absolute destruction of its strength, and annihilation of a moiety of its population. The present disposition of the inhabitants is such that we can gain over no party amongst them to our side. All the moderation and justice we show towards them are of no avail in diminishing their rancour against us, and would fail to obtain for any governor or commander the aid of ten men in a moment of peril.

“Reinforcements are necessary; the emperor is perhaps tired of sending them; but we must either at once conclude

this war, or shut ourselves up in one-half of Spain, in order to make the conquest of the other. In the meantime the resources of the country fail, agriculture is neglected, the coin is withdrawn from circulation; it is impossible to provide for the pay or maintenance of the troops, for the requirements of the hospitals, or, in short, for any of the innumerable things necessary to an army, which is in want of everything. Wretchedness and privations increase the number of sick, and continually enfeeble the army; and in addition to this, bands of the enemy swarming in every direction, every day pounce upon little detached parties of our men, who, with the utmost imprudence, and in spite of the most positive and reiterated prohibitions, continually expose themselves to this danger.

“When I fall into such reflections as these, I am lost, and only recover myself to exclaim, there is need of the head and arm of Hercules! His strength and skill alone can terminate this contest, if indeed it ever shall be terminated.”

The meaning of this was, that the presence of Napoleon himself was necessary to the termination of the war; but although the picture of the state of affairs as drawn by General Kellermann was by no means an exaggerated one, the difficulties opposed to us were not equally great in all the provinces. It was still possible that success might, in the course of time, be the result of perseverance; but its attainment would require all the resources of France and all the genius of Napoleon.

The northern provinces were, as we have said, those which the nature of the country and the exasperation of the inhabitants rendered the most difficult to subdue. Besides the guerilla bands, there was in this part of Spain a regular army to be overcome, that of the Duke del Parque, called the army of the left, being that which was formerly commanded by the Marquis de la Romana. This army was composed of the united troops of Galicia, the Asturias, and Leon, which Marshal Soult had neglected, to plunge into Portugal, which Marshal Ney had repulsed but not destroyed, and to which he had been compelled to resign Old Castille when ordered to join the other marshals in the rear of the British army. Marshal Ney, after the battle of Talavera, had gone to Paris to discuss with Napoleon all those matters which had been subjects of dispute between himself and Marshal Soult. His corps (which was the 6th), reduced by the effects of fatigue and the diseases prevalent in autumn to 9000 effective soldiers, was, about the end of October 1809, in the presence of the army of the Duke del Parque, which numbered almost 30,000 men. This general, in accordance with the reiterated instigations of the junta to assume the offensive, advanced as far as Tamamès, by the route of Ciudad Rodrigo, to Salamanca, with the object of

concurring in some degree with the ambitious views of the government of Seville. Profiting by the example of the English, he prudently and skilfully took up a position upon a group of rocks which were very difficult of access, and of sufficient height to be easily defended against the most valiant troops, unless led to the attack with the utmost caution.

General Marchand, full of the audacious spirit of his chief, and accustomed to despise the Spanish troops, advanced upon Tamamès upon the 18th of October, and did not hesitate to attack the enemy's position. Some pieces of cannon posted in advance of the heights occupied by the Spaniards and covered by cavalry were speedily taken, and the cavalry dispersed; but after this first easy success the heights themselves still remained to be taken. Two regiments, the 6th leger and the 69th of the line, advanced to the attack, and were withdrawn after having suffered considerable loss. Our whole line followed this retrograde movement, and the intrepid 6th corps for the first time paused in the front of the Spaniards; and so furious was the enemy's fire that we were compelled to resign the cannon which had been taken, all the horses which drew it having been slain.

This was an insignificant check, but one which was well calculated to inspirit the Spaniards, and to confirm them in their project of assuming the offensive. Nothing could be more to our advantage than their attacking us in great masses, for our troops were being cut off in detail, and in general actions alone we achieved success. The central government residing at Seville, already strongly disposed, notwithstanding the advice of Sir Arthur Wellesley to the contrary, to direct the forward movement of the army of the centre, did not hesitate, after the affair at Tamamès, to give orders for marching upon Madrid. The central junta, finding even General Eguia too timid, had replaced him by Don Juan de Areizaga, a young officer who had distinguished himself in the affair of Alcanitz against the troops of General Suchet. This new chief, who attributed to their officers the defeats suffered by the Spanish troops, and to a certain extent substituted for them others who were younger and more inured to the perils of actual warfare, inspired such confidence that the heads of the government already began to discuss the measures which ought to be taken when Madrid should have been reached.

Don Juan de Areizaga having collected upon the Sierra Morena the troops of Estramadura, those of La Mancha, and a detachment of Valencians, traversed La Mancha in the course of November, and reached the banks of the Tagus above Aranjuez, in the neighbourhood of Tarancon. His army, consisting of more than 50,000 foot soldiers, somewhat more

disciplined than the generality of Spanish soldiers, of four-score well-served pieces of cannon, and of 7000 or 8000 good cavalry, was inspired with the confidence usual with the Spaniards; and, on the other hand, the news of its approach was received with joy at Madrid, where preparations were made to give them a proper reception.

Marshal Soult, who had become major-general of the Spanish army since the departure of Marshal Jourdan, had at first some difficulty in discovering the intentions of the Spanish general; but having a great part of his troops behind the high Tagus, towards Aranjuez, he was in a position to offer a front to the enemy from whichever direction he might come, and was not compelled to make any decided movement. He had under his command the 2nd, 5th, 4th, and 1st corps, and could muster 60,000 excellent troops, which were twice as many as were sufficient to vanquish all the regular armies in Spain. Unable to divine the plans of an enemy who had scarcely formed any, Marshal Soult made such arrangements as might best suit all probable contingencies. He sent the 2nd corps (General Heudelet) from Aropesa to Talavera, with orders to watch the Estramadura route, by which the English would come, if at all. He brought back the 5th (Marshal Mortier) from Talavera to Toledo, and concentrated the 4th (General Sebastiani) between Aranjuez and Ocana.

About the 15th of November, the enemy having entirely quitted the route of Seville for that of Valencia, and appearing to direct his movements against our left, Marshal Soult, attentively watching the enemy's movements, brought back the 4th (General Sebastiani) from the left to the right, and ordered it to cross the Tagus near to Aranjuez, by the bridge of La Reyna. He drew off the 5th (Marshal Mortier) from Toledo upon Aranjuez. He placed the 4th and 5th corps under the supreme command of Marshal Mortier, and directed that they should debouch upon Ocana. He ordered Marshal Victor, at the head of the 1st corps, to pass the Tagus between Villareja and Fuenteduena, upon the left of the corps of Sebastiani and Mortier; a movement which was a little contrary to rule, and was calculated to render Marshal Victor's corps almost useless, but which could be, however, a source of little peril in the presence of an enemy whom any one of our corps might have encountered singly without danger. Marshal Soult himself set out from Madrid with King Joseph, the king's Spanish guard, and the remainder of the division Dessoles.

In the afternoon of the 18th General Sebastiani approached the Tagus with the dragoons of Milhaud, and crossed the river by the bridge of La Reyna with his cavalry, leaving behind him his infantry, which was still on its march. On arriving

at the edge of the plateau La Mancha, General Sebastiani perceived the Spanish cavalry which covered the main body of the army of Areizaga on its march from Santa Cruz upon Ocana. This troop consisted of about 4000 well-mounted and well-equipped horsemen, and as those of General Sebastiani numbered only about 800 or 900, he found himself in a somewhat embarrassing position; but Marshal Mortier had fortunately just arrived at Aranjuez, and sent him the 10th chasseurs, together with the Polish lancers, which raised the troop at his disposal to the number of 1500. With these troops the imposing mass of the enemy was dispersed by a brilliant feat of arms, which gave good hopes of our success in the battle which would evidently take place on the morrow. The body of the Spanish army was already in sight, and Marshal Mortier made his arrangements for the approaching conflict. The French army consisted of about 24,000 men, a number very insufficient to oppose the 50,000 or 55,000 of the army under General Areizaga. Marshal Soult and King Joseph arrived at the moment when Marshal Mortier had completed his arrangements for the battle, and had only to confirm them.

At eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the 19th of November General Leval attacked the enemy's right with the German and Polish regiments. These troops being soon somewhat broken by an overwhelming fire from the enemy's musketry and artillery, and General Leval seriously wounded, General Gerard, forming in column the 34th, 40th, and 64th regiments of infantry, whilst he opposed the 88th to the Spanish cavalry which threatened his left, passed between the Polish and German regiments, and attacked the Spaniards with the utmost resolution. The enemy began to give way, and to fall back upon Ocana. Our troops continued their attack, and signs of disorder were soon visible in the Spanish army. In the meanwhile our cavalry attacking that of the enemy which covered the baggage in the direction of the road from Santa Cruz to Ocana, dispersed it, and then dashed into the midst of the broken and flying masses of the enemy's infantry. Within the space of a few moments some 4000 or 5000 fell under the sabres or bayonets of our soldiers. Forty-six pieces of cannon, thirty-two flags, and 15,000 prisoners remained in our possession, besides an immense quantity of baggage and 2000 or 3000 horses. The triumph needed only to have been obtained over the English to be complete.

This event naturally caused excessive dismay at Seville, and excited anew the outcry against the central junta. The project of replacing it by a royal regency was reproduced on this occasion with more earnestness than ever. The Marquis de la Romana, however, who had formerly desired to deprive

the central junta of its authority, having now obtained possession of the chief part of its executive power, hastened to check its most daring adversaries, and placed in arrest the Count de Montijo and Francisco Palafox. But as repeated news of misfortune continued to arrive in rapid succession, the junta, perceiving no secure asylum but at the bottom of the Peninsula, behind the lagunes which cover Cadiz, decided to reassemble in the isle of Leon at the commencement of 1810, in order to prepare the convocation and assembly of the Cortes for the 1st March.

Thus the campaign of 1809 may be said to have terminated with advantage and glory to our arms; and there was fair reason to hope the near approach of a termination to this long and cruel war.

But, as commonly happens, embarrassments and chagrin were not the lot of the vanquished alone; for they prevailed at Madrid, in the very court of the victorious king. Joseph in Spain had as many subjects of dispute with his powerful brother as Louis in Holland. We have already seen that he believed himself capable of arriving much sooner at an understanding with the Spaniards by means of his powers of persuasion, than his brother ever would by the exhibition of all his terrors; that, in common with all those whom Napoleon had made kings, he espoused the cause of his new subjects against the French armies charged with the duty of compelling their submission to him; and that Napoleon was transported with passion when he found that Joseph showed greater favour to the Spaniards than to the French troops, who shed their blood to make him a king. A disgraceful and indecent animosity arose in consequence between the two courts; and as the English obtained from the guerillas more than one letter taken from the French couriers, they did not fail to parade in their journals these sad divisions in the imperial family.

Joseph had naturally desired to establish a court at Madrid, as his brothers had established courts at Amsterdam, Cassel, and Naples. Some complaisant but second-rate French officials, military and civil, and some Spanish adherents of the new king, composed this court, to which Joseph gave his entire confidence, and on which alone he bestowed any favours. Its members in return admired his superior understanding, his amiability, and exquisite tact, and were prone to reiterate that Napoleon was surrounded by flatterers, who exaggerated his merits at the expense of his brothers, that his undeniable military talent was sadly deteriorated by a want of prudence and moderation; and some of these flatterers of Madrid, who were such good judges of the flatterers of Paris, had had the imprudence, during the campaign of Wagram, to calculate the chances which threatened

the life of Napoleon, and whilst expressing a due sense of the misfortune which a loss of so much talent and glory would be, asserted that his death would not be so great a calamity for the empire as was generally supposed; for that, in that event, the attainment of peace would be as easy as it was now difficult, and both France and Europe would obtain that repose they so much needed. These assertions, which contained a considerable amount of truth, were imprudently made in the presence of generals who repeated them to Napoleon, because they hated the Spanish court, in the presence of the French ambassador, who reported them because it was his duty to do so, and in the presence of a police which gave information of them in accordance with their instructions. The consequent irritation in Paris may be easily conceived.

Joseph would have gladly rewarded his flatterers, but his whole revenue sufficed only for a third part of the absolutely necessary expenses of his household, his guard, and the salaries of the functionaries who received his orders. But one resource was open to him, and that consisted in the raising money on the national domains. With the money thus obtained Joseph had made some presents to his favourites; he had, moreover, bestowed on them some titles of nobility, some decorations, and some commands in his guard. In justification of these acts, Joseph declared that it was necessary that a king should have something to give, that he should be able to reward those Frenchmen who had attached themselves to his fortunes, and to recompense the Spaniards who had alienated themselves from their countrymen to devote their services to himself.

Nor were these Joseph's only weaknesses, for, being very coldly received by the French troops, who regarded him neither as a friend nor a general, and more coldly still by his subjects in Madrid, who could not look on him as their legitimate sovereign, he passed the greater part of his time in retirement, in the society of his complaisant friends, and of a beautiful and intellectual person who was one of the few Spanish ladies who dared to present themselves at his court.

Napoleon, who could never pardon those errors of his brothers, which he was ready enough to forgive in his own case, and who was irritated by a number of malevolent reports, manifested even a greater degree of anger against the court of Madrid than he had shown towards that of Amsterdam, for in addition to all those reasons of his displeasure to which we have alluded, was the ceaseless and poignant chagrin which he experienced on account of the Spanish war. He declared repeatedly that Joseph had no idea of how to conduct a war, that he had neither genius nor character, and that without the presence of three or four hundred thousand French soldiers he would not

remain eight days upon his throne ; that his gentleness was out of place, and that there was greater need for him to render himself feared, and to cherish the French troops, than to conciliate the Spaniards ; that this mode of governing was, no doubt, very distasteful to one of so gentle a character as Joseph, but that Napoleon had not forced him to become King of Spain, and that after having accepted the crown, it behoved him to wear it in a becoming manner ; that his financial embarrassments were the result of his own incapacity and the incapacity of his ministers ; that Spain had already cost the imperial treasury two or three hundred millions, and that France could not be ruined for her sake ; that Spain contained immense resources, and that were he, Napoleon, able to go there, he would easily procure from them subsistence for his armies, and an ample surplus for the expenses of the civil service ; that he was about to send a reinforcement of 120,000 men to put an end to this wearisome war, that he would provide them equipment, but that Spain must bear the cost of their subsistence ; that his brother's guard was a useless and even a dangerous establishment, which absorbed money which was required for other purposes, and which would desert on the first occasion ; that it was absolutely necessary that Joseph should cease to rule Spain, or continue to do so in accordance with the views and wishes of Napoleon ; and that if the government were not conducted agreeably to his will, he would simply convert into military governments the provinces occupied by the French armies, restoring them to the king on the conclusion of the war, withholding only, as a recompense to France for her exertions and expenses, the provinces comprised between the Pyrenees and the Ebro.

When these remarks of Napoleon were repeated to Joseph, he declared that he already had sufficient to complain of, that he endured a thousand annoyances from the French generals, and that if the proposed military governments should be established, and it should become necessary to announce to the people the dismemberment of the monarchy, not three or four hundred thousand, but a million of men would be required to keep down the Spaniards ; and even a million would not suffice.

We may observe in this quarrel with Joseph a repetition of Napoleon's dispute with Louis, and how little Napoleon gained by employing his brothers as the instruments of his authority, since they invariably became the supporters of those interests which he sought to sacrifice to his inflexible designs.

At the present moment, however, as the despair of Joseph and the anger of Napoleon were tempered by the hopes in which each indulged that the next campaign would put an end to their

anxieties and sacrifices, they devoted themselves wholly to efforts to render the approaching campaign as effectual as possible.

Joseph wished to commence this campaign by an expedition to Andalusia, and his ministers, lending a ready ear to those Spaniards of Seville who represented Andalusia as weary of the government of the junta, and ready to surrender itself to the new king, declared that force need have little part in its conquest, and that Joseph's power of gaining hearts would be its only vanquisher; that to him alone would belong both the glory and the profit; that Grenada and Valencia would speedily follow the example of Seville, and Cadiz soon be as the other three; that he would thus have almost the whole of the south of Spain under his direct authority, and being then possessed of abundant financial resources, would be independent of his brother, and become indeed King of Spain. Joseph, readily entering into these views, earnestly requested of Napoleon permission to make the conquest of Andalusia, and was supported in his request by Marshal Soult, who also believed that it would be very easy, and desired its accomplishment as a means of effacing the remembrance of Oporto.

Napoleon, however, contrary to his usual habit in the case of military affairs, hesitated; he was well aware of the advantage of obtaining immediate possession of Andalusia, and of the probability that its example might lead to a submission of the whole southern portion of the Peninsula. But his great military talent taught him that the first necessity was the expulsion of the English, which would lead to a general peace; and the conclusion of a general peace would leave the passions of the Spaniards as a fire unsupplied with fuel, and destined to be speedily extinguished. In accordance with these views, he had made preparations for overwhelming Lord Wellington with an overwhelming mass of troops; but unhappily he permitted himself to be diverted from this wise project, and considering the expedition to Andalusia as but a temporary employment for the excellent soldiers which he had around Madrid, consented that it should be undertaken.

In permitting this expedition, which Joseph was to carry out with 70,000 veteran soldiers, Napoleon had considered that at least 30,000 at the close of the campaign might be detached, and led towards Lisbon by the left bank of the Tagus, whilst Massena marched by the right, at the head of the 60,000 troops of Ney and Junot, with the 15,000 of the guard, and the 10,000 cavalry of Montbrun, which, without taking into account the reserve of Drouet, would form an overwhelming force which the English would be unable to withstand; and which would probably render the campaign of 1810 the last of the Spanish war.

In accordance with these ideas, without losing sight of his main object, which was the expulsion of the English, Napoleon permitted the expedition to Andalusia, regarding it but as a profitable employment of the troops concentrated around Madrid, until the great army of Portugal destined to march upon Lisbon, under the illustrious Massena, should have been assembled in Castille.

But whilst consenting to the Andalusian campaign, Napoleon directed Joseph to observe certain precautions in its conduct. He commanded him to march with three corps, the 4th under General Sebastiani, the 5th under Marshal Mortier, and the 1st under Marshal Victor, the division Dessoles remaining in reserve. He ordered the 2nd to remain upon the Tagus, *vis-a-vis* with Alcantara, in order to watch the English, whose plan of operations could not be discovered since their retrograde movement into Portugal. He also recommended Joseph to carry with him a siege train, that the want of it might not stop him before Seville as Marshal Moncey had been stopped before Valencia.

These instructions having been given, Napoleon directed General Suchet to take Lerida and Mequinenza, whilst Joseph was employed in the conquest of Andalusia. General Suchet, aided in his undertaking by Marshal Angereau, would in turn be able to assist him in taking Tortosa and Tarragona, and then marching upon Valencia, be in a position to complete the conquest of the south, already commenced by Joseph. In the meantime Marshal Ney in Old Castille would organise his corps, pursue the insurgents of Leon, assist General Bonnet in the Asturias, and prepare for besieging Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, with which the campaign of Portugal was commenced.

Joseph was extremely delighted at receiving permission to undertake the Andalusian expedition, chiefly because it gave him the opportunity of acting out of Napoleon's sight, and with the counsel of Marshal Soult, who served as his major-general, and showed towards him the greatest deference; the marshal himself being sufficiently pleased with an expedition into Andalusia, where in the absence of the English the issue of the battles was rather to be looked forward to with hope than fear.

Although the authority of Joseph over the corps which were not placed immediately under him was of a very undefined nature, Marshal Soult wrote in his name to General Suchet, directing him to abandon the idea of the siege of Lerida, and to march upon Valencia, in order to cover the left of the army of Andalusia. Addressing an order of the same kind to Marshal Ney, he recommended him to commence immediately the siege

of Ciudad Rodrigo, to draw the English towards the north of Portugal, and to set free the right of this army of Andalusia, which was protected in every kind of way as though it encountered the greatest dangers.

These precautions having been taken, they advanced upon the Sierra Morena with the intention of making the attack upon the 19th or 20th January 1810. General de la Romana, who had been charged with the duty of reorganising the Spanish army commanded by General Areizaga, which had been half destroyed and dispersed amongst the numerous recesses of the Sierra Morena, had promised much and done nothing. Scarcely twenty-five thousand demoralised and destitute troops were ranged in three divisions in front of the three passes of Almaden, Despena Perros, and Villa Mourique. A division detached from Old Castille, under the Duke of Albuquerque, had crossed the Tagus in the neighbourhood of Alcantara, and marched to cover Seville.

The troops under General Areizaga defended but feebly the defiles of San Estevan and Despena Perros, and retired in all haste upon Jaen to cover Grenada. The others having fallen back from Almaden upon Cordova, had directed their retreat, not towards Seville, which the Spaniards expected to offer but a slight resistance, but towards Cadiz, where they hoped to find a secure asylum behind the lagunes of the isle of Leon and under the cannon of the English ships. The French army followed to a certain extent in this twofold direction. The 4th corps, forming our left, under General Sebastiani, pursued towards Jaen the two divisions which retreated into the kingdom of Grenada, in order to drive them from this kingdom and the port of Malaga. The 5th corps, under Marshal Mortier, forming our centre, having reached the Guadalquivir, turned to the right, and rejoined the 1st corps which, under General Victor, had descended upon Cordova. From Cordova they turned towards Seville, pausing at Carmona, a little city not far from Seville. Joseph, who was not inclined to attempt the capture of towns by assault, wished to await at Carmona the effect of the secret relations which Messrs. O'Farrill, d'Azanza, and Urquijo were attempting to establish with the interior of Seville.

It would have been better, whilst awaiting this pacific result, to have left Seville on the right and to have hastened directly upon Cadiz, to intercept the troops, the material, and above all, the members of the government who were on the point of flying. The possession of Cadiz would, in fact, have been of more importance than that of Seville, for the walls of the latter might at any time be battered down by the siege train, but it would not always be easy to pass the lagunes which separate

Cadiz from the firm land of Spain, and it was only by a surprise that we could hope to make the capture of this important town.

Joseph proposed to direct a detachment against Cadiz, and to march with the 1st corps only upon Seville. This plan was supported by many of the generals, but combated by Marshal Soult, who objected to it, that the army being already weakened by the despatch of General Sebastiani to Grenada, it could not bear any further diminution, and that Cadiz would fall of itself into their hands on the capture of Seville. The marshal's opinion diverted Joseph from the execution of his idea, and he marched directly upon Seville with the united corps of Marshals Mortier and Victor. The reserve under General Dessoles was left in the defiles of Despena Perros, between the Val de Peñas, Caroline, and Baylen.

The approach of the French caused the greatest excitement in Seville; the central junta left to an executive commission the care of defending the city, and one by one withdrew to Cadiz; but many of them were maltreated by the populace, which arose in insurrection, proclaiming the junta of Seville the junta of defence, and bringing forth from prison the Count de Montijo and Don Francisco Palafox, to dispute with the French possession of the capital of Andalusia.

Whilst the inhabitants were immersed in useless excitement, the French had advanced to the gates of Seville by the route of Carmona. On the 29th the corps of Marshal Victor appeared in sight of Seville; all the bells were tolled, the populace, assembled in masses upon the ramparts and the roofs of the houses, shouted forth the most furious cries. Marshal Victor summoned the place to surrender, declaring that if the gates were not immediately opened he would instantly commence the attack, and put to the sword all who resisted. These threats, in conjunction with the secret correspondence which had been carried on with the interior of the city, had the effect of bringing about conferences during which the chief personages, with the Marquis de la Romana at their head, made their escape. The provincial junta then consented to deliver up the capital of Andalusia, and on the 1st February the gates were opened to Joseph's army, which entered with drums beating and colours flying.

The city was almost deserted; the upper classes had fled either to Cadiz or the provinces, or into Portugal; the monks had been equally eager to withdraw themselves from the power of the conqueror, and the mass of the people had scattered themselves in dismay over the surrounding country; but as the troops respected both persons and property, and Joseph hastened to put into practice his system of conciliation, the greater portion of

the inhabitants soon returned, tired of enduring cold and hunger in the open fields.

The truth of Marshal Soult's declaration, that the conquest of Seville would undoubtedly be succeeded by the submission of Cadiz, now remained to be proved; and the various corps speedily commenced those movements which would put it to the proof.

The 5th corps, marching upon Estramadura, had dispersed on its way some detachments led by the Marquis de la Romana, and made some considerable captures of baggage and money belonging to the numerous fugitives who were flying to the shelter of the strong walls of Badajoz. On arriving at the gates of Badajoz the French general summoned it to surrender, and received an answer from the governor in the name of the Marquis de la Romana, that the fortress would make a resistance worthy of its natural strength and the determination of its defenders. Marshal Mortier, having no siege train, had then taken up a strong position on the Guadiana, and had placed himself in communication with the 2nd corps (General Reynier's), which had now advanced as far as Truxillo.

In the meantime General Sebastiani, at the head of the 4th corps, chasing before him the wreck of Areizaga's army, had successively entered Jaen and Grenada, and had then appeared before Malaga, where the infuriated populace declared their determination to make a furious resistance; but an advanced guard of cavalry and a few light infantry regiments had speedily quelled their ardour and reduced the place to submission. The 4th corps might reasonably expect that its establishment in the kingdom of Grenada would be equally easy.

Matters in relation to the capture of Cadiz, however, were far from wearing a similarly favourable aspect. The ministers of King Joseph had written to many members of the government and to several generals, who even at Seville had appeared disposed to surrender, utterly weary of this devastating war and the interminable civil dissensions. But these last, constrained as they now were by all that surrounded them, replied only in a most vague and unsatisfactory manner. As for the inhabitants of Cadiz, full of confidence in the natural strength of their town and in the support of the English troops which had been promised them, they surrendered themselves to unbridled fury, and met the French summons to surrender with outrageous bravadoes.

A local insurrectional junta had been formed, and made preparations for the defence; the Duke of Albuquerque, with his division, joined the numerous and important political refugees who were now in Cadiz, without giving up the great arsenal of the Caraque to the English, without even opening the interior roadstead to their fleet; the junta of Cadiz had admitted them

into the exterior roadstead, and consented to receive into the enceinte of the place 4000 of the soldiers. Eighteen thousand Spanish troops were already either within the town or in the isle of Leon.

In the meantime the political movement which had been interrupted at Seville by the arrival of the French continued at Cadiz with the greatest violence. Its first result was naturally the dissolution of the central junta, which, persuaded of the impossibility of its retaining its authority for any considerable time, hastened to resign, and amidst the universal applause of the inhabitants and the refugees, immediately convoked the Cortes and nominated a royal regency, to be invested with executive power. This regency was composed of five members—the Bishop of Orense, a man of mediocre and fanatic spirit; General Castaños, a man of some skill and wisdom; Saavedra, a State councillor; a renowned sailor, Don Antonio Escano; and a Spaniard of the American colonies, Don Miguel de Lardizabal, appointed to represent in the government the transatlantic provinces. After having performed these two acts, the junta separated, receiving the greatest ill-treatment from its enemies, who even examined the baggage of many of its members to discover whether they had abstracted any of the public funds; a most unmerited outrage, as they had generally been accounted persons of strict honesty.

The new regency had scarcely been appointed when it displayed a very manifest inclination to delay the convocation of the Cortes; but the people of Cadiz and the refugees were alike anxious for their immediate assembly, and it was determined that they should be convoked in March.

Affairs were in this state when the first corps under Marshal Victor arrived before the canal of Santi Petri three or four days after the entry of the French into Seville. Had he appeared before Cadiz with an imposing force when the government, the armies, and the most impetuous spirits were still at Seville, it is probable that he might have surprised and ensured its reduction; but now it was necessary to make preparations for a long and difficult siege.

Some time would be necessary for the collection of the various means of attack, and the consideration began to strike every one, now that it was spread over this immense tract of country, which extended from Murcia to Grenada, from Grenada to Cadiz, from Cadiz to Seville, and from Seville to Badajoz, that our noble army, twice as large at least as was necessary for the invasion of the south of Spain, would have much difficulty in retaining possession of it. Marshal Victor, with 20,000 men, had scarcely sufficient for the investment of the isle of Leon and for keeping in check its garrison, which was more numerous but happily

less brave than the 1st corps; and if he had sufficient troops for the preparations for the siege, he certainly had not enough for its accomplishment. The 5th corps, under Marshal Mortier, obliged to furnish a garrison for Seville and a corps of observation before Badajoz, had great difficulty in performing this twofold task. General Sebastiani, who, with the 4th corps, had to hold Malaga, to occupy Grenada, and to make head against the insurgents of Murcia, had not a soldier too much. Dessoles' division, posted amidst the gorges of the Sierra Morena, in order to protect the line of communication, was thoroughly employed, for it had to guard, besides the defiles of the Sierra Morena, Jaen, which commands the route of Grenada and the plains of La Mancha, and to provide a garrison for Madrid. Finally, the 2nd corps, under General Reynier, posted upon the Tagus, between Almaraz, Truxillo, and Alcantara, could not prudently be withdrawn from this position, for it was there that the English had passed in the preceding year, on their march from Abrantes to Talavera. We see therefore that this numerous and noble army, the most valiant of all the armies of the empire, having no rival but the corps of Marshal Davout in Hanover, and which numbered nearly 80,000 men, was already scattered over the provinces of Grenada, Andalusia, and Estramadura, that it was scarcely in force at any one point, and certainly not in a condition to afford any assistance to the army which was about to act against the English in Portugal. That the hope of being able to divert a detachment of it towards Lisbon, which had decided Napoleon to permit the Andalusian expedition, was consequently utterly dissipated, and was succeeded by the fear that it would prove insufficient even for the defence of Andalusia.

The new regency entrusted the Marquis de la Romana with the command of the troops of Estramadura encamped around Badajoz, and having summoned General Blake from Catalonia, where he had been replaced by General O'Donnell, had placed him at the head of the army of the centre, the remnants of which had fled into the kingdom of Murcia. Blake rallied them, and in concert with the garrison of Cadiz, directed expeditions upon Grenada and Seville, and in every other direction in which he could afford support to the guerillas of Ronda. We must add, that the twofold diversion which had been ordered to be made upon our wings, and which consisted in throwing Marshal Ney upon Ciudad Rodrigo, and General Suchet upon Valencia, had not succeeded.

The order which had been incautiously given to Marshal Ney to attack the important fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, without siege artillery, and in the neighbourhood of the English, who had withdrawn to the north of Portugal, had only resulted in a

vain bravado. Marshal Ney had confined himself to throwing a few balls against the place from his field-guns, and to sending to the governor a summons to surrender, which received just the kind of answer such an attempt deserved. The marshal had then returned to Salamanca. General Suchet, believing that the order to march against Valencia had been concurred in by Napoleon, presented himself before that city, which, according to some accounts, was well disposed to surrender, and thrown into it a few cannon-balls; but the inhabitants showed a determination to resist which it was vain to expect to subdue without the aid of heavy artillery. General Suchet retired, therefore, in all haste towards Aragon. This was the second French army (counting that of Marshal Moncey) which had presented itself before Valencia, and been compelled to withdraw without having forced the gates of that proud city; a fact which considerably increased the triumphant feelings of the inhabitants.

In the meantime the whole country from Murcia to Grenada, from Grenada to Cordova, and from Cordova to Seville, was in entire subjection to Joseph, who visited these cities in the character of their king, making what his courtiers called a triumphal progress, but which was not so regarded by persons of more discernment. It is true that the fickle and inconstant populace of these cities, much as they detested the French, applauded this king in a manner which afforded his flatterers an opportunity of declaring that he had obtained more by his personal grace and condescension than Napoleon by his terrible soldiers; and that were he only permitted to pursue his own plans he would speedily effect the subjugation of Spain; but the persons who uttered these sentiments forgot that 80,000 of these same terrible soldiers were at the present moment affording to Joseph the means of trying the effect of the charms of his manner upon the people of Andalusia. In the meantime both Joseph and Marshal Soult were satisfied.

But in the midst of these self-congratulations on the subject of the Andalusian expedition, a thunderbolt was launched from Paris, which turned all Joseph's exultation into bitter dismay. The Andalusian expedition had occupied the first months of 1810, and this was the very period of the most serious disputes between Holland and Napoleon, who had not quarrels only with King Louis, but also with King Jerome, on account of Hanover, and with respect to the execution of the financial conditions attached to the cession of that country. Tired of finding his brothers perpetually the cause of some obstacle in his path, and unable to perceive that they were in reality only the passive agents of the resistance of circumstances to those impossible achievements he was attempting, and receiving a multitude of

reports respecting the tone and conduct adopted by Joseph, he took measures with respect to him which were very severe, and by no means of a nature calculated to facilitate the performance of the work which remained to be performed by him in Spain. In the first place, he was displeased that General Suchet should have been called off from the siege of Lerida to carry his heavy artillery against Valencia, by which means the French army had been caused to make a second ineffectual appearance before the walls of that city, and he forbade General Suchet from obeying henceforward any authority but that of Paris. He expressed equal disapproval of the imprudent demonstration which Marshal Ney had been ordered to make against Ciudad Rodrigo.

Joseph's gift of money to his favourites when resources were utterly wanting for the supply of even necessary expenses angered him beyond expression. "Since money can be found," said Napoleon, "for gifts to the idle and the intriguing, means ought to be found for the support of the soldiers who pour out their blood for King Joseph; and since their wants are not supplied, I must provide for them myself." Accordingly he converted Catalonia, Aragon, Navarre, and Biscay, which were the four provinces on the left of the Ebro, into military governments. He arranged that in those governments the generals commanding should exercise civil as well as military authority, that they should receive all the revenues on account of the army chest, and whilst treating the government at Madrid with apparent deference, should neither obey nor be accountable to it.

After having taken military possession of the territories on the left of the Ebro, Napoleon secretly communicated to the generals his intention of annexing them to France as some indemnity for the sacrifices she had made to secure the throne of Spain for his brother; and directed them, in case they should receive orders from Madrid contrary to those they received from Paris, to declare that they had been prohibited to obey any other government but that of France. This was a serious step, not only for Spain, but also for Europe. It seemed, in fact, that Napoleon, as insatiable in peace as in war, was resolved to rule by his decrees where he could not vanquish by his sword. He had annexed to the empire Tuscany, the Roman States, and Holland; he was at this very moment contemplating, although he maintained silence on the point, treating Valais and the Hanse towns in the same manner. To add to these acquisitions the country between the Pyrenees and the Ebro was, in effect, to say to the world that nothing could escape his avidity.

The secrecy enjoined upon the generals relative to the annexation of the four provinces was not long possible. The establishment of the military governments in these provinces would have alone sufficed to reveal Napoleon's real intentions; but

Napoleon did not confine himself to this measure, but took others which restricted Joseph's authority within the gates of Madrid. Besides the acts above mentioned, he distributed the troops in the field into three armies—one of the south, one of the centre, and one of Portugal. He placed Marshal Soult at the head of the army of the south, having renounced upon consideration the intention of inquiring into his conduct at Oporto, and confided to him the 4th, 1st, and 5th corps, which occupied Grenada, Andalusia, and Estramadura. He composed the army of the centre of Dessoles' single division, added to it the depôts generally established at Madrid, and entrusted it to Joseph. The army of Portugal was formed of all the troops assembled in the north, to march upon Lisbon, under the orders of Marshal Massena. The generals commanding these armies were to obey only the orders of the French minister, which meant of Napoleon himself, who had adopted the title of commander-in-chief of the armies of Spain, and had appointed Prince Berthier his major-general. Joseph had therefore no command over the governor of the provinces of the Ebro; none over the generals of the three acting armies; his authority being confined to the army of the centre, which was the least numerous, and was appointed to the performance of but an insignificant task. His authority could scarcely have been more restricted or rendered more nominal, and this certainly was not the way to exalt him in the eyes of the Spaniards. The orders, moreover, relating to the finances were as severe as those relative to the military hierarchy. The revenues received in the provinces of the Ebro were allotted to the armies by which they were occupied. The acting armies were to obtain support from the countries in which they conducted their operations, and as it was possible that sufficient money would not be found for their pay, Napoleon agreed to send to Spain two millions a month for that purpose. Henceforth Joseph only had for revenue the taxes which he could obtain from Madrid itself; and the hatred which the Spaniards bore towards him, not on his own account, but on account of the invasion of which he was the representative, began to change into a feeling of contempt, which was still more formidable.

Joseph received information of the above circumstances at Seville, and was overwhelmed by it. MM. O'Farrill, Urquijo, d'Azanza, and d'Almenara, who had accompanied him to Seville, fell into the deepest despair. Struck by so heavy a blow, Joseph had no longer any taste for remaining at Seville, where his presence was no longer likely to have that effect upon his new subjects which he had expected. He found himself also without authority in Andalusia, Marshal Soult having become general-in-chief of the army of the south, and determined to

visit France, to come to some understanding with his brother, and to make him acquainted with the probable consequences of these his last measures. He took leave therefore of his ministers, leaving Marshal Soult absolute master of Andalusia; and thus 80,000 of the best troops in Spain were paralysed to make, not Joseph, but Marshal Soult, King of Andalusia.

Joseph passed rapidly and without ostentation through Andalusia, which he had lately traversed with so much triumph, and passing through the defiles of the Sierra Morena, where was cantoned Dessoles' division, the only active force which remained to him, and then, leaving some infantry regiments in these defiles, and one or two regiments of dragoons to scour La Mancha, he concentrated around Madrid the few troops upon which he could rely.

He had no sooner entered his capital than he received the most extraordinary information from Seville. Marshal Soult, considering himself not sufficiently strong in troops with the three corps which had been confided to him, and which comprised the best troops in Spain, pretended that all those in the arrondissement of the south belonged to him, and consequently ordered the brigade which was between La Mancha and Andalusia to approach to receive his orders. General Laboussage, to whom these orders were addressed, replied that he was under the commands of the *état-major* of Madrid, and could not, without its authorisation, quit the post which he occupied. Marshal Soult repeated his orders, accompanying them with severe threats in case they should be disobeyed. Joseph, on the other hand, forbade General Laboussage to obey, and whilst in the midst of this quarrel with Marshal Soult, experienced a new annoyance quite as painful as any of the others. The generals stationed in the kingdom of Leon and Old Castille, where the military governments were not as yet established, put into practice the principle laid down by Napoleon, that each army should be supported by the province which it occupied, and should levy contributions without employing the financial agents of Joseph, and without holding themselves accountable to his authority. These repeated blows rendered Joseph's humiliation complete, and he was ready to abdicate, even without compensation, the burdensome crown of Spain. By the advice, however, of his ministers and of some persons who enjoyed his confidence, and who were unwilling to lose the king to whom they had become attached, he directed his wife, who was in Paris, and two of his ministers, MM. d'Azanza and d'Hervas, who were about to proceed thither, to negotiate with his brother and to make him understand that the loss of the provinces of the Ebro exposed him to the hatred of the Spaniards, that the reduction of his authority brought on him

their contempt, and that he would rather resign the Peninsula than retain it on such conditions.

Napoleon received the Spanish ministers without severity but with some disdain; spoke contemptuously of Joseph's system of policy; and displayed great inflexibility on the subject of the finances, declaring that if Joseph were not willing to obtain of Spain the necessary money for the troops, he must procure it himself by the hands of his generals, taking care, however, that whatever surplus remained beyond the necessary expenses of their armies should be paid over to Joseph's treasury. He was unable, he said, to change the distribution of the various military commands, for that he had need of two great armies, that of the south and that of Portugal, to act in concert for the expulsion of the English, and that by leaving between these the army of the centre, and entrusting it to Joseph, he had conceded all that was possible.

With respect to the provinces of the Ebro in which he had established military governments, Napoleon did not dissemble his project for annexing them to France as a means of indemnifying her for her expenses. Portugal, he added, which would one day be annexed to Spain, would be a noble compensation, but it was first necessary to conquer it, to drive out of it the English, and after having driven them out, to force them to make peace; the accomplishment of all which was difficult, and rendered desirable for the present the postponement of any determination, and complete silence on these topics. The Spanish ministers remained, therefore, at Paris, with the intention of negotiating and seizing every opportunity of making some impression on Napoleon's inflexible will.

For the moment Napoleon permitted them to add some troops to the army of the centre. He decided that Marshal Soult in endeavouring to take Cadiz should try also to capture Badajoz on the frontier of Portugal; that Marshal Massena, on his side, whilst his armies completed their formation, should undertake the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, which were the protection of Portugal on the side of Castille, and that these supports once assured, they should take the offensive during the course of the month of September by marching altogether upon Lisbon, Marshal Massena on the right bank of the Tagus, and Marshal Soult on the left. According to this new plan the whole of the summer would be devoted to the different sieges, and orders were given that it should so be employed, and with the greatest possible activity.

General Suchet had, in effect, since the month of April, undertaken the task which was assigned to him. Having promptly repaired the fault which they had caused him to commit, in drawing him upon Valencia, he sat down before

Lerida to besiege that place. His corps, made up to an effective force of thirty and some odd thousand men by the arrival of recent reinforcements, could not furnish more than 23,000 or 24,000 combatants. Of these he kept about 10,000 to guard Aragon, and with 13,000 or 14,000 he had marched on Lerida, investing that place on the two sides of the Segre. These forces were just sufficient for attacking the place; but there was reason to fear that they would be insufficient if it should prove necessary to cover the siege against the endeavours which would very likely be made from without. It was the duty of Marshal Augereau to cover the siege of Lerida and Mequinenza, whilst Marshal Suchet carried them on, and it was the duty of Marshal Suchet in his turn to cover those of Tortosa and Tarragona, whilst Marshal Augereau devoted his forces to that purpose.

Lerida is famous in history, and from the time of Cæsar to that of the Grand Condé has in every age played an important part; it is on the right of the Segre, a river which carries to the Ebro the waters of one-half at least of the chain of the Pyrenees, and being situated at the foot of a rock, which is surmounted by a strong castle, it is protected in one direction by the waters of the river, and on all by the cannon of the castle. The rock on which this castle is built is almost perpendicular on every side, save towards the south-west, on which side it is accessible by a gentle ascent, which commences almost from the town itself, but this also rises abruptly towards its extremity, and is strongly fortified. It was necessary, therefore, to take the town under the fire of the castle, and after the town the castle itself; unless, indeed, a well-arranged system of operations should obtain the simultaneous accomplishment of both these results.

At the moment when the trenches were about to be opened, an intercepted letter apprised General Suchet that the Spanish general O'Donnell was approaching with the troops of Catalonia and Aragon to raise the siege. On the 23rd it was known that he was only one march distant. He came from Catalonia by the left of the Segre, whilst the town and the besieging army were on the right. General Suchet made his arrangements for holding his ground against both the enemies without and those within. On the 23rd April, at daybreak, General O'Donnell appeared at the extremity of the plain of Margalef, which extends on the left of the Segre, and immediately commenced the action. After a brief contest victory declared itself for the French, and the Spaniards fled, leaving behind them almost six thousand prisoners, with many cannon, colours, and a large amount of baggage.

After this brilliant success General Suchet, wishing to know

if the result of the battle which had deprived the garrison of all hope of succour had inclined them to surrender, sent them a summons to do so; but the governor proudly replied that the garrison had never relied upon any external aid for the success of its defence. It was necessary, therefore, to proceed with the siege.

The trenches were opened on the 29th April. The execution of the works was difficult, not on account of the hardness of the soil, but because the spring rains had caused the waters of the Segre to overflow, and because great inconvenience was experienced from the artillery of the castle.

On the 6th and 7th of May all the batteries were constructed and armed, and the cannonade was commenced; but our artillery suffered so severely from the fire from the castle, most of the pieces being speedily dismounted, that the cannonade had to be suspended for the purpose of erecting new batteries and redising the direction of the old. These new works occupied until the 12th of May, when the fire was recommenced, and with complete success. Our batteries silenced those of the town itself, whilst those of the castle had been rendered less dangerous by being approached nearer. At length a practicable breach was effected and an assault rendered feasible. It was arranged that this should take place on the 13th. Two columns were to advance simultaneously to the assault, whilst a company of sappers and miners was to break down one of the gates, by which the army might be admitted. The general-in-chief and Colonel Haxo remained in the trenches at the head of the reserves, ready to advance in whichever direction it might be desirable.

At the approach of evening, four bombs having given the signal, the two columns poured from the trenches into the breaches and clambered up them, in spite of a terrible fire from the front and flank. Having arrived on the rampart, they were for a moment thrown into confusion, but they soon rallied and entered the town, which they found defended by barricades, which were immediately taken. In the meantime the sappers and miners had succeeded, after a hand to hand conflict, in opening the gate situated near the bastion of the Madelaine, and thus giving admittance to the columns which waited behind them. Our troops, thus penetrating into the town in all directions, drove the garrison and the inhabitants, mingled together in confusion, towards the slopes which led to the castle. Filled with terror, they threw themselves into the castle itself and even into the fosses. All through the night this mass of mingled men, women, and children was, by General Suchet's order, overwhelmed with missiles from every species of ordnance; a scene of tragedy being the result,

which it was impossible to avoid, for the immediate conclusion of the siege depended on the state of despair to which this unhappy mass of persons might be reduced.

However great might be the determination of the garrison and their leader, it was impossible to persevere under these circumstances, and on the 14th May, therefore, the governor Garcia Conde hoisted the white flag, and surrendered himself and the garrison prisoners of war. The result of this siege gave to us the most important fortification in Aragon, and producing an immense sensation in this part of Spain, much diminished that confidence in their walls with which the inhabitants had been inspired by the siege of Girone.

Whilst these events were taking place in Aragon, Napoleon had at last compelled Marshal Massena to quit Paris to proceed to Salamanca. Unable to place himself at the head of the armies of Spain, various motives induced him to bestow the chief command upon Marshal Massena. Soult having been twice tried against the English, had not, in Napoleon's opinion, shown sufficient vigour to justify his being opposed to them again. Marshal Ney possessed, on the contrary, that power of energetic action which was necessary in a struggle against such enemies; but he had never commanded in chief, and it was necessary that the general to be matched against so skilful a tactician as Wellington should unite with consummate generalship and great energy of character that habit of command which enlarges the spirit, and renders it capable of bearing fitly all the anxieties attending a great responsibility. Marshal Massena was the only man whose ready spirit, clear judgment, and ardent temperament rendered him fit for such a post. Marshal Massena, with Ney and Junot for his lieutenants, would be able to surmount all obstacles. But Marshal Massena, whose clear-sightedness was not confined to military affairs, perceived that a rapid advance was being made towards some great catastrophe. Having conducted all kinds of warfare in Calabria, Italy, Germany, and Poland, he augured no good from that which was so obstinately maintained in Spain, and he was by no means inclined to compromise his high renown upon a theatre whereon all the difficulties which Napoleon had excited against himself appeared to have assembled. He showed the greatest repugnance to undertaking the management of the campaign in Portugal, and when required by Napoleon to give his motives, alleged, that besides the difficulties which he foresaw in the conduct of the operations, and the want which he suspected there would be of proper means for carrying them out, his health was broken, and his energy most probably enfeebled in consequence; and that, moreover, there would be some inconvenience in his assuming the command over those marshals who

considered themselves his equals, and were accustomed to obey none but Napoleon himself. Napoleon, with that persuasive manner which he knew how to assume with his old companions in arms, had caressed the old soldier, reminding him of his renown, his proverbial energy; declared that he had never displayed more youthful vigour than in the last campaign, that the army re-echoed with his name, that neither Marshal Soult nor Marshal Ney considered themselves his equal, and that neither of them would refuse the obedience demanded by his superiority, his age, and the imperial confidence with which he was invested; that if they were marshals and dukes, he was Prince of Massena; and that there were, moreover, means of forcing unruly spirits to submission; that as far as his health was concerned, the climate of Portugal was exactly the one most likely to restore it; that he would be afforded time for repose by the lapse of three or four months which would intervene, being employed in siege operations, before the commencement of movements in the field; that as regarded the means necessary to the conduct of the campaign, they would be furnished in abundance, 80,000 men being placed under his orders, together with an immense matériel; and that being entrusted with the conduct of this campaign, it was probable that he would become both the most glorious and the most popular of the soldiers of France, by obtaining that maritime peace which was alone required, because it was the only one which had not as yet been obtained. These arguments, accompanied by a thousand caresses, had rendered Massena unable to refuse the request of the most generous of masters; his far-seeing spirit, therefore, sadly yielded to the persuasions of gratitude and the habit of obedience, but not to self-deception.

Massena having thus, whether he would or no, accepted the command of the army of Portugal, proceeded to Salamanca, his arrival being a source of terror to the insurgents, of confidence to the troops, and of displeasure to Junot and Ney. It happened unfortunately that his energy was unaccompanied by that dignity which, whether natural or assumed, imposes upon men, and which was one of those qualifications for command, the neglect of which in Napoleon was compensated for by the prestige of his prodigious genius, his dazzling glory, and unrivalled fortune. Massena arrived at his headquarters in a manner and with an attendance little calculated to impress his already discontented lieutenants, and indiscreetly complaining of his fatigue. "Massena is grown old," was the constant murmur around Marshal Ney at Salamanca, and around Junot at Zamora. Massena was not left long in ignorance of this circumstance. "They consider me old, do they?" he exclaimed with anger; "I will soon make them understand

that my will at least is not old, and that I know how to exact obedience from those who are placed under my orders." A third lieutenant, General Reynier, whose corps was to join the army of Portugal, conducted himself, at first at least, with more propriety than the other two, receiving his commander-in-chief with the respect which was to be expected from a modest and earnest officer.

But these difficulties were by no means the least serious of those which Massena had to encounter. His army was not as yet either organised or supplied with the necessary matériel, and Napoleon refused to furnish the funds by means of which alone it could be obtained. He found, on arriving at Salamanca, that such matériel as had been sent from France since the peace with Austria had been seized on its way, as far as possible, by each corps, and consumed before the campaign had commenced. The weather, moreover, had been as frightful in the Castilles as in Aragon; and in addition to all these difficulties, guerilla bands, more numerous and more audacious than ever, intercepted every convoy that was not guarded by a considerable force. The urgency of the necessities of the army had given birth to abuses which the generals either indolently or purposely connived at. The soldiers and sometimes the officers seized the peasants' cattle or corn, not to use for their own support, but to convert into money. They assisted also the contraband traffic in colonial merchandise by permitting mules burdened with this merchandise to pass by on the payment of a tribute; and they even went so far as to permit some of the Spanish prisoners to escape for bribes. Massena was deeply distressed at this low state of discipline of his old companions in arms, whom he found changed in everything, save that martial daring which neither misfortune nor all Europe gathered under the walls of Paris could subdue.

Independently of this general state of the army, each corps had its own particular distress; and none of the corps were of that strength which Napoleon had hoped and promised they should be. Massena was able, indeed, to assemble an army of 60,000 men, but the diseases attending the summer season, the sieges which were to be undertaken, and the garrisons which would have to be left in the conquered places, would certainly reduce it by 15,000 or 16,000 men, and leave the army of Portugal numbering no more than 50,000 effective combatants. The aspect of things in general, the inferiority of the number of the troops, the want of matériel, the bad spirit manifested by the generals, and the utter decay of discipline, filled Massena with dismay, and he wrote to Napoleon letters which were as talented as they were sad. Nevertheless, old and worn-out and hopeless as he was, he applied himself to the work in hand

with more energetic zeal than he had ever displayed at any previous period of his life.

Aided by the members of his staff and by General Thiebault, governor of Salamanca, he applied himself to the creation of that which did not exist, and the reparation of that which was destroyed. With a view to these objects he ordered to be brought into the chest of the central army the contributions which each corps had seized for its own use from the province which it occupied. He urged the supply of funds from Paris for the acquittal of the arrears of pay; he took possession of the mules bought in France for the army of Portugal, and accelerated the transport of the heavy artillery towards Ciudad Rodrigo. Ciudad Rodrigo, distant three or four marches from Salamanca, was situated in a vast, arid, desolate plain, of some twenty or thirty leagues in extent. Massena sent thither subsistence for the troops of Marshal Ney, which were about to assemble there, and ordered the establishment of all that was necessary for a siege. As it was possible that the English, who, since our entrance into Andalusia, had quitted Spanish Estramadura to retreat into the north of Portugal, might attempt to interrupt our operations, he ordered General Junot to quit Leon and Benavente, and to take up a position between Ledesma and Zamora, in order, if necessary, to be able to concentrate themselves upon the right of Marshal Ney. By these means Massena began to assemble at Salamanca the matériel of a considerable army, and to concentrate around Ciudad Rodrigo a portion of what was necessary to the prosecution of a long siege. Unhappily the route between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo was infested by guerillas who dared to show themselves despite the incessant presence of our troops, and often occasioned us serious disasters. Massena, therefore, did not fail to send most urgent messages to Paris for the prompt arrival of the corps of General Druet, affirming that after his departure for Portugal the presence of numerous forces alone could keep open the means of communication.

Whilst preparations were thus being made for commencing the new campaign of Portugal by the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, a disputed point arose between Massena and his lieutenants. The English were encamped at Visen, three marches from the frontier. The accounts respecting their numbers varied very much, from the fact of the Portuguese troops being frequently reckoned with them; but no one supposed that the English themselves were more than 24,000. Their near neighbourhood inflamed the burning courage of Ney; he found it but tedious work directing the noble ardour of his soldiers against stone walls. He considered that by making an unexpected attack upon the English with the 6th and 8th corps, and the cavalry of

Montbrun, which would amount altogether to about 50,000 men, there would be a great chance of vanquishing them, and ensuring by their defeat the fall of the fortified places themselves.

Marshal Ney proposed this plan of operations to the general-in-chief with all his natural ardour, suggesting it at the same time by letter to General Junot, in order that, receiving the same advice from both, Massena might be, in a manner, forced to adopt it. But although the impetuous Junot added his entreaties to those of Ney, the firmness of the general-in-chief was not moved, for Napoleon's orders were precise; directing that the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida should precede every other operation; that no advance into Portugal should be made until after the intense heat should have diminished, and until provisions should have been got together sufficient for the subsistence of the army for fifteen or twenty days. But Junot and Ney spread abroad amongst their several corps that it was Massena who, grown old, and no longer the same man, preferred wearisome and murderous sieges to an active and decisive campaign.

The plan laid down by Napoleon was evidently the wisest, and the designs of the English generals afforded a full justification of his views. Sir Arthur Wellesley had acquired by his last operations a great reputation with the English government, and even with the English people, who, since General Moore's precipitate retreat, had never ceased to be haunted by the fear that their troops might be driven into the sea. On finding, however, that their new general, Arthur Wellesley, so far from being driven from the Peninsula, had, on the contrary, driven Marshal Soult from Portugal, they had begun to take confidence; but the services which he had already rendered to his country, and the high reputation which he began to acquire, did not suffice to silence the attacks of the opposition, which desired peace, or the objections of the government, which was in continual dread of some disaster. Thus the British government constantly kept at the mouths of the Tagus an immense transport flotilla, to be always ready to receive the army should it be beaten. The peace which France had made with Austria increased its apprehensions, for it believed that Napoleon would throw into the Peninsula his best army and his best general, namely, himself; and this idea filled all England with anxiety in behalf of Lord Wellington, and the army which he commanded.

The English public tormented the cabinet, and the cabinet tormented Lord Wellington, by the expression of unceasing terrors. But the latter endured this annoyance, whilst he saw more clearly than Napoleon himself the course of affairs in the Peninsula, simply because he was on the spot, and not misled

by any of those illusions in which Napoleon, having entered on an ill-judged line of action, loved to envelop himself. He saw that the resistance offered by national hatred, climate, and distance, by the want of method in operations conducted by different generals, and by the disagreement with Joseph, would prevent Napoleon from obtaining possession of certain extreme points, such as Gibraltar, Cadiz, and Lisbon, which were protected by their remoteness and the sea; and he declared that if England continued to excite and to aid from these extreme points the hostility of the Portuguese and Spaniards, the struggle would exhaust the resources of the empire, that Europe would sooner or later revolt against Napoleon, and that he would only be able to meet that revolt with armies half destroyed by an interminable and destructive war. But in pursuing this line of conduct, all depended on the resistance which should be opposed to the French at the extremities of the Peninsula, and Lord Wellington had sought with great care, and discovered with rare quickness of eye, an almost impregnable position, from which he flattered himself that he might defy all the efforts of the French armies. This position, which he thus rendered immortal, was that of Torres Vedras, near Lisbon. He had remarked between the Tagus and the sea a peninsula six or seven leagues broad and twelve or fifteen long, which might be easily isolated by a line of almost invincible works, and behind which Lisbon, the transport flotilla, and the stores of the army might be safe from every attack. Having fixed upon this position, he delineated to his engineers the works which he desired to have thrown up, and Europe remaining in perfect ignorance of the fact, employed many thousand Portuguese peasants in constructing, under the direction of the English engineers, the celebrated lines of Torres Vedras. More than 600 cannon were prepared to arm the numerous redoubts which were thus thrown up across the peninsula of the Tagus.

From the time that the French had invaded Andalusia, Lord Wellington had hastened to quit Estramadura, and had retired into Portugal, with the desire of devoting himself exclusively to the defence of that country, for it was of little importance whether the English were in Spain or Portugal, their presence upon some point of the Peninsula being sufficient to sustain the hopes of the insurgents, and to perpetuate the war. With the bulk of his forces, namely, 20,000 English and 15,000 Portuguese, he took up a position at Visen, at the entrance of the valley of Mondego; his plan being to watch from thence the movements of the French, and to retreat if they advanced to give him battle, until, having come to a strong position, and the enemy being exhausted with fatigue, he should be able to engage them with all the chances in his favour; but to risk nothing for

the sake of saving the Spanish or Portuguese fortresses, or of protecting the countries of his allies from hostile ravages.

On the side of the French, therefore, that plan by which it was proposed that Ciudad Rodrigo should be first taken, that great magazines should be established, and that no movement should be taken without the accompaniment of an ample supply of stores on the backs of mules, was the only practicable one, since Lord Wellington had resolved only to accept battle at his own pleasure, and to retreat and leave us to perish of hunger in his track.

About the commencement of June, Marshal Ney invested Ciudad Rodrigo. This fortress is situated upon the Agueda, a little river which falls from the Sierra de Gata into the Douro. It had an excellent governor, old indeed, but full of skill and energy. General Herrasti, aware of the preparations which had been made by the French for the attack, had long since taken every precaution. The fortress contained a garrison of 4000 soldiers, together with a fanatic population of 6000 persons, increased by the wealthy proprietors of the country, who, having sought an asylum in the place for themselves and their movable property, had furnished a good battalion of militia numbering 800 men. The artillery was numerous and well served, and every preparation was made for affording Ciudad Rodrigo the means of making a long and vigorous resistance.

After having consulted with his engineer and artillery officers, Ney perceived very clearly the best point to make the attack, and chose the north side for the commencement of the siege works, that being the side on which there were only artificial defences, which could be battered down by artillery. On the night between the 15th and 16th of June the trenches were opened at 500 metres distance from the place. The works were carried on during the following days with the utmost diligence, and in spite of the repeated sorties of the enemy, who were on every occasion driven back to the fortress with heavy loss.

The rain which had lasted during the whole month of May, and which now recommenced, caused us more damage than all the sorties of the enemy. It rendered the trenches uninhabitable, and delaying, by the effect it had on the roads, the arrival of the siege train, compelled our soldiers to work without the protection of artillery. Marshal Ney supplied the want of it by forming six companies of the best marksmen of his army, and placing them in front of the trenches in great holes, which were made so as to be able to contain three men with provisions and ammunition for twenty-four hours. From this shelter our marksmen directed such a fire upon the enemy's artillerymen that the inconvenience to our troops of working in front of unopposed cannon was very much diminished.

On the evening of the 24th June the general-in-chief himself arrived in the French camp. After having inspected and approved of the works, he hastened the erection of the batteries, that an immediate attack might be made, to open a breach. On the following day, the 25th, was commenced the cannonade. The fire from forty-six pieces of artillery caused great havoc in the enemy's works. Nevertheless, the cannon of the fortress replied to ours, and occasioned us some damage. Many of our pieces were dismounted, and a considerable number of our artillerymen slain. Marshal Massena, thinking that our artillery was not served with sufficient energy, imperiously ordered Eblé to take upon himself its command. This was a new source of vexation to Marshal Ney, who took careful account of all his annoyances, whether inevitable or not. The speedy result of General Eblé's efforts was that two breaches became practicable, and Marshal Massena wished immediately to proceed to the assault, as the unhealthy nature of the soil exposed the troops to disease, and the English had passed the Coa, a little river parallel to the Agueda, and threatened an attack. He summoned General Herrasti to surrender, telling him that he had already done all that honour demanded, that he could not hold the breach against the courage of the army of Portugal, and that if he still persisted, he would expose the garrison to destruction by the edge of the sword.

The garrison, indeed, began already to despair; but the monks continued to excite the people, and the refugees from the country, who had taken into the town all that they possessed, were unwilling to surrender. One circumstance favoured their determination to hold out. The breach having been opened from a distance, and before the French had carried their works up to the border of the fosse, the counterscarp remained untouched. Thus the breach which was practicable on the side of the town was not so on the side of the country, for troops could only throw themselves into the fosse for the purpose of mounting to the assault by precipitating themselves from a high wall; the defence might, therefore, according to the recognised rules, be still prolonged. General Herrasti, who was impelled, not by fanaticism, but by a sense of military honour, to maintain the defence to the utmost, made this circumstance a reason for refusing to comply with Marshal Massena's summons to surrender, and sent a messenger to Lord Wellington with an earnest entreaty that he would come to his assistance.

This unexpected resistance excited Marshal Massena's extreme displeasure, and selecting from the 8th corps an officer of distinguished merit, Colonel Valazé, who had already distinguished himself at the siege of Astorga, he ordered him to continue the works so as to reach the side of the fosse as soon as possible.

Hearing twelve days spoken of as the time this work would occupy, he demanded that it should be completed in seven or eight, for provisions began to fail, and the 6th corps had been already put on half rations.

As for the English, Lord Wellington, having advanced as far as the Coa, declined to risk an engagement. In vain General Herrasti sent messages for aid, in vain the Marquis de la Romana had visited Badajoz to entreat him to interrupt the operations of the French; he replied that he could only save the fortress by a battle, and he had resolved not to hazard the fate of the English army to preserve a place already almost lost. This stern answer, although founded on the strongest arguments, reduced the Spaniards to despair, and exasperated them with what they called the cold egotism of the English.

In spite of all Colonel Valazé's efforts, the brink of the fosse had not been reached until the 5th or 6th of July; but at length on the 8th the masonry, which had been the cause of the delay, was thrown by means of gunpowder into the fosse, and the breach became practicable on both sides of the fosse, namely, on the descent as well as the ascent. On the morning of the 9th everything was arranged for the assault. At four o'clock in the morning our batteries hurled upon the unhappy town of Ciudad Rodrigo a hail of shot and shell. The enemy's artillery, which at first replied with some quickness, was soon silenced. The two breaches presented only a heap of shelving ruins, which would be easily accessible to the agility of our soldiers. Between three and four o'clock in the afternoon they were declared by our engineers to be perfectly practicable, and Massena ordered the assault. But just as the chosen columns had reached the foot of the first breach and were preparing to throw themselves into it, a white flag, the token of surrender, appeared upon the second. An aged man, with white hair (General Herrasti), presented himself to discuss with Marshal Ney upon the ruined walls the terms of capitulation. Ney accorded him all the honours due to his brave defence, permitting the officers to retain their swords and the soldiers their knapsacks.

This first act of the campaign in Portugal had passed off well. The troops, notwithstanding the unyielding tempers of their generals, and the disorganisation which had resulted from their wretchedness, had displayed their accustomed courage. Ciudad Rodrigo being taken, it was now necessary to attack Almeida. Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered on the 9th of July; offensive operations could not be commenced before the subsidence of the heat, and as that would not be until the month of September, the months of July and August might be devoted to the siege of Almeida, which was said to be more strongly fortified and better armed than Ciudad Rodrigo.

Before quitting Ciudad Rodrigo, Massena ordered the breaches to be repaired, and all the defences to be put in an efficient state. As the town contained the richest inhabitants of the country, who had sought safety within its walls, he levied upon them a contribution of 500,000 francs, of which he was in urgent need for the liquidation of his artillery and engineer expenses, and then returned to Salamanca, where, in his absence, the most important matters had made but little progress. He immediately made the most vigorous exertions for the collection of provisions sufficient to last the troops for twenty days, besides what would be sufficient to provision Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida for several months.

In the meantime he had given directions for the investment of Almeida. Marshal Ney had advanced with the 6th corps, followed by the 8th, to attack the English on the Coa, a little river which, as the Agueda, flows from the Sierra de Gata into the Douro. Almeida is on the right of the Coa, and was consequently on our side. Lord Wellington, persisting in remaining inactive in spite of the curses of the Spaniards, had encamped at Alverca, and quietly watched the progress of events. Marshal Ney, in obedience to the orders he had received, obliged the English rearguard to make a precipitate retreat, and chased them before him as far as a fort called Fort Conception, a regular work on the route from Ciudad Rodrigo to Almeida, and at the summit of a plateau which commanded this route.

Almeida was a regular pentagon, perfectly fortified, completely armed, provided with a garrison of 5000 Portuguese, and built on a rocky soil in which it would be a work of great difficulty to open trenches. The first fortnight of August was occupied in collecting provisions, procuring the necessary matériel, and in awaiting the arrival of the siege train. On the 15th the trenches were opened. Whilst the approaches were being carried on, eleven batteries were constructed, armed with 64 pieces of heavy ordnance which had been brought from Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca. On the morning of the 20th of August, the artillery being ready, Marshal Massena gave orders that the fire should be opened. The place, which was but small, although well fortified, was almost surrounded by the batteries of its assailants, and suffered considerable damage. The enemy replied with vigour, but were not able to make head against our artillery, which was served with as much precision as quickness. Many edifices took fire; towards night a shell, happily aimed, falling upon a powder magazine which was in the very centre of the town, caused a frightful explosion; many of the houses were thrown down, and almost 500 persons, soldiers or inhabitants, killed. Some of the cannon were thrown into the fosses, and portions of the ramparts laid open.

On the following day the disaster which the town had suffered was manifest in all its horror. The inhabitants, in consternation, demanded that they should no longer be exposed to such dangers; and the garrison, indignant at the obstinate immovability of the English, also began to speak of surrendering. Massena, judging correctly how great confusion would prevail throughout the place, summoned it to surrender, writing to the governor to the effect, that after the accident which had happened, it would be impossible for him to prolong his resistance. The governor therefore entered into a discussion respecting the conditions of surrender; but as he continued to dispute respecting the terms during the whole day, Massena had the cannonade recommenced; a few rounds, however, caused the conditions which we had dictated to be accepted. The conquerors found within the fortifications 5000 men, a great quantity of stores, and some very good ordnance.

The first part of the plan of the campaign, that which consisted in the conquest of the fortresses of the frontier, was successfully accomplished; and a good base of operations was established, if only the conquered fortresses could be provisioned, hospitals and magazines formed, and sufficient troops afforded to cover the communications. It was now September, and he proposed to pass the frontier on the 10th or 15th. Napoleon, who was much rejoiced at the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, urgently pressed him to commence at length active operations, and to throw himself upon the English. "They are not more than 25,000," he wrote; "your troops must still, despite the sieges and the diseases of summer, number 60,000; and how are 25,000 English to resist 60,000 Frenchmen commanded by you? To hesitate would be a scandalous weakness, which we need not fear on the part of the Duke of Rivoli and Prince of Essling." Massena needed no exhortation to attack the English when once they should cross his path; but he perceived with grief Napoleon's illusions respecting the strength of the two armies, and had a vague presentiment that he would be the first victim of these illusions, from which no one was entirely free but the British general.

Whilst resigning himself to entire obedience, Marshal Massena wrote again to Napoleon, to assure him that his forces were insufficient, that the roads were dreadful, that he could procure no provisions, that all his communications would be almost immediately intercepted, that it was scarcely possible to keep up any communication between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, that he could receive nothing, that it was a great problem how his soldiers would find subsistence when in the presence of the English army, provided with every necessary, and very much increased in numbers, and that he had no chance of success

unless a considerable body of troops were despatched to follow in his rear with provisions and munitions of war.

But Napoleon, notwithstanding the letters which he received, still persisted, for he had been long since accustomed to hear his generals exaggerate the resources of the enemy, and diminish their own. He considered the English army, moreover, as amounting only to the number of those troops which were actually English, for he held the Spanish and Portuguese troops in no account. He was ignorant of the lines of Torres Vedras, knew not what auxiliaries the enemy would find in the remoteness of the country, its climate, and the sterility of certain portions of it, and had contracted a habit of believing that everything would be accomplished just as he desired.

Massena therefore determined to set out, and fixed on the 10th of September for the passage of the frontier; he adjourned it to the 16th, that he might be better prepared, and that the heat of the weather, which was still very great, might be somewhat diminished. When the moment of departure arrived, he found that he was only able to store four months' provisions in the two fortresses; that he must renounce his plan of forming magazines in the rear of the army; and that he had been able to procure no more than sixteen days' rations for his troops. But the army, in spite of the ill-humour of certain of its leaders, was rejoiced that the moment was at hand when it would arise from its long inaction, and at length attack the English. The infantry, badly clothed, but well shod and well armed, ripe both in age and experience, was full of confidence. The dragoons, blackened by exposure to the sun, and thorough adepts in horsemanship, were armed with long Toledo sabres, which gave mortal wounds at every stroke. If it were ever possible for valour to overcome the force of circumstances, this army was worthy of making the attempt. Had its generals acted together with good-will, they would have been equal to the accomplishment of such a task, and at the head of such troops would probably have accomplished it.

On the morning of the 16th of September Massena set his army in motion. It debouched in three columns across the frontier of Portugal. The first steps taken in this terrible country justified all previous fears. The troops had expected to find it barren, but they also found it devastated by fire and sword. Everywhere the villages were deserted, the mills idle; what the inhabitants had left undestroyed had been destroyed by the English. Not a single available guide could be found; a few old persons alone being met with, from whom but little information could be obtained; and it was only by means of three or four Portuguese officers attached to the army that it

was able to make its way along roads scarcely fit for the passage of the roughest vehicles.

On the 19th the army arrived at Viseu, a little town of seven or eight thousand souls. The whole population had fled, with the exception only of some few whose decrepitude had detained them. But although the English had destroyed the bakehouses, the mills, and the granaries, and burnt the stacks of corn, the troops were able to obtain here a good supply of vegetables and even cattle.

The artillery and the transport corps were the most distressed portions of the army. The roads were almost impassable, and three days' marching had sufficed to exhaust the horses and to cause great damage to the gun-carriages. On this account Marshal Massena, who, anxious as he was to come up with the English, preferred to encounter them in a more open country, granted to the army two days' repose, to rally the troops which guarded the baggage train, and to repair the artillery carriages.

On arriving at the bottom of the valley of the Mondego, it became evident that the English would there attempt to resist us, for both on the one side of the river and the other they held equally strong positions. Reynier and Ney considered, however, and very rightly, that they had not established themselves as yet very firmly on the ground, and that they ought to be immediately attacked before they had time to do so. But Massena was not, unfortunately, upon the spot. Delayed either by fatigue, to which he had begun to be very sensible, or by exertions to bring up the rear of the army, encumbered with an embarrassing waggon train, he did not arrive until the evening. His lieutenants, not having dared to engage in a general action in his absence, had awaited his arrival.

Marshal Massena, after having inspected the position of the enemy, was of opinion, as were his lieutenants, that the English intended to offer battle upon that ground. The nature of the country in advance rendered it necessary either to carry the position or to retreat. Opinions were divided as to the proper course to pursue. Marshal Ney, who had at first considered that an engagement would be the most advisable step, now held the contrary opinion, saying that it was now too late, since the English had had time to establish themselves in their position, and it would be better to retreat than to lose a battle, and to have to retreat amidst such frightful gorges before a victorious enemy.

Massena indignantly rejected the idea of retreating, which was an easy one for Marshal Ney, since the responsibility of a retrograde movement would not fall on himself; he declared such counsel unworthy of a marshal, and maintained that it was necessary to give battle. Reynier, ordinarily very cautious,

held an opinion on this occasion contrary to his character, as Ney's was contrary to his, and supported the advice of Marshal Massena. He affirmed that, having well examined the position, he thought that he could take it. Massena took his advice, and it was resolved that the battle should take place the next day. It was arranged that Reynier should endeavour at a very early hour to advance by the road on the left, named San Antonio, whilst Ney should advance by that on the right, named Moria; that Junot, who arrived late in the evening, should remain in reserve to protect the retreat, if the attack should not succeed; and that Montbrun, with all his cavalry, should hold himself in readiness at the foot of the heights to sabre the English should they attempt to descend; and that the artillery should be placed on the various elevations from which it could throw its shot against the enemy. Massena himself was to remain between the two attacking columns to give such orders as the events of the day might render necessary.

The French generals were not deceived in supposing that Lord Wellington intended to give battle on those heights. The English general, in fact, although very cautious, was unwilling to enter his lines as a fugitive, had resolved as soon as he should come to a strong position to give battle on the defensive, by which he hoped to render his retreat freer from molestation, and to raise the spirits of his troops for the defence of the lines of Torres Vedras, and by which, should its result be entirely advantageous, he would be spared the necessity of retreating upon Lisbon. Having formed this plan, he judged that the Sierra Murcelha and the Sierra Alcoba presented, either of them, such a position as he desired. Being ignorant which of the two the French would attempt to carry, he had posted on the Sierra Murcelha General Hill's division, and had established himself with the bulk of his army on that of Alcoba. On perceiving the direction taken by the French army, he had ordered General Hill's division to join him.

On the evening of the 26th the Anglo-Portuguese army was therefore assembled in its whole strength of 50,000 men on the plateau of the Sierra Alcoba. The French army consisted of nearly an equal number, and as it had found itself superior to the English on the plain, believed that its courage would compensate for the difficulties offered by the ground it was about to attack.

At daybreak on the 27th the corps of Reynier and Ney were formed, the one in front of San Antonio, the other in front of Moira, ready to climb the sierra; the artillery took up a position on some heights in the face of the enemy; the cavalry were drawn up on the plain, ready to cover the army should it be repulsed.

At daybreak Reynier commenced the engagement. The division Merle led the way, followed by the brigade Foy and the division Heudelet. A thick mist covered the advance of our columns. After following for some time the route de San Antonio de Cantaro, the division Merle diverged to the right of this route, and commenced ascending the mountain through the trees and thickets by which it was covered, whilst the brigade Foy and the division Heudelet continued to march along the route. After an hour's toil the division Merle, protected for some time by the mist, arrived at the summit, exhausted with fatigue, and immediately on its arrival at the edge of the plateau threw itself upon the 8th Portuguese, which it routed, gaining possession of its artillery. But Picton's whole division was there supported on one side by Leith's division, and on the other by a strong battery and by Spencer's division. Scarcely had the division Merle attempted to deploy than it received in flank the fire from the artillery on its right, and in front the fire of the musketry of Picton's division, distant only fifteen paces. A great number of officers fell before this terrible fire, and General Picton, perceiving its success, charged with the bayonet our troops, who were taken by surprise, exhausted by their painful ascent, and deprived of almost all their commanders. They were compelled to retreat to the edge of the plateau. At the same moment the division Heudelet, preceding Foy's brigade, debouched by the route on the left of Merle's division, and hastened to support it. But assailed, before it had time to form, by grape and musketry, and deprived of its colonel, Desmeuniers, it fell back. At length Foy's brigade appeared upon the plateau, having on its right and left the regiments of Merle's division, which had been re-formed by General Sarrut. But at the same moment Lord Wellington, having directed Leith's division against our left, and Spencer's division against our right, with all his reserves of artillery, fought with 15,000 men, perfectly fresh and established in a firm position, against our 7000 or 8000 soldiers, who were thoroughly exhausted and entirely unprovided with artillery. After having torn our ranks with grape, Lord Wellington ordered the entire mass of his infantry to charge them with the bayonet. Our troops were compelled to retreat, carrying in their arms many of their generals killed or wounded.

In the meantime Ney had, on his side, met with difficulties no less serious; for towards our right the sierra forming a curve to rejoin that of Caramula, it was impossible to climb it without being exposed to a terrible convergence of the enemy's fire. The division Loison marched first, followed at some distance by the division Marchand, in close column. A third division, that of General Mermet, was held in reserve.

After a brisk conflict of sharpshooters, in which we had the advantage of skill but not of position, Marshal Ney threw his troops upon the position. Loison quitted the road, with his two brigades, and endeavoured to escalate the flank of the sierra, whilst Marchand continued to follow the road. With the utmost firmness and courage two brigades, those of Simon and Ferrey, succeeded, in spite of the murderous fire of the Portuguese, in reaching the summit of the mountain; when suddenly General Crawford's artillery overwhelmed them with grape, and they were at the same moment charged with the bayonet, before they had time to form, and were forced to retreat. At this moment the division Marchand, arriving at the point where the division Loison had turned off from the road, found itself in the midst of a semicircle of fire pouring upon it from all the heights, and in a position from which it could neither advance nor retreat.

In this posture of affairs Massena, who, had he commanded but a simple division, would have probably renewed the attack, and possibly have triumphed over every obstacle by means of his unequalled judgment, considered in his character of general-in-chief that 4500 men were sufficient to lose in an unsuccessful attack, and without despairing of dislodging the English, he resolved to make the attempt in a different manner. He assembled around him his lieutenants, and without addressing to them any reproaches, listened to them with that imperturbable sang-froid which never failed him in moments of difficulty. He made no attempt to excuse the result of the day by accusing his lieutenants, but contenting himself with repelling indignantly the idea of a retrograde movement, ordered them to rally their troops at the foot of the sierra, to bring in their wounded, and hold themselves in readiness to march, and then retired to determine upon his next movements.

Considering it very unlikely that the English would descend from the heights to the plain, and convinced in his own mind, notwithstanding the information which he had received to the contrary, that there was some outlet towards the right, he sent General Montbrun and Colonel Sainte-Croix, an officer of distinguished merit, to employ the night, taking with them a party of dragoons, in searching for it. Having adopted this course of proceeding, he awaited patiently the result of the investigations he had ordered.

At noon, on the day after the battle, the 28th of September, Massena was informed by General Montbrun and Colonel Sainte-Croix that they had discovered amidst the sinuosities of the hills which united the two sierras a road which extended into the plain of Coimbra, and joined the highroad of Coimbra near a place called Sardao. The English had

remained stationary, and seemed as paralysed as though they had not been victorious. Massena, without loss of time, ordered Junot to march off in silence in the evening along the road which had been discovered, and to take possession of the plain beyond. He arranged that Ney should follow Junot, that the baggage train, now loaded with 3000 wounded, but lightened of the provisions which had been consumed, should follow Ney, and that Reynier's corps should form the rear.

It was not until the evening of the 29th that the English general perceived the movement of the French army. He had remained during two days without moving from his position, or endeavouring to discover the enemy's movements by means of well-directed reconnaissances. He only discovered what they had been when the helmets of the French dragoons filled the plain of Coimbra with their glitter. Victorious on the 27th, he was in a manner vanquished on the 29th, and whilst Coimbra was illuminated for the pretended victory of Busaco, he passed through it in all haste, forcing the inhabitants to quit it, and destroy what they did not carry away.

Such was, under Marshal Massena, this first encounter between the French and English armies; with respect to which, it may be observed, that if Marshal Massena failed to obtain on the day of the battle the result which he desired, he obtained it on the following day; and that it was a grave error on the part of the English general not to have perceived from the aspect of the country and the position of the villages that some communication must exist between the valley of Mondego and the plain of Coimbra by the depressed portion of the Alcoba and Caramula sierras.

When the French entered Coimbra, they found the greater part of the population fled, and all the wealthy inhabitants embarked with their most precious possessions on board vessels which left their moorings to descend the Mondego to the sea.

In marching from the north to the south towards Lisbon, along that depressed chain which is the prolongation of the Estrella, as the Estrella is itself the prolongation of the Guadarrama, and which, becoming continually more depressed, ends at last between the sea and the mouth of the Tagus, there are three routes which may be followed: the route of the Tagus, which is reached by traversing the chain of the heights between Pombal and Thomar, and following the river from Abrantes to Santarem, from Santarem to Lisbon; the middle route, running almost from the crest of the heights by Pombal, Leyria, Moliano, Candieros, and descending thus upon the bank of the Tagus, by Alcoentra and Alenquer; and lastly, the route on the sea-coast, which passes by Alcobaca, Obidos, and Torres Vedras. Having arrived at Pombal, the English general sent General

Hill with his division towards Thomar, directing him not to lose an instant in reaching the Tagus, whilst he himself with the bulk of his army took the two other routes, making all possible haste to escape from the energetic pursuit of our advanced guard.

Montbrun and the brave Sainte-Croix were on the track of the English, and Massena, uncertain of the direction taken by the British troops, since he perceived their traces on all the three routes, chose the middle road, which was the shortest, by no means the worst, and which, even if wrongly chosen, would lead but a comparatively short distance from the enemy.

On the 9th the advanced guard reached Alenquer, took some prisoners, and killed as many more. On the next day it entered Villa Nova, which it found well furnished with all sorts of provisions, and pursued even to the heights of Alhandra the rear-guards of the divisions of Generals Crawford and Hill, which disappeared behind entrenchments of formidable aspect.

On the 11th the various divisions of the army reassembled, and took up a position in front of Alhandra and Sobral. On every side the heights were seen to be crowned with redoubts. Our generals had heard en route that the English had thrown up some works in front of Lisbon, but they were ignorant of their nature, and far from supposing that they would be capable of opposing any considerable resistance to our attack; and it was a painful surprise for our army, which had arrived full of ardour and confidence, by no means dispirited by the affair of Busaco, but convinced, on the contrary, of its superiority over the English, to find the enemy which it pursued suddenly escaping, and enclosing itself within so formidable an asylum; but it was still far from losing its confidence, and only saw in this obstacle a difficulty over which it would speedily triumph by its courage; but the obstacle thus so lightly esteemed presented more serious difficulties than were yet imagined.

We may here give some account of these famous lines of Torres Vedras, of which we have above mentioned the object, the site, and the name. As has already been said, it was towards the month of October, in the preceding year, that Lord Wellington had taken care to secure for his army, in the extremity of the Peninsula, an entrenched position, almost impregnable, in which he might be able to resist the attack of the accumulated French forces, and assist that decay of the imperial system which, according to him, was at hand. The promontory formed by the depressed extremity of the Estrella, extending between the ocean and the waters of the Tagus, seemed to him to be the site best suited for his purpose. In the first place, the various lines of works by which he intended to isolate this promontory being some leagues in front of Lisbon, he would be entirely

independent of its numerous and fickle population. Lord Wellington, habituated to the institutions of his country, which he was wise enough to love, although he often suffered from them, detested those popular agitations which attended the first appearance of liberty on the continent. A man of strong understanding, sternly advancing towards his object, and never hesitating to immolate to the success of his plans the people whose independence he had come to defend, he wished to be entirely independent of the population of Lisbon, so as to be relieved even from the anxiety of providing for their support. The following is the plan of the works which he had thrown up.

At nine or ten leagues in advance of Lisbon, between Alhandra on the Tagus, and Torres Vedras towards the ocean, he had taken care to create a first line of entrenchments, which would cut off the promontory at a dozen leagues at least from its extremity in the sea. This first line was composed of the following works. On the bend of the Tagus, the heights of the Alhandra, on one side, falling perpendicularly to the river, and on the other, rising even towards Sobral, formed over a space of four or five leagues escarpments that were almost inaccessible, and washed in all their extent by the little river Arruda. The road which passes between the foot of these heights and the Tagus, and which leads to Lisbon by the bank of the river, was cut off by lines of cannon. Ascending from this point as far as Sobral, the English had artificially escarped all the hills which were not naturally inaccessible. In the hollows formed by the bed of the ravines and presenting little accessible hills, they established such redoubts and abattis as entirely closed the passages. Finally, they had raised on the principal summits forts armed with heavy artillery, crossing fire with each other, and commanding from afar all the avenues by which an enemy could approach. At Sobral itself, a platform which had little natural strength was covered with a multitude of works of the greatest strength, and on an eminence called Monte Agraça had been constructed a veritable citadel which could only be taken by means of a regular siege. Beyond these extended a new chain of heights which stretched as far as the sea, and were washed by the Zizambro. This little river passed Torres Vedras in its windings, whence the immortal lines of Torres Vedras have received their name. There, as on the side of Alhandra, the heights had been escarped, the gorges closed by abattis and redoubts, the summits crowned by forts; and the course of the Zizambro was, moreover, rendered almost impracticable by the construction in its bed of barricades which retained the water, and would preserve the marshes along its banks through every change of season.

The well-stored arsenal of Lisbon had been emptied to supply these various works with artillery, and all the oxen of the country employed in carrying the guns to their appointed positions. The garrisons were permanent, and those of some of the works amounted to 1000 men. Large and easy roads had been provided between the various positions, that reinforcements might be conducted to any of them with extreme rapidity. A system of signals, borrowed from the navy, rendered easy the transmission to the centre of the line of precise information of all that might be taking place at its extremities. At its very entrance, that is to say, *vis-a-vis* with Sobral, was a sort of battlefield, which had been prepared that the English army might be able to advance in its entirety upon the weakest point, and add its defence to the thousandfold fire of the surrounding works. The fortifications were, of course, garrisoned by Portuguese, there being amongst them 3000 Portuguese artillerymen, who had had considerable training and were well skilled. The English army, with the better part of the Portuguese troops, was destined to occupy the principal encampments, which had been skilfully disposed near the most probable points of attack.

General Hill had retired along the bank of the Tagus, and taken up a position behind the heights of Alhandra; General Crawford was established with his light division between Alhandra and the plateau opposite Sobral; General Picton, who had followed the road on the coast, occupied the banks of the Zizambro, and the heights behind it, as far as Torres Vedras; General Leith guarded the entrance of this immense entrenched camp, supported by the divisions of Spencer, Cole, and Campbell.

Lord Wellington having ordered the Marquis de la Romana to leave Badajoz, the defence of which was of less consequence than that of Torres Vedras, and to join him at Lisbon, had brought about 8000 Spaniards, who were excellently fitted for that system of defence which it was intended to commit to their charge. The English general had therefore 30,000 English, over 30,000 Portuguese, and 8000 Spaniards, with whom to defend the position in which he had established himself.

Three or four leagues behind the first line of works was a second, and behind this second a third, which consisted of a semi-circle of heights, escarped and bristling with cannon, inaccessible on the side of the land, and affording by its concavity turned towards the sea a position in which the whole English fleet might lie in safety. In the case of the two first lines of defence having been carried, this last might have been held sufficiently long to have enabled the troops to embark and escape from a victorious enemy.

The works which we have described were on the right of the

Tagus. A few had been executed on the left, but they were of slight importance in spite of the urgent remonstrances of the Portuguese regency; for it caused Lord Wellington but little solicitude that from the left bank Lisbon could be bombarded and destroyed. It had been proposed to construct upon this left bank an entrenched camp, to be defended by the populations of Alentejo; but Lord Wellington regarded them as incapable of defending themselves, and feared that the capture of that camp, which he could not doubt would take place, would have a depressing effect on the defenders of the lines of Torres Vedras.

Lord Wellington, on being consulted by the English government respecting his position, at the very moment when he took up his position behind the lines, and respecting the possibility of withdrawing the transport flotilla, which cost the country more than 75,000,000 a year, replied that he considered himself in perfect security, but that it would be more prudent not to withdraw the flotilla, as the French army might be largely reinforced, and that should he be attacked by such soldiers under the leadership of Massena he could not be certain of the result.

Such was the unexpected obstacle by which Massena found the progress of his army checked; and which, as soon as he had made the proper arrangements for the encampment of his army, he reconnoitred during several days with his own eyes. All the information that he could obtain was unanimously to the effect that after this first line of entrenchments there were a second and a third, the three being armed with 700 pieces of cannon, and defended by 70,000 regular troops at the least, without taking into account the militia and fugitive peasants. It was not therefore a simple entrenched camp, to be carried by a bold assault, but a series of natural obstacles, the difficulties of which had been extraordinarily increased by art; and whilst the English, moreover, by means of the roads which they had constructed and the system of signals they had established, were enabled to throw the entire mass of their forces on any one point, the French met, on their side, with an accidental formation of the ground which would preclude them from any manœuvre of this kind.

Everything being taken into consideration, it appeared impossible, at least for the moment, to attack the position. Massena perceived that it was by no means probable that an assault would be successful, and that a repulse must be attended with certain loss. He was far from having now the 50,000 men with which he had entered Portugal; indeed, his army did not number more than 45,000 effective combatants. To take the lines would have required 90,000 or 100,000 men, and had Massena attacked them with his 45,000 he would have uselessly sacrificed 10,000 in dead and wounded, and have been compelled to retreat before an enemy emboldened by success, through the midst of infuriated

populations and a desolated country. It is probable that he would not have regained Almeida without the loss of his whole army, and his campaign would have ended in utter disaster.

Massena could not hesitate, therefore, to renounce any immediate attack on the lines of Torres Vedras. But it did not follow because the attack was not immediate that it would not nevertheless take place; and it was, moreover, very possible that the immense population of Lisbon becoming, in the course of time, subdued by famine, would open to our troops the gates of the city on the left bank of the Tagus, whereupon the lines of Torres Vedras would, as a necessary consequence, speedily fall into our hands. Favourable chances would therefore be open to us by our remaining in front of the English lines; but it was necessary that whilst we strove to famish others we should provide for our own subsistence, and for this purpose it was indispensable that we should occupy both banks of the Tagus, in order to withhold from the enemy, whilst we procured them for ourselves, all the resources of the fertile province of Alentejo.

After a series of skilful and energetic manœuvres, which had for their aim the subsistence of his troops, and the preparations of means for enabling them to cross the Tagus either above or below Abrantes, Massena fell back some leagues and established himself along the Tagus, from Santarem to Thomar, with a division at Leyria to watch the Estrella, and to guard the great road of Coimbra. This new position between Santarem and Thomar was calculated, by placing us at some leagues distance from the English lines, to afford us greater ease and security, whilst it by no means diminished our power to blockade them rigorously, at least on the right bank of the Tagus. We were thus relieved from the fatigue of having to engage in perpetual small skirmishes, and the distance between us prevented any serious attack from the enemy in the nature of a surprise.

On the 14th of November the change to the new encampment was speedily and skilfully accomplished. Reynier's division was established on the heights of Santarem; and Junot's encamped in the centre of the plain of Galgao, at Torres Novas. Ney established his headquarters at Thomar, having his divisions so arranged as to cover the timber-yards of Punhete, to threaten Abrantes, and to be able to throw himself upon Leyria by a movement from left to right, should Wellington endeavour to turn us.

This position was impregnable, and at the same time adapted to the various objects Massena had in view, and which were the passage of the Tagus, the capture of Abrantes, and the blockade of the English lines until the arrival of reinforcements. Marshal Ney, habitually discontented with the orders

which issued from headquarters, had desired that the whole should be collected between Leyria and Coimbra. He regarded the movement which had taken place as a sort of retreat, as the abandonment of the banks of the Tagus, and the renunciation of effecting a passage across it, as also of the projects against Abrantes, without procuring any additional security or any greater chances of communication with Almeida; and declared that had we, on the other hand, kept only the cavalry and a brigade of infantry at Leyria, we should have been certain of regaining the Coimbra and Almeida roads at pleasure, without the renunciation of any essential object; moreover, that by having the posts upon the Zèzere, we should have been in a position to communicate with the Spanish frontier by a route less infested with the guerilla bands.

Whilst the army awaited reinforcements which were expected by the way of Almeida, or from Andalusia by that of Badajoz, it employed itself in making the preparations necessary for the passage of the Tagus and the attack of Abrantes. In the meantime Massena had hastened to take measures for making known at Paris his position and its necessities. For this purpose he had sent to Paris an intelligent and brave officer, accompanied by a little body of troops, since it was only by being so attended that he could hope to reach the Spanish frontier. He had chosen for this mission General Foy, a man of frank, attractive manners, possessing great powers of expression, and decorated with a wound received at Busaco. To him he confided the task of detailing to Napoleon the operations of the army, from its departure from Almeida to its encampment at Santarem. Independently of the despatches with which he furnished him, he instructed him to explain everything verbally to the emperor, to urge the immediate transmission of stores and reinforcements as the means of putting a speedy termination to the war, whilst their non-arrival would be the source of the utmost disasters.

The two brilliant soldiers whom fate had now brought face to face at the extremity of Portugal could not have pursued any wiser line of conduct than that which they did in fact adopt; the one could not have desired any better means for the defence of that extremity of Portugal which alone remained to him of the Peninsula, and the other made those preparations for attacking his position which were the best possible. On this extreme promontory rested the fate of the nations of Europe, for had the English been once expelled from Portugal, the universal tendency of affairs throughout Europe would have been towards peace, and on the other hand, were they once firmly established in this country, and Massena compelled to retreat, the fortunes of the empire would begin to succumb

to those of Great Britain, as the first, perhaps, towards some immediate catastrophe. The crisis was therefore of the most serious nature, but its event depended less on the two generals charged with its decision than on the two governments whose duty it was to supply them with the means of doing so; the one of these countries being agitated by the spirit of party, and the other governed by a master whom prosperity had blinded.

Marshal Massena's position was sufficiently serious, but that of Lord Wellington, on the other hand, was not without its own embarrassments; whilst the French general considered it difficult to carry the lines of Torres Vedras, the English general considered that it would be difficult to defend them, if the French took the course naturally pointed out by the nature of attending circumstances. For Lord Wellington was threatened by two dangers: the first being the possible concentration of the French forces towards Lisbon to overwhelm him; and the second, that the English government, divided in its counsels, as every free government must be, on the consideration of an important question, should recall him from Portugal, or take those measures which would render his longer stay there impossible. These two dangers, each of them alike serious, although they were not alike probable, presented themselves so forcibly to the mind of the English general as to seriously disquiet it, steadfast as it was.

He had sufficient reason to dread the concentration of the French forces in front of Lisbon; there were many reports respecting the arrival of the famous divisions of Essling, and there was yet a more serious cause for apprehension in the withdrawal towards Lisbon of the French troops in Andalusia, which, either partially or in mass, could join Marshal Massena's army by the left bank of the Tagus, thus securing to him the possession of both banks, and enabling him to attack the lines of Torres Vedras with formidable forces. This was the principal source of anxiety to the English general, and he entreated the Spanish regency to give the French all the occupation possible before Cadiz, to destroy the bridges of the Guadiana, and to render Elvas, Campo Mayo, and Badajoz fortresses of such importance that they would not dare to neglect them to pass on to the siege of Lisbon. He was also anxious to devastate the province of Alentejo, that the French, should they invade it, might find it impossible to find subsistence there. But the Portuguese regency refused to comply with this demand, saying, with some bitterness, that it would be better to combat the French with arms than famine, and better to deliver Portugal than to ruin it.

But the English general was not to be moved from his resolution of risking no battle with the French, although the difficulty

of procuring subsistence for his troops rendered persistence in his plan a matter of considerable difficulty. In the meantime there was considerable murmuring in the English army, notwithstanding its high state of discipline and esteem for its general, at the hardships it endured and its state of inactivity. Many officers sent home letters full of bitter complaints, which contributed to increase the anxiety which prevailed throughout England respecting the fate of the British army.

In London few persons, even amidst the members of the government, believed in the possibility of maintaining a footing in Portugal; and an unfortunate event which took place in England at this time increased the difficulties which had previously attended the position of the ministry, and consequently aggravated those which surrounded Lord Wellington himself.

The English monarch George III. suffered a relapse in his health, and was a second time subject to mental alienation. It was at first hoped that the attack might be but temporary, and a month was permitted to elapse before the proposal to parliament of those measures which such a defect in the royal authority demanded. Both the parliament and the public concurred in this course on account of their respect for George III., and their estrangement from the Prince of Wales, on whom the royal authority would devolve in the character of regent. After having waited, however, as long as possible, it was at length necessary to address parliament, and to ask it to bestow the regency on the Prince of Wales. The prince was the friend of all the heads of the opposition, and no doubt was entertained that he would bestow on them the ministerial offices. Mr. Pitt's party, therefore, which was the war party, made every endeavour to restrict the powers of the regent, whilst the opposition made every endeavour to extend them. In accordance with that species of inconsistency which is frequently to be met with amidst political parties, it was the opposition which professed the most monarchical sentiments, and the government which maintained those which were least so. The opposition maintained that no law could be passed, since that concurrence of the three powers of the State which was necessary to the passing of a law was here impossible; and that therefore the houses of parliament should request the Prince of Wales to assume the royal authority, which accrued to him as of right during the incapacity of his august father, in all that entirety which was necessary for the preservation of the balance of the powers of the constitution. The ministry maintained, on the other hand, that the royal sanction could be supplied by an order of parliament directing the keepers of the royal seal to affix it to the bill; and that the authority of the regent, which would be, it was hoped, but temporary, should not be as com-

plete as though it were permanent; and that it would be inconvenient to give him the power of so far altering the state of affairs that the king on regaining his health would find it impossible to resume the policy of his reign. The majority decided on bestowing by bill the regency on the Prince of Wales, with certain limitations. It was expected that the regent would nominate to the offices of his ministry Lord Holland, Lord Grey, and Lord Grenville, all of Mr. Fox's party. But although he was personally averse to the existing ministers, especially Mr. Percival, he feared to effect so considerable a change, and one which would have involved the exchange of a war policy for that of peace. He wished to know, before taking any decided measures, whether the king's illness would be of sufficient duration to enable him to effect any important change in the State policy. With this view he had consulted the medical men, and imparted his doubts to Lords Holland, Grey, and Grenville.

This crisis in the domestic affairs in England took place in December 1810, at the very time when Marshal Massena and Lord Wellington were encamped opposite each other at the lines of Torres Vedras. The opposition, perceiving that even a partial success would decide the prince regent, redoubled its attacks on the cabinet; taking advantage not only of the incessant anxieties of the war, and the enormous expenses resulting from it, but also of the sufferings arising from a serious and extraordinary commercial crisis, which was the result of the measures taken by Napoleon, and certain peculiar circumstances. The Spanish colonies having refused to recognise the authority of Joseph, and taken advantage of the occasion to declare themselves independent, had opened their ports to British commerce. On receiving information of this the English manufacturers, with that blindness which is equally the attendant of avarice and ambition, had manufactured quantities of goods which far exceeded what all the Americans could either consume or pay for. They had sent immense quantities of merchandise to the Spanish colonies, and a part of this merchandise had returned unsold. That which had found purchasers had been paid for in colonial produce, which had added to the already encumbered state of the London warehouses. In fact, the amount of unsold, exotic produce had grown to that extent that many cargoes of sugar, coffee, cotton, tobacco, wood, and indigo were not of sufficient value to defray the expense of warehousing; the bills drawn on their value were for the most part protested; and the necessary consequence was that the exchange on England suffered a still further depreciation.

It may be easily imagined how eagerly the opposition would avail itself of these circumstances. "See!" cried they, "how

contrary to all reason this prolonged war has been conducted. By attempting to humiliate France we have urged it on to still increasing greatness and dominion over Europe, and given into her hands a part of Germany, together with Italy, Spain, and Holland. If we continue to act as we have hitherto acted, who can tell what will be the limit to her power? Our revenue," they added, "amounts to 37 millions sterling, and we expend yearly 56; a state of things which necessitates an annual loan of 19 millions. It is impossible to borrow such a sum every year without incurring actual ruin, and in the meantime the weight both of our direct and indirect taxation has reached its utmost limit. Besides this, the continually increasing mass of paper money will speedily render it equally impossible for us to carry on either commerce or war. Let us then put an end to this disastrous war by an honourable peace. The victories in which we rejoice are but decoys, and however well the British army may be manœuvred, its situation fills all patriots with alarm. Whilst we reward and decorate its generals, it suffers us to lose the important fortresses Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida; and after having on one day repulsed the enemy at Busaco, it permits him to seize on the next Coimbra and the rest of Portugal. Confined now to a tongue of land where its only source of maintenance can be what it receives by sea, and where it is exposed to an attack from the French, who will be very ill advised if they do not assemble the whole of their forces to overwhelm it, it exists but by a miracle, and may at any moment fall beneath some catastrophe. What will become of England if this army, in which lies our only hope against invasion, at length succumbs, or signs some capitulation which shall constitute its troops prisoners of war? What political advantages, what territorial acquisitions, can be placed in the balance with such risk?" Such was the language constantly in the mouths of the opposition; and the temper of the nation was such, that any day some unexpected vote might induce the prince regent to change his ministers, and to substitute a peace policy for that of war.

The ministry, trembling beneath the pressure of the nation's fears, continually sent to Lord Wellington despatches breathing apprehension in every line, and also filled with complaints of the excessive expenses of the war. These despatches were received by the English general with an intense scorn, to which, however, he gave but partial expression, complaining that his experience of two years' warfare, face to face with the French, in the Peninsula, should not have inspired more confidence; and declaring that on the appearance of any serious danger he would not hesitate to retreat rather than compromise the British army and his own glory.

Such were the difficulties thrown in the path of a firm and able general by a free country, amidst whose people the longing for peace, and the desire for the continuance of the war, were almost equal and were continually opposed. It might have been expected that Marshal Massena, on the other hand, having only to do with a man of genius, with Napoleon himself, would have readily obtained every kind of assistance necessary to enable him to solve that military problem, in the solution of which was involved the destiny of the world. In the course of the following book we shall perceive how far this was really the case.

General Foy, sent from Santarem to make known at Paris the requirements of the general commanding-in-chief, and to reply by word of mouth to all the emperor's questions, performed his perilous journey at the most favourable moment. Accompanied by four hundred picked men, he set off by the route which lies along the valley of Zezère, and after a journey of six or seven days passed amidst dangers of all kinds, arrived in safety at Ciudad Rodrigo.

General Foy continued his journey through Old Castille, now desolated by the guerillas, whose boldness increased every day, and found the Spaniards as full of confidence as the French were discouraged at the length to which the war was protracted, in spite of the numerous reinforcements which had arrived, and at finding the only result of the Andalusian expedition to have been the capture of Seville, whilst the only fruit of the campaign of Portugal had been a march to the Tagus. He found that General Drouet had but one of his two divisions at Burgos, and was awaiting the second; and that General Dorsenne had the greatest difficulty with fifteen or eighteen thousand men in protecting the road from Burgos to Valladolid. He urged General Drouet to proceed towards Coimbra and Thomar, and then continued on his road to Paris, which he reached towards the latter end of November, about twenty days after his departure from the banks of the Tagus. Immediately after his arrival he obtained an audience of the emperor.

BOOK XL.

FUENTÈS D'ONORO.

GENERAL FOY, since so celebrated as an orator, united to great bravery an exalted mind and brilliant but too often ill-regulated imagination, which shone in lines of fire from his strongly marked and open countenance. The general and Napoleon were mutually charmed. The information thus received was the only news which had been received of the army of Portugal; those interested having hitherto been reduced to search for it in the English journals. General Foy found Napoleon perfectly convinced of the question which was about to be decided on the Tagus, for no one had so thorough a comprehension of the general situation, and he was persuaded that to vanquish the English, or even to hold them in check for some time before Lisbon, was the surest means of obtaining peace for Europe. But General Foy found him still full of illusions respecting the circumstances of the Peninsular war, and still unjust towards Massena, whom he preferred to blame for not having performed the impossible to blaming himself for having ordered it; and still persisting in considering the French army as consisting of 70,000 men, and the English of only 24,000. After having incessantly ordered engagements with the enemy, he now blamed the attack at Busaco; and he who had desired that the English should be thrust into the sea now complained that a halt had not been made at Coimbra. And the difficulty was not how to convince him of his error on these points, so much as how to persuade him to admit the truths which were opposed to his calculations.

General Foy maintained that those movements which had been condemned had been forced on Massena by circumstances; that the attack of Busaco was necessary to the honour of the French arms, and had not an altogether unfavourable result; that to have halted at Coimbra would have been a most calamitous confession of weakness; and that all would still be well if, in accordance with the lessons of past experience, the means employed were henceforward in proportion to the end in view. Napoleon did not take leave of the general without learning to a great extent what was the true state of

affairs, and being well aware what steps it was necessary to take.

Having now become acquainted with Massena's true position, he resolved to send in his direction all the disposable troops of Old Castille, and he prepared the most formal orders for the generals to concur in the conveyance of troops in the direction of Portugal. The moment was a suitable one for the sacrifice of secondary objects to the grand one of succouring Massena, had not Napoleon unfortunately, during the progress in the Peninsula of the events above related, given serious provocation in the north, and excited a serious crisis of affairs by that exorbitant ambition which tyrannised over him as he tyrannised over Europe.

We have seen how, on the termination of the campaign of Wagram, he desired to render Austria his sincere ally, to appease Germany, to distribute all the territories which yet remained in his hands, in order to be able to evacuate the countries beyond the Rhine, to devote his whole attention to the prosecution of the Spanish war, and to force England to make peace by the twofold means of the continental blockade, and the infliction of a great reverse on the army of Lord Wellington; and how, notwithstanding these pacific intentions, he had, for the purpose of rendering more effectual the continental blockade, annexed Holland to the empire, extended his military posts upon the coasts of the North Sea as far as the frontier of Holstein, devised a vast scheme of taxation of colonial merchandise, which was a source of great gain to him and his allies, but extremely vexatious to the various populations, and had ordered some governments, and recommended others, to adopt its almost intolerable provisions. Already, as was inevitable, this policy, of which peace was the aim, but the instruments of which were military occupations, usurpations of territory, violent confiscations, and ruinous exactions, had aroused all that distrust which Napoleon had desired to dissipate. To convert, indeed, into French departments, not only Rome, Florence, Le Valais, but also Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Groningen, was not the best method of reassuring those who believed that it was Napoleon's intention to subject the whole continent to his rule. Nor had Napoleon stopped at this point; for he had already entertained the idea that the extension of the territory of the empire, which was already carried as far as the Ems by the annexation of Holland, to the Weser and the Elbe by the annexation of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck, would be exceedingly advantageous; since he would thus envelop in the vast extent of his coasts those seas from whose bosom Great Britain rose. What difficulties opposed the execution of this design? The Hanse towns were in his

power; Hanover, of which it would be necessary to take a certain portion, belonged to his brother Jerome; and the possessions of certain German princes which the fulfilment of this plan would absorb were as much at his disposal as those of any French subject. The Prince of Oldenburg, uncle to the Emperor of Russia, might be compensated for his territories which lay between Friesland and Hanover, the mouths of the Ems and those of the Weser, by the grant of Erfurth, which still remained in Napoleon's hands. As for the portion which would be required of the Duchy of Berg, lately granted to the young son of Louis as a compensation for the crown of Holland, that would be a matter for family arrangement, and need be no cause for anxiety. Napoleon had no sooner entertained the idea of this plan than he hastened to put it into execution.

By a decree of the 13th December 1810 Napoleon converted into three French departments the Duchy of Oldenburg, the territory of the princes of Salm and Arenberg, a portion of Hanover, the territories of Bremen, of Hamburg, and of Lubeck, and at the same time took possession of Valais, which he converted into a French department by the name of the department of the Simplon. A simple intimation of the above facts were addressed to the dispossessed princes; the Prince of Oldenburg being informed, however, that out of regard for the Emperor of Russia he had been recompensed by the grant of the city of Erfurth. Napoleon felt strongly tempted to add to the above acquisitions the principalities of Mecklenburg, which would have given him an ample extent of coast upon the Baltic, and placed Swedish Pomerania in his power; but he dared not as yet take so extreme a step. He contented himself with demanding of the princes of Mecklenburg assistance in the execution of his plans against England, under penalty of annexing their States to the empire.

Russia, treated most cavalierly on the occasion of the Austrian marriage, offended and alarmed by the refusal to sign the convention relative to Poland, very exactly informed of the gradual augmentation of the garrison of Dantzic, and filled with consternation at beholding the French frontier successively extending over Holland, Hanover, Denmark, touching Sweden, and thus approaching Memel and Riga, was deeply offended at the informal and rude manner in which a kinsman was treated, in whose welfare it had always displayed considerable interest.

The neglect of his decrees relating to false neutrals and colonial merchandise had occasioned Napoleon to address Russia in language of considerable bitterness, and it was simply as an addition to some of these reproaches that Napoleon briefly announced at St. Petersburg the annexation of

Oldenburg to the empire, and the confiscation of Erfurth, which had been granted, he declared, out of regard for the Emperor Alexander.

These disquieting and offensive proceedings, accompanied as they were by language so little calculated to extenuate them, and following the disdainful rejection of a matrimonial alliance, which was at first eagerly sought, as well as the just but peremptory refusal of any satisfactory engagement with regard to Poland, profoundly affected the Emperor Alexander, and proved that with Napoleon there was but a short interval between estrangement and actual warfare. The Emperor Alexander was not inclined to pass over this interval quite so rapidly, having sufficient reasons to avoid, or at least to delay, a war which to avoid seemed now almost impossible. Great as was his reliance on his resources, he was by no means anxious to tempt once more the dangers he had incurred at Eylau and in Friedland. He was, moreover, the originator of the policy of forming an alliance with Napoleon, which had occasioned bitter criticisms, and it was painful to him to give his censors a triumph by so speedily deserting that policy for war. But if he were reduced to this extremity, he was anxious not to break off the alliance before it should have produced the fruits he had expected from it, and to obtain which was the only means of disarming the harsh judgments passed against him. Finland was gained, but the Danubian provinces were not, and he desired to have them in his possession before exposing himself to the terrible chances of a war with France. The campaign of 1810 against the Turks had been successful, although the progress of the Russian generals had been very slow. The Turks had not as yet, however, definitively lost the line of the Danube, and a much greater degree of success would be necessary to wring from them the great sacrifices of territory which Russia demanded, and which extended not only over Moldavia, but also Wallachia, reaching to the bed of the Old Danube, and which stretched from Rassoia to Kustendjé, besides the sovereignty of Servia, a portion of territory along the Caucasus, and the payment of the expenses of the war. To obtain such concessions as these from the Porte at least one more campaign was necessary, and that of a very prosperous nature.

The Emperor Alexander, therefore, was by no means desirous of a war with France, and was especially anxious, should it indeed be inevitable, to defer it. But there were certain sacrifices, namely, those relating to commerce, to which he was fully resolved not to submit. He was reconciled to those which had necessarily resulted from war with England, because they were the price of that alliance with France which was a necessary condition to the attainment of those two great

conquests at which he aimed—of Finland in the north, and the Danubian provinces in the south. But he was most unwilling to deprive his subjects, already deprived of all commerce with England, of the commerce which was still carried on by means of the Swedes and the Americans. He had, indeed, as a token of his strict observance of his treaties with Napoleon, established a tribunal charged with the duty of condemning those American vessels which had too manifestly not come from America, and those Swedish ones which carried in too open a manner English merchandise. But whilst he was willing that Russian commerce should be limited and cramped for a time, it was far from his intention to suffer it to be destroyed. He would yield so far as was necessary to preserve him from a rupture with France until at least the war with Turkey should have been brought to a conclusion; but he would choose war rather than suppress the commerce of his kingdom.

Fearing, however, that the greatest precautions might not suffice to prevent a quarrel with one of so obstinate a disposition as Napoleon, he resolved to take some military precautions which should be efficacious whilst entirely free from any appearance of menace. Being desirous of making no movement in the neighbourhood of the Polish frontier, which was in some sort the French frontier also, he abandoned the line of the Niemen, and selected a line of defence further back, on the Dwina and the Dnieper, rivers which, after rising at no great distance from each other, trace, as they flow, the former towards the Baltic, and the latter to the Black Sea, that which is the true defensive line of the Russian interior. Before so impetuous an opponent as Napoleon it would be necessary to place the point of resistance within the empire. Alexander, employing himself in the company of experienced men, in the consideration of military details, ordered the construction of fortifications at Riga, Duna-berg, Vitepsk, Smolensk, and above all, at Bobruisk, a place situated in the midst of the marshes bordering on the river Bérésina. In addition to these defensive works, which ought not, he maintained, to be considered as of any more threatening nature than those which Napoleon had erected at Dantzic, Modlin, and Torgau, he took some measures with respect to the organisation of his troops. There had remained in Finland since the war with Sweden a certain number of regiments belonging to the divisions ordinarily stationed in Lithuania. He replaced these regiments in Lithuania, and employed himself, moreover, in placing on a war footing all those divisions which were stationed on the frontiers of Poland, and had remained for the most part in the same cantonments since the peace of Tilsit.

Having taken these measures, Alexander was careful to adapt

his language to his policy. He resolved to enter into explanations with M. de Caulaincourt on all those subjects which Napoleon had made grounds of complaint, with great gentleness, and at the same time with that firmness which should show that he was well informed respecting the emperor's own proceedings, and that whilst he was by no means desirous of war, he would choose it in preference to making sacrifices to which he had determined never to submit.

He had displayed some coldness towards M. de Caulaincourt since the failure of the marriage negotiation, and the rejection of the convention relative to Poland, but in a manner which showed that it was directed against the French government, and not against M. de Caulaincourt himself. He knew that M. de Caulaincourt, finding his position a difficult one, had demanded and obtained his recall, and being unwilling to send away discontented a man whom he had esteemed and loved, and also being desirous of giving to his language that amicable character which was wanting to his actions, he had affected to restore the French ambassador to all that favour he had formerly enjoyed at St. Petersburg, and held with him frequent and long conversations; the emperor's own share in which generally consisted of gentle complaints that Napoleon had not acted in accordance with the spirit of the alliance with himself.

The occupation of Oldenburg, he said, insisting more especially on this point, had touched him nearly, apart from any personal feelings, on account of the deplorable effect it had produced on his court and people. As for compensation in the shape of Erfurth, its acceptance, he declared, could only cover him with ridicule; and indeed, whilst he refused that, he asked nothing else, for Napoleon had nothing to offer him but what he must first have torn from some poor, innocent German prince, and he was unwilling to place himself in a position to be accused of taking part in those violent confiscations which had so greatly disgusted during the last twenty years the moral sentiment of Europe. Of course, he continued, it was unnecessary to say that he should not declare war on account of the Duchy of Oldenburg; but he wished it to be understood that its seizure had wounded and even afflicted him, and that he earnestly hoped, whilst he neither demanded it, nor intended to do so, that some reparation would be made which would satisfy the offended dignity of the Russian nation.

Speaking of Napoleon's anger at the imperfect enforcement in Russia of those additional commercial restrictions on which he laid so much stress, the Emperor Alexander would exclaim—By what right does Napoleon demand of Russia these sacrifices? Does he demand them in the name of treaties? Russia has faithfully executed that of Tilsit. She undertook at Tilsit

to make war with England, and without expecting to derive any benefit from it for herself, she has done so, and proscribed the English flag. But are those decrees by which Napoleon has been pleased to declare denationalised all vessels that shall have touched at England obligatory upon Russia? Must an alliance between the two countries necessarily infer that they are under the government of the same sovereign? And was Russia bound blindly to adopt Napoleon's measures, when he himself had contradicted his own decrees by adopting the system of licences, by which any ship was enabled to enter the English ports, and under certain conditions, to return from them loaded with British goods? And whilst France knew not how to bear, in a cause which was her own, the privations resulting from the continental blockade, were other nations to make unexampled sacrifices for the sake of a cause which was but very indirectly their own? It is impossible justly to reproach me with having been unfaithful to the alliance. I am, on the contrary, anxious to maintain it. It has worked me both good and ill, but having once entered into it, both my dignity and my interest demand that I should continue true to it. I acknowledge that it has already gained me Finland, and will most probably be the means of my obtaining possession of Moldavia and Wallachia; but these acquisitions are far from being equal to Spain, the Roman States, Tuscany, Westphalia, Holland, and the Hanse towns. Nevertheless, without making any comparison of the advantages which it has brought to the one and the other of us, I wish that it should still exist between us, and obtain for us that peace with England which will assure to us the peaceable possession of all our acquisitions. Let us remain united in a firm bond of concord, mutually excusing necessary and inevitable actions, and carefully abstaining from dissensions which would be speedily noised abroad, to the great injury of the alliance and diminution of the chance of a general peace. For my part, I know very well what is being done at Dantzic, and I know what the Poles say; but I will take no step in that direction; if we are to direct our cannon against each other, the first shots shall come from you. In that case I will appeal to God and my people and all Europe to judge between us, and I and my whole nation would rather perish sword in hand than submit to an unjust yoke. However great may be Napoleon's genius, however valiant his soldiers, the justice of our cause, the energy of the Russian people, the immensity of the distances to be traversed, all concur to give us the most favourable chance in a war which on our side will be a defensive one.

Each time that Alexander indulged, and he very often did so, in this course of observations, he spoke with an accent of truth, and with mingled grace, gentleness, and force. He touched

and confused M. de Caulaincourt, who knew not how to reply to reasoning which was partly true and wholly plausible.

For my own part, as a sincere historian, loving my country better than anything else in the world, but unable to sacrifice truth for its sake, I must declare, that after having perused all the documents relating to the subject, my decided impression is that the Emperor Alexander was sincerely averse to war. Whilst distrust of Napoleon's character impelled him to prepare for it, he would have done anything to avoid it, for besides the great dangers with which it threatened him, it would be a condemnation of his policy, an avowal that he had committed an error in adopting the French alliance at Tilsit, and compel him to renounce Wallachia and Moldavia.

Such was the disposition of the Russian court at the time when territorial aggressions had carried the French frontier as far as Lubeck, and Napoleon put forth his new demands relative to the observance of the continental blockade. M. de Caulaincourt sent a perfectly true account of the state of affairs to Paris, and expressed his own opinion that the czar was far from being desirous of war. He was silent only because ignorant of them, respecting the military preparations which Alexander's distrust of Napoleon had induced him to make; but these had been speedily perceived and loudly announced by the Poles of the army and the Grand Duchy.

Napoleon, on learning from M. de Caulaincourt the replies made by the Emperor Alexander to his remonstrances respecting the ill observance of the continental blockade, was much displeased with the ambassador, declaring that the arguments used by him in his discussions with the Russian emperor had been extremely weak. But when he heard of the works constructed on the Dwina and the Dnieper, and the movements of the troops of Finland in Lithuania, he saw in those simple precautions of the Russian emperor both the declaration and the commencement of war. That which he demanded of Russia was not indispensable to the success of his designs, but he was accustomed to command as absolute master, and irritated at meeting with opposition on the part of a power which he had vanquished although not destroyed, he determined to give it another and a final lesson. He suddenly gave himself up to the idea that by striking one of those terrible blows in the north, which he knew so well how to strike, he should attain the solution of all his difficulties, and found himself regarding a new war with Russia as a matter fully determined on, without being at all conscious of the day or the hour when his resolution had been first formed.

This idea having once taken hold of his mind, he took the measures necessary to its realisation with incredible promptitude;

and indeed, having determined to reduce Russia to as absolute a state of submission as Prussia and Austria, he had certainly good reason to take his measures as speedily as possible, and before she was free from the war with Turkey.

The chief difficulty to be overcome in a war with Russia consisted in the enormous distances which would have to be traversed. To convey 500,000 or 600,000 men from the Rhine to the Dnieper, with an enormous pontoon equipage to provide for the passage of the rivers on the line of route, and with the extraordinary supply of food, not only for men but also for horses, which would be necessary on a march through countries which would most probably be found as completely devastated as Portugal was found devastated by Massena—was an undertaking which presented difficulties never yet surmounted by the art of warfare; for when the barbarians threw themselves on the Roman empire, or the Tartars on China and on India, barbarism invaded civilisation, and was able to find subsistence amidst its fertility; but when civilisation would invade barbarism, it has to surmount the serious difficulty of having to carry with it all the necessaries of existence.

Perceiving that the distances which would have to be traversed would offer the most serious obstacle, Napoleon determined to place his base of operations no more on the Rhine, but on the Oder or the Vistula, and even, if possible, on the Niemen, that is to say, at 300 or 400 leagues from the frontiers of France. He determined, therefore, as quietly as possible, and under false pretexts, to assemble an immense number of troops from the Rhine to the Elbe, from the Elbe to the Oder, from the Oder to the Vistula, and from the Vistula to the Niemen; and at the moment when pretexts became of no more avail, to make a rapid march from Dantzic to Königsberg, so as to place behind him and secure from the Russians the rich country of Poland and Old Prussia.

The principal point in his plan of operations was Dantzic, destined to be a vast dépôt of all the immense matériel of our troops. After Dantzic the fortresses of Thorn and Modlin on the Vistula, of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau on the Oder, and of Magdeburg on the Elbe, merited the chief attention. These places Napoleon gradually stored with troops and every kind of war matériel. In addition to these preparations he established between the Oder and the Rhine, at Hamburg, a dépôt which was as vast and secure as that of Dantzic.

Besides providing a sufficient amount of matériel for the future army of Russia, he had also to consider the means by which men were to be provided to fill its ranks. The year 1810 was the first which he had suffered to pass for a long period without the levy of a conscription. It is true that the class of

1810 had been levied in 1809, in accordance with the habit which had been contracted of taking each class a year in advance; but the eyes of the people had been spared during the whole space of that year from the afflicting spectacle of the levy, and the class of 1811 remained at the commencement of that year intact, not having been called out before its time.

Napoleon now resolved on its immediate levy. As it was unlikely that hostilities would commence before 1812, he was able to calculate among the number of the forces with which he would be able to take the field the conscription of that year also. These additions to the effective troops already stationed in various parts of Europe would enable him to have an army consisting of 300,000 French troops and 100,000 allies on the Vistula, a reserve of 100,000 French on the Elbe, and 135 battalions at dépôts, which would be employed in the interior of the empire in instructing recruits and guarding the frontiers, whilst the forces devoted to the prosecution of the Peninsular war would remain unweakened.

Napoleon did not, however, confine his attention to military measures, but also took care to make his diplomatic policy subserve his projects, especially in all that related to Turkey and Austria.

Since the conferences of Tilsit and Erfurth, all the details of which the English had related to the Porte with much exaggeration, the Turks had considered themselves as entirely given up by the French to the Russians, and entertained so violent a feeling of distrust towards us that they scarcely endured the presence of our representative at Constantinople, and only addressed him to complain of what they called our treason. Napoleon hoped, however, that when they found we were in a state of hostilities with Russia they would begin to regard us once more as friends, and be ready to listen to proposals of alliance; and he accordingly directed the French legation at Constantinople to lose no opportunity of making friendly advances to the Turks, of intimating the estrangement between France and Russia, and of making the Porte comprehend that as Russia would soon be obliged to direct her forces elsewhere than on the Danube, they ought to avoid concluding a disadvantageous peace, but rather to continue the war, forming in the meantime a firm alliance with France.

Overtures of the same nature, and in an equally cautious manner, were made to Austria. But there was less embarrassment to be encountered at Vienna than at Constantinople. Both the courts and the populations of the two kingdoms had been somewhat reconciled by the marriage. Napoleon had sent by M. de Metternich a most amicable letter to his father-in-law, and the renunciation of the most important article of the last

treaty—that which limited the Austrian army to 150,000 men. Napoleon, abandoning the Russian alliance as abruptly as he had embraced it at Tilsit, ordered M. Otto in his conferences with M. de Metternich to express a feeling of disgust towards the Russian court, and extreme regret with regard to the subject of the Danubian provinces which France had engaged to suffer to fall into the hands of Russia. In the meantime M. Otto was directed to behave towards the Russian embassy with great reserve and the utmost caution.

It was impossible that such military preparations as these, and these diplomatic manœuvres, should long remain hidden from Russia. Napoleon had nevertheless determined to dissemble the object of these proceedings as long as he possibly could, and only to avow their real meaning when it could no longer be concealed. He therefore directed his agents, in their communication with the cabinet of St. Petersburg, to say with regard to the garrison of Dantzic, that it had been rendered necessary by the direction of an immense English armament towards the Sound, and that as the troops in question were German, it was impossible that the matter could be any just cause of offence. As for the conscription, they were to say, that none having been levied in 1810, and the Spanish war absorbing a great number of men, a portion of the class of 1811 had been called out for the purposes of this war alone. When all these excuses should have been exhausted and found unavailing, M. de Caulaincourt was authorised to declare, that, in fact, it was possible that France was arming against Russia as well as England, feeling some natural distrust of the former, since the withdrawal of her troops from Finland to Lithuania, and the construction of entrenchments on the Dwina and the Dnieper.

In his anxiety to put himself in an advantageous position with regard to Russia, Napoleon gave but a divided attention and slender resources to the conduct of the war in the Peninsula. He no longer thought of carrying it on in person, and it was impossible to send to Torres Vedras a reinforcement of 60,000 or 80,000 men for the purpose of crushing the English, when he was wholly occupied in preparing three armies between the Rhine and the Vistula. It only remained, therefore, to make the best use of the resources already existing in the Peninsula. Napoleon had already organised a division of reserve for Catalonia, as a means of hastening the progress of the sieges of Tortosa and Tarragona. He had also organised another division of reserve for the provinces of Castille. By means of these resources, together with the corps of General Drouet and the army of Andalusia, he hoped to furnish Marshal Massena with sufficient reinforcements to enable him to triumph over the

English; and he immediately sent the necessary orders for the concentration of all the forces in the Peninsula towards the Tagus, accompanying them with declarations that no object in the Peninsula was of equal importance to Santarem and Lisbon, on which depended the fate of Europe.

After having shown him every mark of favour, Napoleon sent back General Foy to Marshal Massena, to inform him of the arrangements he had made for his reinforcements, and to convey to him Napoleon's instructions for his future movements. Whilst the events above narrated were taking place in the north, Marshal Massena passed the winter of 1810-1811 on the banks of the Tagus, between Santarem and Punhète, making unheard-of efforts to support his army, and preparations for the passage of the river; had remained for five months without receiving communications of any kind from the government; and displayed the whole strength of his character in his endeavours to preserve alive a good spirit, not amidst his troops, who bore their strange position with complete equanimity, but amongst his superior officers, some of whom were discontented because they had not the chief command, whilst the rest were disgusted with a campaign which afforded no opportunities for the performance of brilliant actions.

The chief want experienced by the army was in the article of clothing, almost all the garments of the troops being in complete rags. But the officers alone were really worthy of pity; nothing could exceed their state of destitution, for they had no means of subsistence but that which was afforded them by the affection of the soldiers, and not having the ability possessed by the latter, of mending their own tattered garments, or manufacturing sandals of the skins of beasts to supply the place of their worn-out shoes, they were compelled to pay enormous prices to the few workmen who remained at Santarem and some neighbouring villages.

In the meantime General Eblé was solving the problem involved in the construction of a pontoon equipage without tools, without wood, and almost without workmen, with a perseverance and fertility of invention worthy of all admiration. But whilst he advanced most successfully in the execution of his task, a most disadvantageous result of its performance was the ruin of the horses belonging to the artillery and the baggage train. There was but a very insufficient supply of food for them, and they died in great numbers.

The last great difficulty to be overcome consisted in the necessity of obtaining a supply of cordage and means of effecting moorings, such as anchors, grappling irons, &c.

With incredible energy General Eblé had established manufactories of cordage, which were supplied partly with

hemp and partly with old ropes found at Santarem. He had also, as anchors could not be procured, had grappling irons forged, with which the boats of the bridge might be fastened to the banks. But how the bridge, when completed, was to be launched in the presence of the enemy, was the great question in all minds.

The bridge was being constructed at Punhète, situated on the Zezère, at some distance from the point at which this river falls into the Tagus. On the left and at no great distance was Abrantes, whither Lord Wellington had sent Hill's corps, and on the right, but much lower, Santarem, to which Lord Wellington had carried his own advanced posts. It was now a matter of doubt whether the bridge should be thrown across the river near Abrantes or Santarem. There were excellent reasons both for and against the choice of either of these positions. The comparative narrowness of the river at Abrantes would render the launching of the bridge there easier, but the operation would have to be performed in the presence of a numerous and well-established enemy, and only a portion of the French forces could be made available for its defence. At Santarem the river presented many natural obstacles, but sufficient forces could be concentrated there for the defence of our lines and the protection of the passage.

On this as well as other questions respecting the passage of the river great difference of opinion prevailed both among soldiers and generals, and no inconvenience would have resulted from this had it not been accompanied by bitter expressions directed against the general-in-chief, as though he had been responsible for the strange position in which the army found itself on the Tagus, and were not the first victim of an inflexible will, which took its resolutions at an immense distance from the theatre of war, and in a most complete forgetfulness of facts. This state of things even reached such a point that Ney, since the occupation of the new position on the Tagus, had never visited Marshal Massena, and remained at Thomar, as though he had been the general commanding-in-chief, and Thomar headquarters. These things somewhat irritated Massena, who was not, of course, left in ignorance of them; but ensconcing himself in his accustomed negligence and disdain, he contented himself with presenting to his lieutenants an example of firmness and coolness which they should have imitated, but did not. This infringement of good discipline, however, did not infect the troops. They, unaffected by the envious declarations of their immediate generals, but, on the contrary, full of confidence in the character, the fame, and the good fortune of Massena, and confidently expecting the arrival of reinforcements from Napoleon, hopefully awaited the hour

when they should perform those great deeds which had been promised as the result of this campaign. But whilst they were perfectly ready to sacrifice themselves for the attainment of any important object, the sad state of the hospitals had taught them to regard a sick or wounded soldier as a dead man, and made them demand to be spared the risks of skirmishes which were of no apparent necessity.

The army being in this position, we may readily understand how *à propos*, how useful, and agreeable to the real state of affairs were the imperial instructions transmitted to Massena, by which he was directed to ensure the power of manœuvring on both banks of the Tagus by throwing, not one, but two bridges across it; to establish vast magazines of provisions and war matériel, in order to be enabled to prolong his sojourn under the walls of Lisbon; to capture Abrantes, where vast resources were certain to be found; to harass the English incessantly, and to endeavour to entice them beyond their lines to risk a general engagement, &c.

Repeatedly urged by Napoleon, and especially by the last instructions received from him, to enter Portugal, and to reopen, at all hazards, communications with Massena, General Drouet at length set off with his 9000 men by the route which lies through the valley of Mondego, taking with him neither provisions nor war matériel, of which, indeed, he was entirely destitute; having been even compelled during his sojourn in Old Castille to subsist on the stores in the two fortresses, Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, which was a great misfortune, since there was great probability that those places would sooner or later be invested by the enemy.

General Drouet traversed, almost without meeting any obstacle, the Sierra Murcelha, and debouched upon Leyria, his troops obtaining such subsistence as they could find on their road. In the meantime the army of Portugal experienced the utmost impatience for the arrival of a French troop, were it to consist even of only a few hundred men. At length a troop of dragoons led by General Gardanne joined Ney's advanced posts between Espinhal and Thomar, and were received with the greatest demonstrations of affection. General Gardanne gave information that General Drouet was on his way with a strong division, and that another division followed him, that the ninth corps could not number less than 20,000 or 30,000 men, that it was accompanied by abundant stores, and that when communications were once reopened, provisions and war matériel would arrive with the utmost ease. Shortly afterwards the news of General Drouet's arrival filled the whole army with enthusiasm. Calculating on the almost immediate arrival of 30,000 of their comrades, Massena's soldiers delivered themselves up to the most

flattering hopes. Winter had now given place to spring; the lines of Torres Vedras no longer appeared insurmountable.

Massena had an interview with General Drouet, and received from him a mass of despatches which should have arrived earlier. Some of them no longer had any bearing on the actual condition of affairs, and others, the more recent ones, and written since Napoleon's interview with General Foy, contained some criticisms on his movements, at which Massena could only sadly smile, as proofs of the erroneous impressions in which Napoleon was determined to remain. These despatches were chiefly useful as showing what were the means which Napoleon furnished for the accomplishment of his great object, and which was, either to force the position held by the English, or to blockade them until they should be compelled to abandon it. And here all was deception and vexation. The ninth corps, announced as consisting of 30,000 men, scarcely amounted to 15,000; and of these, 8000 had been left at Viseu, sixty leagues distant, to maintain the communications.

At the very moment when the army was full of joy at the arrival of this reinforcement, Massena was a prey to bitter disappointment, and completely disabused as to the reality of the succour which had been promised him. For even of the 9000 that had arrived, Gardanne's detachment alone was to remain, for General Drouet's 7000 were soon to depart again to keep open the communications with the frontier of Spain, and had only come, in fact, as an escort of insignificant despatches, and to fill the army with a false joy.

Massena resolved, however, not to allow General Drouet to depart. His departure, after a short stay, would have thrown the army into despair, and would have deprived it of courage even to attempt the passage of the Tagus. Massena might have simply, in his character of general commanding-in-chief, have ordered General Drouet to remain, but he preferred to reason with him, and obtain his free assent. But General Drouet, without any feeling of ill-will, alleged his instructions, with which he was deeply impressed, and which were, unfortunately, extremely precise; directing him to carry succour to the army of Portugal, but at the same time not to allow himself to be cut off from Almeida, and by no means to lose his own communications for the sake of establishing those of Marshal Massena. The general commanding-in-chief contended, on the other hand, that he ought not, for the purpose of fulfilling one part of his instructions, to neglect another which was of more importance, that, namely, which directed him to convey succour to the army of Portugal, and concluded his arguments by declaring that if General Drouet were now to desert the army of Portugal, he would be personally responsible for all the future evils which

might result from that step. General Drouet no longer hesitated to remain, and Massena directed him to take up his position at Leyria, on the further side of the Estrella, where he would defend the army from being turned by the road along the coast, whilst it was encamped on the route of the Tagus.

Although the reinforcements which had arrived only consisted of about 9000 men, as the army now numbered about 53,000, Massena saw in it the means, not of attacking the English lines, but of rendering the passage of the Tagus infinitely less perilous. By leaving 23,000 men on the right bank, whilst he crossed over with 30,000 to the left, he would have comparative little cause for anxiety for the fate of the two portions of the army, separated from each other by a great river; the danger, however, remaining very serious for both, should the bridge between them be broken, as that on the Danube at Essling. The peril incurred in dividing the army on the two banks of the river was much diminished by the reinforcements which had been received, and Massena finally resolved on putting his plan of crossing the Tagus into execution, for when the army should have once entered the province of Alentejo, it would be able to find subsistence sufficient for three or four months in the environs of Santarem, to obey the instructions of Napoleon, by which he enjoined the continuance of the blockade of the lines of Torres Vedras, and thus to await the expected arrival of the army of Andalusia. When this reinforcement should arrive, the army of Portugal would be enabled to leave the defensive for the offensive, and to terminate under the walls of Lisbon the long war which for twenty years had devastated Europe.

When the army learned the true nature of the reinforcement which had been received, it passed from enthusiastic delight to a state of despondency, and blamed the emperor, who had left them in such a situation, without provisions, war matériel, or reinforcements. It began to be imbued, as were all the troops which were sent to Spain, with the feeling that they were sacrificed without mercy, without the chance of glory, to the ungrateful task of creating *royautés de famille*. It needed but a few more sources of dissatisfaction to excite insubordination in its ranks.

In the meantime General Foy arrived with a new detachment of 2000 men, with Napoleon's verbal instructions, and the inspiration drawn from his numerous interviews with the emperor. At Ciudad Rodrigo he had taken advantage of an opportunity which offered for sending to Marshal Soult a letter, urging upon him the necessity of uniting the whole or part of the army of Andalusia with the army of Portugal. He described to him the situation of Europe, especially that of England, and the indubitable hope which existed of changing the war policy of Great

Britain to a peace policy, if one serious disaster could be inflicted on Lord Wellington's army. He put forth these views not so much as his own as those of Napoleon himself, and declared that he understood the emperor to express his decided will to be that the army of Andalusia should march upon the Tagus.

On the 5th of February General Foy arrived at headquarters. His arrival produced a great sensation in the army, because, being full of impressions received at Paris in his interviews with the emperor, he brought with him the conviction that the army of Portugal was the instrument of great designs, and that but a little patience was necessary to enable it to accomplish its glorious task. This had the best possible effect on the spirit of the army, and compensated in some degree for the ill effect produced by the weakness of the last reinforcements. Unhappily, however, the arrival of General Foy added to the embarrassments of General Drouet, for he brought with him a packet of despatches containing the most formal instructions to assist Massena only so far as he could do so consistently with securing himself from being cut off from Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. But by remaining with the army of Portugal, General Drouet would be as completely cut off from those places as Massena himself. It was a new argument to urge with the commander-in-chief. But as the moment for effecting the passage of the Tagus had now arrived, he consented to remain still at Leyria, in the rear and on the flank of the army of Portugal.

Massena now submitted to the generals serving under him the following questions: was it necessary to cross the Tagus? at what point should it be crossed? and in what manner should the operations be conducted? And would it not be more prudent, should the difficulty attending the passage of the stream in the face of the English be found too great, or the division of the army on the two banks of the stream too dangerous, to retreat, since it would be impossible to obtain subsistence for any length of time in the present encampment, upon the Mondego, whose valley had escaped devastation, whilst the city of Coimbra would then be the principal point of a position in which the army could hold the English in check, and await the necessary reinforcements from France.

The last proposition was unanimously and instantly negatived, as though to entertain it would be a kind of crime, since it was contrary to the wishes of the emperor. It remained, therefore, to attempt the passage of the Tagus, however perilous it might be. The idea was at first entertained of selecting Punhête as the point from which to attempt it, and Junot supported this project; but General Loison, who knew better than he the nature of the place in question, having been encamped there, pointed

out some dangers which would attend such a choice, and the project was then entertained of passing lower down, namely, at Santarem, which offered, according to General Reynier, who knew the place well, an almost invincible position, since, should a hostile force attack it in front, they would be destroyed at the foot of the heights, and should they attempt to turn it, be enclosed and taken. There was one disadvantage attending the choice of this point from whence to attempt the passage of the stream, which was, unfortunately, a fatal one, and consisted in the expansion of the river before Santarem, and the incessant variation of its size according to the rise or fall of its waters. However, by sacrificing some of the advantages attending the proximity of Santarem, sufficiently great facilities were offered by an island situated at the mouth of the Alviela, a little river which throws itself into the Tagus, under the protection of the heights of Boavista. This island being placed beyond the principal breadth of the river, there remained, after it should have been reached, but a small arm to be crossed. By occupying it during the night with the necessary forces, it would be easy to fasten to it the bridge of boats, which would thus rest on a fixed point, easily defended.

There was but one objection to this plan, which unfortunately appeared a far more serious one to General Eblé than it really was, and consisted in the fact that the materials of the bridge were at Punhète. According to General Eblé, to transport them by land to the mouth of the Alviela would require means which we did not possess, since the horses were worn out, and a length of time which would be sufficient to betray our plan to the enemy; and that to descend to the Tagus by water would occupy more than a night, and compel us to pass along the enemy's bank of the river under so close a fire from the English that the boats would run great danger of being destroyed.

The great authority of General Eblé, who had accomplished a sort of miracle by the creation of the materials for this bridge, supported by General Massena's opinion, determined the neglect of this isle, which would doubtless have been for us a second Lobau.

However this might be, as the proposal of passing at Santarem had been rejected, as well as that of making the passage near Abrantes, it now remained to be considered from what point it should be really attempted. As first one plan was proposed and then another, General Foy said that in all probability the 5th corps would within eight or ten days appear on the left of the Tagus, and that then all difficulties would vanish of themselves, for that the English at the sight of the 5th corps would not remain opposite Punhète, that the left

bank would be thus cleared, and that the passage of the Tagus could be then made at that point with perfect ease. The arrival of the 5th corps appeared so probable, that all the generals assented to General Foy's reasoning, with the exception of Reynier, who declared that his soldiers would die of hunger before Soult's arrival, and Massena, who never flattered himself that Soult would come to his aid. He knew too much of Spain and of men to expect such a thing. He entertained the idea, therefore, of retreating upon the Mondego, for he could see no probability of any succour arriving from the direction of the south, and General Drouet's arrival had taught him to expect none on the north. In the meantime the army awaited the arrival of the reinforcements which it expected from Andalusia.

That we may judge of the probability of the arrival of these reinforcements so earnestly expected, we must direct our attention to the course of affairs in Andalusia and Aragon. After General Suchet had taken Lerida, the capture of which has been described in the preceding book, and Mequinenza, a small but very important place, since it commanded a part of the course of the Ebro, there remained for him to take Tortosa and Tarragona, the two strongest fortifications of Catalonia, or perhaps even of Spain, if we except Cadiz. Tortosa is situated on the Lower Ebro, near its mouth, and commands the direct route between Catalonia and Valencia; Tarragona, situated more to the north, between Tortosa and Barcelona, on the sea-coast, in the centre of a fertile country, was to the north-east of the Peninsula what Cadiz was to the south, and Lisbon to the south-east.

On the 19th of December General Suchet opened the trenches before Tortosa; the point of attack having been chosen on the south. The trenches had been opened boldly very near the enceinte, and were pushed on so vigorously that within a few days they had reached the foot of the enemy's works. The enemy made numerous sorties with the design of compelling us to relax in our exertions, and on the 28th of December a body of 3000 men boldly led, vigorously attacked our men employed in carrying on the works, killed many of our engineer officers, and began to destroy the trenches, when Generals Hubert and Abbé, coming up with a body of troops, drove them back with a loss in killed or prisoners of 400 men. On the following day, the 29th of December, after some indispensable repairs had been completed in our works, forty-nine cannon of heavy calibre threw into the place a hail of shot and shell. On the 30th two large breaches were visible, and gave promise of affording in about a couple of days free access to the courage of our soldiers. On the 1st of January the assault

was about to commence amidst the shouts of our troops, when a white flag announced a desire to capitulate. General Suchet refused to grant the terms demanded by the governor, and as he threatened that if the place were not immediately surrendered he would put the garrison to the sword, on the 2nd of January the gates were opened, and 9400 prisoners defiled before him, laying down their arms.

This successful siege had cost the army of Aragon seventeen days, and 500 or 600 men. The siege of Tarragona would most probably be both as difficult and as long, and everything tended to show that the army would be detained in Catalonia during a portion of the year 1811. It was therefore impossible that it should afford the army of Andalusia any immediate succour.

During this period, that is, from June 1810 to January 1811, the army of Andalusia had been no less occupied than that of Aragon.

The central junta having resigned, as we have seen, in favour of a royal regency and the Cortes, the Cortes had assembled at Cadiz with much solemnity on the 24th of September 1810, and immediately passed decrees declaring that the national sovereignty was in the Cortes, and the royalty in the house of Bourbon. After having promulgated these decrees, the assembly at Cadiz had demanded of the regency that it should accept them and swear to observe them. These preliminaries having been completed, the assembly betook itself on the laws of the kingdom, with a view to the reform of the Spanish monarchy. In the meantime the regency, General Castaños being the most prominent in this matter, concerted with General Blake, with the other generals of the army, and with Henry Wellesley, brother of Lord Wellington, the scheme of military operations.

Cadiz and the isle of Leon were abundantly provided with troops and all kinds of resources. Besides 7000 English troops, it contained 17,000 or 18,000 soldiers, the remnants of all the regular Spanish armies. In addition to this force assembled at Cadiz, there was in the province of Murcia a body of 20,000 men, composed of the troops which had retreated from the defiles of the Sierra Morena towards Grenada, and of the insurgents of Murcia. In the centre between Grenada and Seville, there were, besides the fierce mountaineers of Ronda, the contrabandists of the environs of Gibraltar, who were at this period unemployed, and very apt in assuming the character of guerillas. Finally, on the left, at the mouth of the Guadiana, in the country of Niebla, there were other bold contrabandists, and higher up, upon the Guadiana, between Badajoz, Olivença, Elnas, Campo Mayor, and Albuquerque, was the army of Romana, consisting of 27,000 or 28,000 men, of whom 7000

or 8000 had joined Lord Wellington under the Marquis de la Romana.

It was with these forces, aided by situation and season, that Generals Castaños and Blake had resolved to paralyse the three corps which formed the army of Andalusia.

General Sebastiani, occupied alternately in the Ronda or in the Alpuxarras, had been obliged sometimes to direct his whole force against Blake, whom he had vanquished at Baza, at another time to give battle at Fuengirola to the English, whom he had forced to re-embark; and had finally been compelled to burn the principal villages of the Ronda without having suppressed the insurrection, although he had succeeded in driving into Gibraltar the troops which fomented incessantly the disturbances amidst these mountains.

The campaign of the 1st corps, although it had cost fewer men, had not been less laborious. Marshal Victor, aided by Senarmont, the skilful general of artillery, had embraced within a series of redoubts, most accurately placed, and adapted in the best possible manner to their object, all the space which extends from Puerto Santa Maria to Puerto Real, from Puerto Real to Santi Petri; and had wrested from the enemy Trocadero and the fort of Matagorda, which, forming an advanced point in the roadstead, could overwhelm Cadiz with the fire of its artillery. To arm this fort Marshal Victor had had an immense number of mortars of a peculiar construction founded at Seville. He had also collected 150 gunboats, and a sufficient number of boats for the transport of 10,000 men, which he had conveyed partly by water and partly by land to Puerto Real. The preliminary works were therefore in an advanced state; but there was still the want of sailors to manœuvre the flotilla, of artillerymen, of matériel for the ordnance, and a reinforcement of infantry. Had these wants been supplied, it is most probable that the whole state of affairs in the Peninsula would have been changed. But, in fact, not only were these wants left unsupplied, but Marshal Victor was also entirely unaided by Marshal Soult.

In the meantime the career of Marshal Mortier was no less laborious than that of General Sebastiani in Grenada, or Marshal Victor before Cadiz. Sometimes obliged to march with the 5th corps to Badajoz against the troops of Romana, sometimes against the insurgents of Niebla and the detachments which made sorties from Cadiz, and sometimes to Jaen to aid General Sebastiani, his troops were thoroughly worn out with fatigue. He had been successful, doubtless; but on re-entering Seville towards the end of the year 1810, there were only 8000 men out of his whole force capable of taking the field.

Napoleon severely blamed Marshal Soult, who was general-

in-chief of the army of Andalusia, for a want of vigour and a defect of combination in the manœuvring of the troops; and indeed, instead of directing all his forces upon Cadiz, and being contented to hold simple posts at Cordova and at Seville, for the purpose of keeping open the route of Madrid, by which mode of operations Cadiz would have been readily taken, and the whole of Andalusia speedily reduced to subjection, he had endeavoured at one and the same time to threaten Valencia and Murcia, to occupy Jaen, Grenada, Malaga, to reduce the Ronda to submission, to blockade Gibraltar, to guard Seville, and to besiege Cadiz, Badajoz, Elvas, and Campo Mayor, whereby he had exhausted the army of Andalusia with fatigue, and destroyed it by exposure to disease, and reduced himself to the necessity of sending to Napoleon for a reinforcement of 25,000 infantry, 1000 marines, 1000 artillerymen, and a fleet; with these reinforcements he promised speedily to take Cadiz, and to reduce the whole south of the Peninsula from Carthage as far as Ayamonte.

Having made these demands for reinforcements, Marshal Soult was surprised, we may even say filled with consternation, at receiving a formal order to send the whole 5th corps, together with a siege train, to Abrantes, and to sacrifice every other object, except the siege of Cadiz, to this supreme one; for this was to order him to perform what was both extremely difficult and extremely perilous, and to aid the undertakings of another at the expense of his own. He resolved, therefore, to defer obedience to those imperial orders, on the ground that to obey them would probably involve the loss of the 5th corps itself, and to implore that an officer might be sent to examine and confirm the truth of this assertion; adding, that being anxious to aid Marshal Massena, he intended to throw the whole 5th corps, together with some detachments of the two others, upon the Guadiana, in order to undertake the siege of Badajoz, of Olivença, and Elvas, which movement would most probably prove to be a most advantageous diversion in favour of the army of Portugal. He had accordingly set out at the commencement of January 1811 with the division Gerard, followed by the division Gazan, which was to march more slowly in order to escort the siege train.

On the 11th of January he reached Olivença, and invested it without delay. This fortress, situated on the left of the Guadiana, had during two ages belonged sometimes to the Spaniards and sometimes to the Portuguese, and since 1801 had been the property of the Spaniards. It contained a population of five thousand souls, a garrison of four thousand, and had a feeble governor. It was well fortified, and might have opposed a certain amount of resistance, had the governor

taken due precautions and been careful to arm the exterior works. Our officers and soldiers of engineers, well aided by the infantry, carried on the approaches with great boldness, and within ten days the breaching batteries were enabled to open fire and overthrow a large portion of the wall. At the sight of our columns ready to mount to the assault, the populace, which had at first displayed much ardour, was terrified; the garrison and the governor made no endeavour to prolong the defence, and on the 23rd of January the gates were opened to our troops.

On the 26th, Marshal Soult departed for Badajoz, the second fortress situated on the left of the Guadiana, and the only important one. On the right bank of the Guadiana, almost *vis-a-vis* with the castle of Badajoz, is the fort of St. Christoval, which serves as a protection to an entrenched camp established on the heights of Santa Engracia. The river Gevora, which falls into the Guadiana, washes and protects this camp of Santa Engracia, and here, at this period, was the Spanish army of the Marquis de la Romana, which, after having been dispersed by the 5th corps, had speedily re-formed, as was usual with the Spanish armies, and had been rejoined by the seven or eight thousand men who had been sent to Lisbon. The whole army, after having left in Badajoz a garrison of nine or ten thousand men, presented on the opposite bank, in the entrenched camp of Santa Engracia, an army of twelve thousand men; and as a stone bridge, in the enemy's possession, joined the two banks at that spot, it was possible that the besiegers might at any moment be attacked by twenty thousand men. Besides an excellent governor, the fortress contained provisions for six months, and fortifications in a perfect state of defence. To the twenty thousand Spaniards spread over the two banks of the Guadiana, the French army could only oppose nine or ten thousand, until the arrival of the division Gazan, which would increase it to fifteen or sixteen thousand. It should be observed that our troops had no means of crossing from the one bank to the other, if we except a small craft which could only carry a few men at a time.

Happily the quality of our troops compensated for their inferiority, and it was with a less number that General Suchet had taken places infinitely stronger within a space of fifteen or twenty days. On the 20th of January the trenches were opened, and at the same time was commenced the construction of some batteries, as though it were intended to commence the bombardment almost as soon as the approaches. In the meantime continual rains retarded our operations, and the lot of our troops became worthy of commiseration; for as all the horses had been employed in the draught of the heavy artillery, it

had not been possible to carry the foraging excursions to any great extent, and the soldiers were in want of bread. For many days together their only food was flesh, and from the use of such a diet sprang several distressing maladies.

The progress of the works was at first very slow, by reason of the unfavourable state of the weather, the absence of the division Gazan, and the want of any energy in the conduct of the siege. The governor Menacho, on the other hand, resolved to delay our proceedings by means of numerous sorties with strong bodies of troops. On the 31st of January, in particular, he directed one against our central works of attack which caused us considerable loss in men; but our works were too distant and in a stage too little advanced to suffer much. During the following days the rains were so violent that work of any kind became impossible. At length, fortunately, the division Gazan arrived with about 6000 foot soldiers, together with heavy ordnance and tools. Our troops now numbered, therefore, about 12,000 infantry, 1200 sappers and miners and artillerymen, and about 2500 cavalry. A little more energy was now thrown into the conduct of the siege, but several days were occupied in repairing the damage done to the trenches by the rain, and there was made but little real advance.

On the 6th of February news was received in our camp of the arrival of the enemy's army of succour. This army, which had been partly drawn from Lisbon, as we have before mentioned, and which consisted of 10,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, took up a position on the right of the Guadiana, in the camp of Santa Engracia, from whence it was in communication with the fortress by means of the stone bridge of Badajoz; and the enemy could now, therefore, by uniting the army and the garrison, throw a force of 21,000 men on any selected point, and it was not at all impossible, by such a movement succeed in raising the siege.

The first employment which they made of their forces was to attempt, on the 7th of February, a great sortie. After having made a feigned demonstration against our left, they debouched upon our right, and boldly advancing in a compact mass of 7000 or 8000 men, arrived even as far as our lines, whilst those detachments of our troops which strove to resist them failed to do so. As commonly happens in sorties, the enemy held the ground for an instant, and destroyed some works of little importance; but Marshal Mortier soon succeeded in driving them back in disorder, leaving 700 killed or wounded. Unhappily the ardour of our troops, leading them to expose themselves to the fire of the fortress itself, cost us on our side about 100 killed and 300 wounded.

Marshal Soult now conceived the project of attacking the enemy in the camp of Santa Engracia, and depriving him of the possibility of renewing such attempts by the destruction of the army of succour. But to effect this purpose it was necessary to obtain means of crossing the Guadiana, which would be a feat by no means of easy accomplishment, on account of the fulness of the stream; and in the meantime he directed his attention to the object of disembarassing himself from the Spanish army encamped beyond the Guadiana, and the removal of which would render our siege operations much more rapid. There was never any difficulty in overcoming the Spaniards in the open field, and they had, in spite of Lord Wellington's remonstrances, neither erected a palisade nor removed a square foot of earth; they guarded their camp, moreover, in the most careless manner, and with secrecy and promptitude 7000 or 8000 troops might easily surprise and take it.

This movement projected by Marshal Soult was as well executed as conceived. On the 18th February his engineers had provided means of crossing the Guadiana sufficient for 6000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. On the night of the 18th, Marshals Soult and Mortier effected the passage of the river, with troops chosen from the two divisions Gerard. At the break of day on the 19th they found themselves on the further bank of the Guadiana; and as they had crossed it above Badajoz, it was necessary to descend the right bank of this stream in order to arrive at St. Christoval and the heights of Santa Engracia, on which was established the Spanish camp. A thick mist favoured the march of our little army.

The bank of the Gevora was soon reached, and before the Spaniards had made any preparation for disputing its passage with us. The cavalry crossed it at some distance to the right, and dispersed without difficulty the Spanish cavalry which covered the camp on the side of the plain; whilst our infantry, led by Marshal Mortier, plunged through the Gevora, the water reaching breast high, and speedily arrived in the best order at the foot of the escarpment of Santa Engracia at the moment when the mist dispersed.

Our soldiers, who had but little fear of Spanish troops, boldly attacked the height of Santa Engracia, under a terrific fire, which caused them serious loss; but in a few moments they reached the summit of the escarpment, whilst two battalions which had been sent to the left intercepted the road of the fort of St. Christoval, and the cavalry, which had been thrown to the right, on the plain, gained the rear of the enemy. The Spaniards, finding themselves threatened in front by our infantry, in flank and rear by our cavalry, formed themselves

into two firm and imposing squares, which, however, were immediately broken and dispersed by the charge of our infantry and dragoons. Of the 12,000 men with whom the Spaniards had commenced this action, at the most only 5000 escaped by taking flight in every direction.

Marshal Soult took advantage of his victory to invest completely the fortress on the right of the Guadiana; and being now freed from the proximity of the Spaniards, quietly and slowly proceeded with the operations of the siege of Badajoz. In the meantime Lord Wellington and Marshal Massena awaited with very different sentiments the result of this siege. Lord Wellington regarded his position as a difficult one, considering that if the French were to assemble in force under Marshal Massena, he would have much cause for fear, even in his position behind the lines of Torres Vedras. He never ceased, therefore, to urge the Portuguese to devastate Alentejo, and to carry into Lisbon as much of its resources as possible. His entreaties, however, had but little effect, for the Portuguese were by no means inclined to prevent the French from seizing their property by destroying it themselves. He was far from intending to give battle to Marshal Soult had he quitted Andalusia to come to the succour of the army of Portugal, and had ordered Marshal Beresford, who commanded at Abrantes, to defend the affluents of the Tagus, which traverse the province of Alentejo, just so far as might avail to retard the progress of the French, but not so far as might entail the risk of losing a battle; to avoid which, he was to enter the lines of Torres Vedras. The route was thus entirely open to Marshal Soult; but he was ignorant of the fact, and the phantom of the English army, moreover, withheld him from the idea of marching upon Abrantes.

Massena held this phantom in less account, and was only withheld by the want of every kind of provision and matériel of war; and he had, moreover, to struggle against the increasing disgust of the army, the first symptoms of which had sprung from the arrival of General Drouet with no more than 7000 men. As the famine amongst the troops grew more severe, and the hope of their being reinforced by Marshal Soult entirely vanished, it was scarcely possible to restrain them within the bonds of discipline, the more especially as they were under the influence of commanders who gave full license to their tongues. At length when the month of March arrived, with no appearance of Marshal Soult, with no hope of effecting the passage of the Tagus, with an impossibility of obtaining subsistence, resulting from the impossibility of crossing the Tagus, and with only fifteen days' provision of biscuit remaining, Massena took the resolution of executing that retrograde

movement upon the Mondego which he had always regarded as the wisest step he could take, and from which he had only been withheld by Napoleon's formal command, that he should remain on the Tagus as long as possible. He gave orders for such preparations as would enable the troops to be in full retreat on the 4th or 6th of March.

It was absolutely necessary that the retreat of the army should be preceded by the sick, the wounded, and the heavy baggage at least two days in advance, to avoid confusion; and the inconvenience attending this movement would be that it must necessarily excite the notice of the English, and too soon draw them in pursuit of us. This danger existed but to a slight degree on the route of the Tagus; but with respect to the route along the coast, it was to be feared that if they should be informed of our retreat, they would march rapidly to Leyria, Pombal, and Condeixa, and thus anticipate us in our movement on Coimbra and the Mondego. In this case it would be necessary to renounce our intention of taking up a position at Coimbra, and perhaps even that of following the valley of the Mondego, and to resolve upon a short but disastrous retreat by the valley of the Zezère, which is on the south of the Estrella. It was possible to avoid all these inconveniences by occupying Leyria in force, by means of a well-combined and well-timed movement. Such a movement Massena conceived and executed with rare precision.

On the 4th of March the sick and the heavy baggage were sent forward, and on the evening of the 5th the whole army was ordered to commence its march. Reynier, who was at Santarem, in a position very near the enemy, destroyed the bridges of the Rio Mayor, and then pursued in silence the route of Gulgao. Junot took the road of Torres Novas, Chao de Maçans, and Ourem. This excellent man, unhappily less talented than brave, had received in a recent skirmish a wound in the forehead which could scarcely fail, sooner or later, to be fatal, and always devoted to his duty, although somewhat untractable, he was anxious to superintend the retreat on horseback; but Massena, to spare him this fatigue, had placed himself in person at the head of the 8th corps. Ney, on his side, threw himself on Leyria and Ourem, in order to watch the great road of Coimbra.

The arrangements made by Marshal Massena were carried into execution with extreme precision. On the 6th the army was in full march, without being pursued by the English; on the 7th it had reached a line from which it might have given battle, Reynier being at Thomar, Junot at Ourem, Ney at Leyria; whilst Loison remaining at Punhête, awaited the close of day, to set fire to those bridge materials which were the marvellous and useless result of the exertions of General Eblé.

It was not until the morning of the 6th that Lord Wellington received exact information respecting the retreat of our army. The movements which had taken place on the 4th, and certain information which he received, had prepared him for the event; but as he could obtain no certain information, his customary prudence withheld him from hazarding any movement; and indeed, the retreat of the French was in itself so great a triumph for him that he had good reason not to compromise this success by any precipitate action which might expose him to some serious reverse. Receiving information at this time that Badajoz was reduced to the last extremity, he sent a message to the governor of this place, promising immediate succour, and urging most earnestly the protraction of the defence; and immediately despatched Marshal Beresford, with the troops of General Hill, from Abrantes, to save a place which was the key of Alentejo. These arrangements having been concluded, he proceeded to follow in the track of our army, resolving at the same time to conduct his movements with the most extreme circumspection, since he had conceived for Marshal Massena's talents, even after this campaign, which has been subsequently so much blamed, the most profound esteem.

On the 9th of March our rearguard, the 6th corps, was at Pombal, between Leyria and Coimbra, under Marshal Ney; and as it was a position possessed of some resources and means of defence, various strategical reasons induced Marshal Massena to remain at Pombal during the 9th and 10th. On discovering this proceeding on the part of the French, Lord Wellington conjectured that they had resolved to make amends for their retreat by giving him battle; and being somewhat intimidated by this idea, he countermanded his orders with respect to some of the troops which he had directed Beresford to take to the aid of Badajoz, and assembled around himself, by the highroad of Coimbra, the greater portion of his forces.

Ney, discovering from Pombal the concentration of the English army, informed Massena of it on the evening of the 10th, and demanded that either he should be permitted to leave his position, or that he should be supplied with sufficient reinforcements to enable him to make head against the enemy. Massena hastened to Ney's headquarters, and took pains to reassure him, whilst he urged him to maintain his position at Pombal until the next day, and on the succeeding day to make a stand at Redinha, so as to give the necessary time for the occupation of Coimbra and Mondego by the troops of Junot. Ney was by no means so easily convinced of the security of his position as Massena desired, but promised to hold it as long as possible. To increase the embarrassment of the moment, General Drouet, who was charged with the duty of supporting Ney, was seized once more with

the desire of seeking what he considered his proper position, and announced his immediate departure, which would have reduced Ney's force to two divisions. Massena committed the error of not decidedly commanding him to stay, and permitted himself to be satisfied with Drouet's promise to retire slowly. Ney promised to maintain his position at Pombal, but did not say for how long. Massena was guilty of a twofold fault on this occasion, for he failed to command with sufficient vigour, and omitted to take advantage of this position of Pombal to inflict a severe blow on the English.

On the morning of the 11th, Ney, posted at Pombal, on the right bank of the little river Arunça, saw the English descending by the left bank, in order to cross it below Pombal, and immediately ordered a retreat without attending to the remonstrances of the chief of the staff, Fririon, who endeavoured to induce him to maintain his position. Contenting himself with sending a few battalions under General Fririon's command to check the immediate advance of the English, which duty they effectually performed, he quietly commenced his retreat, descending the right bank of the river in the face of the English, who occupied the left. He halted at night-fall at Venda da Cruz, at the point where the road quits the valley of the Arunça to take its course along that of the Soure.

On the following day, the 12th, Ney commenced his march before daybreak, in order that he might not have the enemy at his heels in the defiles through which he would have to pass. With his 7000 or 8000 men he slowly retreated, followed by 25,000 English, formed into three columns, the one on the right composed of the troops of General Picton and the Portuguese under General Pack, the central one composed of the troops under General Cole, the third, on the left, consisting of the light infantry of General Erskine. The cavalry of General Slade, that of the Portuguese, and the sharpshooters, formed the connecting links between these three columns. Ney, as a lion pursued by hunters, kept his eyes fixed on his assailants, prepared to hurl himself upon the one that should be most rash. When one of these columns pressed too closely, he swept it with musketry, or charged it with the bayonet, or hurled his dragoons upon it, employing each arm in turn, according to the varying nature of the ground, with admirable skill and irresistible vigour. He thus employed half the day, whilst he gave way, at the most, no more than two leagues, and prepared for the English on the bank of the Soure a final and warm reception, which would form a worthy conclusion to the exploits of the day.

Ney had now reached the chain of heights which border the Soure, and at the foot of which, on the very bank of the river,

is the village Redinha. His position now, therefore, rested on the bed of the Soure and Redinha, whilst in front of him there was a little plain, through the midst of which the English advanced with awkward movements. It was an advantageous position to defend, since it commanded on every side the ground occupied by the enemy, and even offered the opportunity of a decided success, since it would be possible, whilst repulsing the English, to drive them headlong into the defile which had been traversed by each army in the course of the morning, and to precipitate them from thence into the valley of the Arunça. With 12,000 infantry and 1200 cavalry at his disposal, Ney was almost certain of success in such a mode of proceeding, but prudential reasons restrained him from making the attempt, for in the position which he now occupied he was exposed to the danger of being driven into the Soure, and also of being pursued into a frightful defile which lies between Redinha and Condeixa; he took up his position, therefore, on the heights which he was determined to defend, and having taken ample precautions for securing a retreat in the case of a reverse, he awaited the arrival of the enemy.

Generals Picton and Pack attempted to climb the heights on the left, in order to be able to dispute with Ney his retreat upon Redinha, whilst Generals Cole and Spencer advanced in the centre, and Erskine's light infantry endeavoured to cross the river on our right. But Ney, employing each arm of his forces with the same ready skill, directed an overwhelming fire upon Picton's troops, and forced them to make an oblique movement for the purpose of avoiding it. Having at length, however, succeeded in climbing the heights, after having suffered considerable loss, they advanced upon Ney's flank, and had arrived within musket range of it, when he overwhelmed them with grape from six pieces of cannon, and then charging with the bayonet, drove them to the foot of the heights. Lord Wellington then carried his centre forward, for the purpose both of rallying and covering his right, and with the intention of attacking the front of the French position. Ney, permitting this mass to approach, first received it with the fire of his artillery, then with that of his musketry, and finally charging with the bayonet, drove it down the declivity of the ground. He then sent forward the 3rd hussars, which broke the first line of the English, and sabred a great number of their infantry. At this moment the confusion in the whole mass of the English troops became extreme; but Ney, being anxious not to compromise the safety of his troops, called them back, and drawing them up in battle array, remained in position during more than the space of an hour, continuing to hurl shot against the English, and thus causing them the most serious losses.

It was now four o'clock in the afternoon. Lord Wellington, deeply chagrined at finding himself thus baffled by a handful of men, drew together his whole army, formed it into four lines, and advanced with the manifest intention of forcing the position at any price. The moment had now come when it was proper for Marshal Ney to retreat, for it had not been his intention to maintain, but to dispute his position, and he conducted his troops with great skill and in good order to the other bank of the Soure. The English having reached the heights which we had just abandoned, hastened to descend to the bank of the river, with the purpose of attempting to cross it, but perceived our troops posted on the opposite bank, covered by a cloud of sharpshooters who prevented any approach.

The various circumstances of this engagement were of a nature to render the English very cautious, and the French very confident. Ney had retreated into the defile which led from Redinha to Condeixa, and abutted on heights which might be easily defensible. It was the last step which had to be traversed on the highroad from Lisbon to Coimbra, and had to be so taken as to afford Junot time to establish bridges on the Mondego, and to occupy Coimbra, which is on the other bank of this river.

On the evening of the 12th, after the splendid battle of Redinha, Massena complimented Ney on his triumph, but at the same time expressed some regret that he had not maintained the position in front of the Soure, and implored him to resist to the utmost, as the nature of the ground would well enable him to do, on his way to Condeixa. Marshal Ney appeared to be but slightly moved by the exhortations of the general-in-chief, and offered to do his best, without promising success. He seemed to be particularly anxious respecting the movements of the English on his left, demonstrations which, if serious, might have separated him from Loison and Reynier, that is to say, from the bulk of the army. To provide against all danger on this side, Massena had directed the movements of the divisions Loison and Clausel so as to connect Ney's left with Reynier, and believing that he was thus sufficiently supported, and would obey the orders given by his general-in-chief, Massena proceeded on the morning of the 13th to visit Loison, and from the position which he occupied to endeavour to learn the true projects of the enemy.

Scarcely had Massena departed than Ney began to employ himself in making observations on the least movements of the English, with a strange distrust of the position which he occupied, and in which there was nothing to give just cause for alarm. A movement made by General Picton on his left thoroughly persuaded him that all his fears were about to be

realised, and that he was on the point of being isolated from the main body of the army, perhaps even surrounded. Hurried on by this terror, and perhaps also by a desire to quit the land of Portugal, which he had learned to hate, he disputed but for a few moments the heights of Condeixa, and then hastened to quit them, taking a road which led along a defile to Miranda de Corvo, and would enable him to rejoin Loison, Clausel, and Reynier.

In adopting this important resolution after the formal orders he had received to maintain a position at Condeixa, he took too much responsibility upon himself, and for the sake of avoiding an imaginary or at most doubtful danger, he exposed the army to certain peril. But, however this may be, Ney entered the defile above mentioned, and as he perceived that he thus exposed Montbrun, who held a position on the bank of the Mondego, to being cut off and taken, he informed him of his own movements, and ordered him to retreat immediately with his cavalry, ascending the banks of the Mondego by a movement parallel with his own.

In the meantime Massena had repaired to Fuente Cuberta, where Loison, supported by Clausel, was the link which united the divisions of Ney and Reynier, and was prepared to defeat every attempt which the English might make to penetrate between the two principal masses of the French army. From the elevated point at which he now was, Massena could perceive the movements of General Picton, and saw in them no cause for apprehension. When, therefore, it was announced to him in the middle of the day that Ney had evacuated Condeixa, and had thus taken upon himself to decide the issue of the campaign, he expressed aloud his indignation to Fririon, the chief of the staff, and was so greatly angered as to entertain for a moment the idea of depriving Ney of his command; but perceiving the inconvenience which must result from the loss of the services of one of his lieutenants, he restrained himself to a cold expression of his discontent, at the same time drily ordering Marshal Ney to stop as soon as he should have issued from the defile in which he then was, in order to give Montbrun and the heavy baggage an opportunity of effecting a movement similar to that executed by the 6th corps. Marshal Ney's precipitate retreat had, to a certain degree, imperilled Massena himself, who had under his own command the divisions Loison and Clausel; for being now uncovered on his right, he might, had the English been more active, have been cut off from the 6th corps. But he immediately set his troops in retreat, marching by moonlight during the whole night, and debouching in the morning between Casal Novo and Miranda de Corvo, behind Marshal Ney.

Marshal Ney, on emerging from the defile which ran from Condeixa towards Miranda de Corvo, stopped at the village of Casal Novo. On the following day, the 14th, in spite of a thick mist, he commenced a series of manœuvres in the presence of the English with a dexterity, precision, and skill which excited general admiration. And now the two armies slowly proceeded, the one behind the other; the French only yielding their ground step by step, after a well-planned resistance at every point, and the English advancing with difficulty under a murderous fire, and against positions in which they attempted to come up with the enemy, and as perpetually failed to do so. At the close of the day they were compelled to halt in the presence of the French army, which was assembled in force in an almost impregnable position.

No loss had resulted from the movements of Marshal Ney, but the failure of the execution of the plan which had been so wisely formed by the general-in-chief, of establishing the army on the Mondego. All the corps of the army were reunited, together with their matériel, after a loss of men inferior by three-fourths at least to that suffered by the English, and after having successfully passed the most difficult portion of their road. The English, roughly handled at Redinha and Casal Novo, showed no impatience to attack our troops, and appeared rather to escort than to pursue them.

Our army had passed the night of the 1st on the bank of the river Ceyra, which it had crossed; but Ney, with too much confidence, had permitted two of his divisions to pass the night on the same side of the river with the English. Massena had intimated to him the danger to which he thus exposed himself; but he disregarded the hint, in the belief that the English would not have the audacity to attack him. Lord Wellington, however, who was determined, with all his prudence, to lose no opportunity of destroying us, if we were so foolish as to afford any opportunity, perceived that a considerable portion of the 6th corps had remained on his side of the Ceyra, and on the morning of the 15th hastened to envelop it with masses of troops. Our soldiers, surprised by this unexpected attack, ran to arms, a portion of them (the division Mermet) proceeding to occupy the heights which surrounded the ground on which they had been encamped during the night, in order to hold in check the enemy, whilst Marshal Ney directed the retreat of the remaining portion (the division Marchand) by the narrow pass of the bridge of the Ceyra. Whilst the troops were crossing the bridge, several slight circumstances concurred to create a panic amongst them, which turned their retreat into a disorderly flight. Ney endeavoured in vain to rally them, and could not even make his voice heard amidst the confusion.

After some moments of this tumult, however, he succeeded in rallying a battalion of the 27th and some companies of voltigeurs, and with this handful of men he ascended the heights, where General Mermet with his second brigade was maintaining a desperate struggle against the English. The presence of the feeble reinforcement brought by Marshal Ney reanimated the courage of our troops, and charging the English, they compelled them to retire with loss. In the meantime the tumult at the bridge had subsided; the fugitives perceiving the heights behind them to be securely occupied by French troops, became reassured, and defiled across the bridge in tranquillity. The second brigade, after having held the heights as long as was necessary, descended, and crossing the bridge, rejoined the rest of the 6th corps.

The army took up its position behind the Ceyra without being disturbed, for Lord Wellington had learned that this army, always so great in the hour of danger, could not be easily crushed. On the 17th it advanced to the Alva. Massena suffered cruelly, as may be well supposed, at being forced to this retreat by the error of his master, who had assigned to him the performance of an impossible task; by the error of his lieutenants, who had thwarted all his plans; by the error of the other generals in the Peninsula, who had failed to succour him; and finally, by the conspiracy, as it were, of circumstances against him. He was deeply distressed, and endeavoured to give the movement the character of a manœuvre rather than of a retreat. It was with this motive that he had formed the plan of establishing a position on the Mondego; and being deprived of this resource by Ney's precipitancy in quitting his post at Condeixa, he would have wished at least to remain upon the Alva, which flows along the Sierra Murcelha; but this position was a very insecure one, since the English could turn it by ascending the right bank of the Mondego, and it was distant, moreover, many days' march from Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, which contained the resources of the army. It would be therefore rather a consolation to his honourable pride than a manœuvre the success of which was important.

On the 18th the French army reached the Alva. Junot was on the right (in respect to the enemy), near the point of junction of the Alva with the Mondego; Ney was in the centre, behind Ponte Murcelha; Reynier on the left, towards the mountains and on the sides of the Estrella, whence the Alva takes its source; and Drouet, whom the orders of Massena could no longer detain, on the Almeida road. Massena had particularly urged upon Ney the importance of defending the Ponte Murcelha position, and he had both promised and intended to do so.

But this time, so great a fatality seemed to pursue the army

of Portugal, the disobedience was to come from the most obedient of Massena's lieutenants, General Reynier. Marshal Ney, established on the Alva, in the position of Ponte Murcelha, endeavoured to ascertain by reconnaissances whether his wings were well guarded, and whether there were no risk of being again surprised by the enemy. On the right he had found the posts of Junot's division closely connected with his own; but on his left he failed to find those of Reynier's division precisely at that part of the Murcelha Sierra which, being but slightly connected with that of the Estrella, could be passed. Ney, uneasy at finding himself almost completely unprotected on his left, made earnest complaints to Massena on the subject. The general-in-chief sent officers after officers to make inquiries of Reynier, and he was found far from the Sierra of Murcelha, on the Sierra of Moita, another detached branch of the Estrella, and situated very much in the rear of the actual position of the army. The source of this conduct was some ill-humour which Reynier had conceived against the general-in-chief, in consequence of certain reprimands the latter had found it necessary to give him; and now, far from obeying the order he received, to place himself on the left of the army, he replied to it by detailing the plan of an attack on the English, which, according to him, must have great results; and whilst he was discussing these operations, Ney, finding himself completely exposed, and distinctly perceiving the advance of the English on the other side of the Alva against his left, was compelled by many prudential considerations to abandon Ponte Murcelha, and thus once more, although involuntarily, to frustrate the projects of Marshal Massena. The position of the Alva was from that time no longer tenable, and that this was the case could only be a subject of regret on account of Massena, to whose pride it was a consolation. To regain the Spanish frontier was all that now remained to be done.

The English, on their side, as their provisions began to fail on account of the difficulty of transporting them so far from the sea, and as they despaired of crushing an army which defended its retreat so vigorously, perceived the necessity of making a halt of some days' duration. The Portuguese troops, whose subsistence was never cared for till the English troops had been supplied, began to die of hunger, and complained bitterly. Lord Wellington resolved, therefore, on a halt of three or four days between Ponte Murcelha and Coimbra. The French army continued its march in three columns without being pursued, arrived about the 22nd of March at the line of heights which separate the valley of the Mondego and that of the Coa, and found itself within sight of the frontiers of Spain, from which it had departed six months before to invade Portugal.

The old marshal re-entered Spain with a heavy heart. Although his retreat had not, indeed, been like that of Junot from Lisbon after a capitulation, nor that of Soult from Oporto with the loss of his artillery; although he had maintained his position on the Tagus during six months, without succour of any kind or even communications with France, in one of the most difficult positions in which a general could be placed; although he had performed a march of sixty leagues through a sterile and devastated country, pursued by an army twice as numerous as his own, without the loss of a single cannon, wounded man, or baggage waggon, and inspired the enemy with so much respect that it had relinquished its pursuit; although his movements had, in general, been such that he could find in them no cause for self-reproach, yet it was cruel at his age, after so much toil, after so many triumphs, to add to his numerous campaigns one which, however meritorious in the eyes of the well-informed and the thoughtful, could not but be regarded by the public in general, which only judges of actions by their results, as a failure. The aspect of his army, moreover, was calculated to affect him deeply. The discipline of the troops was still admirable, but half of them were constantly scattered in every direction in a search for provisions. The greater number of the draught horses were either dead or thoroughly worn out, and scarcely sufficient remained to manœuvre a few pieces of cannon in front of the enemy. The soldiers, blackened by the sun, attenuated, ragged, shoeless, but vigorous, inured to fatigue, haughty, arrogant, and licentious in their manners as their language, failed to endure the state of distress in which they were with that resignation which sometimes so highly ennobles the miseries of warfare. Massena himself had by this time, unfortunately, been deprived of his accustomed prestige, partly by the indiscreet observations made respecting him by the generals under him, and partly by his own errors. In the season of victory soldiers smile at the faults of their leaders, but in the hour of adversity they regard them as crimes. But the general-in-chief was still far from being overwhelmed by circumstances under which most men would have been crushed, and resolved on the execution of new operations calculated to give another character to his retreat. He proposed to refresh and provision his troops, and then, by Guarda and Belmonte, to cross the Sierra of Gata, to descend upon the Tagus by Alcantara, and thus to recommence the campaign of Portugal. He had still, after the withdrawal of Drouet, 40,000 men under his command, of incomparable valour, and proof against fatigue and fear, and with such a force, acting in connection with the army of Andalusia, he flattered himself that he might penetrate into Portugal by a new road. But when orders having for their aim the execution of this project

emanated from headquarters, they were the object of violent criticism throughout the army, and universal indignation.

Full of this project, which consoled him for his disappointments, Massena, on arriving on the frontier of Old Castille, directed his three corps towards the Sierra de Gata, and assigned to each the cantonments it was to occupy after the march they were about to perform. He appointed Belmonte, which is situated at the sources of the Zezère, as the position to be occupied by Reynier's corps; whilst Junot's corps was to establish itself at Guarda, which is at the sources of the Mondego, and Ney's corps at Celorico, a stony, arid, desolate district, which separates the waters of the Coa from those of the Mondego. As soon as Massena's project became known, the generals of the various corps raised their voices against it, declaring that it would be impossible to remain forty-eight hours in the positions to which they had been ordered, and that it was impossible to recommence operations without a supply of clothes, shoes, money, and horses. Marshal Ney especially was dissatisfied at the idea of making another campaign under Marshal Massena. Encouraged by the complaints which arose around him, and the popularity he enjoyed in his corps of the army, he permitted himself to indulge in an action of insubordination; writing to the general-in-chief a letter in which, declaring the sufferings endured by his corps, the impossibility of procuring subsistence at Celorico, the necessity of leaving it to fall back upon the Coa, and enumerating the inconvenience which would attend a new campaign on the Tagus, he formally demanded the production of the orders of the emperor, and declared that if those orders did not exist, as he believed was the case, he should find himself compelled to disobey the commands lately laid upon him.

Marshal Massena was convinced that the insubordination of his lieutenants had alone hindered him from carrying the enemy's position at Busaco, from crossing the Tagus at Punhete, from seizing the line of the Mondego at Condeixa, and finally, from being able to make a stand on the line of the Alva. He had hitherto smothered his anger, that he might not cause any commotion in the army, which would be dangerous during the progress of a retreat; but now, aroused from his habitual calmness by this last act of Marshal Ney's, he determined to deprive him of his sword in the presence of the whole army. He repeated his commands to him, and demanded to be informed whether he still refused to obey. Marshal Ney began to perceive that he had made a false step; but he dared not now recede, and once more, although in more moderate terms, insisted on the communication of the emperor's own orders.

Massena no longer hesitated; but ordering Marshal Ney

immediately to quit the 6th corps and to retire into the interior of Spain, there to await the emperor's commands, he directed General Loison to assume the command. The flatterers who had enticed him on to his insubordination now quailed before the energy of the general-in-chief, and endeavoured to persuade Marshal Ney to yield. And this he did; atoning for a moment's error by a most praiseworthy submission.

This sad sacrifice having been made to discipline, the language of the troops became less insubordinate, but they were still as disinclined as ever to renew those attempts on the Tagus which they regarded as both calamitous to the army and useless to the designs of the emperor. They were resigned to obey, but hated those who demanded such obedience. Although Massena had too little consideration for the sufferings of his troops, he had consented that the 6th corps should approach Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo for the purpose of obtaining provisions from the stores which they contained; unhappily the country in which the troops now were was as destitute as themselves.

A new measure taken by Napoleon at this period, namely, the nomination of Marshal Bessières to the command of all the north of Spain, still further aggravated and complicated the unsatisfactory state of affairs. The emperor, perceiving the inconvenience of having distinct commands at Burgos, Valladolid, Leon, and Salamanca, and being discontented with General Kellermann, had been anxious to consign the command of all the troops scattered throughout the north of Spain to a single commander-in-chief, to whom would also be committed the government of the provinces of Biscay, Burgos, Valladolid, Zamora, and Leon. Marshal Bessières was selected for this exalted post, because he had served in the north of the Peninsula, and was at the head of the imperial guard; he was already established at Burgos when the army of Portugal entered Old Castille. Massena had written to him announcing his arrival, his necessities, and his plans, and requested immediate supplies of provisions, munitions, and horses. Bessières had in return been prodigal of assurances of the most complete devotion, but failed to send anything to the succour of the army of Portugal more substantial than promises.

After having waited on the frontier of Old Castille during some days, Massena, finding that no succour arrived, receiving very unsatisfactory information respecting the resources of Estramadura, and perceiving the stores of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida diminish with fearful rapidity; seeing that his cavalry and artillery were without horses, and taking into consideration that the whole army was exasperated at the idea of

a new campaign on the Tagus, Massena finally renounced a project which, since the successive loss of the lines of the Mondego and the Alva, had been his sole consolation.

Marshal Massena immediately sent a confidential officer to inform Napoleon of the events of the retreat, the causes which had prevented him from establishing himself on the Mondego, and those which had withheld him from again marching on the Tagus, and of the deplorable quarrel which had occurred between himself and Marshal Ney. This officer was also directed to demand supplies and orders, and all that would be necessary to the immediate recommencement of the campaign. In the meantime Massena led the army into Old Castille, and having placed it in cantonments at Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, Salamanca, and Zamora, went himself to Salamanca, in order to inspire by his presence some activity into the administration of the army.

In the meantime Marshal Soult had continued and accomplished the siege of Badajoz. This siege had been conducted at first with great slowness, and afterwards with great rapidity. The news received from all sides on the state of affairs at length lent an impulse to the works, which triumphed over every obstacle. Information was received from Andalusia that Marshal Victor was in the greatest peril, being threatened by an Anglo-Spanish army that had been formed in front of Gibraltar, and to oppose which he had only seven or eight thousand men; that General Sebastiani, instead of holding himself in readiness to succour Marshal Massena, had, on the contrary, directed his principal forces against the kingdom of Murcia; that there was great danger that the siege of Cadiz would be raised, and the immense matériel collected for the purposes of this siege destroyed. From the neighbourhood of Lisbon news was received that the English threatened the fortresses of Estramadura, and that an English army, probably that of Lord Wellington himself, was advancing to raise the siege of Badajoz, and this, amongst other reports, gave rise to the belief that Marshal Massena had at length been compelled to retreat from the Tagus.

On the receipt of this news, Marshal Soult visited the trenches in person, accompanied by his chief engineer and artillery officers, and declared that he hoped to be in Badajoz within forty-eight hours. Finding that before a breach could be rendered practicable, the removal of the summit of the wall of the counterscarp would be necessary, and that to effect this in the usual manner would require a space of two days, he determined that a detachment of soldiers should pull it down by hand, under cover of the night.

On the 10th the breach was declared practicable, and Marshal

Soult, who had received from Andalusia and Portugal news even still more disquieting, was anxious not to lose an instant, and had the place summoned to surrender. The governor perceived the danger of resistance, but endeavoured to enter into negotiations, for he had been informed of the approach of the English. Marshal Soult, however, refused to allow himself to be tricked, and ordered that the assault should take place at four o'clock in the afternoon; but at the moment when our columns were about to throw themselves into the breach, a white flag announced that the fortress had surrendered. On the 11th of March our troops entered Badajoz, forty-two days after the first opening of the trenches. Having devoted two days to the repair, arming, and provisioning of Badajoz, that it might be able to resist the English, Marshal Soult hastened to proceed towards Cadiz, feeling great anxiety with respect to what was taking place in that quarter.

The following had, in the meantime, been the state of affairs in the neighbourhood of Cadiz. Being in constant dread of the concentration of our troops on the Tagus, the English had resolved to make such manœuvres between Murcia, Grenada, Gibraltar, and Cadiz, that the French troops which were in Andalusia would not dare to leave it even though they had taken Badajoz. The plan was well conceived, and the errors committed on our side rendered its execution easy. Murat at Naples, after having made every preparation for a descent on Sicily, had renounced his project and dispersed the troops he had collected for its execution, thus leaving the English at liberty to send four or five thousand of their best troops to Gibraltar. These troops, together with some others which were already at Gibraltar, and a part of the garrison of Cadiz, were assembled at the camp of Saint Roche, and formed an army of about 20,000 men—8000 or 9000 English, and 12,000 Spaniards. So large a proportion of English rendered this army formidable, and the junction of General Sebastiani with Marshal Victor was necessary to oppose it. But unfortunately the movements of General Blake in Murcia had drawn General Sebastiani thither, and a few feeble columns which he had despatched to Tarifa and Ronda were not calculated to be of any assistance to Marshal Victor.

Marshal Victor had no more than 8000 effective troops at his disposal. He left at the various posts of the line of investment as few as possible, sent 2500 men of the division Villatte towards Santi Petri, to hold in check the garrison of Leon, and with the 5000 men of the divisions Leval and Ruffin which remained, and with 500 horse, he marched by his left, in the direction of Gibraltar, to meet the enemy's army, of the strength of which he was ignorant.

On the 3rd of March, General Villatte surprised the Spaniards, who had thrown a bridge over the extremity of the canal Santi Petri, and had already passed across, and drove them back into the isle of Leon, with the loss of 100 killed, 100 drowned, and about 400 prisoners. He then took up a position near the canal, awaiting the appearance of the English army, which Marshal Victor had gone in search of. On the 4th information was received that it was on the sea-coast, and on the 5th that it had been seen in a position on the sandy heights, with the sea behind it, its left being towards Santi Petri, and its right towards the tower of Barrossa.

On the morning of the 5th, Marshal Victor had no hesitation in taking the offensive with the 5000 men whom he had under his orders. Leaving on his right General Villatte, who, by occupying the banks of the canal, was the object of attack to a portion of the enemy's forces, he made a vigorous movement towards the sandy heights occupied by the Anglo-Spanish troops. When the attack commenced, the impetuosity of our men obtained them some temporary success, but there was no probability that 5000 men could vanquish 20,000, especially when 9000 of them were English. Marshal Victor, therefore, took up a position somewhat withdrawn, and then awaited General Villatte, whom he had sent for, and ready, in spite of all perils, to renew the struggle, should the disembarked army endeavour to quit the sea-coast to penetrate into the interior of Andalusia.

The enemy, fearing that if Marshal Victor should be reinforced, they might be driven into the sea, determined to retreat, and to renounce the endeavour to raise the siege of Cadiz.

When Marshal Soult returned to Andalusia, he found everything retrieved, and the siege of Cadiz continued, and that a most decisive triumph might have been obtained, had he known how to concentrate at the proper moment the forces of General Sebastiani and Marshal Victor. He found himself, however, in a most critical position: the battles in which he had engaged had left Marshal Victor scarcely sufficient troops to maintain the blockade of Cadiz; Marshal Mortier, left at Badajoz with some thousand men, was reduced to the alternative of either departing from it, or shutting himself up within its walls; it was tolerably certain that the English would attack it almost immediately, and snatch it from our hands, unless succoured by an efficient army; and Soult himself had at his disposal no more than 7000 or 8000 effective men. Devoured by anxiety, Marshal Soult hastened to write to King Joseph and to Massena for succour, and to send to Paris earnest entreaties for reinforcements, and that orders might be given to the army of Portugal to join him in Estramadura.

Information of the greater number of these events was carried to Napoleon by General Foy, who was personally well received, but scarcely listened to when he attempted to present the defence of his general-in-chief. Napoleon had no pity for his illustrious lieutenant, and even as the blind public only judged by results, took not into account the nature of attending circumstances. "Why," exclaimed Napoleon in each of his interviews with General Foy—"why give battle at Busaco? Why, instead of stopping at Coimbra, march upon Lisbon? Why remain so long on the Tagus without doing anything? Why quit the Tagus when Marshal Soult was in the act of marching upon Abrantes? Why retreat so precipitately and so far?" We have already repeated these reproaches, and shown how far they were founded in reason. Without paying any heed to the truth, Napoleon spoke so severely against Massena, that General Foy, intimidated, defended him but badly. After numerous interviews with the general and the officers who had recently arrived Napoleon gave the following orders to his generals commanding in Spain.

Perceiving the impossibility of making Ney serve under Massena, he replaced the former by Marshal Marmont, still committing the error of placing marshals under other marshals. Napoleon ordered Marmont to enter immediately upon the task of reorganising the composition of the 6th corps. He annexed General Drouet's corps to the army of Portugal, and ordered Marshal Bessières to furnish it with horses, mules, provisions, and war matériel, and to enable it, in short, to accomplish that descent upon the Tagus by Plasencia and Alcantara. Being ignorant as yet whether it would be possible to make a new campaign in Portugal, Napoleon regarded the army of Portugal as that which, constantly watching the movements of Lord Wellington, and following him in all his movements, should make head against him in Castille, if he remained on the Mondego; in Estramadura, if he descended upon the Tagus; and should give him battle on the first opportunity; whilst the army of Andalusia, having been reinforced, carried on the siege of Cadiz.

But whilst with an inexhaustible fertility of mind, and unfortunately also with an equal abundance of illusions, Napoleon rearranged all his plans, he had foreseen, even before the arrival of the couriers from Andalusia, the embarrassments in which Marshal Soult must find himself. It was not probable, in fact, that the army of Marshal Massena could reach the Tagus before the lapse of a month, and in the meantime everything foretold that the English would throw themselves en masse in the direction of Estramadura, for the purpose of

retaking Badajoz, or at least would direct to this quarter a large detachment which Marshal Soult would find it impossible to resist. Napoleon therefore ordered the army of the north to send immediate reinforcements towards Andalusia; he ordered General Belliard, who was directing under Joseph the movements of the army of the centre, to restore to Marshal Soult all the detachments which belonged to him; and directed Marshal Bessières to send away all the battalions belonging to the fourth, first, and fifth corps, and consequently to the army of Andalusia. He had already sent towards Castille a division of reserve, which was formed of battalions intended to recruit the armies of Andalusia and Portugal; he now recommended Bessières not to retain it, pointing out to him that he might weaken the strength of his forces without danger, since he was protected on the side of Old Castille by the entry into that province of the army under Massena. He considered that these measures, strict obedience to which he imperiously commanded, would be the means of affording Marshal Soult an immediate reinforcement of 12,000 or 15,000 men, which would repair his losses, and enable him to oppose some resistance to the English on the frontier of Estramadura.

It was to be feared, however, that before these orders could be put into execution, serious events must take place, either on the frontier of Old Castille, or on that of Estramadura. Lord Wellington's position had become a much stronger one since Massena's retreat than it had previously been, and both the Portuguese and English had been compelled to acknowledge that he alone had comprehended the kind of warfare which was best suited to oppose the French in Spain. The opposition party in the English parliament had done homage by the mouth of Lord Grey to his military strategy, and declared that he had proved the groundlessness of all their fears, and surpassed their highest hopes. From this time the war party was completely in the ascendant, and definitely in the possession of power. Commercial suffering was still doubtless very great, and the financial difficulties very embarrassing; but the anxiety which had oppressed all hearts was removed. The Prince of Wales, who had intended to change his ministers as soon as his father's illness should have been considered likely to endure, no longer thought of so doing, although the malady under which George the Third suffered had been declared incurable. The favourable chance which had been offered to Napoleon had vanished, and Lord Wellington, covered with honours, saw all the obstacles which had obstructed his road to fortune crumble before his steps. He now proposed, whilst the bulk of his forces remained in sight of the fortresses Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, to attempt with the remainder the recapture of

Badajoz, and the re-establishment of things in Estramadura on their old footing.

The plan of the English general was only too well suited to existing circumstances. Massena, in his anxiety to put the army on an effective footing, had, as we have said, repaired to Salamanca, and was there surrounded by a demonstrative host which promised much and did nothing. Marshal Bessières, indeed, was so far from fulfilling the promises which he had made of affording succour to the army of Portugal, that he had in some cases even deprived it of resources which were on their way to it. In the meantime Marshal Massena had been compelled to scatter his army from the summit of the Sierra de Gata even to Benavente, near the Asturias, in order to enable it to find subsistence. Two powerful reasons, however, made Massena anxious to concentrate the army: it was necessary to prevent the investment of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; and there was now an opportunity of striking a vital blow at the English army, since its general-in-chief and a portion of its strength were absent.

As soon as he had become inspired with the hope of effecting these two objects, Massena was a different man; where he could command, he gave the most absolute orders, and where he could not command, he employed the most earnest entreaties, to the end that he might obtain what was necessary for putting the army into an effective state; but the time employed in collecting supplies sufficed to permit the English to remain two or three weeks under the walls of Almeida, and it was compelled to surrender.

At length Massena, who began to put no trust in the promises of Bessières, and to disregard the opposition of his lieutenants, gave orders for the concentration of the army. By means of the good services of the excellent General Thiebault, governor of Salamanca, and the money provided for the pay of the troops, Massena had procured a certain amount of biscuit and salted meat, which he intended to introduce into Almeida.

The idea of encountering the English in a pitched battle inspired the soldiers with hope, as it had the general-in-chief. They were only about forty thousand men, it is true, and carried with them no more than forty pieces of cannon, but they were capable of every heroic effort. Unhappily, with the exception of Montbrun and Fournier, who commanded the cavalry, the generals did not share the ardour of the troops. Loison, always brave, was disconcerted at the distrust felt with regard to him by the 6th corps, which had not ceased to regret the departure of Marshal Ney; Junot was suffering from the effects of a wound; Reynier, who had not recovered from his fatigues and

anxieties, had not a spirit equal to a great crisis; and Drouet, who had been hitherto of so little use, declared that he was about to quit the army of Portugal. Napoleon, indeed, always more anxious for the army of Andalusia, had ordered that the 9th corps should depart immediately for the Guadiana; but whilst urging Massena to dismiss it as speedily as possible, he had left to him to decide upon the moment of its departure. Massena had therefore ordered Drouet to follow him; but the latter was as little disposed to attempt any energetic action as the others.

Massena, relying on himself and his excellent troops, made all wills on this occasion bend to his own, and proceeded towards Ciudad Rodrigo with about 34,000 men, having left the division Clausel on the Salamanca route, to preserve his communications; for it was by this route that he expected to receive provisions, munitions of war, and reinforcements. But whilst the sturdy aspect of his troops was inspiring Massena with the hope of obtaining a prompt and brilliant success, he received information of an event, which he might have easily expected, and which diminished without destroying his hopes. Lord Wellington, to whom the rumours of Marshal Massena's preparations had intimated the nature of his designs, had returned to his army, to prepare it for the contest, to concentrate and reinforce it. But still the French general-in-chief marched forwards, confident in his own superiority, and in that of his soldiers. On the 1st of May he was on the point of quitting Ciudad Rodrigo, without awaiting the arrival of some reinforcements promised by Marshal Bessières; but at that moment Bessières himself appeared, and announced that 1500 horses, a battery of six pieces, and thirty teams would reach the camp in the evening.

The certain hope of this succour, more especially the cavalry, sent a gleam of satisfaction into every countenance. It was resolved to delay the march until the morrow. In the evening the promised reinforcements arrived, and the night was employed in making preparations for departure on the following morning.

The army defiled by the bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo over the Aguéda. Whilst traversing the Aguéda, our troops found the English advanced posts on each side of a little river called the Azana, and behind which they retreated after having lost some men, who were either sabred or taken by our cavalry. Their real position was at some little distance on the banks of a stream, the Dos Casas, deeply entrenched, and presenting those natural defences against an attack such as the English loved to defend. The English army posted behind this stream consisted of about 42,000 men, of whom about 27,000 were English,

12,000 Portuguese, and 2000 or 3000 Spaniards. Lord Wellington had arrived at his camp on the 28th, and personally superintended all its arrangements. On his extreme right, towards the village of Pozo Velho, at the sources of the Dos Casas, he had placed the Spaniards, under their commander Don Julian, that he might have means of readily ascertaining the movements which might be made by the French on that side. Nearer his centre, at the village of Fuentès d'Onoro, he had established his light division, under General Crawford, with a portion of the Portuguese troops, and a little further back, three strong divisions of infantry, under Generals Spencer, Picton, and Houston. The point at Fuentès d'Onoro was important, for it covered the principal communication possessed by the English with Portugal, namely, the bridge of Castelbon over the river Coa. Had they been deprived of this bridge, there would only have remained to them one below Almeida, very insufficient for the passage of an army in retreat, especially when vigorously pursued; this explains why Lord Wellington had collected such a mass of troops in front of and behind Fuentès d'Onoro. On his left, near Alameda, at a point of the Dos Casas where it was of a depth that would render its passage a matter of difficulty, he had echeloned the 6th division, under General Campbell; farther back, towards Fort Conception, was the 5th, under General Dunlop; and finally, the remainder of the Portuguese so disposed as to form a connecting link between Fort Conception and Almeida. As this position occupied from its one extremity to the other less than three leagues and a half, should Massena, instead of proceeding directly against Fuentès d'Onoro, defile before him, with the purpose of descending upon Fort Conception and Almeida, the English general would be able to cross the Dos Casas and throw himself upon the flank of the French. And even without crossing the Dos Casas he would be easily able to concentrate his forces around Fort Conception, which was but partially destroyed, and would prove a valuable point in the manœuvres of a battle. There was but one inconvenience attending this position of Fuentès d'Onoro, and that consisted in the existence of a stream behind it of much the same character as the one in front of it. This stream was the Turones, and was calculated to be either an additional support to the English army, were time afforded for forming behind it in good order, or a source of danger should it be driven towards it in confusion.

Massena, after having remained during the night of the 2nd of May a little in advance of the Azava, took up a position on the morning of the 3rd on the Dos Casas, in the face of the English; Reynier, on the right of the Dos Casas, opposite Almeida; Salignac, with the only division of the 8th corps, was

on the field; and Drouet with the 9th occupied the centre, between Alameda and Fuentes d'Onoro, a little in the rear of the Dos Casas. Loison with the 6th, and Montbrun with the cavalry, were posted directly in front of Fuentes d'Onoro.

When Massena had reconnoitred the enemy's position, he paused to consider whether, defiling by his right, and executing a flank march, he should follow the course of the Dos Casas as far as Fort Conception, and there penetrate to Almeida; or whether he should vigorously attack with his left the English right, established at Fuentes d'Onoro, with the view of cutting it off from Castelbon and the Coa, throwing it back upon their left and centre as far as Almeida, then to drive them altogether upon the Lower Coa, where their retreat would be very difficult and probably very disastrous. As the first plan involved the peril of a flank march in the presence of the enemy, and of finding in Fort Conception a formidable obstacle, Massena much preferred the second plan, which offered the opportunity of gaining a victory, the probable result of which would be the retreat of the English to Coimbra, or even as far as Lisbon.

On the 3rd, therefore, about the middle of the day, Massena ordered General Ferrey, who commanded the 3rd division of the 6th corps, to attack Fuentes d'Onoro, whilst Reynier on the right should throw back the English upon Almeida, and Salignac and Drouet, holding posts of observation in the centre, united the two portions of the army. General Ferrey, preceded by the light cavalry of General Fournier, advanced by the chief road upon Fuentes d'Onoro. General Fournier vigorously charged the English cavalry and light infantry, and drove them in confusion to the village of Fuentes d'Onoro, which General Ferrey then immediately attacked with about 3000 men. This little village of Old Castille, which has become so celebrated, is situated partly on one side of the Dos Casas, and partly on the other, on the slope of a height; it was surrounded by an enclosure very capable of being well defended, and filled with sharpshooters. It was occupied by Colonel Williams, with four battalions of light troops, and the second battalion of the British 83rd. In addition to the natural barriers which rendered its approach very difficult, the English had closed the principal entrance.

General Ferrey attacked Fuentes d'Onoro with 1200 men, and left in reserve his second brigade of almost 1800. Carrying at the bayonet's point all the barriers which had been raised in the principal avenue, he at once drove back the English beyond the Dos Casas, and followed them to its left bank. Colonel Williams was wounded. Lord Wellington brought up reinforcements, and our troops were forced to retreat. At five in the afternoon Massena ordered a second and more serious attack

to be executed by the whole division Ferrey and a brigade of the division Marchand. This was an error. The enemy were now on the alert, and Fuentès d'Onoro should have been attacked by the three divisions of the 6th corps led by the brave Loison.

In the second attack our troops speedily obtained possession of the lower part of Fuentès d'Onoro, the right bank as well as the left bank of the stream, and advancing to the foot of the height, attempted in their impetuosity to climb it. Overcoming one obstacle after another, they arrived almost as far as the summit, and there being exposed to a terrible fire of musketry and artillery, found how unequal were their numbers to the accomplishment of such an enterprise. They were driven back to the bottom of the height, and were on the point of being forced to retreat in disorder on the line of the Dos Casas, when General Ferrey, rallying the troops which had been engaged in the morning, together with the Hanoverian legion and a regiment of the division Marchand, attacked the English with the bayonet, and compelled them to regain the position from which they had descended. The result of these actions was that the English remained masters of the upper part of the village, whilst the French had possession of the lower, and of both banks of the stream, and that either side had lost 600 or 700 men in killed or wounded.

If Massena were not endowed with that foresight and energy which seem to have been possessed by Napoleon alone in modern times, he nevertheless never failed to retain his presence of mind on the field of battle, where most generals ordinarily lose it; and he was so far from being discouraged by difficulty that the strength of his character was always manifested most clearly and exactly in those circumstances in which other persons usually lose theirs. After having passed the day on the field of battle of Fuentès d'Onoro, he had perceived that in ascending towards his left, and consequently towards the English right, the bed of the Dos Casas became less deep, and that at this point a slightly undulated plain formed the only separation between us and the enemy. He supposed, therefore, that on this side he might easily attack and even turn the English, and driving their right upon their centre, their centre on their left, realise his first and well-considered project of throwing them on the Lower Coa, and depriving them of the road which leads to the bridge of Castelbon.

On the evening of the 4th of May, therefore, he executed with the whole army a movement from right to left, from Fuentès d'Onoro to Pozo Velho. He left Reynier before Almeida, with instructions to occupy the attention of the English by an attack more or less vigorous according to events. He left General Ferrey in the low part of Fuentès d'Onoro, giving him the whole

9th corps to assist him in taking this village as soon as sufficient progress had been made towards Pozo Velho to render this operation practicable; he sent the divisions Marchand and Mermet of the 6th corps, all the cavalry, and the division Salignac of the 8th corps (about 17,000 men in all) over against the open ground of Pozo Velho.

On the next day, the 5th of May, the troops had executed their movements betimes. Reynier was in front of Almeida, extending his left towards Fuentès d'Onoro; Ferrey was in the low part of Fuentès d'Onoro; and Drouet behind him, with the 9th corps ready to march to his support. The divisions Mermet and Marchand of the 6th corps, and all the cavalry, with the exception of that of the guard left a little in the rear, were at the height of Pozo Velho. The division Salignac of the 8th corps was appointed to act as their reserve. The army, full of confidence and ardour, believed that it was marching to victory.

In the meantime Lord Wellington had divined Massena's project, and had adapted his movements so as best to meet it. Sending back the light division towards Fuentès d'Onoro, he left Picton with the 3rd division on the heights of Fuentès d'Onoro, and Spencer a little in the rear with the first. He sent towards Pozo Velho, Ashworth's Portuguese brigade, two English battalions, a part of his cavalry, and the whole of General Houston's division, the 7th. Finally, he posted Don Julian and his Spaniards more to the right at Nave d'Avel. He took great precautions with regard to his right, but they were not such as could effectually oppose the 17,000 men whom Massena was about to send against him.

On the morning of the 5th, at daybreak, the movement of the French army commenced. Loison marched towards Pozo Velho, having Montbrun on his left with 4000 dragoons and 1400 hussars and chasseurs. Montbrun wished, in the first place, to disperse Don Julian's Spaniards, and attacking them with his light cavalry, he drove them beyond the Turones. In the meantime Marchand, deploying by his left towards the village of Pozo Velho, which, surrounded by a little wood, was guarded by the Portuguese and by a part of the division Houston, directed an attack upon it which was entirely successful, the enemy being driven away with a loss of about 200 prisoners and 100 in killed or wounded. The brigade Maucune pursued the English beyond the village, and on issuing from it met the cavalry of Montbrun.

At the sight of the English line, which was protected by two regiments of cavalry, Montbrun, burning with ardour, could no longer hesitate to attack them; and having obtained from Massena four pieces of cannon, he advanced upon the division Houston, having in front a squadron of the 5th hussars deployed to conceal his cannon, the dragoons being in the centre,

a squadron of the 11th chasseurs on the right, and one of the 12th on the left. A hundred sharpshooters advanced in front of these troops in order to provoke the centre of the English line. The 51st (English) made a movement in advance, and was speedily broken by the fire from our guns and the charge of our cavalry. Our troops continued their march against the division Houston, and driving it back, separated it from its artillery, which it was on the point of taking, when an unexpected and well-directed fire from some of the enemy's sharpshooters enabled the division Houston to retreat behind the Turones, where it found Don Julian. At the same moment it was replaced on the ground it had quitted by Crawford's light division, which advanced in all haste.

Massena, perceiving that the English right was broken and driven back beyond the Turones, ordered General Loison to advance his divisions Marchand and Mermet, in order that, debouching from Pozo Velho, they might second the effort of the cavalry, and proceed to the environs of Fuentes d'Onoro. This movement, conducted with vigour, would result in the right wing of the English being thrown back upon their centre, as Massena had planned. At the same time he threw Montbrun's cavalry upon Crawford, who prepared to receive it by forming his troops into three squares, with artillery in the intervals between the three.

Our cavalry, led with the most admirable vigour and precision, advanced under a terrible fire from the cannon placed between the English squares. The charge of our light regiments speedily broke the squares on the left and the centre, and fifteen hundred English infantry, with their colonel, surrendered themselves prisoners. The square on the right, however, being protected by the nature of the ground which it occupied, escaped this disaster. Taking advantage of a momentary confusion amongst our soldiers, arising from a groundless supposition that General Fournier had been killed, a portion of the English who had surrendered recommenced their fire; and Montbrun, perceiving the ravages caused in his ranks by the grape of the English cannon, and seeing that the whole English cavalry was advancing against him, made his light cavalry retreat, and sent to demand the assistance of the cavalry of the guard, and the support of a body of infantry.

The cavalry of the guard, however, could not act without an order from Marshal Bessières, and remained immovable. The infantry, badly led by Loison, had penetrated into the woods which surrounded Fuentes d'Onoro, chased away the English, arrived at the foot of the ravine which separated it from Fuentes d'Onoro, and commenced a useless fire against Picton's troops, whilst Ferrey renewed his attack from the Avant Veille.

Montbrun, however, being left unsupported, was unable to renew his attack upon the English infantry, which had this time to re-form and replace themselves in line. Spencer, with the first division, rallying the Portuguese, placed himself beside Crawford, and presented an imposing front supported by a numerous artillery and the whole of the English cavalry. On his left he was in communication with Picton, who defended Fuentes d'Onoro, and on his right with the division Houston, which was on the other side of the Turones.

This being the state of affairs, Montbrun, after having long supported the fire from the English artillery, withdrew his cavalry behind a protecting slope, and thus awaited the recommencement of the battle to renew his exploits of the morning. In the meantime Reynier, believing that he had before him masses of the enemy which in reality were not there, and considering that the task of gaining the battle was not his, confined his operations to insignificant skirmishes. Ferrey furiously attacked Fuentes d'Onoro, and aided by two regiments of the division Claparède, seized the heights above the village; but not being supported, he was compelled to abandon them again. Loison, full of good-will, but erring in his march, and having directed it towards the right instead of towards the left, was stopped by a ravine which separated him from Fuentes d'Onoro.

Massena's invincible determination, however, repaired every misadventure. Formidable as was the English right, composed of Spencer's and Crawford's divisions, the Portuguese and the cavalry, he did not despair of forcing it with the divisions Marchand, Mermet, and Salignac, Montbrun's heroic cavalry, and the effects of the execution of the orders which had been given to Drouet to make a desperate attempt upon Fuentes d'Onoro, and to Reynier to make a serious attack on Alameda.

It was in such moments as these that Massena's keen judgment and determined character displayed all their strength. Montbrun, Loison, Marchand, and Mermet were eager to second his exertions. But at the very moment when the attack was about to be renewed and one last blow struck for victory, General Eblé was compelled to announce that there remained very few cartridges, Bessièrès having failed to supply them. Even this difficulty, which would have been considered fatal by any other man, did not make Massena despair; he deferred the attack until the following morning, believing that the English would remain in the same position, and being convinced that they could receive no reinforcements, for Picton with the 3rd division was indispensable to the defence of Fuentes d'Onoro, Campbell with the 6th to that of Alameda, Dunlop with the 5th to that of Fort Conception. He ordered that the baggage waggons brought by Bessièrès should be sent in all haste to

Ciudad Rodrigo for cartridges and provisions. But Bessières resisted this order, alleging that his baggage train, having been on the march for many days without rest, was too exhausted to execute the proposed task. What was now to be done? Was Massena to deprive Bessières of his sword as he had deprived Ney of his? There are difficulties before which the most determined men are forced to yield. To prevent the scandal of any further disturbance, Massena consented to defer until the morning of the next day the despatch of the waggons to Ciudad Rodrigo.

Such was this battle of Fuentès d'Onoro, which so many obstacles and so many acts of indocility rendered undecisive, and which the courage of our troops, guided by the skilful generalship of Massena, must have converted into a brilliant victory, decisive in respect to Spain, and most probably equally so as regarded Europe, had they only been properly seconded. The position of the two armies on the following day was singular. From Alameda to Fuentès d'Onoro the corps of Reynier and Drouet formed a continuous line opposite the English army along the Dos Casas. At Fuentès d'Onoro our line was bent, and forming almost a right angle, held in blockade beyond the Dos Casas the right wing of the English turned back upon its centre. Lord Wellington had drawn together his best forces upon this point, and had supplied what the position wanted in natural strength by art, having employed his soldiers, although very much fatigued, in throwing entrenchments through the whole of the night. Massena saw with dismay that the time granted for repose to Bessières' teams was much more usefully employed by the enemy. Relying, however, on the ardour of his troops, he determined to renew the contest. But Generals Fririon, Lazowski, and Eblé, who were as devoted to him as to the honour of their arms, revealed to him those sad truths he would fain have ignored, and informed him that many officers, some of them worn out with fatigue, others summoned to serve in different armies, were not sufficiently resolved to do their duty to be safely relied on in a desperate attack. Reynier was in a state of terror, believing that the whole force of the English was about to overwhelm him; Drouet was on the eve of departure; and Bessières conducted himself as an ambitious man in the presence of one whose fortunes were on the decline.

The general-in-chief was dissuaded, therefore, from the course of action he had proposed, and determined to destroy the fortress of Almeida in place of revictualling it. To effect this purpose it was necessary to find some men who would undertake to carry the necessary order across the English army. Three volunteers for this office presented themselves, whose names history ought to preserve. They were Zaniboni, corporal in the 76th of the

line; Noel Lami, a sutler of the division Ferrey; and André Tillet, a chasseur in the 6th light. Each of them carried an order to General Brenier to destroy the fortification, and then to make his way across the line of the English posts as far as the bridge Barba del Puerco on the Aguéda; and he was directed to fire a hundred guns to announce his receipt of the general-in-chief's order.

During the next day, the 7th, Massena remained in position before the English, who continued immovable behind their entrenchments. In the evening was heard the signal which testified the receipt of the order sent to Almeida. On the 8th, Massena, in order to give General Brenier time to complete the destruction of Almeida, made a threatening movement against the centre of the enemy's position. He continued this pretended movement on the following day, and the English, remaining cautiously within their lines, concentrated means of defence on the threatened point, without doubting the intention of the French general.

On the 10th the army, following the example of some of its chiefs, and being ignorant of the marshal's real intention, began to murmur at being uselessly detained before the enemy, and as General Brenier had now had time to complete his task, Massena consented to retreat upon the Aguéda. The English followed our troops with extreme caution, fixing their whole attention on the bulk of the army, and paying no regard to Almeida, which they believed destined to a speedy surrender.

At midnight the army heard during its march a dull explosion, and thus learned that the fortress of Almeida had been destroyed. Reynier left General Heudelet in advance of the bridge Barba del Puerco to receive the fugitive garrison. The next day was expected with the greatest anxiety, for the garrison had eight or nine leagues to pass before it could reach the Aguéda.

General Brenier had some time since undermined the principal works of the fortress, and having received the order on the 7th, completed all the necessary preparations on the 10th. At ten o'clock in the evening he sallied forth with the garrison, leaving 200 sappers under Morlet, the commander of the battalion of engineers, to fire the mines, and rejoin him afterwards by a remote by-way. The departure from the place was made from the quarter least liable to observation, and which was that leading to the Aguéda. The garrison proceeded two leagues without falling in with the enemy, then it met with the advanced posts of Campbell's division and Pack's Portuguese brigade. The latter, wholly giving themselves up to plundering the convoy which followed our troops, permitted them to pass, but General Pack pursued them with the English cavalry of General Cotton. At

daybreak they reached Villa de Cuervas, not far from Barba del Puerco, and joined Morlet and his sappers, who, after having fired the mines, had also arrived to force the line of the enemy's posts. In spite of the attacks of Pack on the one side and Cotton on the other, our brave fugitive garrison succeeded in escaping, and in throwing themselves into the midst of the troops of General Heudelet, which came to meet them. It is said that when Lord Wellington heard the particulars of General Brenier's exploit, he declared that it was equal to a victory; and with an injustice little worthy of him, laid the blame of the misfortune on General Campbell, who certainly was not more in fault than the rest of the army or the general-in-chief himself.

Massena, continuing his retreat, left four months' provisions in Ciudad Rodrigo, remained and reinforced its garrison, and then re-entered Salamanca to refresh and reorganise his army.

In the meantime his companion in arms, Marshal Soult, to whom he had rendered a great service, by freeing him from the presence of Lord Wellington, and from that of one or two English divisions, had been even more unfortunate than himself. Scarcely had Massena's retreat commenced when Lord Wellington sent Hill's corps towards Estramadura, and had added to it various detachments, with the intention of giving succour to Badajoz, or by retaking it by a new siege, should the French have already reduced it. An English division accordingly proceeded to invest Badajoz, which was defended by a garrison determined to resist to the utmost; whilst another body of English, Portuguese, and Spanish troops took up a position on Albuera in order to cover the siege. The 5th corps, under the command of General Latour-Maubourg, was posted a little in the rear, awaiting with impatience succour from Seville; for consisting at most of only eight or nine thousand men after the departure of Marshal Soult, it was reduced to almost nothing when it had furnished the garrison to Badajoz.

Such were the events which had taken place in Andalusia whilst Massena was fighting the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro and having Almeida destroyed. Marshal Soult, having found security re-established in front of Cadiz by the vigour with which Marshal Victor had repulsed the English, and the return of a part of the 4th corps to the province of Seville, had given his attention to the cries of distress which had proceeded from the garrison of Badajoz, which defended itself with the greatest courage, and determined to proceed thither. On the 10th of May he set out with eleven or twelve thousand men to join the remainder of the 5th corps on the road from Seville to Badajoz.

After having rallied the 5th corps, Marshal Soult found himself at the head of about seventeen thousand excellent troops,

including twenty-five hundred of the best cavalry. He arrived on the 15th of May at Santa Martha, within sight of the English army, which was posted at some leagues in advance of Badajoz, on the hills which border the Albuera. Although the Anglo-Spanish army numbered thirty and odd thousand men, and his own amounted to only seventeen thousand, Marshal Soult did not hesitate to attack it, for it was the only means of saving Badajoz, and avoiding the humiliation of seeing the capture of this place, which was his only conquest.

Marshal Beresford commanded the allied army, which comprised Stuart's division (English), the three Portuguese brigades of General Hamilton, and the troops drawn off from the siege of Badajoz.

The Anglo-Spanish army was posted behind the little river Albuera, which might be very easily crossed. Its left was on the village of Albuera, its centre, consisting chiefly of English and Portuguese, on the low hills, and its right, comprising all the Spaniards, on the spurs of these hills, but slightly behind them, so as to be scarcely visible. The troops drawn from the siege of Badajoz, passing actually behind the English line, served for its prolongation and support.

Marshal Soult determined to attack the English on the morning of the 16th of May. He made arrangements for cannonading vigorously, and feigning a serious attack upon the village of Albuera, which was on the enemy's left; but it was against the enemy's right that he determined to make the greatest effort, for he hoped that the English, being attacked on their right, which covered their communication with Badajoz, would be the more easily alarmed and beaten, and that the infliction of a reverse upon them in this direction would have the most important results.

Unfortunately he did not have his arrangements put into execution under his personal inspection, and detained too long by his side General Gazan, who, commanding a division, filled also the functions of chief of the staff, and was one of the most energetic and experienced infantry officers in the army. There was therefore a want of completeness and precision in the execution of the manœuvres. The detachment on our right, which was to cannonade the village of Albuera, took up its position in good time along the stream, and commenced a fire which was equally destructive to the village and to the English troops themselves. The two divisions Gerard and Gazan, forming a mass of eight thousand infantry, also duly entered into action, and advancing in close column, passed the stream, whilst the cavalry of General Latour-Maubourg threatened the enemy's right. But unhappily a certain want of uniformity in the execution of the manœuvres occasioned an hour of inaction to the troops beyond the stream, which gave the English time to con-

concentrate the bulk of their forces on the threatened point. The signal of attack having been given, the division Gerard rapidly ascended the heights, followed by the division Gazan. The division Gerard had scarcely arrived on the height when it found the enemy reaching it almost simultaneously; but although exposed to a most murderous fire, this brave division continued to struggle vigorously forward, and succeeded, with the aid of a vigorous charge of our cavalry, in completely routing the enemy's first line, which was composed of English and Spaniards. But at the same moment Marshal Beresford had carried towards his right a strong body of troops, which took the division Gerard in front and flank, and overwhelmed it with a true and well-sustained fire. In a few minutes almost all the officers were either killed or wounded.

The two divisions were unfortunately too closely crowded together to render possible the manœuvres which would have enabled our troops to return the enemy's fire, and they were accordingly compelled to retreat. Fortunately Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, coming up in mass and deploying on the English flank, held them in check; and General Ruty, having skilfully dispersed his artillery on the heights which were opposite those occupied by the enemy, inflicted on them a loss almost equal to that which we had sustained from the fire of their musketry, the Anglo-Spanish army losing about 3000 in killed and wounded, and the French about 4000.

Marshal Soult, having thus lost 4000 men out of 17,000, was not anxious to risk a second engagement with the English. He brought in his wounded, and took up a position somewhat in the rear. He wrote immediately to Madrid, to Salamanca, and to Paris, to make known his difficulties to Joseph, Marshal Massena, and Napoleon. Although he had not raised the siege of Badajoz, he had proved to the garrison that he was far from being unmindful of it; and the unskilful manner in which the siege had been first conducted by the English had added to the hopes which were natural attendants of the courage of the soldiers of the garrison, of the energy and ability of their commanders.

Such was the condition of affairs in Spain in the month of May 1811; such the result of the great exertions made by Napoleon after the peace of Vienna.

In Portugal, Marshal Massena, after the capture of the frontier fortifications, and after six months passed in front of the lines of Torres Vedras, had been compelled to retreat, and that he might not be forced to behold the capture of the two fortresses which were the only trophies of his campaign, under his own eyes, he had fought the bloody and indecisive battle of Fuentès d'Onoro. Of the 70,000 men he should have had, he

had never in reality had more than 55,000, and these were now reduced to 30,000 exhausted and irritated troops which required to be entirely reorganised.

In the south of Spain, Marshal Soult, after having invaded Andalusia, occupied Cordova, Grenada, and Seville, almost without striking a blow, had employed fifteen months in front of Cadiz, in no more important occupation than erecting some batteries around the roadstead. He had captured, it is true, the fortress of Badajoz, but had been compelled, even as Massena, to fight a bloody battle to save this his only conquest. The 80,000 men he had once had were now reduced to 36,000, as worn out as those of the army of Portugal, but less disorganised perhaps, because having made war in a rich country, they had not been exposed to such great privations, and because they had not been exposed to such evil example on the part of their immediate commanders.

The army of the centre, under Joseph, was far from numerous, had performed no important operations, and had but just sufficed to maintain communications with Andalusia, to disperse towards Guadalaxara the bands of Empecinado, and to keep the province of Toledo in a state of tranquillity. The army of the north had been perpetually harassed by the guerillas of the two Castilles. One province alone presented an appearance of order and repose, and that was Aragon, where the protracted resistance of Saragossa seemed to have exhausted the hatred of the inhabitants, and where the good policy of General Suchet seemed to have reclaimed their spirits, thoroughly worn out by a great calamity. General Suchet, after having obtained possession of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa, had made preparations for besieging Tarragona, the strongest of all the fortifications of Spain. But the surprise of Figüeres by the enemy somewhat counterbalanced the satisfactory state of affairs in this part of the country.

To the sad picture presented by the state of the French military affairs in the Peninsula must be added another not less afflicting, of the court of Madrid. Shut up in his capital, only having command over the army of the centre, consisting of no more than 12,000 effective men, and treated with the greatest disrespect by the various generals, deprived by the want of finances of the consolation of bestowing benefits on his favourites, rendered wretched by the reports he received from his two ministers from Paris, and hearing even at Madrid the echo of his brother's raileries, Joseph, almost overwhelmed by despair, sometimes entertained the idea of abdicating as his brother Louis had done; and being beset on the one side by disgust at the circumstances under which he was at present forced to reign, and on the other by the greatest

repugnance to ceasing to reign, he demanded permission to visit Paris, under pretext of the accouchement of the empress. Napoleon had consented, and Joseph had set out in April in as desponding a state as though the enemy had finally driven him from his capital. This, then, in the month of May 1811, was the result of Napoleon's exertions in regard to Spain.

Why had these two campaigns of 1810 and 1811, from which so much had been hoped, so little answered the expectations which had been founded on them?

To the fault of desiring to rule, to enslave, to transform the world, Napoleon had added the desire of putting his intentions into immediate execution. He had endeavoured, accordingly, to subdue at the same moment both the north and the south of Spain, Valencia, Andalusia, and Portugal. With this view he had dispersed from Grenada to Badajoz 80,000 of his best troops, and had left the army of Portugal without those reinforcements on which it had reckoned, and without which it was unable to accomplish its task. Besides this unfortunate dispersion of troops must be mentioned the desperate tenacity with which he clung to certain illusions, and which he made the basis, although he was partly aware that they were false ones, of his various plans and orders to his lieutenants. But as he could not divest himself of some doubt respecting the reality of the forces which he chose to presume were under his generals' command, he did not dare to give them absolute orders—knowing well that in giving such at so great a distance from the scene of action he might be ordering what was impossible or what would lead to absolute disaster, he left his commands so undefined that full scope was given for their evasion either from ill-will or timidity.

How can we wonder or complain that the errors of the master were increased by those of the lieutenants? What wonder that these distinguished and courageous men should be sometimes careless, inattentive, disunited, jealous! when Napoleon's own great spirit was itself subject to these things—jealousy, rancour, perturbation, error? How blind and improvident is he who does not foresee that these things will exist, and fails to shape his plans accordingly! That alone is a well-judged policy which remains unshaken by the errors of its agents.

If then the great European question, which he had so imprudently transferred to Spain, was not solved in 1810 and 1811, notwithstanding the immense resources devoted to that purpose, we should accuse, not the genius of Napoleon, but his policy, which engendered both his own military errors and those of his lieutenants. After having failed in obtaining the solution of this question in Spain, he endeavoured to attain it in the north,

and we shall see in the future volumes of this work what was the result of that endeavour.

Genius often adds to its errors the fault of being unwilling to acknowledge them, and a desire to attribute them to some other person; and Napoleon, accordingly, recalled Massena, and disgraced this faithful old companion in arms, who had rendered him so many services, and who had displayed in this campaign, although its issue was unfortunate, rare qualities of character and spirit, and had only succumbed to the force of circumstances.

The old warrior re-entered France a broken-spirited, deserted man; his glory tarnished, his energy gone, and no longer capable of command. Napoleon should have regarded him with compassion rather than anger, and in his destiny read his own; for Massena was the first victim demanded by fortune, and Napoleon himself was to be the second; with this distinction, that Napoleon deserved his fate, and Massena had not. For Massena was but the reluctant instrument of those gigantic designs which were to bring upon their author so terrible a punishment, and Napoleon was the author himself. We must add, however, that Massena also deserved to share in this chastisement, for having consented to take part in the execution of that of which he disapproved. But such is commonly the unfortunate effect of unlimited and irresponsible power—by creating the habit of submission it suppresses the idea of resistance, even on the part of the firmest and most clear-sighted men.

BOOK XLI.

THE COUNCIL.

IN the midst of the diverse and complicated events of which the recital has been submitted to the reader's perusal, Napoleon had beheld the realisation of that which was the chief of all his wishes; for he had obtained from Providence a lineal heir, a son, whom France had hoped for, and whom, for his own part, with perfect confidence in his fortune, he had never ceased to expect.

On the 19th of March 1811, towards nine o'clock in the evening, the Empress Marie Louise experienced the first pangs of child-birth. The skilful accoucheur Dubois was immediately present, followed by the great physician of that period, M. Corvisart. Although the young mother was perfectly formed, the circumstances preceding the delivery were not of a perfectly satisfactory nature, and M. Dubois could not refrain from experiencing some anxiety as he reflected on the responsibility which had fallen upon him. Napoleon, perceiving with his usual penetration that the operator's nervousness might be the source of some danger to the mother and the infant, took pains to render lighter his sense of the responsibility upon him.

"Imagine," he said to him, "that you are attending the accouchement of a saleswoman of the Rue Saint Denis; you can do no more than if the case were really so; and in any event let your chief care be to save the mother." He charged M. Corvisart not to quit M. Dubois, and for his own part never ceased to lavish the most tender attentions upon the young empress, and by the most affectionate language to aid her to support her sufferings. At length on the morning of the next day, the 20th March, this child, to whom so high a destiny appeared to be promised, and who in reality found only exile and death in the flower of his age, was born without any of those accidents which had been feared. Napoleon received him in his arms with joy, with tenderness, and when he knew that it was a male infant, a glow of pride beamed from his countenance, as though this important circumstance were a new and remarkable mark of the special protection of Provi-

dence. He presented the new-born child to his family, to his court, and gave it into the charge of Madame de Montesquiou, who had been appointed *gouvernante* of the children of France. The cannon of the Invalides announced to the capital the birth of a child born to an inheritance extending over the greater part of Europe.

The populace felt almost as great exultation as in the most prosperous periods of the reign, and in spite of much cause for anxiety, was delighted at finding a pledge given by Providence for the continuance of the Napoleonic dynasty.

In accordance with the decree which had made Rome the second city of the empire, and in imitation of those Germanic usages by which the prince who was heir-apparent to the throne received the title of King of Rome, this title was bestowed on the new-born prince, and his baptism, which was to be performed with as much pomp as solemnity, was fixed to take place in the month of June.

Singular mockery of fortune! This heir, so much desired, received with such rejoicings, and born to perpetuate the empire, arrived at the moment when this colossal empire, secretly undermined in every direction, was approaching the close of its duration. Few minds as yet had observed the deep-lying causes of its approaching ruin; but secret apprehension had seized upon the masses of the population, and the feeling of security had left them, whilst the sentiment of submission remained unabated. The rumour of a great war in the north, a war which every one instinctively dreaded, especially as that of Spain was not yet concluded, had spread far and wide, and caused universal disquietude. The conscription, the result of this new war, was enforced with extreme rigour; at the same time a violent crisis overwhelmed both commerce and industry; and finally, the ecclesiastical quarrel increased in bitterness, and gave rise to the dread of a general schism. Such were the various causes which mingled grave anxiety with the joy inspired by the birth of the King of Rome.

Napoleon had suddenly changed his precautionary measures into preparations, which seemed to imply that the war would commence in the summer or autumn of the current year, 1811. Indeed, Russia, which had hitherto confined itself to the construction of some works on the banks of the Dwina and the Dnieper, and to some movements of the troops of Finland in Lithuania, and for which it was easy to give specious excuses, although it was impossible to conceal them, having received information from every quarter of the extent and rapidity of Napoleon's preparations, had at length decided on the serious measure of marching its armies on the Danube, a measure

which would render doubtful the much longed for conquest of Wallachia and Moldavia. The news of this retrograde movement produced the most lively impression on Napoleon's mind; for in place of regarding it as a result of the fear which he had inspired, he believed that he had discovered in it a proof that the designs of Russia were not defensive but aggressive. This was an error; but accustomed to the hatred of Europe, and the perfidious conduct which was frequently its result, he imagined that there was a secret agreement between Russia and his enemies, open or concealed; and he considered that he ought to prepare for the commencement of the war in the July or August of the current year.

He had already resolved to march the fourth battalions upon the Elbe, and now determined to send them forward immediately, and to form a sixth battalion in those regiments (the fifth remaining that of the *dépôt*), which would permit of their furnishing five battalions for effective service.

He hoped thus to raise Marshal Davout's corps to five French divisions, without taking into account a sixth division which would be Polish, and would be formed of the troops of Dantzic. He had horses collected from Germany, preferring to exhaust this country rather than France; drew the cuirassiers, the chasseurs, and the hussars whom he intended to send to Russia from their cantonments, and ordered the colonels to prepare to place their regiments on a war footing. Supposing that he had not time to raise to five or even to four battalions the corps of the Rhine, which was composed of the ancient divisions which had served under Lannes and Massena, and was spread over Holland and Belgium, he had select battalions formed of the best soldiers of each of its regiments. He gave similar orders with respect to the army of Italy; ordered the assembling and equipment on a war footing of those corps of the old and young guard which were not in Spain; wrote to all the princes of the German Confederation to demand their contingents; and thus placed himself in a position to be able to send forward on their march 167,000 excellent infantry, 39,000 or 40,000 of the finest cavalry, and 24,000 artillery serving 800 pieces of cannon, independently of 100,000 Poles, Saxons, Bavarians, Wurtembergians, Badians, and Westphalians.

Napoleon recalled Marshal Ney from Spain, wishing to confide to him the command of a portion of the troops assembled on the Rhine. He intended to place the surplus under Marshal Oudinot. He also recalled from Spain Marshal Montbrun, who by his conduct at Fuentès d'Onoro, and on many other occasions, had distinguished himself as one of the first cavalry officers of the period.

Fearing a sudden invasion by the Russians of the Duchy

of Warsaw, Napoleon had instructed the King of Saxony and Prince Poniatowski, the lieutenant of the King of Saxony in Poland, to transport all the artillery, all the ammunition, and all the equipments of the weaker, ill-defended places into the fortresses of the Vistula, such as Modlin, Thorn, and Dantzic. He recommended the King of Saxony to hold the Saxon troops in readiness, in order to be able to march them rapidly upon the Vistula, by the side of those of Prince Poniatowski. Both were to be under the command of Marshal Davout, who was ordered at the first signs of danger to hasten upon the Vistula with 150,000 men, of whom 100,000 French were to take up a position from Dantzic to Thorn, and 50,000 Saxons and Poles from Thorn to Warsaw. By means of such precautions it would be easy to reply to all offensive movements on the part of the Russians, and even to prevent them.

In order to fill up the ranks of his armies, Napoleon had been compelled to hasten the levy of the conscription of 1811. But he had not confined himself to this measure; for he desired to recover the arrears of the previous conscriptions, which consisted of about 60,000 refractory persons who had never joined. The conscription had not then become naturalised to the national manners, as it has since become, and the sad fate of those that were drawn, and who went to Spain to perish, whilst still mere youths, rather of famine than the sword, had not tended to dispose the population to submit to it. In certain provinces, and especially in those of the west, the centre, and the south, where courage was not wanting, but submission to the central authority was by no means firmly established, the conscription was resisted; many of those who were drawn in these parts declined to yield to the summons of the law, or if they did, subsequently deserted, and betaking themselves to the woods and to the mountains, and being favoured by the people, sometimes even made war on the gendarmes. It was this kind of men who furnished in La Vendée the troops of the royalist insurrection. Naturally brave, they had also derived courage from having been many years in a state of insubordination. Twenty or twenty-four thousand of these men had been recovered either by means of capture or offers of pardon; but about sixty thousand still remained at large throughout the various provinces of France.

When Napoleon had an end in view, he seldom failed to find means for its accomplishment, and he now formed ten or a dozen columns mobile, which, under zealous commanders, and accompanied by bodies of gendarmes as guides, were to undertake an active pursuit of the refractory recruits. These columns were authorised to place under martial law the provinces they

should traverse, and to place soldiers in those households where the sons had failed to obey the conscription. When we remember that these soldiers regarded the refusal of military service as in the highest degree shameful and criminal, and had been in the habit of living in conquered countries, we may readily conceive that they might commit many excesses, although they were now in their own country, and that their conduct, added to the distress arising from the conscription of 1811, would drive the provinces exposed to it almost to despair.

The prefects, whose duty it was to give the sentiments of the population a direction favourable to the government, were alarmed and almost distracted at this measure. Nevertheless some of them, wishing to make their zeal equal to what they had to perform, rendered the execution of the orders they received severer than the orders themselves. Others, on the contrary, and amongst them M. Lezay-Marnezia in the Bas-Rhin, had the courage to resist, as far as possible, the general who had the command of columns in his department, and to write to the minister of police the most energetic letters, intended to be submitted to the perusal of Napoleon himself. But the larger number of these officials, although secretly grieved at them, preferred to execute the orders they received rather than resign their office.

If the rural populations had their griefs, so had those of the towns theirs; these latter arising from a serious industrial and commercial crisis. We have already related the ingenious and yet violent measures devised by Napoleon for the exclusion of British commerce from the continent, except on payment of a ruinous duty, to the profit of the imperial treasury. These measures had obtained, if not all the success which had been anticipated, at least all that could have been reasonably expected, since the conditions necessary to their success were opposed to the interests, the tastes, and the inclinations not only of one people, but of the whole world. With the exception of some contraband traffic carried on by the Swedes, who conveyed clandestinely the colonial merchandise of Gothenburg to Stralsund; with the exception of some permitted into Old Prussia, as much from negligence as bad faith; and with the exception of a certain amount which was still carried on in Russia under the American flag; there was no outlet for the disastrous accumulation which had taken place in London of colonial merchandise. The manufacturers of Manchester, of Birmingham, and of all the manufacturing towns of England, overleaping, as usual, the end aimed at by their greedy desire for gain, had produced three or four times as much merchandise as the colonies of all the nations of the world could possibly have consumed. The vessels sent from Liverpool had been

compelled to bring back a portion of their cargoes; and those few which had been able to part with their cargoes had received in exchange colonial produce, which had become so depreciated in price that the cost of warehousing it exceeded its value. In 1811 the distress had become so great that the British parliament, fearing a general bankruptcy, had voted an aid to commerce of six million sterling to be distributed in loans to those manufacturers and merchants who were the most embarrassed. Such a condition of affairs, already endured for a considerable time, must inevitably have led to a commercial and financial catastrophe, or to a tendency to peace too strong for the government to resist.

But there is no species of combat, whatever be the weapons employed, by which one is able to injure without receiving injury in return. Napoleon had not been able to keep back in England such quantities of products which were either agreeable, or useful, or necessary to the populations of the continent, without causing considerable perturbation; and he had excited in France and the neighbouring countries a commercial and industrial crisis which was as violent as that which afflicted England, although happily of shorter duration.

Cotton tissues having to a great extent superseded those of linen, especially since they had been produced by machinery, had become the largest branch of industry in Europe. The French manufacturers having to supply old and new France and the whole of the continent, had proportioned their enterprise to the extent of the demand which they expected. They had speculated immoderately on the supposition that the exclusive supply of the continent would be in their hands, as the English had upon that of the English, French, Dutch, and Spanish colonies. Other branches of manufacture had received an extension as vast and as rapid as that of cotton, and had as immoderately multiplied their produce.

Nor had the ardour of the moment directed itself only to the manufacture of the various products, but also to the introduction of the original materials of which they were composed. The speculators, to whom the funds, on account of their almost constant uniformity, offered but little temptation, traded with eagerness in sugar, coffee, cotton, and indigo; they hurried to Antwerp, Mayence, Frankfort, and Milan, where the government sold the merchandise which was brought back by the artillery waggons which had conveyed shot and shell to the banks of the Elbe; and on the basis of these rash speculations raised up brilliant fortunes, which by turns appeared and disappeared in the sight of the astonished and envious populace.

In the midst of this commercial agitation prudence had, of

course, been the virtue least observed. Whilst industry produced much which it could not sell, the speculators in raw material endeavoured to purchase far larger quantities of it than the industry of the country could employ, and the inevitable consequence of this was that its price rose to an immoderate height. To pay for these imprudent purchases there were created artificial methods of obtaining credit. Thus a house in Paris which dealt in timber and colonial produce drew to the extent of fifteen hundred thousand francs a month on a house in Amsterdam; this drew upon others, and these last in their turn drawing upon Paris, there was created a fictitious method of supply, which in the language of commerce is known as *papier de circulation*. The police, observing everything, but not comprehending everything, fancied that they had discovered in this commercial artifice a conspiracy, which they hastened to denounce to the emperor, who was soon satisfied of its real nature by the minister of finance.

As little reserve was displayed in the enjoyment of the profits obtained by these means as in the means themselves. The newly acquired fortunes were lavishly expended in the purchase of those estates and châteaux of the ancient noblesse which had come into the possession of the State under the title of national property; and there were in Paris manufacturers who had honourably acquired wealth by their exertions, and speculators in colonial produce whose money was less honourably gained, who were possessed of the noblest domains in the country.

This proneness to speculation had been in existence many years, had been checked for an instant in 1809 in consequence of the Austrian war, had been resumed after the peace of Vienna, had been immoderately developed during the course of the year 1810, and had finally led, at the commencement of the year 1811, to the inevitable catastrophe which always follows such industrial and commercial excesses.

The failure of a great commercial house of Lubeck gave the signal for a succession of bankruptcies. The oldest and most respectable of the houses at Amsterdam, which had been induced by the temptation of large commissions to lend its credit to the rashest merchants of Paris, failed almost immediately after the Lubeck house. The Parisian houses which had existed solely on the resources they had drawn from this Dutch house perceived that the artificial nature of their existence must now be discovered, and with great clamour implored the succour of the government. Napoleon, who perceived, although he did not avow, the share which he had in this crisis, and who was unwilling that the celebration, which was about to take place, of the birth of the heir to his throne, should be attended

by sad incidents, hastened to announce that he would afford aid to the embarrassed houses; and he desired, very properly, to render this aid efficacious by bestowing it speedily and quietly. Unfortunately the personal opinions of his minister of the treasury, and the strange vanity of one of the houses which had been assisted, prevented the exact fulfilment of his intentions. M. Mollien held theoretical objections to the principle of affording aid to commerce. Napoleon disregarded his objections, and ordered him to grant assistance to a certain number of houses. But the minister consoled himself for his defeat by disputing with these houses either the value of the securities which they offered, or the possibility of saving them. This was the cause of the loss of a great deal of time. Besides this, one of the assisted houses made open mention of what the government had done for it. In this way were lost all the advantages which would have resulted from speedy and secret aid. It became known that there was a crisis, and there took place the usual panic. Napoleon refused, as usual, to be intimidated by the difficulty, and openly assisted the chief of the embarrassed houses, in spite of all the objections of his minister of the treasury; but he had not the satisfaction of saving more than a very small portion of those merchants and manufacturers in whom he had interested himself.

The houses which had speculated in sugars, coffees, cotton, and timbers were the first to fall. After these came those who had not speculated in the raw material, but who had manufactured cotton fabrics to an extent which had exceeded the demand, and had lived on the credit granted to them by certain bankers. When this credit failed they speedily succumbed. The ruin of the producers of cotton tissues was succeeded by that of the manufacturers of cloths, to whom the exclusion of French cloths from Russia had been a serious blow. The refiners who had speculated in sugars, and the leather sellers who had speculated in the leathers introduced by means of licences, felt the shock of the crisis in all its severity. Finally, the silk manufacturers, who had produced large quantities of fabrics, but who had not been so rash as other manufacturers, because their branch of industry was old and well established, and less affected by novelty and the exaggeration of profits, received a sensible blow from the last commercial regulations of Russia and by the ruin of the Hamburg houses, which, in the absence of the Americans, served as the means of export for the products of Lyons.

Large bodies of workmen soon found themselves deprived of employment in Brittany, Normandy, Picardy, Flanders, Lyons, Forey, *le comtat* Vendissin, and Languedoc. Napoleon, much grieved at these accumulated distresses, and more especially at

the sufferings endured by the people, and fearing the effect they might have during the fêtes he was preparing in celebration of the birth of his son, was anxious to alleviate them at any cost. He held council after council, and learned too late that there are troubles against which a man's genius and determination, however exalted, can avail nothing. It was not his system of exclusion with respect to the English which had been the cause of the evil; but his complicated combinations had induced to foolish speculations in raw material; the usurpation of the sovereignty of Hamburg had precipitated the ruin of houses which were indispensable to the vast system of continental credit at this period; large government sales had hastened the crisis, and the aid he had afforded to commerce had, by reason of the personal opinions of the minister of the treasury, been granted too slowly and too grudgingly. Finally, his famous tariff of 50 per cent. had prolonged the evil, for the manufacturers who had begun to get rid of their fabrics, and who had desired to reopen their works, had not ventured to do so on account of the high price to which the elevation of the duties raised the raw material.

Rejecting the theories of M. Mollien, and holding frequent councils with the ministers of the interior and finance, with the director-general of customs, and many distinguished manufacturers and merchants, such as MM. Tourneaux and Hottinguer, Napoleon devised a plan which had some beneficial effects; this was to purchase goods secretly, and at his own expense, but apparently on account of the great banking houses, so as to lead the public to suppose that the sale was natural. This kind of aid could not change the real state of affairs, but it was not without influence, especially at Rouen, where the sales were believed to be genuine, and regarded as the commencement of a commercial movement!

This state of affairs, however, painful as it might be, was in many respects advantageous as compared with that which existed at the same time in England; for the lapse of time must ameliorate the position of commerce in France by clearing off the superabundance of manufactured goods, and attracting the Americans, who had already begun to replace in our markets the Dutch and the Russians, and to bring us the cotton which was so essential to our industrial activity. The situation of the English, on the other hand, if their commerce still continued to be blockaded, and they gained no ally on the continent, would speedily become intolerable.

The situation of French commerce and industry was, nevertheless, for the moment, extremely critical. Napoleon received deputations from the chambers of commerce, and in his original language, as familiar as vigorous, addressed to them a discourse,

of which he desired the substance and chief expressions to be promulgated as widely as possible, and which was somewhat to the following effect: "My ears are open to all that is said in your houses of business, and to the kind of conversation you hold in the bosom of your families and among yourselves on my policy, my laws, and myself. 'He only understands warfare,' you frequently say; 'he knows nothing of commerce, and he has no one about him capable of instructing his ignorance; his measures are extravagant and have been the cause of our ruin.' But the truth is that you who say these things are ignorant of the principles of commerce and industry. The cause of your present ruin is not I, but your own conduct. You have indulged in the belief that fortune in commerce is to be gained in a single day, as a campaign is sometimes decided by a battle. But it is, in fact, by life-long labour, by prudent conduct, and by adding the accumulations of economy to the products of toil, that riches ought alone to be expected. Some of you have speculated in the sudden variations of the price of raw material, and have frequently been deceived; instead of making their fortunes, they have made those of others. Others have manufactured to an extent far exceeding the demand, and have lost when they might have gained. Is it my fault if greediness has deprived you of prudence? But errors may be atoned for by patience, and that which is lost may be recovered by more prudent proceedings. You have committed faults this year; you will be wiser and more fortunate next year. As for my measures, how can you tell whether they be bad or good? Shut up in your workrooms, and ignorant of everything which does not relate to silk or cotton, iron, wood, or leather, having no general view of the whole industrial system, ignorant of the vast relations existing between State and State, how are you capable of judging of the means which I employ against England? Inquire, however, of those among you who have gone furtively to London for contraband purposes, respecting what they have seen there. I know what they say as well as I know what you say, for I am thoroughly informed of all that you utter and all that you do. They have returned astonished at the distress endured by England, at the overcrowded state of their magazines, at the continued depression of its exchange, at the ruin of its commerce, and have said on their return, of me and my measures, 'This devil of a man is right after all.' Well! I *am* right, and my plans have reduced England to a desperate position more speedily than I could have hoped. She has saturated with her products the colonies of Spain, her own, and ours, for I do not know how many years. They have not been able to pay her, or when they have paid her it has been in colonial produce, by which that already on her hands has

been depreciated in value. On this colonial produce the merchants draw bills, which go to the bank and are there converted into paper money. The government also draws upon the bank for the pay of its armies and navies, and this causes fresh emissions of paper money. How long do you suppose that this state of things can last? And are we in a similar state? No! I have freed you from paper money, I have still 800 millions in gold or silver in my treasury, and you have the whole continent open for the sale of your manufactures. The contest was not on equal terms between England and ourselves. She must sooner or later succumb. There are some outlets in Sweden, Prussia, and a more distant part of the world (alluding to Russia), by which English produce finds its way over the continent; but be patient; I shall take proper measures. There are contraband traders; I shall find means of detecting them. Those who escape my custom-house officers shall not escape my soldiers, and I will pursue them to the utmost. Do you understand me?"

Napoleon uttered these words menacingly, and with the utmost excitement of gesture, glance, and accent. He resumed his discourse and said: "This war with England is long and painful, I know, but what would you that I should do? What measures do you wish me to employ? Since you complain so much that the sea is closed, I presume that you are of opinion that it should be open, that a single power should not rule over it at the expense of all the others? For myself, I am thoroughly determined on this point; I will never abandon the rights of neutrals; I will never submit to the principle that the flag does not cover the merchandise, that the neutral should be compelled to visit England to pay her tribute. Should I be guilty of yielding to such theories, you would soon be unable to sail from Rouen or Havre without a passport from the English. My decrees from Berlin and Milan will be laws of the empire until England has renounced its foolish pretensions. The Americans ask permission to reappear in our ports, for the purpose of bringing you their cotton and purchasing your silks, which will be to you a source of great relief. I am ready to consent to this, on condition that they enforce on their side the principles which I maintain, and which are also theirs, and the principles of all maritime nations, and that if they should not be able to induce England to respect these principles as regards themselves, they will declare war against her. If they will not consent to this condition, I will treat them as English, and close against them my ports. What would you that I should do? Undoubtedly if I had been able to form admirals, as I have formed generals, we would have beaten the English, and a real peace, not patched up like that

of Amiens, and cloaking over a thousand unappeased resentments, a thousand opposite, irreconcilable interests, would have been established. Unhappily I cannot be everywhere. Being unable to vanquish the English on the sea, I conquer them by land, and pursue them along the coasts of the old continent. Nevertheless I do not resign all attempts by sea, for our sailors are as brave as theirs, and our naval officers need only practice. My vessels shall again go forth, and if they lose the first battle or the second, they will gain the third or at least the fourth, for there will at length arise a man who will render our flag victorious; and in the meantime I will hold my sword at the breast of any who may be inclined to aid the English. The contest is long, I grant, but in the meantime you will profit by the development of our industry, by becoming manufacturers, and by supplying the continent, in the place of the English, with woven fabrics, cutlery, and cloths. It is after all no slight advantage to have the supply of the continent in our hands. The world is constantly subject to change; there is not a single age which resembles another. To be rich in former times, it was necessary to possess India, America, St. Domingo. These times are already nearly passed away. We must now be manufacturers, and provide for ourselves that which we formerly sought elsewhere. If I have time you shall manufacture your own colonial produce, sugar, indigo; not that I despise the colonies or maritime enterprise; but manufacturing industry is at least of equal importance; and whilst I am striving for the freedom of the seas, the industry of France develops. Being in this position, therefore, we are able to wait. In the meantime Bordeaux and Hamburg suffer; but they suffer now that they may profit hereafter by the re-establishment of freedom on the seas. It is necessary to know how to suffer for the sake of a great purpose. Your sufferings during this year, however, have not been for any great purpose, but are the result of your own errors. I am better acquainted with your affairs than you are with mine. Act with prudence and moderation, and do not hasten to blame me, for when you do so, it is frequently the case that you ought rather to blame yourselves. Moreover, I watch over your interests, and every alleviation of your condition it is possible to obtain for you you receive."

Such was the language by which Napoleon silenced, without convincing, although he was right upon almost every point, the commercial men with whom he spoke. But it is a subject of constant wonder, that men who have abundant wisdom to bestow upon others have very little with which to guide themselves. Napoleon was right to blame the merchants for their rash speculations, but how much would he have been em-

barrassed if one of these speculators in sugar or cotton had demanded of him, a speculator of another sort, whether a contest with England rendered necessary to acquire the crowns of Naples, Spain, and Portugal, and to bestow them upon his brothers; whether the difficulty of establishing his dynasty upon so many thrones had not singularly increased the difficulty of triumphing over the maritime pretensions of the English; whether, with the Bourbons trembling, and submission at Madrid and Naples, he could not have obtained from them as much concurrence in his designs as from his half-rebellious brothers; whether the French troops dispersed at Naples, Cadiz, and Lisbon might not have been better risked between Calais and Lisbon; whether, even allowing these conquests to be necessary, he would not have commenced by driving Lord Wellington into the sea, contenting himself with the blockade as practised by Russia, instead of suddenly leaving the English to be triumphant in the Peninsula, for the purpose of venturing in the north on a new war, the success of which must have been doubtful, under a pretence of enforcing a strict observance of the blockade, which was by no means indispensable; and whether constant changes of place, inordinate pride and desire to make the whole universe submit to his will, was the sure and direct method of putting an end to the tyrannical ambition of England.

There was no such tardy questioner, and the truth was not spoken. But to leave the truth unspoken is to conceal an evil without checking it; and its secret ravages are the most dangerous, because they suddenly become apparent when it is too late to remedy them.

Added to the two causes of evil, which we have spoken, and which were the conscription and commercial crisis, was a third, which consisted of the religious troubles which had been recently aggravated by a fresh outburst of Napoleon's violent self-will.

We have seen above to what point matters had arrived, with the Pope in confinement at Savoy. Napoleon had sent to him the cardinals Spina and Cassel, for the purpose of obtaining in the first place the canonical institution of the nominated bishops, which was the chief source of difficulty, and afterwards to sound him with respect to a settlement of all the points in dispute between the empire and the papacy. Napoleon was particularly anxious to induce Pius VII. to consent to the abrogation of the temporal power of the Holy See, the annexation of Rome to the territory of the empire, and the establishment of a papacy dependent on the new emperors of the west; the residence of which should be Avignon or Paris, and as much under the authority of the Emperor of the

French as the Russian Church was under the authority of the czars, and Islamism under the authority of the sultans. Pius VII. had at first received the cardinals with considerable coldness ; but he had subsequently displayed a more conciliatory demeanour towards them, and had shown himself not absolutely averse to the canonical institution of the nominated bishops, but indisposed to grant it immediately in order that he might preserve a means of constraining Napoleon to bestow attention on the affairs of the Church. At the same time he appeared determined to reject the material advantages which were offered to him, demanding but two things—the catacombs as a residence, and some faithful cardinals as councillors.

Although their journey was without result, the two cardinals were inclined to think that the Pope was not unreasonable, and that by considerate treatment and the grant of a council he would be induced to resume his pontifical functions without leaving Savoy, being content to live there because he was there, and because being in some sort a prisoner there he would sanction nothing by his submission to it, whilst if he went to Paris or Avignon, and accepted the offers which were made to him, he would be sanctioning the imperial acts. From the interviews which the Pope had since had with M. de Chabral, the same conclusions might be drawn, and Napoleon sought for some plan of reconciling the inclinations of the Pope with his own views, when various incidents which had suddenly come to pass had hurried him into a state of extraordinary exasperation and the most violent proceedings.

The reader doubtless remembers the expedient which had been devised for the provisional administration of the dioceses to which the prelates had been nominated but not instituted. There were no less than twenty-seven dioceses in this position, and amongst them such sees as Florence, Malines, Paris, &c. The chapters, some of them voluntarily, and others compulsorily, had conferred the qualification of vicars capitular on the nominated bishops, by which means they were enabled to govern as administrators their new dioceses. Cardinal Maury, nominated Archbishop of Paris in the place of Cardinal Fesch, and not yet instituted, administered in this manner the diocese of Paris ; but he had much opposition to bear on the part of the chapter.

Napoleon was like an enraged lion at such new instance of opposition on the part of the clergy ; but he allowed such things to occupy his attention but little now, as he looked forward to a general settlement of all ecclesiastical affairs, shortly to take place. But reports reached him from Turin, Florence, and Paris, which suddenly revealed to him a plan devised by priests and bigots to render impossible the provisional administrations devised for the churches. The Pope had secretly written to the

various chapters to engage them not to recognise as vicars-capitular the nominated but uninstituted bishops. He addressed to the chapter of Paris a formal prohibition to recognise Cardinal Maury as vicar-capitular, and had sent a most bitter letter to the cardinal himself, reproaching him with his ingratitude towards the Holy See, which, he said, had received him in his exile, and endowed him with many benefices, and especially the bishopric of Montefiascone (as though the cardinal had not done for the Church at least as much as the Church had done for him), and enjoined him to renounce the administration of the diocese of Paris. By a strange piece of negligence this double missive had been addressed to the chapter and the cardinal through the minister of worship, together with many other missives relative to matters of detail, which the Pontiff was from time to time desirous of arranging. The minister having opened these letters, was extremely surprised at their contents, and being unwilling to say anything respecting them to the cardinal from a fear of distressing him, sent them to the emperor, whose irritation may be conceived, when he saw these efforts of the imprisoned Pope to nullify the last means left of administering the vacant dioceses.

At the same moment there arrived from Piedmont and Tuscany information of an exactly similar nature. M. d'Osmond, nominated Archbishop of Florence, and actually on his way to his new diocese, was met at Plaisance by a deputation from the chapter of Florence charged with a declaration to him that there was already a vicar-capitular, that it would be impossible to elect another, and that instructions had been received regarding this matter from Savoy, and that it was resolved not to disobey them. This unhappy archbishop, a wise but a timid man, had therefore remained at Plaisance in the most cruel perplexity. The Princess Elisa, Napoleon's sister, who governed her duchy with a happy mixture of gentleness and firmness, had been informed of the circumstance, and having inquired into the whole matter, sent an account of it to Napoleon before taking any severe measures. In Piedmont the nominated Bishop of Asti met with a similar reception; and the Prince Borghèse, governor of Piedmont, had sent to Paris, as had the Princess Elisa, the particulars of this singular and audacious opposition.

Napoleon now saw that there was a well-combined system of resistance, of which the result must be either to compel him immediately to come to terms with the Pope, or to excite a decided schism. He was informed almost simultaneously, namely, on the 29th, the 30th, and 31st December 1810, of the facts above related. He determined to put a stop to the propagation of the letters of the Pope, and with this end in view desired to strike with terror all those who had carried

them, had received them, or had them in their possession. On the following day, the 1st January 1811, he was to receive the homage of the great bodies of the State, especially of the chapter and clergy of Paris. At the head of the chapter of Paris was the Abbé d'Astros, a passionate and imprudent priest, who held, even to fanaticism, all the opinions of that portion of the clergy which was hostile to the emperor. Napoleon, knowing the kind of man with whom he had to deal, entered into conversation with him, on this occasion, on the most difficult points of the religious disputes, and in such a manner as to provoke on the part of the abbé some imprudence which might serve to draw out his real opinions. He succeeded perfectly, and after having drawn the abbé into uttering those expressions he wished, he had the Duke of Rovigo, who was in the palace, summoned to his presence, and said to him, "Either I am much deceived, or this abbé has in his possession letters of the Pope. Detain him before he leaves the Tuileries, interrogate him, and give orders that his papers be searched, and we shall certainly discover that which we wish to know."

The Duke of Rovigo, who had already acquired all the dexterity necessary to his new functions, on interrogating the abbé, pretended to be acquainted with that of which he was ignorant, and obtained by this means a revelation of that which had taken place. The Abbé d'Astros acknowledged that he had received the two letters from the Pope, the one for the chapter, the other for the cardinal, declared, however, that he had not yet propagated them, and very imprudently admitted having spoken thereof to his parent, M. Portalis. At the same moment the agents sent to the abbé's abode had found the papal letters, and many other missions which revealed full particulars of the scheme which was being inquired into.

When all this was first discovered, Napoleon, who desired to inspire fear, commenced with a first victim, and this victim was M. Portalis, who, equally submissive to the Church and Napoleon, had thought it sufficient to say to the prefect of police, who was his friend, that there was in circulation a letter from the Pope which was much to be regretted, and which was very capable of sowing discord between the Church and the State, and that it would be well to prevent its propagation; and had not thought it necessary to particularise his son, the Abbé d'Astros.

On the 4th of January, the Council of State being assembled, and M. Portalis assisting at the sitting, Napoleon commenced by relating all that had passed between the Pope and certain chapters, and the aim of which was, according to him, to excite subjects against their sovereign; then affecting a tone

of extreme grief, he added, that the most painful part of the circumstance was that amongst the most guilty persons was a man whom he had loaded with benefits, the son of an old minister whom he had much esteemed, a member of his own council then present, M. Portalis. Then turning abruptly to the person accused, he demanded of him whether he had known of the Pope's letter; whether, having known of it, and keeping it secret, this were not both treason and black ingratitude. M. Portalis, an eminent magistrate, whose energy was not unfortunately equal to his high intelligence, was only able to utter some broken words, and Napoleon, forgetting what was due to a member of his council, to the council, and to himself, addressed him thus:—

"Go, sir, go! that I may see you here no more!" The councillor of State treated with this violence tremblingly arose, and traversing in tears the council chamber, retired almost senseless from the midst of his stupefied colleagues.

The secret satisfaction which humanity generally experiences at the sight of any extraordinary disgrace was not the sentiment which was excited on this occasion. Compassion and a sense of wounded dignity were manifested throughout the council by an icy demeanour. There is no power, however great, which can offend with impunity the sentiments of an assembly of men. Napoleon, perceiving from the aspect of those around him that he had been injudicious and cruel, experienced a feeling of embarrassment, from which he vainly attempted to escape by an affectation of extreme grief which was almost ridiculous. He was permitted to indulge uninterrupted in this senseless display, and the council retired without saying a word.

Napoleon took more efficacious measures than this for the purpose of intimidating the clergy, and checking the ill consequences that might result from the circumstances that had come to light. He had M. d'Astros detained; arrested or banished from Paris many of the priests composing the conciliabule of which the existence had been discovered; ordered the Prince Borghèse, and his sister Elisa, to send under arrest the refractory canons of Asti and Florence to Fenestrelle, and to declare to these chapters that if they did not immediately submit and directly confer on the new prelates the quality of vicars-capitular, their sees would be suppressed, together with the canonries, and that the canons would be confined in the State prisons. The same declaration was addressed to the chapter of Paris.

These violent measures were followed by others still more grievous. Napoleon ordered the Pope to be separated from all those persons by whom he was surrounded, with the

exception of one or two domestics on whom perfect reliance could be placed; that he should be deprived of all means of writing; that his papers should be seized and sent to Paris; that his expenses, which had hitherto been on a princely scale, should be reduced to fifteen or twenty thousand francs per annum; and that he should be expressly forbidden either to write or to receive letters. An officer of gendarmerie was to watch him day and night, and to observe his least movements. The prefect, M. de Chabral, was charged to frighten him, not only in respect to himself, but in respect to all those who had been mixed up in the late proceedings; and to intimate that by his imprudent conduct he had rendered himself liable to be deposed by a council, and had exposed his accomplices to still severer punishments.

The execution of these furious measures was fortunately entrusted to a man of tact and good sense! But whilst he executed his orders with all kindness, he was compelled to fulfil them; and the Pope, although at first he testified more annoyance at the measures to which he was subjected than was fit (and we are grieved at having to record the fact, for we are jealous of the dignity of such a victim), soon submitted to them with great patience, saying that he did so, not for his own sake, but for the sake of those who might become victims of their devotion to the Church, and adding, that as for himself he was near the close of his career, and would soon escape from his persecutors by leaving in their hands, instead of a Pope, an inanimate corpse.

As for the chapters of Florence and d'Asti, they were miserably zealous in their submission; made their excuses with tears and on their knees, and conferred on M. d'Osmond for the diocese of Florence, and on M. Dejèan for the diocese of d'Asti, almost all the powers not only of an administrator, but even of an instituted prelate. At Paris the completeness of the submission was even more strongly marked. The dioceses of Metz, of Aix, and others, where the same spirit of opposition had been displayed, submitted with equal docility. This was not for the Church the age either of martyrdom or genius. Pius VII., notwithstanding some weaknesses inseparable from his state of suffering, was the only one of its members worthy of the fortunate ages of the Roman Church.

Napoleon, being obeyed, grew calm. But he resolved to put an end to this spirit of resistance, and determined to execute an idea which had already frequently offered itself to his mind, and which was that of assembling a council, of which he would be the absolute master, and by means of which he might either induce the Pope to yield, or render his submission unnecessary, by substituting for the authority of the head of the Church the authority of the assembled Church. He had already formed an

ecclesiastical commission, composed of many prelates and many priests, and he now reconvoked it, and submitted to it all those questions which arose out of the project of a council, such as whether it should be general or provincial, and what forms it should observe. He insisted earnestly on the speedy examination of these questions, as he proposed to assemble the council at the commencement of the month of June, on the very day of the baptism of the King of Rome.

In the meantime Napoleon devoted constant attention to the affairs in the north, and was equally active in his diplomatic and military preparations.

In diplomacy he had made a choice which could not have a happy influence on his destiny, and which was that of the Duke of Bassano for his minister of foreign affairs. Already, as we have seen, he had separated himself from the only two personages who could be perceived across the auréole of his glory, MM. Fouché and Talleyrand. As we have before related, he had replaced M. Fouché by the Duke of Rovigo, and had replaced M. de Talleyrand by M. de Champagny, Duke of Cadore, a wise and temperate man, who never opposed Napoleon's wishes, but never aggravated them, and rather softened their execution by the moderation of his character. M. de Cadore made excellent reports, but he spoke little, and Napoleon often complained to Prince Cambacérès that his minister of foreign affairs failed in conversation, and at length yielded to the solicitations of his Secretary of State, M. de Bassano, who ardently desired the position. Napoleon decided upon this choice in April 1811, a period when the affairs of all Europe were in a most complicated state, and when such a choice might have the most unfortunate consequences.

M. de Bassano had precisely all those qualities in which M. de Cadore was wanting. Exactly to that extent that M. de Cadore was endowed with modesty and timidity, M. de Bassano was endowed with the very opposite characteristics. He was an honest man, and devoted to Napoleon, but his devotion was of a species that is fatal to the princes who are its object; he had the taste and the talent for representation, spoke well, and was vain to excess of the reflection of his master's glory. He was exactly fitted to add to Napoleon's defects, if, indeed, any one could add to any quality of Napoleon's. Napoleon's imperious will expressed by the hesitating lips of M. de Cadore lost its violence, and in the sarcastic manner of M. de Talleyrand lost its bitterness; but Napoleon styled this method of transmitting his orders mal-address in the first case, and treason in the second. He had nothing of this sort to fear on the part of M. de Bassano, and might be quite certain that his imperious will would never be tempered by the prudent reserve of his minister. The proudest

of masters was now to have the least modest of ministers, and that, too, at a period when Europe, driven at bay, required the most skilful management. We must add as an excuse for M. de Bassano that he regarded Napoleon not only as the greatest of captains, but also as the greatest of politicians.

On the 17th of April Napoleon summoned the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, and informing him of the cause of his dissatisfaction with M. de Cadore, stated his intention of replacing him by the Duke of Bassano. The Prince Cambacérès said a few words in favour of M. de Cadore, and was silent respecting M. de Bassano; a silence which Napoleon well understood, but of which he took no notice, and having signed the decree, he directed the Prince Cambacérès to go with M. de Bassano to demand of M. de Cadore his portfolio. M. de Cadore was extremely surprised at the message, for he was ignorant that he had displeased his master, and he delivered the portfolio, with ill concealed chagrin, to M. de Bassano, who received it with the blind joy of gratified ambition.

Prince Cambacérès had observed the distress of M. de Cadore, and reported it to Napoleon, who, always filled with regret when he found it necessary to afflict his old servants, granted him a fair recompense for the ministry of which he had been deprived, by nominating him intendant-general of the crown.

Napoleon had been happier in his choice of a new ambassador to St. Petersburg. He had replaced, as we have said above, M. the Duke of Vicenza by M. de Lauriston, one of his aides-de-camp, whom he had already employed with advantage in many delicate missions. M. de Lauriston was a plain, sensible man, who was unwilling to displease his master, but preferred displeasing to deceiving him. No ambassador was more fitted for reconciling the two emperors of France and Russia, if they could have been reconciled; but there was little chance of his effecting such an object in the situation which affairs had now reached.

Napoleon, whilst he precipitated his warlike preparations, on receiving information of the recall of the Russian regiments from Turkey, perceived that they could no longer be dissimulated, and had ordered M. de Caulaincourt at the moment of his departure, and M. de Lauriston at the moment of his arrival, to avow all the preparations which had been made, in such a manner as to intimidate Alexander, since his suspicions could no longer be lulled. But he had, at the same time, authorised them to declare that he was not anxious for war, and only prepared for it because he felt convinced that Russia, as soon as the war with Turkey was concluded, would form an alliance with England; that she had already taken some steps in this direction by receiving the Americans into her ports; that, in

his opinion, the reception of contrabandists was almost a declaration of war; that as for so wretched a thing as Oldenburg, an indemnity had but to be demanded of him and it should be given; but that it was necessary that any secret cause of dissatisfaction should be openly expressed in order that arms should at once be taken up or finally laid aside, as it was impossible to submit to the exhaustion of useless preparations. All these things he had said by his own mouth to Prince Kourakin and M. de Czernicheff, with that mixture of grace, hauteur, and bonhomie which he knew so well how to employ to suit his purpose, and he had urged M. de Czernicheff to go to St. Petersburg to repeat them.

But all these precautions were useless, for Alexander had been informed day by day, and with rare exactness, of all that had taken place in France. To every attempt, therefore, made by M. de Caulaincourt to deny or to excuse the facts respecting which information arrived every day at St. Petersburg, Alexander replied, "Do not deny them, for I am certain of the truth of what I assert. It is very evident that you are left in ignorance, and that you are no longer trusted. All the pains that I take to enlighten you, and which I willingly take because I esteem and regard you, are thrown away. Napoleon does not trust you because you tell him the truth; he asserts that I have seduced you, that you are mine and not his; it will be the same with M. Lauriston, who is also an honest man, for he will only be able to repeat the same things, and your master will say that M. Lauriston has been gained over by the enemy."

M. de Caulaincourt having replied that France was certainly making preparations, but they were only in answer to those made by Russia, and having spoken of the works on the Dwina and the Dnieper, of the movements of the troops of Finland, and of those of the troops of Turkey, Alexander rejoined, "You assert that I am arming, M. de Caulaincourt, and I am far from denying it; I am effectually armed; I am ready, quite ready, and you will find me prepared to defend myself to the utmost. And what would you have thought of me if I had acted otherwise, if I had been so simple, so forgetful of my duty, as to leave my country exposed to the prompt, exacting, and terrible will of your master? But I have only armed after having received certain information that Dantzic is being placed in a state of defence, that its garrison is being augmented, that the troops of Marshal Davout are being reinforced and concentrated, that the Poles and Saxons have been ordered to hold themselves in readiness, that Modlin and Thorn have been repaired, and all the fortifications provisioned. This information having reached me, see what I have done." Then conducting M. de Caulaincourt by the hand into a retired cabinet in

which were spread open his maps, he added, "I have ordered defensive works, not in advance of, but behind my frontier, on the Dwina and the Dnieper, at Riga, at Dunaburg, at Balernisk, that is to say, at a distance from the Niemen almost as great as that which separates Strasburg from Paris. If your master should fortify Paris, should I complain of it? And when he carries his preparations so far in advance of my frontiers, should I be accused of provoking war because I arm myself behind mine? I have not drawn whole divisions from Finland, but simply restored to the divisions of Lithuania those regiments which had been taken from them for the war against the Swedes. I have changed the organisation of my depôts; I have augmented my guard, and am anxious to render it equal to the guard of Napoleon. Finally, I have drawn five divisions from Turkey, of which I am so far from making a mystery, that I make it a subject of accusation against you, for by compelling me to do this you have prevented me from reaping the profit which it was agreed I was to have from our alliance. I have not such good generals as yours; I am not myself so good a general or administrator as Napoleon; but I have good soldiers, and a devoted people, and we will perish sword in hand rather than permit ourselves to be treated as the Dutch or the people of Hamburg. At the same time I declare to you, upon my honour, that I will not strike the first blow. I will let you pass the Niemen before I pass it myself. Believe me when I say that I do not desire war, and that my nation, although hurt and terrified at your proceedings, does not desire it; but if attacked, she will not recede.

M. de Caulaincourt having replied again, that the projected alliance with England after the conquest of the Danubian provinces, and the re-establishment of commercial relations with her, were regarded by Napoleon as no less dangerous than an attack by artillery; Alexander was as prompt in giving explanation on this subject as on the others. "Ally myself with England," he said, "after the conclusion of the war with Turkey! I have never thought of such a thing. After the conclusion of the war with Turkey; after having added Finland, Moldavia, Wallachia, to my empire, I shall consider that the military and political tasks of my reign have been accomplished. I shall have no wish to run new hazards, but rather desire to enjoy in repose that which I shall have gained, and to employ myself in the civilisation of my empire rather than its enlargement. Again, to reconcile myself with England, I must alienate myself from France, and thus run the chance of a war with her; a war which I regard as the most dangerous of all! And for what end? To support England, to assist her in the maintenance of her maritime theories, which are not mine? This

would be madness on my part. I shall remain faithful to the policy of Tilsit, I shall remain at war with England, and keep my ports closed against her, but in that manner which I have already declared, and from which it is impossible that I should depart. I cannot, I have told you, and I repeat it, interdict all commerce to my subjects, nor prevent them from dealing with the Americans. Some English merchandise thus enters Russia, but you admit at least as much by your tariff which permits its entrance, on the payment of a duty of fifty per cent. It is necessary that whilst persisting in an alliance which you take no pains to popularise in Russia, I should not render it intolerable to my people by a kind of devotion to it which you do not display in respect to it, and which is not necessary to the reduction of England, since this will speedily take place if you do not raise up allies for her on the continent. On the other points on which we dispute, I have made my determination. The Poles are very turbulent, and openly announce the approaching reconciliation of Poland; but with respect to this subject, I rely on the emperor's word, although he has refused me the convention which I have demanded. As for Oldenburg, I desire some suitable compensation, not for the sake of my family, for I am sufficiently rich to recompense it for this loss, but for the dignity of my crown. And in this matter also I rely on the Emperor Napoleon. I have told you, and repeat it, that although hurt and embarrassed by what has taken place with respect to the Duchy of Oldenburg, I will not make this a reason for war."

Subtle as Alexander was, he manifestly expressed his real sentiments in his discussions with M. de Caulaincourt. He was far from being gratified at Napoleon's greatness, but he resigned himself to it in consideration of obtaining Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia. He did not wish to become reconciled with England at the risk of a war with France, the very idea of which made him tremble; but nevertheless he was not prepared to sacrifice to her the remainder of his commerce, and to preserve this alone was he willing to brave a rupture with her. His nation, and by his nation we understand particularly the nobility and the elevated portion of the army, divined and shared his sentiments on all these points; and whilst it knew that a war with France would be sufficiently serious, was prepared to defend its independence. An idea had already spread throughout all ranks of the people that the example of the English in Portugal would be followed, that they would retreat into the depths of Russia, destroy everything as they retreated, and that the French would perish of destitution if not destroyed by the Russian arms. But in language and attitude they showed no dispo-

sition to insult or provoke France, and those Frenchmen who were in the country were everywhere received with redoubled politeness.

The news of the birth of the King of Rome having reached St. Petersburg before the arrival of M. de Lauriston, Alexander had sent all the *grandees* of his court to compliment the ambassador of France, and behaved in this matter with as much frankness as cordiality. M. de Caulaincourt desired to terminate his brilliant, and, we must acknowledge, useful embassy (for he had contributed to the delay of the rupture between the two empires), by a magnificent *fête* given on the occasion of the birth of the King of Rome. He had naturally desired that the emperor should be present at it, and the latter, divining his wish, addressed him thus: "Do not invite me, for I should be obliged to refuse you, not being able to dance with you while 200,000 French soldiers are marching towards my frontiers. I shall declare myself ill, to furnish you with a reason for not inviting me, but I will send you all my court, and even my family, for I wish that your *fête* should be as brilliant as it ought to be, whether we regard the event which it celebrates or you who give it. Your successor arrives, and possibly brings us some reassuring information; and should an understanding be come to between us, I will bestow both on your master and yourself distinguished testimonies of my friendship.

M. de Lauriston, very impatiently expected, at length arrived on the 9th of May 1811. M. de Caulaincourt immediately presented him to the Emperor Alexander, who received him very graciously. After some days consecrated to official receptions full of *éclat*, Alexander put M. de Lauriston to the question, so to speak, in order to obtain some information respecting Napoleon's projects; but he learnt nothing which had not been already told him by M. de Caulaincourt, or repeated to him by M. de Czernicheff, who had recently arrived from Paris.

After some discussions had taken place between the emperor and M. de Lauriston similar to those which had so often taken place with M. de Caulaincourt, the emperor received the adieux of the latter, embraced him, entreated him to make Napoleon acquainted with the whole truth, prayed M. de Lauriston, who was present, to repeat it in his turn, and sadly added these characteristic words: "But you will no longer be believed, M. de Caulaincourt . . . they will say that you have been gained over, that I have seduced you, and that, fallen into my snares, you have become more Russian than French."

After some days passed in St. Petersburg, M. de Lauriston wrote to the French minister declaring that as an honest man he was compelled to say that the Emperor Alexander, although

to a certain extent prepared, was not desirous of war, and would certainly not take the initiative; that as regarded Oldenburg, he would accept whatever might be given him, even Erfurth, although such an indemnity was ridiculous; and that with respect to the commercial question, more rigour might be obtained in the examination of the papers of neutrals, but that Russia would never consent to all that was demanded in that respect.

M. de Czernicheff was again sent to Paris to repeat in other terms, but with the same affirmations, exactly the same things, and also to continue that corruption of the bureaux of war, to which his government attached so high a value, because it enabled it to obtain the most precise information respecting the French military preparations.

The conclusion arrived at by Napoleon from the new explanations brought by MM. de Czernicheff and de Caulaincourt, and received in the letters of M. de Lauriston, was, not that peace was possible, but that the war might be deferred a year; and as he had determined to conduct this new campaign in the north with immense resources at his command, he was not sorry to have still a year in which to complete his preparations. But why did he not see that it was possible not only to defer, but even entirely to avoid the contest? Because he had so often found that after a first coldness a war was with him inevitable, and had so often seen his concealed enemies ready to rally round the first open enemy who dared to raise the mask. He had seen so plainly in Russia an enemy, vanquished but not crushed, around whom the resentments of Europe would gather, that he had said that a war with her sooner or later was inevitable; and perceiving in the probable war all the consequences of a war declared, reading profoundly the hearts of others without looking into his own, failing to see that the change from coldness to open quarrel was chiefly caused by his own impetuous character, failing to see that it would be otherwise if he would himself become moderate, patient, and tolerant towards others; making no salutary reflections, and having no one about him to compel him to make them, he resolved a second time, we may say, in the May of 1811, to make war with Russia.

He wrote to Marshal Davout that the matters were less pressing, but that no preparations were to be resigned; that his intention was to have the army of the north ready for the commencement of 1812, but of more extensive proportions than he had at first determined on. It was no longer of 300,000 men that he thought; he wished to have 200,000 under Marshal Davout on the Vistula, 200,000 others under his own command on the Oder, with a reserve of 150,000 on the Elbe or on the Rhine, an almost equal force in the interior, for the safety

of the empire, and nevertheless to send troops to Spain, instead of withdrawing them. Napoleon countermanded the departure of the fourth and sixth battalions of Marshal Davout, decided that they should be formed at the dépôt, because they would receive there better organisation, and projected the formation of a seventh, so as to have six for actual service.

He hastened the formation of battalions d'élite which had been ordered in the regiments stationed in Holland and Italy, and even wished that a fourth and a sixth battalion should be created in each of these regiments. He ordered that a purchase of horses which had been commenced should be enlarged, but made more slowly, in order that its results might be of a better quality; and made preparations for the construction of an immense baggage train of the largest proportions and on a new plan. He took advantage of the time at his disposal to reorganise, and on a larger scale, the Polish army, and sent funds to Warsaw for the purpose of having the fortifications of Torgan, Modlin, and Thorn thoroughly repaired and armed by the following year.

In the conduct of his diplomacy he held the same ends in view. Austria had been sounded, and a response had been obtained from her which was of a nature to inspire confidence. M. de Metternich directed the cabinet of Vienna since the war of 1809. His declared policy was peace with France, and being ambitious to obtain from this peace some brilliant result for his country, he wished to make it the foundation of a species of alliance, and by means of this alliance to obtain the restoration of Illyria, which was what Austria at this moment regretted the most. It was on this account that the idea of a marriage between Napoleon and Marie Louise had been received with so much cordiality. But this policy found at Vienna more than one opposer; being contradicted both by the conduct and the inclinations of the court and the people. But the government had determined on the line of conduct that it would take, and had decided, if it could not remain neutral, to pronounce for the strongest, that is to say, for Napoleon.

In the meantime the Austrian emperor, leaving his court to act as it chose, and contenting himself with holding aloof from any of its manifestations, wrote the most friendly letters to his daughter, encouraged his minister to treat France with great caution, at once consented to aid her in Turkey (for he was anxious to prevent Russia from obtaining the Danubian provinces), and held out hopes that Austria would be an ally in the event of new European complications, on condition of obtaining some solid advantage.

M. de Metternich entered fully into these views, and was perhaps rather more favourably inclined towards us than the

king himself. He said to M. Otto with a singular mixture of abandon, cordiality, and confidence in himself: "Leave me to myself, and all will go well. Your master is always anxious to do things too rapidly. At Constantinople you commit great faults. You are too apt to think that the Turks are brutes to be driven with a cudgel. These brutes are become as subtle as yourselves. They perceive the speculations which all the world, and especially you, are indulging in with respect to them. They know that you delivered them up to the Russians in 1807, and that now you wish to take them away again, to make them aid you against these same Russians. They detect you, and understand in an opposite sense all that you say to them. Keep in the background, be reserved at Constantinople, and we shall snatch from the hands of the Russians the rich prey which you have so imprudently resigned to them. Trust in me, and the Turks shall lose neither Moldavia nor Wallachia. But show yourselves in the matter as little as possible. All counsel that comes from you is suspected at Constantinople." In speaking on the probability of war with Russia, M. de Metternich counselled peace, saying, that great as was the Emperor Napoleon, fortune might betray him, and that although the chances were doubtless in his favour, it would be wiser not to tempt her; and that if the emperor should happily incline to this opinion, he, M. de Metternich, would rejoice to become the mediator between him and Russia, and believed that he would be a successful one; that as for Austria, she was worn out, and had great need of repose, and that she could only be induced to afford aid to France, in opposition to the whole spirit of the nation, by a reward that would be worthy of such an effort.

Such language showed that at the price of a province an Austrian army might be obtained as a Russian army had formerly been obtained at the price of Finland. But M. Otto at Vienna and M. de Bassano at Paris were directed to be as obscure in their communications as M. de Metternich, to intimate that war was generally fruitful in consequences, that it was impossible to make a distribution of booty beforehand, but that those allies who were really useful to Napoleon had never gone unrewarded.

In Prussia the policy was not so. M. de Hardenberg, the chief Prussian minister, and his colleagues, had devised a plan, since become a permanent one in Prussia, by which Prussia might have many troops whilst appearing to have but few. We must remember that a secret article of the Treaty of Tilsit prohibited Prussia from having more than 42,000 men under arms. To evade this article fresh bodies of troops were successively enrolled and drilled, as quickly and well as possible, and then dismissed to their avocations to make room for others.

By this means 150,000 were rendered available instead of only 42,000, the number fixed by the treaty. At the same time all the youth of the upper and middle classes, nobles and citizens, priests and philosophers, united themselves into secret societies, which took various names, such as *Ligne de la Vertu*, *Ligne Germanique*, in which vows were taken to be entirely devoted to the cause of Germany, to live but for her, to forget every difference of class or province, to acknowledge only Germans, to speak no language but German, to wear nothing but what was of German manufacture, to cultivate and cherish only German art, and in short, to devote to Germany every faculty.

Situated on such a volcano, the position of the king and of M. de Hardenberg was one of cruel perplexity. Scruples of conscience rendered the former unwilling to break with Napoleon, to whom he was engaged by the most solemn protestation of fidelity, made in the hope of saving the remains of his monarchy; and the latter, in a position similar to that of M. de Metternich, was endeavouring to discover which line of conduct would be most advantageous to his country.

In the meantime the German party was urgent for the adoption of a patriotic perfidy, according to the plan of which Prussia was to arm extensively, under pretext of the threatening appearance of affairs in Europe, to induce Napoleon to consent to this by conferring with him respecting an alliance, to promise and sign anything, and at the last moment to unite with the Russians to overwhelm the French, whilst the whole of Germany would arise against them in their rear.

The king, M. de Hardenberg, and some of the wiser spirits considered this plan as absurd, and only adopted that portion of it which was free from perfidy. They resolved to arm, and by means of the expedient we have already pointed out, although restricted to 42,000 effective troops, had in a very short time 100,000 or 120,000. But although they could equivocate respecting the number of their disposable troops, they could not conceal some of their preparations, such as, for example, those that were made in the fortifications which Prussia still retained. The intention of the king and M. de Hardenberg was, when they could no longer keep their preparations secret, to acknowledge them, to avow their motive to lie in the project imputed to Napoleon of commencing the Russian war by suppressing the remains of the Prussian monarchy, and to place France in the alternative of either accepting their sincere alliance at the price of a solemn guarantee of their national existence and the restitution of various territories, or of having them bitter enemies, prepared to fight to the last man in defence of their independence.

Matters had now arrived at such a point that it was necessary to speak openly, for dissimulation both on the one side and the other was no longer possible. Napoleon, in fact, had already ordered Marshal Davout to hold himself in readiness to march the division Friant upon the Oder, in order to cut off the King of Prussia and his army from the Vistula, to seize him and the greater part of his troops at the first hostile movement, and to prepare three parks of artillery which would be capable of taking in a few days Spandau, Graudentz, Colberg, and Breslau. Having given these orders, he had directed M. de Saint-Martin, the French ambassador, peremptorily to demand an explanation of the cabinet of Berlin, to require under the form of an ultimatum an immediate and complete disarming, and should this ultimatum not be accepted, to withdraw, giving into the hands of Marshal Davout the monarchy of Frederick the Great.

The state of affairs in Denmark and Sweden were of no less serious an aspect. Denmark, compelled in common with the rest of the European shore to comply with the laws of the continental blockade, was as faithful to those laws as could be expected from a State defending the cause of another; for although Denmark regarded the cause of the neutrals as her own, in the state which affairs had now reached the cause of the neutrals had unfortunately disappeared in another, that of Napoleon's ambition. Denmark, composed of islands, and having a portion of its fortune in other isles situated beyond the ocean, could only exist by means of the sea, and considered it hard that for the purpose of being free at some future time it should be completely deprived of freedom at the present. But the natural probity of the government and the country, the remembrance of the disaster of Copenhagen, the natural hatred to England, and the courage of the reigning prince, all concurred to render Denmark the most faithful ally of France in the great matter of the continental blockade. But although this was the general spirit of the country, the infidelity of some and the sufferings of others prevented it from being universal. Altona especially, situate at some steps from Hamburg, served as a means for the continuance of communications with England. The merchants of Hamburg, become French in spite of themselves, and as such submitted to the rigorous laws of the blockade, exposed, moreover, to the inflexible severity of Marshal Davout, and fearing (as sometimes happened) that their books would be examined to discover whether they still maintained commercial relations with England, had made Hamburg the residence of their families, and had kept at Altona their offices, books, and correspondence. By means of smugglers and contrabandists, whose proceedings were much

favoured by the form of the country, Holstein was filled with colonial produce, and Napoleon, taking the same measures in regard to it as he had formerly taken with regard to Holland, had attempted to empty this dépôt by granting permission for the introduction of this colonial produce into the empire during two months on payment of a duty of 50 per cent. This plan had succeeded, and had produced thirty millions of receipts. Holstein was emptied and was no longer a magazine of English colonial produce. Contraband traffic was therefore almost entirely suppressed in this quarter. Denmark had furnished us with more than three thousand excellent soldiers for the Antwerp fleet.

One motive of its fidelity to us was its fear of Sweden ; which country, having lost Finland rather by the extravagance of her king than the insufficiency of her arms, entertained the culpable idea of recompensing herself for this loss by taking Norway from Denmark. Napoleon had shown himself inflexible upon this point. But to comprehend this other European complication, it is necessary to be acquainted with the circumstances of a new revolution which had taken place some months since in Sweden, the country which, after Florence, has been the most fertile in revolutions.

Wearied of the follies of Gustavus IV., the Swedish people relieved themselves by a military revolution of this mad king, who had since wandered about Europe an object of general pity, whilst his uncle, the Duke of Sudermaine, reigned at Stockholm as wisely as the difficulties of the times would permit. At his request Napoleon had granted peace to Sweden, on condition that she should immediately declare war with England, close her ports against British commerce, and comply with all the regulations of the continental blockade. Then for the purpose of having peace with Russia and France, Sweden had been compelled to abandon Finland to the first, and to sacrifice her commerce to the second. At this price she had recovered Swedish Pomerania and her commercial relations with the continent. But of what value to her was permission to introduce merchandise of every kind into continental Europe if she had lost by war with England the ability to receive them ?

Sweden had escaped from her embarrassment, as is usual with the weak, by means of deceit. She had only made a fictitious declaration of war against England ; had closed against her her ports, but left open to her the chief of them, and the most advantageously situated, that of Gothenburg. This port, situated in the Cattegat, opposite the coasts of Great Britain, at the entrance of a deep gulf, presented infinite conveniences for the strange system of contraband traffic devised at this period. The English fleet, under Admiral Saumarez, was

stationed either at the isle of Anholt, or in the various mouths of the gulf. Under the protection of the British flag hundreds of vessels undisguisedly deposited on the coast of Sweden their cargoes of sugars, coffees, cottons, and all the products of Birmingham and Manchester. This merchandise, exchanged for the products of the north, and sometimes also for the silks of Italy, were carried to every part of the Baltic shore under various pretended neutral flags, and especially under that of America. But the principal scene of this commerce on the continent was the port of Stralsund, in Swedish Pomerania. Introduced into this port as Swedish merchandise, English products had free entrance into Germany since the establishment of peace between France and Sweden.

It was thus that Sweden eluded the conditions of its peace with France. But such facts, concealed for a moment, could not long remain hidden from Napoleon. Moreover, a new complication had added to the singularities of this strange state of affairs. The Duke of Sudermaine, uncle of Gustavus IV., had no children. The most simple plan would have been to make the son of the dethroned king heir to the throne. But the party of the deposed monarch had rendered itself so hateful to the nation that it was quite impossible to re-establish the inheritance of the throne in the family of Wasa by adopting as its future king the son of Gustavus IV. In this dilemma, the new king, Charles XIII., had adopted a Danish prince, the Duke of Augustenbourg, and *beau-frere* of the King of Denmark. The crown of Denmark was itself threatened with a failure of heirs, for the King of Denmark had no offspring. Many sensible persons in Sweden, seeing that both the thrones at Stockholm and Copenhagen would probably soon become vacant, and perceiving the progressive decadence of their country, threatened by Russia by land, and by England by sea, believed that a renewal of the famous reunion of the three kingdoms was the only means of securing their greatness and independence. This was true policy, and pointed to that which the Swedes ought to have desired for themselves, and Europe have desired for the Swedes. Unhappily, although a certain national instinct supported this idea, amongst the peasants, who formed the liberal order, the union of Calmar was associated with only sad remembrances; and their new king, therefore, not daring to adopt the King of Denmark himself, adopted his *beau-frere*, destined at a later period to ascend the Danish throne.

The Duke of Augustenbourg, thus destined one day to wear the three crowns of the north, was possessed of no pleasing qualities, but of many of a nature to procure esteem. Before he had time, however, to acquire the respect of the Swedish people, he was suddenly carried away from amongst them,

suddenly falling dead from his horse at a review. It was fully proved that his death proceeded from natural causes alone; but the Swedish people, inspired with a sudden burst of sympathy for a prince so suddenly struck down, persuaded themselves that the criminality of interested parties had snatched away this object of their growing affection. With the usual violence of popular passion, they pointed out as the committers of this crime the chief persons of the party of the deposed king, and hurled against them the most atrocious threats, which were happily without effect, except in the case of the Comte de Fersen, whom the populace murdered in the public streets.

In proportion as the aspect of affairs became more grave, the enlightened persons of the nation, with Charles XIII. at their head, became the more inclined to the union of the three crowns, and were tempted to take another step in pursuit of this policy, either by adopting the cousin and heir-apparent of the King of Denmark, Prince Christian, or by adopting the King of Denmark himself. But in the midst of the conflict of ideas arising from the various proposals, there were some persons, and their number increased every day, who had turned their thoughts in another direction. Many Swedes, favourably inclined towards France by their fondness for the French revolutionary ideas, by their military enthusiasm, and by that long existing instinct which always inclined the two countries towards each other, entertained the idea that in the existing state of circumstances the best plan would be to apply to him by whom thrones were raised or overthrown, Napoleon. The feeling respecting him in Sweden was similar to that which had been felt towards him in Spain before the revolution of Bayonne, and was an extraordinary blending of admiration, fascination, and adulation for his talents both military and civil. To address him, therefore, with the purpose of obtaining from him either one of his princes or one of his captains, was an idea even more popular than that of uniting the three Scandinavian kingdoms, and was particularly gratifying to the warlike feelings of the Swedes.

The reigning king, entirely devoted to the policy of the union of the three kingdoms, but perceiving the necessity of having the support of France, had sent a confidential messenger to Napoleon with a letter with which he informed him of the feeling which existed in favour of the union of the three crowns; declared that it was in his opinion the best policy that could be selected, but that he was unwilling to do anything without consulting the arbiter of the destinies of Europe, the powerful Emperor of the French, and if that he approved he would choose his sovereign from amongst the princes of Denmark, but that if he disapproved, he, the King of Sweden, hoped that

he would grant to Sweden, who would accept the gift with transport, either one of the princes of his own family, or one of the illustrious warriors under his command. In addition to this letter, the secret envoy was directed to insist that Napoleon should himself bestow a king upon Sweden.

Napoleon was more embarrassed than flattered by this message. He had found that he was compelled to support at a heavy charge the new kings whom he created, and that in spite of all that they cost him, they were little less compliant than those he had deposed, being obliged, as they were, to make themselves the instruments of their peoples' resistance. He was not anxious, therefore, to take upon himself new difficulties of this kind. Moreover, he had given sufficient umbrage to Europe by the creation of French departments at Hamburg and Lubeck, without aggravating it by the elevation to the throne of Sweden of a French prince, who might very probably speedily become an enemy. Napoleon had therefore immediately replied that he had no prince or general to offer to the Swedes, and that he had no ambitious projects at that moment either for his own family or for his lieutenants; that should he comply with the request made, Europe might be offended, and that the policy which held in view the ultimate union of the three crowns of the north appeared to him to be the best, and the most worthy of the excellent prince who reigned at Stockholm; that for himself, he asked no more than that Sweden should be the faithful ally of France, and aid her against England by an exact compliance with the laws of the continental blockade.

When this answer had arrived, Charles XIII. no longer hesitated to follow his own inclinations, and resolved to adopt the brother of the lately deceased prince, the Duke of Augustenbourg. But a new incident had again complicated the circumstances attending this choice. The King of Denmark, Frederick VI., desiring not only the union of the three crowns, but that they should be united on his own head, had prohibited the Duke of Augustenbourg from accepting the adoption with which he was honoured, and had openly, in frank and noble terms, for the sake, he said, of the peoples of the three kingdoms, solicited the adoption of Charles XIII.

The union so boldly presented to their notice, and associated, moreover, with a King of Denmark, whose position offended Swedish pride, whilst his real or supposed character frightened the numerous partisans of the new ideas, had caused a species of agitation, and the confusion in men's minds became greater than ever. In this strange position of affairs, which was prolonged during the whole of the year 1810, public feeling, becoming constantly more fluctuating and more perplexed, had turned once more towards Napoleon, without being

able to penetrate his designs, and employed itself in conjecturing what prince or general Napoleon could bestow upon Sweden. There was one man, Marshal Bernadotte, both a warrior and a prince, allied to the imperial family by means of his wife, sister of the Queen of Spain, who had sojourned for some time on the frontiers of Sweden, and had contracted relations with many Swedes; and having been directed to threaten Sweden with an expedition, and to assist the Russians in Finland, and at the same time receiving secret orders not to act, he had permitted the Swedes to believe that his inaction was the result of his own good-will towards them. Courting on all occasions all those with whom he came in contact, moved by a vague feeling of ambition which led him to watch all the thrones that were vacant or were likely to become so, he had made friends amongst the Swedish nobility whose tastes were military. Knowing both how to flatter others and to set forth his own merits, he had persuaded some persons to regard him as an accomplished prince. The name of old General Bernadotte was therefore mentioned by some persons as that of a man dear to Napoleon, having rendered him immense military services, and who would obtain for Sweden, besides great renown, the thorough friendship of France.

This idea was rapidly propagated, and in the meantime a last incident, as singular as those which had already signalled this singular dynastic revolution, had occurred, and was not of a nature to enlighten the Swedes respecting the wishes or intentions of the French emperor. Our chargé d'affaires, M. Desangiers, was deprived of his post for having held a conversation with a Swedish personage, from which it might be concluded that France was inclined to the union of the three crowns. This solicitude to disavow an idea, which nevertheless was its own, proved how determined France was not to manifest her opinion. What then did she desire?

In the midst of this cruel state of embarrassment, the king, having to submit a proposal to the *comité* of the assembled States, had presented three candidates—the Duke of Augustenbourg, the King of Denmark, and the Prince of Ponte Corvo (Bernadotte). The *comité des états*, under the influence of M. d'Adlersparre, the head of the revolutionary and military party that had dethroned Gustavus IV., had adopted, as the wisest and least hazardous resolution, the adoption of the Duke of Augustenbourg, brother of the prince lately deceased. This candidate had eleven votes, and the Prince of Ponte Corvo only one.

Matters were in this state when there suddenly arrived an old French merchant, long established at Gothenburg, where he had not been successful in his commercial transactions, and

who was an excellent agent in elections. Sent by the Prince of Ponte Corvo with letters and funds, he was directed to set at work every agency in support of the French candidate. In a very short time the most extraordinary rumours were afloat. It was whispered about that it needed very little penetration to discover the true wishes of France, wishes which she was compelled to conceal for political reasons sufficiently apparent, and that these evidently pointed to the elevation to the throne of Sweden of the Prince of Ponte Corvo, that illustrious general and wise counsellor, who had been the inspirer of Napoleon in his most successful campaigns and in his greatest acts of policy. This comedy, played with much tact, was perfectly successful, and within a few hours the new opinion had spread so widely, that it involved the government and the assembly of the States, the king was compelled to renew the presentation he had made, the *comité* electoral to reverse its vote, and in a single night the Prince of Ponte Corvo was proposed and elected, almost unanimously, prince-royal, heir-apparent to the crown of Sweden.

Every circumstance attending this revolution was to be equally strange. When the secret agent who contrived this sudden electoral reversal set out from Paris, Napoleon, fearing that he might abuse the name of France, had charged the minister of foreign affairs to disavow him, but the disavowal had arrived at Stockholm too late. The prince chosen to be the ally of France (we shall speedily see how much he was so) was already elected. Napoleon, on learning of this election, smiled with a sort of bitterness, as though he had penetrated into the depths of the future; but he spoke of it with a kind of indifference, having absolute faith in his own strength, and regarding the ingratitude which he foresaw as one of the ornaments of the career of a great man. He received with mingled hauteur and benignity his old general, Bernadotte, when he came to solicit that approbation which was absolutely necessary to him as regarded Sweden; he told him that he was a stranger to his elevation, for that his policy did not permit him to interfere in the matter, but that he regarded it with pleasure as a homage rendered to the glory of the French arms; that he felt convinced that Marshal Bernadotte, a leader of his armies, would never forget what was due to his country, and in this confidence he concurred in the election made by the Swedes; and as he was unwilling that a Frenchman should make abroad an appearance which was not worthy of the dignity of France, he had ordered M. Mollien to supply him with the funds of which he might have need.

Immediately after his arrival at Stockholm, the Prince of Ponte Corvo devoted himself to flattering all parties, and

pretending, in turn, to hold the opinions of each. For some time this conduct was possible, and might succeed up to the moment when the bursting forth against us of a storm of universal hatred would render the part of irreconcilable hatred against France also successful. In the meantime, being desirous of immediately gratifying Swedish pride, the Prince-Royal of Sweden, with the precipitation of a new-comer, had devised a strange overture to make to the French minister, and which proved what an idea he had formed of political fidelity.

It was at this period, as we have already said, that Napoleon prepared, without hurrying his proceedings, for a campaign against Russia. In every direction there were rumours of a great war in the north. The Prince-Royal of Sweden, displaying on this occasion an affected devotion towards France, said to our minister that he saw very plainly what was in preparation, and that there would soon be a great war; he referred to the important services he had rendered in the war of 1807 (and it must be admitted that his services on that occasion were important); observed that such a war must be dangerous and difficult; that it would render necessary to Napoleon powerful alliances; that a Swedish army thrown into Finland, almost at the gates of St. Petersburg, would be an immense assistance, but that there was little probability that this province could be recovered; that its recovery was considered hopeless amongst the Swedes, who regarded Norway as the natural and necessary recompense for its loss; and declared that if Napoleon would at once secure Norway to Sweden, he would place the Swedes at his entire disposal. He had the hardihood to conclude by threatening his immediate hostility should his proposition not be accepted, and after having shown how he could serve, took pains to point out how he could injure.

The French minister hastened to write to Paris for the answer which he should make to such a proposition. Napoleon, let it be said to his praise, on receiving this information, made a movement of indignation, which had great results. He blushed with indignation and contempt at such a proposition, and addressed on the subject to his minister for foreign affairs one of the best and most honourable letters he ever wrote in his life, expressing his regret at the foolish line of conduct adopted by the new prince-royal, declaring that to betray Denmark would be a crime which was to France impossible; and that as to the services offered, or the injuries threatened, France feared no enemy, and was dependent on no ally. He recommended M. Alguer, our minister, not to wound the prince, but to make him understand that his precipitancy and the tone which he had adopted were a mistake, and

that no answer would be given to him with respect to the subjects on which he had touched so lightly, since he was only the heir-apparent. Napoleon further directed his minister to assure the king and his ministers that all that France expected of Sweden was fidelity to treaties, especially to the last treaty of peace, which was being at that moment scandalously violated, and that he especially required the total suppression of the depôt at Gothenburg, on neglect of which, war would recommence, and Swedish Pomerania, but recently restored, would again be seized as a pledge to compel Sweden to return to its duty. By the same courier Napoleon recommended Denmark, without giving any reason, to maintain numerous bodies of troops in Norway.

Such was the state of affairs in Europe on the eve of that great and last struggle on which Napoleon was now about to enter. The most complete external submission covered the bitterest secret hatred, and where there was not hatred there was embarrassment. Thus our German allies, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Saxony, and Baden, whilst they prepared the contingents demanded of them, trembled in secret at the hatred which they saw to be occasioned by the conscription. Attached to the cause of Napoleon both by their fears and their interests, they were earnestly desirous that he should not expose himself to fresh hazards, and on this account were extraordinarily terrified at the idea of the approaching war. The King of Wurtemberg especially, considering that alone good which increased either his revenues or his territory, having as much energy as spirit, and always expressing his candid opinion to the all-powerful protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, had addressed to him some objections relative to the preparations for the new war, and to the contribution of the Wurtemberg contingent demanded for Dantzic. Napoleon had immediately replied to him by a long and curious letter, in which was displayed all the strange fatality under the control of which he ran into new hazards. He said that he preferred to have German rather than French troops at Dantzic, as they excited less umbrage, and that it was impossible not to take up a position at Dantzic, since it was the true base of operations for a campaign in the north; that this campaign would not spring from his, Napoleon's wishes, but from the fantasy of a young warlike prince who was anxious to make a brilliant début in the world; that it was possible this campaign might be delayed a year, but was inevitable, and that it would have been very ill judged to have allowed the confederation to have been surprised by an enemy who had been permitted to make his preparations with impunity; that he had therefore obeyed necessity, and not his own will, and demanded the two

Wurtemberg battalions necessary to complete the garrison of Dantzic.

News now arrived from the east, and information arrived respecting the manner in which the first overtures had been received at Constantinople. Moldavia and Wallachia had been saved; but it was not so easy to convert the Turks into allies. In fact, on seeing that Russia was compelled to withdraw a portion of her forces, they had promised to make no concessions for the sake of having peace with her, but distrusting us as much as M. de Metternich had said, they had scrupulously declined to listen to any proposal of alliance with us. Peace was their only object, and they awaited with impatience the day when Russia, pressed hard by Napoleon, would be constrained to conclude with her an advantageous peace, and regarded that only as advantageous which should cost them no part of their territory. Russia, taking into consideration the probable course of events, had addressed to her a proposition that she should retain Bessarabia and Moldavia, and restore to Turkey Wallachia. She had demanded, besides, the independence of Servia. The Turks, however, perceived that the time was fast approaching when Russia would not be able to leave any of her troops on the Danube, and had rejected all these offers, demanding in all its integrity the *status ante bellum*. In the meantime they dissembled their secret resentment against France, whilst at the same time their care not to engage themselves to her was so great that they eluded even the overtures of Austria, displaying no less evasion with regard to her than with us, and showing in every portion of their conduct that if they had lost that savage energy of character in which had formerly consisted their greatness, they were gaining every day greater skill in political finesse.

Whilst employed in making his diplomatic as well as military preparations for the great war in the north, Napoleon had taken pains to arrange the domestic affairs of the empire, so as to leave no source of embarrassment behind him during an absence of which he could not foresee the duration. He had desired, as we have already said, to assemble the council by means of which he hoped to bring the religious differences to an end, on the day of the baptism of the King of Rome. It had appeared to him very proper to join to all the bodies of the State, assembled around the cradle of his son, the Catholic Church itself, and to have consecrated by her the title of King of Rome, which had been given to the heir of the new empire. But the bishops, either because they objected to entering into this species of engagement, or because the reason they alleged was sincere, declared that the greater number of them were too aged to endure the fatigue of a double ceremony on the same day, and the assembly of the council was deferred until the day after

the baptism. The bishops accordingly were only to assist at the baptism individually, and not as a body representing the Church.

The 9th of June was the day selected for the solemn ceremony of the baptism of the King of Rome. Every preparation had been made to render this ceremony worthy the greatness of the empire, and the vast fortunes to which the young king appeared to be destined. On the evening of the 8th of June Napoleon arrived at Paris, followed by the kings of his family, and by the Duke of Wurzburg, who had been sent by the Emperor of Austria to represent him at the baptism of his grandson. All the population of Paris had thronged around the superb cortége, already partly consoled for their commercial sufferings by a marked renewal of industrial activity, and the immense orders of the civil list and the war department. Paris still applauded her emperor, although her applause was not like that of earlier times; she still applauded him, being always dazzled and fascinated whenever she saw him, always marvelling at his fortune and his glory, always carried away, as all populations are, by the excitement of grand fêtes. Paris blazed with triumphal fires; all the theatres were open gratis to the crowding multitudes; the public places were covered with gifts offered to the people of Paris by the happy father of the King of Rome; and that which contributed more than anything else to the general satisfaction was, that the delay of the war until another year enabled them to hope that it might be avoided altogether.

On the following day, the 9th of June, Napoleon, accompanied by his wife and his family, conducted his son to Notre Dame, and presented him to the ministers of religion. A hundred bishops and twenty cardinals, the Senate, the Legislative Body, the mayors of the large towns, and the representatives of Europe filled the sacred enclosure where the imperial infant was to receive the waters of baptism. When the Pontiff had concluded the ceremony, and given the King of Rome into the hands of the *gouvernante* of the children of France, Madame de Montesquiou, the latter transferred him to Napoleon, who, taking him in his arms and elevating him above his head, presented him in this manner to the magnificent assembly which assisted at the ceremony, with a visible emotion which speedily became general. This spectacle moved all hearts.

How great is the mystery which surrounds human life. How grievously would the spectators have been surprised if, behind this scene of prosperity and grandeur, they could suddenly have beheld a crowd of ruins, torrents of blood and fire, the flames of Moscow, the ice of the Beresina, Leipzig, Fontainebleau, the isle of Elba, Saint Hélène, and finally, the death of this august infant at eighteen years of age, in exile, unpossessed of a single

one of those crowns which were now accumulated on his head; and could they have beheld, besides, all those other revolutions by which his family was still to be raised up after having been overthrown.

Leaving the metropolis in the midst of an immense multitude, Napoleon repaired to the Hotel de Ville, where an imperial banquet had been prepared. On the following days fêtes of all kinds succeeded, for Napoleon was desirous to prolong as much as possible the manifestations of public joy. But the terrible destiny which disposes of the lives of the greatest as well as of the humblest of mortals, and hurries them on unceasingly to the end assigned to their career, would not allow to him any long delay. The most serious affairs, inextricably interwoven with each other, demanded in uninterrupted succession his entire attention. On the 9th of June he had attended the baptism of his son, and on the 16th of June it was necessary to convoke the council.

We have observed at the commencement of this book the motives which induced Napoleon to convoke a council. An ecclesiastical commission composed of prelates, a civil commission composed of high political personages, and comprising amongst others the Prince Cambacérès, had examined and determined upon, as follows, the numerous questions excited by the convocation of such a council.

In the first place, could a council be convoked without the sanction or the presence of the Pope? The history of the Church left no doubt with respect to this question, since there had been councils convoked by emperors against Popes, for the purpose of condemning unworthy Pontiffs, and others convoked by Popes against emperors who oppressed the Church. Moreover, good sense, which is the surest light in religious as well as other matters, pointed out that the Church, having had to save itself, and having succeeded with rare skill, sometimes from unworthy Popes, sometimes from tyrannical emperors, it was necessary that it should possess a constitution independent of those whom it might have either to restrain or punish.

The next question was, whether the council should be œcumenical, that is, general, or only national. A general council would have had more authority, and would have been more agreeable to the extended policy and exalted imagination of Napoleon. But although Napoleon possessed within his empire and the allied States the greater part of Christendom, there remained too many prelates beyond his power in Spain, Austria, some portions of Germany, and Poland, to permit him to brave the inconvenience of their absence or of their opposition. By convoking a council exclusively national, which would comprise the bishops of the French empire, those of Italy and

a part of Germany, there would be assembled a most imposing council, and one which would perfectly suffice for the settlement of the questions which would be submitted to it.

If it had been necessary to submit to the council the great question respecting the temporal sovereignty of the Popes, an œcumenical council would have been the only one capable of determining it. But all that Napoleon at present required was the acquisition of a government for the churches, by obtaining the canonical institution of the bishops he had nominated. If he could, by means of a decision imposed on the Pope, or approved of by him, obtain the canonical institution of these prelates, he would be freed from his embarrassment; for, desiring to undertake nothing contrary to the dogmas of the Church, he had no reason to fear a schism.

The method of the nomination and canonical institution not being uniform in the different countries of Christendom, and having, moreover, varied with the progress of ages, a question of local discipline had arisen, which a national council would be able to settle; and this solution of it would satisfy Napoleon, for the Pope would by this means be deprived of the instrument he had used to put a stop to all Napoleon's ecclesiastical plans.

It was therefore determined that a council consisting of the prelates of Italy, France, Holland, and a part of Germany should be convoked at Paris at the commencement of June, and that to its consideration should be submitted the grave question which had arisen between the temporal power and the Church. The question was to be presented in an imperial message, the general purport of which was that Napoleon, on becoming possessed of the government of France, had found the Catholic religion in a state of decay, and had successfully exerted himself for its re-establishment; that it was perfectly manifest that since his first ascent to the throne he had not committed a single action derogatory to the faith, and that he had, on the contrary, taken many measures for its extension and protection;—that, nevertheless, an unfortunate dissension had arisen between the Pope and the emperor.

Napoleon, reckoning Italy amongst the number of his conquests, had been desirous of establishing his power over it on a firm foundation, and had therefore regarded the Pope, in his character of temporal sovereign of the Roman States, as an enemy open or concealed, but always intractable, who neglected no opportunity of destroying the power of the French in Italy. And with respect to the Pope, it was not as spiritual sovereign, but as the temporal sovereign of Rome, that he had, for a question of simply material interest, quarrelled with the temporal sovereign of the French empire. And what was the

arm which he had employed against him?—excommunication; a weapon either entirely powerless, and therefore exposing, by its use, the spiritual authority to contempt, or destructive of all authority, and therefore tending to nothing less than to throw both France and Europe into anarchy.

On this point complaint was easy, and was well calculated to find an echo, for almost all the clergy, the exceptions being a few fanatics, had disapproved of the bull of excommunication; and amongst the enlightened persons of all the States there had been none who had not said that the papacy had made use of a weapon that was ridiculous if weak, and culpable if efficacious, and worthy of the anarchists of 1793.

Having found the bull of excommunication ineffectual, the Pope had used as his second weapon the refusal of canonical institution to the nominated bishops. He had thus permitted the German episcopate to fall into such a state of decay that out of twenty-four German sees only eight were filled, whereby a great temptation was offered to the princes, for the most part Protestants, to possess themselves of the temporalities of these sees.

There was reason to fear that the Pope had caused the same thing in France, for there were already twenty-seven sees vacant, for which the emperor had provided, but for which the Pope had refused to provide on his side by bestowing canonical institution on the nominated prelates. Could it be possible, then, that the Pope, for the purpose of preserving his temporal advantages, had put the Church in peril, and allowed spiritual interests to decay.

By refusing institution to the nominated prelates, the Pope had violated the Concordat. The Concordat was therefore an abrogated treaty, and the parties to it were able to place themselves in the position of former times, when the Pope did not institute the bishops, and when the bishops, elected by the faithful, were confirmed and consecrated by the metropolitan. On this subject was the question which the emperor, unwilling to determine it himself, submitted to the consideration of the assembled Church, in order that it might provide for its own safety.

The form of the council, and the question to be submitted to them, having been determined, the high personages who afforded Napoleon the assistance of their talent in ecclesiastical affairs, besought him to take one last step with regard to the Pope—to send to him two or three prelates of high consideration, for the purpose of announcing to him the convocation of the council, and to persuade him to render its task more easy by consenting in advance to certain resolutions, which, if consented to by him, would be unanimously agreed to.

Napoleon had already sent to Savoy the Cardinals Spina

and Caselli, and the little success they had met with had induced him to consider all attempts of the kind as useless. He believed that the prelates assembled at Paris and under his own immediate control would obey his will, and that they would sanction, under his dictation, a decision which might be sent to the Pope clothed in the authority of the council, and which he would not dare to resist.

Amongst the ecclesiastics to whose advice he had recourse were several of great authority and real merit, and in all respects worthy of attention; and these were M. de Barral, Archbishop of Tours, M. Duvoisin, Bishop of Nantes, M. Mannay, Bishop of Trèves, and some others.

M. de Barral was one of the most respectable and learned prelates, particularly well acquainted with the traditions of the French Church, and possessed of much talent in the management of affairs. He had been agent-general of the clergy, and enjoyed much authority. M. Duvoisin, Bishop of Nantes, formerly Professor in Sarbonne, and one of the most renowned of professors, added to a most profound acquaintance with ecclesiastical matters an exalted intellect, extreme tact, and remarkable political talent—a talent which every day became rarer amongst the heads of the Church, and which did not consist in the art of gaining the confidence of sovereigns for the purpose of governing them, but in that superior good sense which has enabled the Church to adapt itself to the genius of the ages through which it has existed, and to pass through them victoriously. Finally, M. Mannay, Bishop of Trèves, inferior in talents to those just mentioned, was nevertheless a wise and learned man, and a judicious adviser.

MM. de Barral, Duvoisin, and Mannay, having no solicitude respecting their own interests, but deploring the dominating character of Napoleon, who wished to render the Church dependent on the empire, and profoundly afflicted at the violence which he had permitted himself to offer to the Holy Father, were nevertheless of opinion that being powerful as he was, and destined without doubt to found a dynasty, and being as he was of a temper extremely friendly to the Church, it was necessary rather to guide and calm him than to irritate him by an opposition of which the moving principle might be easily divined, and which was neither religious nor liberal, but royalist. As the Church had employed intrigue for the purpose of obtaining power, might it not make use of prudence for the purpose of guiding a powerful man when its object was not power but existence? Many persons, moreover, feared to see in Napoleon a new Henry VIII., ready to drive the nation to a species of religious independence which must end in Protestantism.

Such were the reasons which induced the prelates to treat

Napoleon with great caution, although they deplored the senseless despotism which hurried him into wishing to change the constitution of the Holy See, and to place the Church in a position of dependence on the emperors as she had been under Constantine. Aided by Cardinal Fesch and many of the prelates assembled at Paris, they persuaded Napoleon to send to Savoy a new deputation, consisting of MM. de Barral, Duvoisin, Mannay, to make before the opening of the council one conciliatory step towards the Pope.

These three prelates were not to speak in the name of the emperor, who was supposed to have sanctioned the mission without, however, having ordered it, but in the name of a crowd of bishops already assembled in Paris, and desiring, before forming themselves into a council, to concert with the head of the Church, in order, if possible, to proceed in conformity with his views. Certain of the bishops, after having conferred amongst themselves and with Cardinal Fesch, had written letters to the Holy Father, in which, whilst professing the utmost devotion to him, and their anxiety to preserve the unity of the Catholic Church, they had besought him to restore peace to the Church, now threatened by a new schism by the man who had re-established it, and who could save it.

M. the Archbishop of Tours, MM. the Bishops of Nantes and Trèves, were to present these letters to the Pope, and to propose to him, still in the name of the French clergy, that he should at once grant canonical institution to the twenty-seven prelates nominated by the emperor, in order that so many churches might not remain empty, and that a period might be put to the conflicts raised by the vicars-capitular; and secondly, that he should add a clause to the Concordat relative to the canonical institution, according to which the Pope should be compelled to grant the institution within the space of three months, if he could not show any cause which rendered the nominated persons unworthy of it. These three months having expired, the metropolitan, or, in his default, the oldest prelate in the ecclesiastical province, was to be authorised to confer the canonical institution.

If there be any arrangement which is in especial conformity with good sense, with policy, and the respective rights of the Church and the State, it is incontestably that which confers the choice of bishops on the temporal sovereign of a country, and the confirmation of this choice on the head of the universal Church, under the form of canonical institution. A power such as that exercised, bishops could only proceed from these two authorities—from the imperial sovereign in the first place, for he alone has the right to confer the right of exercising authority within the limits of his territory, and is, moreover,

alone able to judge of the merits of his subjects; and in the next place, from the spiritual sovereign, who should interfere to assure himself that the nominated persons are in conformity with the Catholic faith. It is very true that a Pope may abuse canonical institution, as a temporal sovereign may abuse the power of nomination; each kind of abuse is possible, and has existed in unhappy times, from which, however, the Church has escaped without perishing. But the destruction of the double tie which attaches the bishops both to the chief of the State and to the head of the Church, would destroy that beautiful system which has permitted that there should exist in Christendom two governments, side by side, without any mutual interference or disparagement—a religious government charged with the duty of directing the souls of men towards heaven, and a civil government charged with the duty of guiding them in the performance of the duties they owe to society.

The partisans of the opposite opinion, and that which was at this moment professed by Napoleon, who had thought differently at the period of signing the Concordat, appealed to ancient traditions, and the first ages of the Church when prelates were not instituted by the Pope, since in France the necessity of their institution by the Holy See had not been recognised until the Concordat of Francis I. and Louis X.; and if search were made into ages still more remote, it would be found that the bishops were neither nominated by the sovereign nor instituted by the Pope; for in the simplicity of ancient times the faithful chose their shepherds, and the metropolitan consecrated them. In the course of time this power had been gradually transformed from the faithful to the chapters, from the chapters to the kings, and the right of confirming the election, for the sake of the interests of religion, had been transformed from the simple metropolitan to him who was the metropolitan's metropolitan, namely, the Pope. If either of these primitive customs were revived, it would be necessary to revive the other, and to do this would be to proceed in a direction not only contrary to the course of time but also to reason.

A strange concession was therefore demanded of the Pope, when it was required of him that he should abandon the right of canonical institution. It is true that it was proposed that the Pope should be allowed three months to institute the nominated prelates, and that he might reject those who were nominated, on the ground of unworthiness. But who was to be the ultimate judge of their worthiness? Evidently the emperor; since, if he insisted, the metropolitan would eventually institute them. In this way, therefore, the right of institution would fall from the hands of the Pope. But at the present

moment all minds were acutely sensible of the decay of the German Church, resulting from the vacancy of almost all its sees, and of the danger which threatened the French Church, from the vacancy of a fourth part of its sees, and were vividly struck with the fact that Pius VII. made use of canonical institution as a defensive weapon, whereas its only legitimate purpose was to maintain the unity of the faith, by rejecting as prelates persons unworthy either in respect to morals, learning, or orthodoxy.

The wisest course of proceeding would have been to have obtained from the Pope, by influencing either his amiability or his prudence, the institution of the twenty-seven prelates nominated by the emperor; to demand this of him for the sake of religion, and to ask of him no sacrifice of principle. He would thus have been only temporarily disarmed, it is true, but disarmed of a dangerous weapon.

However this might be, the prelates who had charged the three envoys to speak in their name, supported the additional clause of the Concordat as strongly as Napoleon himself, who, indeed, set the maintenance of the Concordat at this price; and as this word Concordat had been rendered a sort of magic word signifying re-establishment of the altars, cessation from the persecution of the priests, and a thousand other benefits, so when Napoleon mentioned the abolishment of the Concordat, it appeared like an intimation of the abolition of all the guarantees given to religion, to worship, to the priests, and that in respect to all these things there would be a return to the state of affairs before the Concordat. By declaring, therefore, the abolition of the Concordat, should the new clause relative to the canonical institution not be accepted, he produced, as he desired, considerable excitement.

The three envoys were authorised, should they find the Pope more tractable than hitherto, to exceed the objects to which their mission was first confined, and to confer with the Holy Father respecting the position of the Holy See, the position of future Popes, and to proceed even so far as to sign a provisional convention on the subject; the conditions of which were to be as follows. The Pope to reside at his pleasure either at Rome, Avignon, or Paris; to be provided with a magnificent establishment at the expense of the empire; to enjoy a revenue of two millions without any deductions on account of the papacy, the cardinals and all the ministers of the spiritual government being liberally maintained at the cost of the imperial treasury; to have power to receive ambassadors from all the powers, and to maintain representatives at their courts; to have entire freedom in respect to the management of spiritual affairs; and that all that conduced to the prosperity, the renown, or the propagation

of Catholicism should be maintained, extended, or re-established. Foreign missions to be restored with all the support of the empire; the fathers of the Holy Land to be protected, and the Latins restored to all the privileges of worship at Jerusalem. And to all this magnificence, to which only independence was wanting, Napoleon annexed but the one condition—that if the Pope preferred to reside at Rome he should take to the emperor the oath taken by all the prelates of his empire, and that if this condition were too repugnant to him, and he could consent to reside at Avignon, he should simply promise to do nothing contrary to the principles contained in the declaration of 1682.

As the interval between the moment when Napoleon decided to send this deputation and the time for the assembly of the council was short, three prelates departed in haste, having but a period of ten days in which to accomplish their mission.

M. the Archbishop of Tours (de Barral), MM. the Bishops of Nantes (Duvoisin) and of Trèves (Mannay), set forth without delay for Savoy, and arrived there as soon as the means of travelling available at the period permitted.

The Pope, although resigned with rare gentleness to a captivity the sufferings of which had for some time been much aggravated, felt nevertheless the weight of his chains, and although he feared what they came to announce with respect to the council, he experienced a sort of satisfaction on learning that three prelates endowed with the imperial confidence had been sent to confer with him. He knew how great was the influence and the merit of these men; he knew also that their opinions were contrary to those called in France ultramontane, and that this was equivalent to their being in some degree his enemies; but this was as nothing in his eyes in comparison with the important circumstance that they had come to him with some communication.

Pius VII., having learned from M. de Chabral the names of the three prelates, consented to admit them immediately to his presence. With greater reverence than if he had been at Rome on the throne of the Cæsars, the three envoys presented themselves before the Pontiff, almost asking pardon that they were not as captive as he was, and coming to entreat him to crown his virtues by adding to his other sacrifices some new and indispensable ones, by abandoning for the sake of religion certain prerogatives which were dear to him. The manner, the noble language, the respectful demeanour of these worthy prelates deeply affected the Pontiff, and at the touch of the gratification he experienced, all the graces of his character sprang to light. He behaved towards them with the utmost goodwill, and showed that he trusted them, especially when he

found that instead of having assembled to judge him, the object of their council was to concert with him on the manner of putting an end to the religious troubles, and that it besought him to find some means of coming to an agreement with that power which had re-established the altars, and which, having the power to destroy them, had no desire, fortunately, of doing so, provided he met with no opposition in temporal matters.

The Pope and the three prelates held frequent interviews, sometimes having several in one day, although the latter, taking into consideration the Pope's feeble health, used much discretion in their requests for fresh interviews; for when they had not ventured to come he sent for them. The Bishop of Faenza, nominated Patriarch of Venice, and at this moment at Savoy on his way to join the council, had demanded permission to join this species of ecclesiastical council, and by the consent of each party had been admitted, for he pleased the Pope as an Italian, and an Italian *fort spirituel*, and was not displeasing to the envoys as an Italian who desired the immediate pacification of the Church.

The Pope having referred with dignity and moderation to the odious captivity in which the head of the Church was plunged, the profound isolation, the deprivation of all counsel and all means of communication in which he was condemned to live, declared the affection he had felt for General Bonaparte, now the powerful Emperor of the French, and the difficulty of the journey he had undertaken for the purpose of consecrating him at Paris; and then, pointing to the walls which shut him in, remarked on the strange contrast between the services rendered and the price which had been paid for them. He then entered into the details of the question respecting which the representatives of the council were charged to treat with him.

Respecting the canonical institution of the twenty-seven nominated prelates, he appeared disposed to yield, cloaking his submission under a detail of form, and consenting to institute the twenty-seven nominated prelates, omitting in the act the name of Napoleon, and at the same time omitting the mention of the *motu proprio*, which would have given the appearance of his having nominated them himself, in place of confirming only the nomination which emanated from the imperial authority. On this point Pius VII. was ready to yield, and to put an end to the cessation of ecclesiastical government in France, in order that he might no longer be charged with interrupting it on account of a matter purely personal to himself; but with respect to the additional clause of the Concordat limiting the time during which canonical institution could be granted, he could not persuade himself to yield. At first he objected that the space of three months was too short; but he declared that

whatever was the term, if the institution could finally be given by the metropolitan, the head of the Church would be spoiled and deprived of one of his most precious prerogatives. To this the three prelates replied by referring to the events of past times, showing that the Pope had not always enjoyed the power of instituting the bishops; that six months, if three were thought to be too few, would suffice for inquiry into the fitness of the nominated persons; that it was not right to suppose that the power of nomination would be exercised foolishly in the choice of unworthy prelates; that to make the right of institution any more than the means of securing a good choice of persons, would be to render it a weapon capable of being used against the temporal authority, and no one, the envoys said, was willing to admit that this was its legitimate use.

The unfortunate Pius VII., who, with considerable powers of mind, had not sufficient force of reason to rise to those great principles on which rests the double investiture of ecclesiastical pastors with both temporal and spiritual power, and who, moreover, when it was said that canonical institution was not to be a weapon in the hands of the Pope, perceived a reproach in this argument, because, in fact, many persons had reported to him that he was accused of sacrificing, by refusing bulls, the interests of religion to the interests of the Holy See, knew not how to answer, perceiving on the one hand that there ought not to be a power at Rome of abusing the right of canonical institution, whilst on the other hand he could not permit himself to resign one of the prerogatives with which he had found the Holy See provided; for to do this would be, in his eyes, a weakness with which he was unwilling at any price to sully his memory. And when it was represented to him that he was mistaken in supposing that his yielding on this point would be blamed by the Catholic world—and this was true, for people were not then as Roman as they claim to be at the present day—he replied, “But how do you suppose that I can judge of that, alone, imprisoned, deprived of all council? And to this argument, as true as it was sad, the three prelates, indignant at his captivity, knew not what to answer, and were silent, with tears in their eyes, or advised him to consult a cardinal who was in the neighbourhood, and who was the only man whose assistance they were authorised to offer him.

The subject of the general establishment of the papacy was a still more difficult one. To propose to the Pope to consecrate by his consent the abolition of the temporal power of the Holy See, at the price of a rich endowment, and beautiful palaces in the imperial capitals, was to propose to him the most grievous and dishonourable of abdications. However, he

recognised the decree annexing the Roman States of the empire, and it was necessary to foresee the fall of Napoleon, in order to be able not to regard this decree as irrevocable; and it was possible, therefore, and the prelates made the attempt, to advise him, on the grounds of prudence and the interests of the Holy See, to accept a recompense which at a later period it might not be possible to obtain, and which was, moreover, accompanied by so many advantages conducing to the protection and propagation of the Catholic faith. MM. de Barral and Duvoisin, whilst expressing sincere grief at Napoleon's proceedings, insisted much on the necessity of behaving cautiously towards a man who might so easily play in France the part acted by Henry VIII. in England; on the wisdom of taking advantage of those compensations, which he felt compelled to offer at the moment when he was despoiling the Church, and which he would not probably care to grant when the annihilation of the Pope's temporal power would be no more than one of those catastrophes to which the world had been so habituated for the last twenty years; and above all, insisted on the aid which would be obtained from him in the meantime in the propagation of the faith when his unbridled ambition should have been satisfied. In reply to this the Pope acknowledged the difficulty of inducing Napoleon to retract his resolutions; and did not dispute the probable duration of his empire (although he did not regard it as imperishable, and displayed remarkable doubts on the subject); but without regard to any such mundane considerations, displayed, on the grounds of conscience and honour, an invincible repugnance to make the concessions demanded of him. To make the pontifical residence in Paris was especially repugnant to his feelings. "Napoleon desires," he said, "to make the successor of the Apostles his chief almoner, but he will never obtain from me so great a debasement of the Holy See. He thinks that he vanquishes me because he holds me in bonds, but he mistakes; I am old, and he will soon have nothing in his hands but the corpse of an old priest who died in chains."

To reside at Avignon, would, on account of its having been the residence of previous Popes in times of persecution, have been more agreeable to Pius VII.; but to acknowledge the declaration of 1682, which was on the condition on which he was to have his establishment there, would be excessively painful to him, being full, as he was, of Roman prejudices. He constantly repeated that Alexander VIII. before his death had pronounced the condemnation of the propositions of Bossuet, and that to recognise and to subscribe to them would be regarded as a weak compliance torn from him by captivity. However, he made a distinction between the various proposi-

tions of Bossuet, and was ready to admit that which refused to the Pope the power of overthrowing temporal sovereigns by releasing subjects from their obedience. But he was full of scruples relative to the others, which declare, as we know, that the Church is not an arbitrary government, that it has its laws, which are the canons, that the authority of the Pope, although ordinarily superior to all other, meets sometimes with an authority superior to its own, namely, that of the Church itself when assembled in œcumenical or universal councils. These maxims, which are but a fair abstract made by Bossuet of ecclesiastical history, and which place the Church at the head of legal and regular governments, instead of degrading it to the rank of a despotic and arbitrary government, agitated Pius VII., and threw him into deep anxiety. "I will do nothing contrary to these maxims," he said, "for I have given my word of honour that I will not, and it is well known that I am an honourable man; but it should not be attempted to force me to sanction them by a former acknowledgment, for I prefer remaining in prison to committing such a weakness." To return to Rome, even deprived of his temporal crown, was the object of the Pope's most earnest desire; for to re-enter Rome without a single sovereign honour, would have seemed to him almost equivalent to his re-establishment upon the chair of St. Peter. But to return to Rome at the price of an oath which would constitute him the subject of Napoleon, and force him to sanction the spoliation of St. Peter's patrimony, was more impossible to him than anything which had yet been demanded of him. "I demand no dotation," he said, "and I desire none. I do not ask for the Vatican, but for the Catacombs. Let me be permitted to return with some old priests to assist me with their counsels, and I will continue my pontifical functions, submitting myself to the authority of Cæsar, even as the first Apostles, and doing nothing either to disturb or to destroy it." But notwithstanding the sincerity of the Pope's humility, it was very evident that he indulged in the hope that in his abject condition he would be more powerful than when seated on the throne of St. Peter's, and from the depths of the Catacombs hold Napoleon in check, and probably survive his colossal empire.

The tendency of his thoughts in this direction was very evident, and even avowed with naïve ardour. But MM. de Barral, Duvoisin, and Mannay permitted him to entertain no illusion on the subject. They made him thoroughly understand that they would never allow him to return as a dethroned prince to a capital in which he had reigned as a sovereign, unless he returned recompensed and reconciled.

These explanations occupied many days. The envoys, to

whom was now added the Bishop of Faenza, had succeeded in rendering Pius VII. much more tractable, and had made him understand that if he himself preferred captivity to making the least concession, he should be careful lest he deprived the Church of advantages it could never recover. And in the last place, they made him understand that at the close of May they should be compelled to depart to assist at the opening of the council, fixed to take place at the commencement of June, and that it was necessary that he should come to his determination, and enable them to declare it to the assembled prelates.

After having enumerated the various questions and repeated to him their opinion upon each, after having persuaded him to say that he was not averse to the institution of the twenty-seven nominated prelates, and that desiring, even at the price of a great sacrifice, to give the Church of France a testimony of confidence and affection, he would acknowledge, without renouncing canonical institution, that it was necessary to prevent the abuse which might be made of it by an ill-advised or malevolent Pontiff; and finally, after having obtained from him an avowal that he would, when free, and assisted by his natural and legitimate counsellors, at least deliberate respecting the new establishment offered to the Church, they persuaded him to consent to the drawing up of a declaration containing—first, his consent, for this time, to institute the twenty-seven nominated prelates, without mention of the *proprio motu*; secondly, a declaration that for the future the Holy See should be bound to institute within six months the bishops nominated by the temporal power, and that in its default the metropolitan should be considered authorised by the Pope to institute in his name; thirdly, a statement of the Pope's readiness, when he should be free and surrounded by his cardinals, to listen to arrangements that should be submitted to him for the definitive establishment of the Holy See. The nature of these arrangements was not even indicated.

On the 20th of May the envoys took leave of the Pope, who parted with regret from these wise prelates, since so unworthily calumniated by a portion of the clergy, and gave them his benediction with affectionate earnestness. But he was much agitated, and during the night following their departure he persuaded himself that he had been guilty of a weakness, and that all Christendom would regard it as such, and accuse him of having, from fear of Napoleon or weariness of captivity, abandoned the interests of the faith. This fear arose chiefly out of the last proposition, by which he had engaged himself eventually, when he should be free and provided with counsel, to examine the propositions which should be made to him relative to the pontifical establishment. He feared that he had thus in some degree agreed to the suppression of the temporal power of the

Holy See, and the annexation of the Roman States to the French empire; and this idea threw him into such a state of trouble and despair, that having had the prefect summoned, and having learned from him that the prelates had already left Savoy, besought him to send a courier after them and recall them, and to signify to them, should they decline to return, that the declaration must be regarded as invalid, as he had been surprised by his feebleness, his weariness, and failing health; and added, "See what it is to deprive a poor priest, aged and worn out, of the counsels which should enlighten him. He is thus exposed to the danger of covering himself with infamy. . . ."

The prefect succeeded in tranquillising the Pontiff to some extent by proving to him that the two first propositions were, after all, conformable to what he had always thought and always said, and that as for the third, it was but a promise to examine, and contained no indication of any definite arrangement. Nevertheless, for the purpose of satisfying the Pope respecting this last point, the prefect sent a courier with a message that the paragraph in the declaration relating to the last proposition was to be held absolutely null; and that with regard to the remainder of it, the Pope still adhered to it, provided it were regarded neither as a treaty nor an engagement, but simply as a basis for negotiation. This being done, Pius VII. grew calm again, and wrote to Cardinal Fesch a letter, in which, heaping praises on the three prelates, and authorising the council to place implicit confidence in their report, he expressed almost the same disposition as that which we have just portrayed.

When the prelates sent to Savoy had returned to Paris, Napoleon was sufficiently well satisfied with the result of their mission, for the government of the Church was no longer threatened with interruption, and all fear of schism had entirely vanished.

Almost all the prelates had now arrived, and amounted to nearly a hundred, of whom almost thirty were Italian. Those who had failed to come were either infirm old men, incapable of making a long journey, or some Roman bishops who had refused the oath on account of the overthrow of the pontifical government. The disposition of the prelates was of a nature to deceive the government and to deceive themselves respecting the result of the council. Although full of earnest compassion for the misfortunes of Pius VII., disapproving entirely of the abolition of the imperial power of the Holy See, and urged to discontent by the coteries of devoted royalists in the midst of whom most of them habitually dwelt, they were very careful not to manifest their sentiments, especially since the catastrophe of the *black cardinals*. And those were generally the

most hostile who were the most submissive, for in their terror they believed that Napoleon was almost as well acquainted with the secrets of their hearts as God Himself, whilst they did not believe that he was as clement. Yet, although it needed but a slight spark to inflame all these sentiments concealed at the bottom of hearts, there was no one in the government of Napoleon capable of foreseeing the explosion which must be the result. M. Bigot de Préameneu, an honest and temperate minister, had no acquaintance with deliberative assemblies; and Napoleon himself, although in the habit of divining that of which he was ignorant, believed that he would manage his bishops as he had managed the members of his legislative corps. He troubled himself little more respecting his difference with the Pope than with a difference which he had had with the Grand Duke of Baden, although he was annoyed at this *querelle de prêtres*, as he called it, and which was a quarrel which had continued too long and obstinately for his taste. The Duke of Rovigo alone had been prudent enough to gain the confidence of several of the prelates, and knowing how much the royalists of Paris exerted themselves to win over the members of the council, had conceived some apprehensions, which he imparted to Napoleon. But the emperor, having always available Vincennes, his grenadiers, and his good fortune, and being blinded by the effect produced by the birth of the King of Rome, an effect which equalled the *éclat* produced by his greatest victories, disregarded the apprehensions thus presented to his notice.

On Monday the 17th of June the council was assembled at the church of Notre Dame. At the earnest entreaty of Cardinal Fesch, who had assumed the right of presiding over the council by virtue of being Archbishop of Lyons, the prelates agreed to grant him this honour, not so much because he was Primate of Gaul, as because they wished to commence the operations of the council by an act of deference to the emperor. It had also been determined to follow the ceremonial adopted at the Council of Embrun in 1727, and that its members should take the oath of fidelity to the Holy See, which, since the Council of Trent, had been imposed on every assembly of prelates, provincial, national, or general.

On the morning of the 17th of June the cardinals, archbishops, and bishops, to the number of more than a hundred, proceeded in procession from the archiepiscopal palace to Notre Dame, with the ceremonial usually observed by councils. Although Napoleon, who employed no other precaution against license than silence, had strictly ordered the exclusion of the public and especially of journalists, curiosity drew a great number of persons to the gates.

After mass had been celebrated with much pomp, M. l'Abbé de Boulogne, Bishop of Troyes, on whom had fallen the duty of preaching the sermon usual at the opening of a council, preached long and eloquently; observing a strict neutrality with respect to the Pope and the emperor, speaking most respectfully of both of these powers, and of the importance of the existence of a good understanding between them. He formally expressed his adhesion to the doctrines of Bossuet, declared that in case of necessity a Church could find in itself the means of its own safety, and thus adopted the imperial doctrine, which tended to render the temporal power independent of the Pope, but at the same time made great professions of devotion to, and affection for, the imprisoned Pope. Singular symptom of the sentiments which filled all hearts. That which he said of the doctrines of 1682, and of the possible case of necessity in which a Church would have to save itself, was considered merely as conventional expressions suited to the exigencies of the moment, whilst all that portion of his discourse which treated of the papal power created, on the contrary, a profound sensation; and altogether this sermon, which was reviewed and censured by Cardinal Fesch, had all the appearance of a demonstration secretly hostile to the emperor.

Immediately after the sermon, Cardinal Fesch, with the mitre on his head, ascended the throne, which was decked out in the customary manner for this ceremony, and took the oath prescribed by Pius IV.: *I acknowledge the Holy Catholic and apostolic Roman Church, Mother and Mistress of all other churches; I promise and swear sincere obedience to the Roman Pontiff, successor to St. Peter, Chief of the Apostles, and Vicar of Jesus Christ.*

These words, although merely a continental form, caused considerable emotion amongst the members of the council, for to swear obedience to an imprisoned Pontiff, within some paces of the palace of the emperor, who held him in captivity, seemed thoroughly audacious. They retired moved and surprised; and no man of experience who should have beheld this assembly could have failed to foresee that it would escape from those who pretended to control it.

Napoleon, on being informed of the aspect of affairs, was excessively irritated, and only calmed by being shown that whilst awaiting the decision which should somewhat retrench the authority of the Roman See, the Church of France should display its fidelity to it, in order that it might not be suspected or calumniated. But although somewhat oppressed, Napoleon was from this moment less confident of the result of the council. He wished, therefore, that the direction of the assembly should

be entrusted to persons on whom he could rely, and decided by a decree that it should be entrusted to a committee consisting of the president, three prelates nominated by the council, and the two ministers of worship of France and Italy, MM. Bigot de Préameneu and Rovara. He confirmed by his decree the resolution which had conferred the presidency on Cardinal Fesch.

A message had, moreover, been prepared in very impolitic language, containing a harsh and lengthy history of the dispute with Rome, and presenting the question which had to be solved in a manner far too imperative. It was on Thursday the 20th that the decree regulating the tenue of the assembly, and the message, were presented to the council. The two days intervening between the Monday and the Thursday had been occupied in secret interviews, which were infinitely more active on the side of the malcontents than on the side of the adherents of the imperial power.

On the 20th the council held a great general sitting. The two ministers proceeded to Notre Dame in carriages belonging to the court, escorted by the imperial guard, and arrived with great pomp, bringing with them the decree respecting the formation of the committee, and the message. They took seats beside the president, and first read the decree, each in his own language. This exercise of authority, which recalled that which had been exercised by the Roman emperors over the first councils, when Christianity had not yet established its government, and treated on terms of equality with the masters of the earth, created a lively sensation amongst the members of the council, which was, however, expressed only in their demeanour. When the votes were thrown for the purpose of electing the three prelates who were to complete the committee, of the hundred members who were present scarcely thirty voted for the candidate who obtained the most. These were given to the Archbishop of Ravenna, who obtained this number because it was desired to pay the Italians the compliment of making one of their prelates a member of the committee. The second number, twenty-seven, was obtained by M. d'Avisu, Archbishop of Bordeaux, a respectable but unenlightened ecclesiastic, who was at little pains to conceal his indignation at the captivity of the Holy Father. M. the Archbishop of Tours (de Barral), and M. the Bishop of Nantes (Duvoisin), the merits of both of whom were well known, obtained each nineteen votes, and on the votes being taken again, M. Duvoisin obtained the majority. After the formation of the committee the message was read; producing by its harsh and haughty expressions a very painful feeling; contradicting the apparently pacific tendency of the mission to Savoy,

and causing the assembly to separate with sad and anxious impressions.

The choice made by the council of members for the committee was the first troubled symptom. It is, indeed, by the choice of persons that assemblies, even those that are the most discreet, betray their real inclinations, for they are able in this manner to express their opinions without exposing themselves to trouble and danger by their manifestation. Thus, in the present instance, the only member of the council who obtained a real majority, after the Archbishop of Ravenna, elected for the reason already mentioned, was the Archbishop of Bordeaux, who was notoriously adverse to the religious policy of the imperial government.

Another symptom, of no less unsatisfactory a tendency, and due in great part to the tergiversation of Cardinal Fesch, was the position given to the twenty-seven nominated but uninstituted prelates. Of these there were eighteen whose episcopal character could not be disputed, although their title to the dioceses to which they were nominated might be; and these were those who, having been promoted from one diocese to another, had an incontestable title in respect of the old see. Nine of these twenty-seven, however, having become bishops only when presented to these sees, were not yet completely bishops as regarded the Church, although they were as regarded the power by which they had been nominated. Twice they had been summoned to join the council, and it was wrong to refuse to them a deliberative voice, especially as the ancient councils presented examples of members deliberating who were not bishops. In the preparatory conferences with Cardinal Fesch, Cardinal Maury, having been desirous of introducing one of the bishops not yet instituted, M. de Boulogne, preacher of the sermon at the opening of the council, had exclaimed that the presence of these prelates in their dioceses had already been a scandal, and that such a scandal in the very assembly in which their fate was to be decided would be intolerable. Every one yielded submissively to these words of M. de Boulogne, and the *uninstituted*, as they were called, had been excluded without opposition from the preparatory meetings. They had been permitted to vote in the election of members for the committee, on the express condition that the permission extended to that time only, and was not to be regarded as a precedent. No one had dared to dispute the opinion which set aside the uninstituted bishops, and it became evident that if the ruler of the empire was feared without the council, there was another ruler within it who was feared even more; and that was public opinion, which condemned the despotic violence of Napoleon towards the Holy See, and condemned this violence, we may

add, much more than it condemned his theological opinions, since M. de Boulogne himself appeared disposed to admit limits to the right of canonical institution.

After the preliminary meetings a species of anxiety began to manifest itself on all sides. The prelates who were partisans of the government were not the most numerous, and were anxious for more support, and unwilling to give up their uninstituted colleagues. They complained that they were not supported by either Cardinal Fesch or the minister of worship, who were both equally ignorant of the art of managing an assembly, and vacillated by turns between the emperor and the council. Those prelates, forming a larger body, who without being precisely partisans of the government, were anxious that there should be peace between the emperor and the Pope, were grieved at the form of the message. And of this party the Italian prelates appeared especially amazed. They had set out on their journey with the idea that Napoleon was admired and feared, and at Paris they had found that he was, doubtless, very much feared, but that in spite of their fear the Parisian population judged and criticised its master, sometimes violently blaming him, and was far from submitting to the man whom it had desired to make the ruler of the whole world. These poor Italians therefore demanded an explanation of so strange a contrast, and whilst they shared the general anxiety, also experienced the greatest astonishment.

The prelates absolutely hostile to the government, as few in numbers as those who were absolutely in favour of it, were some of them filled with indignation, on account of the indignities offered to the Pope, whilst the others were under the domination of those passions of ancient royalism which began to be fostered into new life by the passions of the existing authority. But whatever might be the motive of their hostility, they were delighted at the spirit of the council, although terrified at the consequences which might be its result.

A new and important opportunity occurred for the manifestation by the council of the disposition by which it was animated, on the occasion of the drawing up of the address in reply to the imperial message. The government having enunciated from its own point of view the facts to be considered and the questions arising from those facts, it now became the duty of the council to present these facts and questions as viewed by itself. From thence resulted the necessity of an address, and as a natural consequence, the formation of a committee to draw it up. A committee was accordingly formed in accordance with the spirit of the council, composed of the Cardinals Spina and Caselli (enlightened persons, but like all the Italian members of this council, rather desirous of eluding difficulties than resolving

them), the Archbishops of Bordeaux and Tours, the Bishops of Gand and Troyes, MM. de Broglie and de Boulogne, both of whom had passed from a feeling of enthusiastic admiration for the First Consul to an imprudent hatred for the emperor, M. Duvoisin, the Bishop of Nantes, and finally, the Bishops de Comacchio and d'Ivrée, Italians, whose chief wish was to pass safely through the position in which they found themselves.

This committee, over which Cardinal Fesch presided, discussed all those general questions which arose from the condition of affairs, and found it difficult to come to an agreement, especially in the presence of the Italians, on such subjects as the propositions of Bossuet; the bull of excommunication; the relations of the Holy See with the temporal power; the prerogatives of the papacy, and the power which it might have of resigning any of them in certain cases. The committee was unanimous respecting the necessity of a cordial understanding between Napoleon and Pius VII.; but whilst its members bowed before the more powerful of the two, their hearts inclined towards him who was a proscribed man and a prisoner. The text of the proposed address was cautious as regarded Napoleon, and full of devotion with respect to Pius VII.

On the 26th of June this text, which was drawn up by M. Duvoisin, was presented to the assembled council; and although it had been drawn up by a man of great sagacity, and amended by various persons of opposite opinions, produced amongst the prelates, already excited by the circumstances of their position, the same sensations as those experienced by the committee. The Italians were shocked at the opinions of Bossuet, too openly enunciated; the moderate party was pained at the reference to the bull of excommunication; some thought that the rights of the temporal power should be more expressly acknowledged, and the competence of the council more openly declared; whilst their opponents, on the contrary, were anxious that no engagement should be entered into on this last point, and desired to confine themselves to generalities, and an expression of anxiety to put an end to ecclesiastical evils.

In the meantime there occurred what was, in the eyes of inexperienced men, a phenomenon, but which in those of men accustomed to the régime of liberal countries appeared a very natural circumstance. Scarcely had the prelates, so timid in Paris, been assembled in a council, than they underwent a sudden transformation; their timidity vanished; the sentiment by which the greater number were animated suddenly came to light, and this sentiment was one of sorrow, which at any moment might change into a feeling of indignation, for the captivity of Pius VII.

The debate on the proposed text of the address continued

with much animation during five hours, when M. Dessoles, the Bishop of Chambéry, a respectable prelate, brother of a general in the service of the emperor, arose, and with eyes animated with the idea of the proposition he was about to make, said the bishops assembled in council could not deliberate there as members of the Church, whilst the head of the universal Church, the venerable Pius VII., was in bonds. He proposed to the council that it should go in a body to St. Cloud to demand of the emperor the liberty of Pius VII., and added, that when this had been obtained they could then entertain the questions before them, and probably come to an agreement respecting them. At these words the assembly throbbed with respectful pity, and even remorse, at the idea that whilst they were tranquilly deliberating, the Pope was a prisoner, without the society of a single friend to whom he might open his heart, and without even materials with which he might express the thoughts which agitated his soul; and a large portion of the assembled prelates involuntarily arose with a cry of "Yes! yes! to St. Cloud!" The more prudent, perceiving the danger of the proposed step, wished and yet did not dare to oppose this generous impulse; for there was now more fear within the council of the sentiment which animated it than of the terrible power which held sway without. Cardinal Fesch, in a state of bewilderment, consulted the committee, as he could obtain no advice from the two ministers (whose presence irritated the council without guiding it), and followed the suggestion of M. Duvoisin to adjourn the sitting to the next day. This was a wise resolution, and immediately adopted; the most prudent of the prelates hastening to quit their seats, to induce the others to follow their example.

Notwithstanding the silence of the journals respecting them, the circumstances above narrated produced a great sensation throughout Paris; and giving much gratification to the party hostile to Napoleon—a party which was formerly very small, but now become much increased by his own errors. The persons of this party thronged around the members of the council, flattering them and encouraging them to advance still further in the same direction. But the unhappy prelates, astonished at their own daring, had no sooner gone forth from Notre Dame than they experienced a renewal of their fears of the Duke de Rovigo, who, indeed, had not failed to intimate that it would be well for them to be cautious, as he was not the man to permit the scenes of the Revolution to be renewed under a religious garb.

The legislative corps, assembled at this time, because it was desired that they should assist at the baptism, was surprised, confused, and jealous that it should be idle and lifeless, whilst a convocation of priests was becoming a convocation of the states-general of the empire, and producing heaven only knows

what consequences. And in fact the council did bear a great resemblance to the states-general. In the meantime Napoleon, who, in spite of his far-sightedness, had not expected the display of spirit made by the council, walked up and down his cabinet in a state of agitation, uttering threats, but delaying to put them into execution, being restrained by MM. Duvoisin and Barral, who promised him that the result of the convocation of the council should yet be a successful one, if he would but be patient and moderate.

On the following day the council was calm, according to the habit of assemblies, which are calm, as are also individuals, on the day following a day of agitation, and agitated after a period of repose. MM. Duvoisin and Barral, and all the sagacious men who dreaded violent measures, and did not yet despair of a favourable result, expressed themselves to the effect that when the address should have been adopted; when guarantees should have been given to the imperial authority against the abuse of power by the papacy; and that when the council should have shown a disposition to deprive the Pope of the power of refusing the right of canonical institution, Napoleon, reassured, would become more accommodating, and restore the Pope to the faithful. By means of such remonstrances as these, made throughout the council in the course of familiar conversations, and by means also of making such further retrenchments that it became deprived of all character, the address was voted almost unanimously; the Italians abstaining from voting on account of the propositions of 1682.

In the sittings of the council the uninstituted prelates had been completely ignored, or rather they had ignored themselves by resigning that power of voting which they despaired of obtaining. The prince-primate, chancellor of the Confederation of the Rhine, and head of the German Church, had with great difficulty been received into the council; for its members, little acquainted with the men and circumstances of their times, had believed according to that which they had been told, that this ecclesiastical prince was a philosopher and a sceptic. They could not imagine that a noble and a prince who dared to call himself a friend of Napoleon and of France could be anything else. They had listened, however, with much profit to his complaints on the state of the German Church; a state which was a striking proof of abuse to which canonical institution was liable, since instead of being a guarantee of the selection of fit persons, it had only become a weapon of war.

It became necessary, at length, to broach the great question on account of which the council had been convoked, and M. Duvoisin announced that the emperor demanded that it should immediately be taken into consideration. The assembly had,

in fact, become inconvenient to Napoleon, and he was unwilling to leave it unoccupied. The Bishops of Trèves and Tournay were added to the committee which had drawn up the address, and it was charged with the consideration of the question of canonical institution. The government had declared that the Concordat had, it considered, been violated by the refusal of institution to the twenty-seven prelates, whereby twenty-seven sees were left vacant, and that having been freed, therefore, from this treaty, it would only readopt it on consideration of its receiving modifications which would prevent a recurrence of the abuse of which it complained.

The committee, composed of twelve members, entered, therefore, on the consideration of this question, under the presidency of Cardinal Fesch. The first thing which had to be done was to declare what had been agreed upon between the Pope and the three prelates who had been sent to Savoy; and this declaration was made by M. Barral in a most judicious manner, in which respect for the Pope was mingled with lively sympathy and complete sincerity. He communicated the note consented to by Pius VII., taking care to suppress the last article, which had become to the Holy Father a source of so much anxiety. It was asked why this note had not been signed; M. de Barral said wherefore, and Cardinal Fesch read the Pope's letter by which the note was sanctioned and acknowledged. But according to the members of the committee, the note and the letter were equally valueless, and at the best, only the commencement of an arrangement, and not in themselves an arrangement either precise or definite.

That simple settlement of the question to which Pius VII. had been persuaded having been therefore set aside, it was necessary to consider the question itself, and in the first place to examine the competence of the council. M. Duvoisin established, therefore, the competence of the council with logic which was as neat as it was vigorous. It was evident, in fact, that although incompetent to decide a question of dogma and general discipline, which the universal Church could alone have decided, the council was fully competent to decide a question of national discipline which concerned only the French Church; and the proof that the question was one of particular discipline alone consisted in the fact that the mode of nomination and institution varied from country to country, and was regulated by special treaties between various governments and the Church. To this reasoning, however, the Bishop of Gand (M. de Broglie), the Bishop of Tournay (M. d'Hirn), and the Archbishop of Bordeaux (M. d'Aviau) replied, that a question of so great difficulty could not be settled without the concurrence of the Pope, and that the council was incompetent to decide it alone. To this objection

M. Duvoisin rejoined, that doubtless it would be better if this could be the case, but that the present case was one of extreme necessity, and that in such cases each Church possessed within itself the means of self-preservation, and that such cases as those of a forced separation from the Pope, or the emptiness of the papal chair, or the possession of it by an unworthy Pope, rendered it necessary that the metropolitan should resume the power he formerly possessed of instituting bishops. The more prudent members of the council, however, were anxious that suppositious cases should be set aside, and that it should examine whether in the present instance institution by the Pope could be dispensed with.

When it became at length necessary to come to a decision respecting the competence of the council, there were but three votes in its favour, and these were those of the three prelates sent to Savoy. At this moment, therefore, the objects of the convocation had failed, and the matters in question were exposed to all the chances of Napoleon's anger, which might violently dissolve the difficulty, without recourse either to the Pope or the council. A message being sent to St. Cloud, speedily followed by Cardinal Fesch in person, to inform him of what had occurred, the emperor fell into a paroxysm of rage, declaring, with all kinds of contemptuous and injurious expressions, that he had wished to restore the Gallican Church to the greatness it had enjoyed under Bossuet, but that it was not worthy of such a mission, and that its bishops, instead of being the princes of the Church, were but its vergers, and that he would take his own measures for relieving himself from the difficulty; that he would make a law by which he would declare that each metropolitan had the power of instituting the nominated bishops, and that it should be seen that the Church could preserve itself without the Pope.

At this moment M. Duvoisin arrived to calm an anger which it was easy to foresee, and to restrain its consequences; and indeed, having been withdrawn from the irritation which he almost always experienced in the presence of Cardinal Fesch by the influence of M. Duvoisin, he then exclaimed, "Let us hear M. Duvoisin; he knows what he is talking about." M. Duvoisin, lamenting with much reason that the council had disarmed itself by denying its own competence, maintained, nevertheless, that it was not necessary to act as though all were lost, and that by acting on a basis other than the competence of the council, namely, the note of Savoy, it was possible to arrive at the same end by a different way. It was possible, he argued, to make a declaration by which it should be stipulated, for example, that the episcopal chairs should not remain vacant longer than a year, six months being afforded to the temporal power in which to nominate, and six months

allowed to the Pope in which to institute; and that when these six months should have elapsed, the Pope should be considered to have delegated his right of institution to the metropolitan. M. Duvoisin added, that it seemed impossible that the committee should be unwilling to agree to a settlement of the question which had been accepted by the Pope himself.

Napoleon consented to make this new attempt, and to defer to the morrow the exercise of his supreme authority, which was, in his opinion, quite sufficient to settle everything, in spite of all circumstances and all criticisms. MM. Fesch and Duvoisin retired to propose the new plan to the committee; and after much sensible and urgent advice given by M. Duvoisin, the committee yielded to his representations, and the declaration of Savoy was unanimously, with the exception of the votes of the Archbishop of Bordeaux and the Bishop of Gand, made a decree of the council.

This conclusion to a most formidable dispute was a source of great satisfaction to all prudent minds, and was particularly agreeable to the little court of Cardinal Fesch; for although the cardinal was never tired of boasting of the heroism with which he resisted his nephew, his followers preferred that he should not have any occasion for its display. But this satisfaction was too readily entertained, for having been informed of what had taken place, the members of the royalist or bigoted party employed themselves during the whole evening, and even during the whole of the night, in besieging the members of the committee with urgent declarations that they were dishonoured, that they had given over the Church to its tyrant, and that all was lost unless they retraced their steps in the morrow's sitting. This pleading was successful, and the committee promised, after having attempted to save themselves from Napoleon during the day, to save themselves from dishonour on the morrow.

On the following day, in fact, the committee having been assembled anew, appeared to have undergone a complete change. It was not the dread of Napoleon, but that of the Catholic Church, which now prevailed. The Cardinals Caselli and Spina, talented but weak men, were the first to retract. They pretended that when they had voted as they had, they were ignorant of the laws of the State, that they had since learned that they were in their very nature irrevocable when they had once been consecrated by the Senate, and that therefore, before adopting the decree, it would be necessary that they should have the consent of the Pope, and thus was opened anew the question of the competence of the council. The Bishop of Tournay employed less ceremony in his retraction, and declared that he was adverse to the decree. The Bishops of Comacchio and

d'Ivrée, with a vacillation common to all the Italian priests throughout this affair, explained their vote in their turn, and then retracted it. M. de Boulogne, who was usually more consistent, retracted his also; and all that had been done was again undone. The committee had now fallen into a strange state of confusion, and attempted to escape from it by adopting the general principle of the decree, which was based on the indisputable note of Savoy, on condition that it should receive the consent of the Holy Father, in order to obtain the signature which was wanting to the note on which it was based.

This vote, such as it was, having been obtained, Cardinal Fesch earnestly pressed M. Barral and M. Duvoisin to consent to be, the one or the other of them, the reporter of the resolution which had been taken. These gentlemen, however, whose advice had not prevailed, considered that they could not take upon themselves the duty of drawing up the report; and in this they committed an error, for the resolutions adopted were probably of less importance than the language in which they should be presented to the council; and it was far better that they should be reported by persons sincerely desirous of a peaceable solution of the difficulty, than by enemies who were only anxious for trouble and confusion. MM. Duvoisin and Barral were now, in fact, irritated in their turn, and obstinately rejected the office they were entreated to undertake. On their refusal, it was entrusted to the Bishop of Tournay, although he did not know French, and M. de Boulogne was requested to give his report that grammatical correctness which it might probably want.

Those persons who were only anxious for scandals had now good reason for satisfaction. The compiler of the report made it the vehicle for all the opinions of his party; M. de Boulogne deprived it of all that was offensive to his fine rhetorical taste, but permitted it to retain all that which a judicious politician would have erased. The report was to be read to the council on the 10th of July.

The secret had been carefully kept, as party secrets usually are. On the 10th of July the council assembled with extreme curiosity and visible anxiety. Scarcely had the report been read when extreme emotion was manifested throughout all the ranks of the assembly. A judicious report might have calmed all opinions by granting to each a reasonable amount of satisfaction, and rendered acceptable to the emperor an arrangement which was certainly acceptable to the hostile portion of the council, since it had emanated from itself. But the report having been, on the contrary, drawn up exclusively in favour of the opinions of one party, it completely satisfied the members of that party, whilst it excited the indignation of

their opponents. The partisans of the temporal authority said that to declare the incompetence of the council was to place the whole question in the hands of the Pope, and that by so doing, therefore, no settlement could be obtained. To this it was replied that even if the council were competent, its acts could not be of any force without the sanction of the Pope, for that the decisions of a council were of no value until the Holy See acknowledged them. This omnipotence of the Pope asserted by those on the one side, led those of the opposite opinions to review the use which had lately been made of it by Pius VII., to cite the bull of excommunication, and to blame it as an act tending to anarchy, and to ask what, had it succeeded, must have been the result.

At these words the Archbishop of Bordeaux threw himself into the very midst of the assembly, holding in his hand a book containing the acts of the Council of Trent, opened at the very article which conferred on the Pope the power of excommunicating sovereigns when they should encroach on the rights of the Church. Refusing to be withheld, he advanced, and casting the book upon the table, exclaimed, "You assert that sovereigns cannot be excommunicated, blame then the Church, which declares that they can!" These words produced an immense effect amongst those who approved of them, and amongst those who feared the consequences that might result from them, for their utterance was almost a renewal of the excommunication of Napoleon to his face, almost within the verge of his palace, and under his very hand.

At this point of the discussion Cardinal Fesch, somewhat recovering his presence of mind, declared that it was impossible to continue the deliberation in the state in which the council then was, and deferred to the morrow the definitive vote on the subject under discussion. The council separated, therefore, with a general feeling of anxiety and terror.

When Napoleon was informed of the details of this sitting, he thought that he beheld the commencement of a revolution. But he could not see that they were the evidences of public opinion bursting forth, in some degree in spite of itself, in reprobation of his proceedings. He could not learn the striking lesson taught by the fact that he could not assemble some old, feeble, trembling priests, strangers to any scheme of policy, without their expressing, as soon as they assembled, an energetic protest against his actions.

In all this Napoleon could only see, as despotism could only see, the necessity of employing force to suppress those offensive manifestations; as though the evil could be destroyed by attacking the effects of which it was the cause. Napoleon treated his uncle very harshly, reproved him with his weak-

ness and want of clear-sightedness; passed a decree declaring the immediate dissolution of the council, and gave the most violent orders with respect to the individuals who had been the chiefs of the opposition. The Bishops of Tournay, Troyes, and Gand were considered to be the persons chiefly in fault, and pointed out as the first victims of this species of ecclesiastical insurrection. By Napoleon's order the Duke of Rovigo had them arrested in the night, and conducted to Vincennes, unjudged, unheard, and even without any explanation.

On the following day it became known that the council was dissolved, and that the three principal prelates had been sent to Vincennes. The clergy were especially moved by these circumstances, but were, we must add, as much terrified as indignant. The partisans of government whispered that the three prelates had been found to be complicated in a dangerous intrigue, which had caused M. d'Astros to be imprisoned, and M. Portalis to be excluded from the Council of State. In the meantime the other members of the council, separated from each other, and deprived of that strength they had possessed in their union, fell into their old state of personal timidity. Amongst those who were the most terrified and the most inclined to demand their pardon were the Italians, who, considering the whole quarrel as one which did not concern them, and as being between Napoleon and the French Church alone, were very unwilling, after having preserved their sees even after the captivity of Savoy, to fall into difficulties for a matter of mere form, such as canonical institution. Cardinal Maury, who had no desire to assist in new revolutions, and whose heart was as devoted to Napoleon as it was full of resentment against the Church which had treated him so ungratefully, did not fail to report these sentiments held by the Italian prelates to the minister of worship and to the emperor himself. Nineteen Italians offered, and fifty or sixty French prelates, less indifferent than the Italians with regard to the settlement of the question, but not less terrified, could be relied on, to act in accordance with the wishes of the government. Cardinal Maury advised that the assent of each should be taken singly, saying, "It is an excellent wine, but will be better in bottles than in the cask." This advice was taken, and a decree was passed almost similar to that which had been agreed to in the committee, limiting to a year the interval during which a see might remain vacant, allowing six months for nomination by the temporal power, and six months for canonical institution by the Pope, after the lapse of which period the metropolitan of the ecclesiastical province should be charged with the institution of the nominated persons. To this decree was added a clause directing that the sanction of the Pope should

be obtained; but this clause was understood in the sense that if the Pope did not agree to the decree, the council would vote it anew on its independent authority, and submit it to the emperor to be made a law of the State. This plan having been determined on, the prelates on whom reliance could be placed were summoned, one after the other, to the presence of the minister of worship. Nineteen Italian prelates gave their cordial adherence to the decree, sixty-six French prelates followed their example, and thus eighty-five out of the one hundred and six members of the council gave their votes in its favour. Nor were all the remaining twenty directly opposed to the decree, for at least half of them rather withheld their consent than refused it.

This result having been obtained, Napoleon gave it his sanction, and according to the advice of Prince Cambacérès, issued a decree directing a new convocation of the council for the 5th of August. The council met again, therefore, on that day, and having listened in silence to the reading of the decree, voted it almost unanimously.

It now remained to obtain the sanction of the Pope, not because there was any acknowledgment of the incompetence of the council, but because it was necessary to conform to the natural and necessary usage of submitting to the supreme head of the Church the acts of every assembly of prelates. Napoleon consented, therefore, to send a deputation composed of bishops and archbishops to solicit the papal approbation, and to add to it some cardinals, who might supply to Pius VII. that counsel of which he always complained that he was deprived.

Napoleon had accepted this result of the council, in the first place, because it brought it to a conclusion, and in the next, because he had almost obtained his end in obtaining the limitation of the Pope's right of canonical institution. But he perceived that he had been naturally defeated, for a spirit of opposition, which was the more significant that it was involuntary, had manifested itself among the clergy, and had declared that it regarded him as the oppressor of the Pontiff. He consoled himself by the flattering belief that the deputation would soon bring from Savoy, in accordance with the terms of the decree, the institution of the twenty-seven nominated prelates, which would suffice for the arrangement of the affairs of the French Church, and the removal of the difficulties which at present interrupted its administration. In the meantime, weary of this priest's quarrel, as he had called it, since he had taken up the part of disregarding the Concordat, his best work, he devoted his whole attention to his great political and military undertakings.

Although deprived of free journals, at least in France, the

attention of Europe was directed with mingled anxiety and curiosity to the misunderstanding, already very grave, between the Emperor Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander. Sometimes it was said that the war was inevitable, and would commence immediately, that the French were about to pass the Vistula, and the Russians the Niemen; and at other times, that the quarrel was appeased, and that each was withdrawing his troops within his own territories. Especially since the arrival of M. de Caulaincourt at Paris, and M. de Lauriston at St. Petersburg, had hopes been entertained that peace would be maintained. But the movements, which continually took place, of troops from the Rhine to the Elbe, were ill calculated to support these hopes, and destroyed the good effect of the pacific rumours which had circulated during the last two or three months. The friends of peace had but too much cause for anxiety, for Napoleon, who had resolved to defer the war, whilst he persisted in his determination that it should take place, had continued his preparations, only taking the precaution to dissimulate them sufficiently to prevent an open rupture before 1812. Thus, for example, after having delayed at first the departure of the fourth and sixth battalions of Marshal Davout, and retained them at the dépôt, he had changed his plan, and thinking that they could be nowhere better disciplined than under that vigilant and strict disciplinarian, he had marched them upon the Elbe. Thus there were not fewer than thirty-two battalions sent at once across the Rhine; and to oppose the effect of this fact, which it was impossible to conceal, he had ordered the withdrawal of the two Westphalian battalions, which were intended to complete the German portion of the garrison of Dantzic, and directed that this retrograde movement should be conducted with as much ostentation as possible, and that the march of the two French battalions on the Elbe should be declared to be only the conclusion of a march long since commenced by them. Having under his command the French and a portion of the German journals, he was able for a moment to deceive the public; but hundreds of Russian spies of all nations speedily made known the truth with considerable exaggerations.

In the instance above mentioned the Russian cabinet had not been deceived, and the Emperor Alexander had said to M. Lauriston that indeed two German battalions had retreated, but that at the same time more than thirty French battalions had advanced from the Wesel upon Hamburg. "However," he added, "I do not wish to be behind the Emperor Napoleon in pacific demonstrations, and as he has withdrawn two battalions I will withdraw a division."

M. de Lauriston, who was much terrified at the idea of a new northern war, and who saw very clearly that it must result from

the reciprocal armaments of the two emperors, besought the Emperor Alexander to be the wiser of the two, and to take the initiative in those explanations which were neglected either from motives of false pride or ill-intentioned calculations. "Demand," he said to the Emperor Alexander, "an indemnity for Oldenburg, and I have no doubt that it will be granted to you; send some one to Paris as bearer of your complaints, and I am certain that he will be received with cordiality." To these urgent entreaties the Emperor Alexander replied by an absolute refusal. He was unwilling, as he had already said, to demand compensation for Oldenburg, either in Germany or Poland, because in the one case he would be denounced as the spoiler of the German princes, and in the other he would be accused to the Poles as being desirous of dismembering the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The Emperor Alexander was unwilling, moreover, to appear in the character of an intimidated prince, seeking at the Tuileries a peace which he was thoroughly convinced he should not obtain; and he feared that he should but precipitate the impending war by explaining himself categorically upon certain points, such as, for example, the matters relating to commerce. He was as desirous as Napoleon of deferring the war to another year, and maintained, therefore, an extreme reserve, affirming with sincerity that he desired peace, promising, as a proof of his sincerity, that if the French emperor would disarm, he would instantly do so likewise, and adding, that although distressed at the spoliation of the Prince of Oldenburg, that was not a matter of immediate importance; that he hoped some compensation would be granted, but that he did not insist upon obtaining it immediately, and that he should never make that matter a cause for war.

In this delicate and serious position of affairs, it would have required great care and the most judicious conduct to have prevented the war, and it needed but one imprudent word to render it inevitable and perhaps immediate. And how great was the fear, the character of Napoleon being, as it was, so impetuous, and his language so habitually energetic, that this word would not remain unspoken.

On the 15th August 1811, the day of his fête and grand reception, as it was well known that he was prompt to express the feelings of his heart, every one listened to his words with great attention, and strove to find in them some hint respecting the important question of the moment. He was on this occasion in a gay humour, and inclined to speak. His magnificent countenance beamed with good temper and intellect, and he could not have failed to attract the attention of men less curious and interested than those who now surrounded him. At length the greater number of the persons invited had departed; there

remained the ambassadors of Russia and Austria (the Princes Kourakin and Schwarzenberg), the ambassadors of Spain and Naples, and one or two of the ministers of the little German courts, which always listened anxiously to the words of the giants who were in the habit of making them their playthings. Followed to and fro by these persons, and engaged in general conversation, Napoleon said to the ambassador of Spain that it was a bad season in his country for military operations, that no decided operations could be carried on just then, but that in the autumn he would urge matters forward, and by one rapid stroke settle matters with the Spaniards, Portuguese, and English. Then turning towards the Prince Kourakin, he spoke of a despatch which had been fabricated by the English, couched in very arrogant terms, and purporting to be a despatch addressed by France to Russia, and he said that it had not even the appearance of truth; to which Prince Kourakin replied that it certainly had not, for that it was quite impossible that he ever should receive such a one. Napoleon smiled quietly at this sally of pride on the part of Prince Kourakin, and then, as though to avenge himself a little, turned the conversation to the state of affairs with Turkey, respecting which, in fact, he had much to say. The Russians in the last campaign had remained masters of all the fortifications on the Danube, from Widin to the Black Sea. They had been less successful this year; and it was evident that they had suffered from the retreat which had taken place of certain of their divisions. Prince Kourakin endeavoured to explain away the reverses of the campaign, and naturally boasted considerably of the courage of the Russian soldiers. Whilst the prince was speaking, Napoleon gazed at him with much malice, and took great pleasure in watching the embarrassment with which he spoke, and fruitlessly endeavoured to prove his point. "Yes, yes," he said, at length, "your soldiers are very brave, as we Frenchmen are well aware; but your generals do not know how to use them, and it is impossible not to see that they are very badly manœuvred. It is very difficult to defend a line so long as that of the Danube, from Widin to the Black Sea. It is only possible to dispute one bank of a river when possessed of the means of transport to the other bank, for the true art of defence consists in knowing how to attack. Your generals have acted contrary to all rules." Prince Kourakin, desirous of excusing the Russian generals, declared that the necessary forces had been wanting to them, that they had on this account been compelled to withdraw from a portion of the theatre of war; and then, perceiving the mistake which he had committed, added, that the state of the finances of the empire had necessitated this measure. Napoleon smiled at the prince's awkwardness, and continued

to play with him with as much spirit as grace. "The state of your finances," he said, "has obliged you to withdraw from the Danube. . . . Are you quite certain of that? . . . If that is the case you have made a sad financial blunder, for it is a general rule that troops of which the maintenance is too costly should be marched upon the enemy's territory. This is my usual mode of proceeding, and my finances are accordingly in a very good state." Then suddenly abandoning the good-humoured tone he had adopted during the interview, he continued, with the petulance of one no longer able to restrain himself: "But are we speaking seriously, prince? Are we now dictating despatches or writing for the journals? If it be so, I will at once admit that your generals have been constantly victorious, and that it was the state of your finances which compelled you to withdraw a portion of your troops from living at the expense of the Turks, to make them live at the cost of the Russian treasury—I will grant all that; but if we are speaking frankly before three or four of your colleagues who know the real state of affairs, I will plainly tell you that you have been beaten, that your own errors have caused you to lose the line of the Danube, and that its loss resulted less from the ill-advised manœuvres of your generals than from the mistake of your government in depriving them of the necessary forces by withdrawing five divisions from the Danube on the Dnieper. And why was this done? To make a demonstration against me, whom you call your ally, and who have no possible feelings towards you! You have committed faults upon faults! If you have any cause of anger against me, you should openly declare it. In any case, instead of scattering your forces, you should have concentrated them against Turkey, so as to have overwhelmed it and compelled it to a peace which should have been as advantageous as that of Finland, and then you would have been in a position to have taken precautionary measures against me. But in policy, finance, and war, you have committed a thousand errors; and for whom? For the Prince of Oldenburg and some contrabandists. . . . For the sake of such persons it is that you have exposed yourselves to the risk of a war with me, whose resources you well know! . . . You choose to listen to the English, who tell you that I am resolved to make war upon you; you choose to ally yourselves with contrabandists whom your commercial measures have enriched; you arm yourselves against me, and I am compelled to arm in my turn, and we are now face to face ready to wage war! . . . You are as a hare which, having received shot in its tail, rises on its feet to look around, and thus exposes its head. . . . As for myself, perceiving that I am threatened, I naturally take up weapons of defence. . . . But it is necessary that this state of affairs should come to an

end." Napoleon, expressing himself with extreme volubility, and at the same time preserving a good-humoured and even amicable tone, now paused for a moment, and afforded the Prince Kourakin an opportunity of replying. The prince, whose remembrance or knowledge of the existing facts was but slight, although he was not wanting in finesse or skill in the conduct of important affairs, failed to remind Napoleon that in the series of military armaments France had preceded Russia, and overwhelmed himself with protestations of friendship and devotion, declaring that Russia had never ceased to be faithful to the French alliance; that she had been greatly distressed by Napoleon's treatment of the Prince Oldenburg, to whom the court of Russia was strongly attached; that nothing could have more deeply pained the court of Russia than the seizure of the States of this prince; but that Russia had nevertheless confined itself to remonstrances on the subject, to *reserves*. . . . "To *reserves*," replied Napoleon—"to reserves! You have made a formal protest, you have denounced me to Germany, to the Confederation of the Rhine, as a robber. . . . Perhaps you do not know that your Prince of Oldenburg was a great favourer of contraband traffic, that he broke his treaties both with you and with me, that he violated the compact which bound together the members of the Confederation of the Rhine, that according to the ancient German law I might have summoned him to my tribunal, placed him under the ban of the empire, and dispossessed him without giving you an opportunity of making any objections? Instead of adopting this mode of proceeding, I have anticipated your wishes, and offered him a recompense." Whilst Napoleon was uttering these words, he smiled as though he did not speak them in earnest, and seemed almost to acknowledge that he had acted with too much precipitation. Then he added in a tone of mingled regret and gentleness, "I admit that if I had known how great was the interest felt by you in the welfare of the Prince of Oldenburg I would not have acted as I have. But now what course shall I adopt? Shall I restore to you the territory of Oldenburg filled with my custom-house officers, the only condition in which I would restore it? This you would not wish. . . . In Poland I will grant you no compensation, none." . . . And Napoleon pronounced these last words with an accent which proved that Alexander had had good reason for being unwilling to expose himself to an attack on this point. . . . "In what quarter then," Napoleon continued, "shall we find a suitable compensation? . . . Only make some request and I will endeavour to satisfy you. . . . Why have you let M. Nesselrode depart at such a moment? . . . (M. Nesselrode, the principal director of the affairs of the legation, was quitting Paris.) It is necessary that your master should send either him or some other with powers to conclude an arrangement, satisfac-

torily removing our mutual causes of dissatisfaction ; otherwise I will continue my armaments, and you know that I am not in the habit of permitting myself to be vanquished. . . . I suppose you reckon upon having allies ! Where are they ? Is Austria one of them ; Austria, with whom you were at war in 1809, and from whom you have taken a province at the conclusion of peace ? ” . . . And whilst uttering these words Napoleon looked at the Prince of Schwarzenberg, who was silent, and held his eyes fixed on the ground. “ Is Sweden one of them ; Sweden, from whom you have taken Finland ? Is Prussia one of them ; Prussia, whose spoils you accepted at the peace of Tilsit after having been her ally ? . . . You deceive yourselves, you will have no allies. Come to an understanding then with me, and let us have no war.” . . . At the close of this interview Napoleon took the hand of the Prince Kourakin in the most friendly manner, and then dismissed the circle, smiling delightedly at the embarrassment of the Russian ambassador, who exclaimed, as he left the Tuileries, that he was suffocated, that it was very hot in the salons of the emperor. This conversation recalled to the memory those which Napoleon had held with Lord Whitworth on the eve of the rupture of the peace of Amiens, and with M. de Metternich on the eve of the campaign of Wagram ; and although it had not the violence of the former, nor the intentional gravity of the latter, it was capable of affording ground for very dangerous exaggerations, and such as would be extremely embarrassing to the Emperor Alexander, who was already too much compromised in the eyes of the nation in regard to the wounds suffered by his dignity.

On the following day Napoleon's flatterers, who were in the habit of celebrating the prowess of his lips as much as that of his sword, did not fail to relate how he had overwhelmed the Russian ambassador ; whilst his detractors, in the habit, on the contrary, of putting a bad construction on his best actions, were very active in declaring that he had violated every law of propriety in respect to the representative of one of the chief powers of Europe. Prince Kourakin, however, adopted no such tone in his report, which was simple and moderate ; and the Emperor Alexander would have permitted this new outbreak of his formidable ally to have passed without remark, had not a number of letters sent to St. Petersburg from Paris, Vienna, and Berlin, strangely misrepresented the interview of 15th of August. “ I should have wished,” Alexander said to M. Lauriston, “ to have taken no notice of this conversation, but all the salons of St. Petersburg are resounding with it, and this new circumstance has but confirmed my nation in its resolution to defend its dignity and independence to the death. Napoleon would not have spoken this if he were not resolved

upon war. I remember his conversation with Lord Whitworth in 1803, and that which he held with M. de Metternich in 1809; and I can only see in that which has just taken place a sign which leaves little hopes of the maintenance of peace."

The Emperor Alexander made these observations with an air of extreme sadness, which was shared by his minister, M. de Romanzoff, whose political existence depended on the maintenance of peace. Each of them declared that the first steps towards war would not be made by Russia; but it was very evident that they no longer retained any doubt respecting the approach of war, that the favourable impressions produced by the presence of M. de Lauriston, and the tone of his language, were completely dissipated, and that the autumn and winter would be occupied with active preparations for a decisive and terrible struggle.

In the meantime Napoleon despatched to the Elbe the fourth and sixth battalions, by which means the forces under Marshal Davout were raised to eighty battalions of the finest infantry. Adding the chasseurs corses and those of the Po, with some Spanish and Portuguese detachments, Napoleon proposed to raise the corps of the Elbe to ninety battalions, and to distribute it in five divisions of equal strength. An excellent Polish division, another composed of veteran soldiers of the Hanseatic towns, and a third composed of Illyrians, would raise to eight the number of Marshal Davout's division. Many French officers, some returned from foreign service since the annexation of their native country to France, others from the school of Generals Friant, Morand, and Gudin, had contributed to inspire with proper spirit these troops of foreign origin. Napoleon flattered himself that under the iron hand of Marshal Davout, and within the influence of the flame of patriotism and military honour which burnt in the ranks of his army, these Spaniards, Portuguese, Illyrians, and Hanse troops would acquire the valour of the French themselves.

In the rear of the Elbe, Napoleon, as we have already said, formed his second army, called the corps of the Rhine, with a dozen regiments which had fought at Essling under Lannes and Massena, and to which he was desirous of adding the Dutch troops. Being certain that he would have a year in which to complete his preparations, he proposed to raise these regiments to four and even five battalions, since he had renounced the plan of select battalions.

We may here observe what an incredible fertility of spirit he displayed in the creation of his armaments, a fertility which, being liable, as all great faculties are, to abuse, sometimes led to artificial creations, the unreality of which became only too apparent in the ensuing campaign. We have already

seen that Napoleon was anxious to add to the class of the conscription of 1811, which had been wholly levied, a very considerable addition both in numbers and quality, by procuring the submission of the refractory recruits of the levies of former years. Eleven or twelve columns mobile overrunning France in every sense, had compelled fifty or sixty thousand of these refractory persons to submit. The measure had been severe but efficacious. As their detention, however, was a source of considerable difficulty, Napoleon determined to have them trained in the isles which border France, from which flight would be impossible. With this view he formed in these isles, and of good troops, regiments of instruction, of which the effective force was left undetermined and might be raised to fifteen thousand men. He formed one of these establishments in the isle of Walcheren, a second in the isle of Ré, a third in Belle Isle, and two in the Mediterranean, one of which was in Corsica, and the other in the island of Elba.

Napoleon devoted the most sedulous attention to these establishments, and at length, considering them sufficiently well trained, drew some thousands from the regiments at Walcheren to complete the fourth and sixth battalions of Marshal Davout. His intention was, if this attempt succeeded, to furnish the marshal with sufficient of these troops to raise all his battalions to a thousand men each.

These first detachments were perfectly successful, and of the men sent, scarcely a sixth were lost by desertion. The remaining five-sixths presented in their ranks a robust and veteran appearance, and gave good hopes that they would become, under good treatment, very serviceable troops. Marshal Davout, who knew how, when necessary, to lay aside his extreme severity, gave orders that they should be accustomed to discipline by gentle treatment. This plan was tried, and not without success. Unfortunately when other bodies of these troops were sent from their various dépôts they carried with them the fevers of Walcheren and other dangerous maladies. The first detachments, moreover, had not been sent until properly equipped and disciplined; but the latter were sent in peasant costume and totally uninstructed.

Marshal Davout devoted his earnest attention to the task of remedying a portion of these evils, to the proper management of the unhappy persons sent, to the providing them with the necessary equipment, and to inspiring them with the martial spirit of his regular troops. But what a task was this; and how much danger there was that, after having succeeded during twenty years, failure would at length ensue at the moment when all the most natural sentiments, too rudely repressed, should be driven to despair! The care bestowed

by Napoleon on the organisation of his troops was equalled by the attention which he bestowed on the provision of sufficient war matériel. His plan was to have at Dantzic, besides what would suffice for the subsistence of 20,000 men during twelve months, provisions sufficient for the maintenance of an army of 400,000 or 500,000 men during the same time; and with this view he had, in the first place, ordered General Rapp to watch the stores of grain in this city, which is one of the chief depôts of cereals in Europe, and to keep himself informed of the quantities in the magazines, so as only to purchase at favourable seasons. Having taken this precaution, he then directed him to purchase 600,000 or 700,000 quintals of wheat, several millions of bushels of oats, and to buy up all the fodder he could find. Three military chests, the first at Dantzic, the second at Magdeburg, and the third at Mayence, known to him alone, in order that they might not be generally reckoned on, were secretly to furnish the necessary funds for these purchases.

The supply of stores, however, was not the only care; it was also necessary to provide means for transporting them; and Napoleon had already ordered the formation of a certain number of transport corps for the conduct of about 1500 waggons loaded with biscuit. Continually pondering on the subject, which occupied all his thoughts, and devising every moment new combinations, he had, since the preceding year, discovered means of transport still more efficacious and ingenious than those on which he had at first determined. The ordinary waggon, drawn by four horses, and driven by two men, was very well suited for the conveyance of the daily provision of troops which it accompanied; and one such could carry one day's provision for a battalion. But something else was now required by Napoleon, who was planning to convey sufficient stores for the provision of his army during fifty or sixty days; and having this end in view, he conceived the idea of great chariots drawn by eight horses, conducted by three or four men, and capable of containing ten times the load of an ordinary waggon. A tenfold result would thus be obtained, whilst the expense of conveyance would be scarcely doubled. Considering, however, after further reflection, that this kind of carriage would be too heavy for the soil of Poland and Lithuania, Napoleon determined upon employing a chariot drawn by four horses and conducted by two men, which would leave the existing organisation of the transport corps undisturbed, whilst the amount carried by each waggon might be trebled or quadrupled. He immediately gave orders, therefore, for the construction of waggons after this model in France, Germany, and Italy, wherever there were commissariat depôts, in order that the

troops might have at the same time the old waggons for the conveyance of the provisions necessary for each day, and the new waggons for the transport of the stores sufficient for one or two months. Still further racking his brain, as it were, to provide for every contingency, he was desirous of adding to his means of transport *chars a la courtois* and *chars a bœuf*. The former are, as is well known, light, and easily drawn by a single horse, which is trained to follow the one preceding, so that one man is able to conduct a considerable number of them. The latter are heavy, but are drawn by strong animals, which, feeding during the occasional moments of repose on the grass beneath their feet, occasion no trouble in the evening after having performed the most considerable services during the day. On account of these reasons, therefore, Napoleon resolved to add to the eight transport battalions which he had determined on for the army of Russia, four battalions *a la courtoise* and five battalions *a bœufs*, planning at the same time a method of organisation which would permit the waggoners to transform themselves immediately into soldiers for the defence of the convoy they conducted.

Napoleon calculated that these seventeen battalions, conducting 5000 or 6000 waggons, would render him secure of provisions for 200,000 men during two months, or for 300,000 men during three months. And this, he considered, would be sufficient, for he proposed to embark his stores on the Vistula at Dantzic, transporting them by its waters to Frische-haff, from Frische-haff to the Pregel, and from the Pregel by the interior canals to the Niemen. He had even despatched some naval officers to arrange the details of this plan. Arriving at the Niemen with 500,000 or 600,000 men, he would lead forward the half of them into the interior of Russia, and having, according to the preceding calculation, forty days' provisions in his baggage train, he hoped to be able, with what he might procure on his route, to provide for the subsistence of his soldiers; for, in spite of their plans of devastation, the Russians would scarcely have time to destroy everything. On these reasons and on these immense preparations Napoleon founded his hopes of being able to maintain his troops on the vast plains of the north, which he expected to find desert and devastated.

But these 5000 or 6000 waggons required 8000 or 10,000 men to conduct them, and 18,000 or 20,000 horses or oxen to draw them; and if we add 30,000 artillery horses, and probably 44,000 cavalry, we may form some idea of the difficulties which had to be overcome in matter of providing the necessary stores. Napoleon hoped to make this necessary provision by delaying offensive operations until the fields should be clothed with herbage.

Knowing that the soldiers much preferred bread to biscuit,

and having perceived that the difficulty of procuring bread did not arise from the baking, but from the labour of converting the grain into flour, he ordered the greater part of the cereals in Dantzic to be ground, and that the flour thus procured should be stored in barrels adapted to the new waggons, and that masons should be enlisted for the purpose of constructing ovens at the various places of encampment. These masons were to be incorporated amongst the troops of workmen of every calling whom he designed to carry with him, such as bakers, carpenters, smiths, &c.

The pontoon equipage, by no means the least important subject of care, also received improvements in this second year of preparation. He had ordered the construction at Dantzic of two pontoon equipages of 100 boats each, which would serve for throwing two bridges over the largest rivers. As there would seldom be a scarcity of wood in the region in which the war would be waged, and iron and cordage would be the only things difficult to procure, Napoleon ordered such of these things to be provided as would suffice for the construction, with wood to be procured on the spot, of a third pontoon bridge. He also ordered provision to be made of materials for the construction of fixed bridges. General Eblé, who had performed on the Tagus such marvels in this branch of military art, was placed at the head of the corps of pontonniers, to the service of which were assigned 2000 horses. "With such means," cried Napoleon, "we shall swallow up all obstacles!"

Although Napoleon had confided to Marshal Davout the organisation of the greater portion of the army, because he regarded him as a consummate disciplinarian and an administrator at once just and severe, he did not intend to entrust him with the entire command, naturally reserving this for himself. But he wished in case of sudden hostilities to have on the Elbe and the Oder, and under a single head, an army of 150,000 French and 50,000 Poles ready to throw themselves upon the Vistula. He proposed at a later period, when operations should have commenced, to detach a portion of these troops which, joined to the corps of the Rhine, should be divided between Marshals Oudinot and Ney. Marshal Oudinot was to assemble at Münster the regiments cantoned in Holland, and Marshal Ney at Mayence those which were cantoned on the Rhine. Each of these marshals had been ordered to join their several corps immediately, and to commence the organisation of their infantry and cavalry. As for the cavalry, they were each to receive their share on entering Germany, whither all the cavalry troops had already been sent in order to be mounted. Independently of these forces, so considerable in themselves, 100,000 allied troops of various nations were to be distributed among the different corps of our army.

Napoleon ordered Prince Eugène to be ready at the close of the following winter to cross the Alps with the army of Italy, and he had assembled in Lombardy almost the whole of the armies of Illyria and Naples. He had selected from each of the best regiments, consisting of five battalions, three battalions d'élite for service in Russia, proposing thus to form an army of 40,000 French, supported by 20,000 Italians, which should cross the Alps in March under the command of Prince Eugène. The fourth and fifth battalions retained at the dépôts, with many entire regiments of the Neapolitan army of Murat, were charged with the defence of Italy against the English and against insurgents. The levies of the conscription of 1811, and the refractory conscripts of the isle of Elba, having undergone a severe course of discipline, would refill successively the ranks of the fourth and fifth battalions, which would be exhausted for the purpose of filling the three first. Napoleon had, moreover, taken from the Italian and Illyrian troops ten or a dozen entire regiments for the purpose of creating an army of reserve, which would replace in Spain the imperial guard and the Poles, whose departure for Russia he had already ordered. Thus at the very moment when he was preparing to strike a great blow in the north, Napoleon did not renounce his intention of striking one in the south, pursuing simultaneously, as was his wont, all the objects he had in view. In the preceding year this army of reserve could have had no better destination than Spain, since there was the theatre of decisive events; but at the present time, on the contrary, the north having become the scene of final conflict, he should have directed to this quarter all his forces, confining himself in Spain to energetic defensive operations on the limits of Old Castille and Andalusia. But Napoleon, assuming all that his vast imagination conceived to be real, believed that he could at the same moment hurl the thunderbolt at Cadiz and at Moscow.

Whilst occupied with these vast conceptions, which were to be put into execution in the following spring, he was careful to visit a country which had been recently added to the empire, a country on which he placed a high value, in which he hoped to produce a very favourable impression by his presence, and where he could personally inspect a portion of his preparations for war; this country was Holland. Naval affairs were also another reason which induced him to make this journey; for with his usual determination to attend to everything at the same time, he had by no means renounced his exertions in the establishment of his marine, and was as active on this subject as though he were not preparing for a war with Russia. He was anxious in the first place to hold the English in check, and by causing them continual anxiety to prevent them from

exhausting England of troops by sending them to the Peninsula. With this purpose he had resolved to make them live in continual apprehensions of expeditions constantly prepared against Ireland, Sicily, and even Egypt, and hoped by these means to have, in the improbable case of no war taking place with Russia, the means of embarking 100,000 men.

Now that the Scheldt was entirely under his own control, he had altered his arrangements with regard to his flotilla at Boulogne, reducing it to what would suffice for the embarkation of 40,000 men instead of 150,000 as formerly, and thus confining it to a size which would render an expedition perfectly practicable. He had besides on the Scheldt sixteen vessels at Flushing, and would soon have twenty-two. By adding a flotilla of brigs, corvettes, frigates, and large armed long-boats, he reckoned upon having means for the embarkation of 30,000 men. He included also in his calculations the eight or ten vessels at the Texel, so long demanded of his brother Louis, and already prepared since the administration of Holland had been in his own hands. This squadron, escorting a flotilla, was capable of embarking 20,000 men. There were some frigates at Cherbourg, two vessels at Brest, four at Lorient, and seven at Rochefort, and with these materials Napoleon prepared to re-establish the Brest flotilla, which he desired to employ in the seizure he projected of the islands Jersey and Guernsey. Finally, he had eighteen vessels at Toulon, which he intended with the aid of Genoa and Naples to increase to twenty-four. He had thus prepared in the Mediterranean means for the embarkation of 40,000 men, and for an expedition which might alternately threaten Cadiz, Algiers, Sicily, and Egypt. Three vessels and some frigates were ready at Venice, and were about to proceed to Ancona, to be followed by two others and several frigates, so as to have complete command of the Adriatic.

These already vast resources Napoleon desired to increase in 1812 and 1813 to eighty or a hundred vessels, and thus to possess means of transport for nearly 150,000 men. He had already sufficient for the purpose of throwing 30,000 men into Ireland, 20,000 into Sicily, 30,000 into Egypt, and thus filling England with consternation. These means would also enable him to recover the Cape, long since lost, and the isle of France and Martinique, lost but lately. If, therefore, the peace of Europe should be arranged without securing to France maritime peace as well, he would be able immediately to strike a blow at England.

These various preparations and certain details of his armaments for the war with Russia rendered it necessary that he should take a journey along the coasts. Setting out, therefore, from Compiègne on the 19th of September, and stopping

successively at Antwerp and Flushing, he inspected the works which had been ordered for the defence of the Scheldt, embarked on board the flotilla of Flushing under the flag of Admiral Missiessy, made sail, and was overtaken by a great storm, which rendered communication with the land impossible for thirty-six hours. He was well satisfied with the condition of naval affairs in this quarter, and did not depart without distributing rewards and bestowing great praises on the admiral.

One object of anxiety which occupied Napoleon's attention during this voyage arose from the fact that as there were soldiers of all nations in the ranks of his army, so there were sailors of all nations on board his vessels, and there was some danger that when out at sea they might become insubordinate and join the English. He determined, therefore, to place on board each vessel a guard composed of 150 veteran French infantry. He had, independent of the imperial guard and foreign regiments, 130 regiments of infantry, some consisting of five and some of six battalions, and he resolved to take from the best organised *depôt* battalions companies of infantry to be regular garrisons on board the vessels of the line. Putting into immediate execution, as was his wont, the idea which had occurred to him, he gave orders for the despatch of these companies to all the ports at which the squadrons were assembled; and always impatient of delay, insisted at Antwerp that the shipbuilding should proceed incessantly, and that as soon as one vessel had been launched, another should be placed upon the stocks. As there was a want of the necessary wood, he planned a vast system of transport from Hamburg to Amsterdam, by means of small boats passing between the coast and the isles which lie along the shore of the North Sea from the mouths of the Elbe to the Zuyder Zee. Nor did he stop here. A dry summer, which had been very favourable to the vineyards, had checked the growth of the cereals, and the price of grain was rising every day. Napoleon withdrew, therefore, the licences which had been granted for the exportation of grain, and ordered the purchase of corn at Hamburg for France.

After having inspected the regiment of Walcheren and ordered various measures relative to the health and equipment of the men, Napoleon visited Amsterdam. The Dutch, much distressed at having lost their independence, hoped nevertheless to be recompensed in some degree by their incorporation with a vast empire, and by the vivifying administration of Napoleon. There had been some time before bloody executions on the occasion of the conscription in East Friesland; nevertheless, whether led away by the prestige of his

glory, or the excitement which fêtes occasion to even the most phlegmatic people, the Dutch received with acclamations the man who had deprived them of their independence, and whom, as they speedily proved, they were far from loving. The reception was such, in fact, as might well deceive Napoleon; and as he beheld the resources of the country, he indulged for a moment in a crowd of hopes and illusions.

Amongst the causes which had induced Napoleon to visit Holland, the defence of the new frontiers of the empire was not the least. With that admirable quickness of eye which enabled him to determine, with a mere glance at the map, how a country should be defended or attacked, he devised immediately the best system of defence for Holland. He determined in the first place, on account of the danger always threatened by the English, the chief *depôt* of stores should be neither at Texel nor Amsterdam, nor even Rotterdam, but at Antwerp, and he ordered the immediate conveyance thither of all the contents of the Dutch arsenals. He determined that there should be a first line of defence passing by the Wesel, Koevar-den, and Groningen, embracing not only Holland, properly so called, but Gueldres, l'Over Ysel, and Friesland; a somewhat feeble line, and only of the strength of advanced works. He designed a second stronger line to leave the Rhine towards Emmerich, following the Ysel, passing by Deventer and Zwolle, embracing Gueldres and a moiety of the Zuyder Zee, and covering almost all Holland, with the exception of Friesland. But he resolved that the true line of defence should be that which, leaving the Rhine or Wahal only at Garcum, should end at Waarden on the Zuyder Zee. This line, in fact, included the most hollandaise part of Holland, consisting of fertile lands and flourishing cities, so situated that in case of an inundation they could be converted into isles, impenetrable even to a maritime enemy, by means of the fine works on the Texel, which would form the extreme and invincible point.

Assisted in the execution of these plans by the able general of engineers, Chasseloup, Napoleon ordered the construction of magnificent works at Texel, the object of which was the protection of an immense flotilla with its stores, affording it the means of entrance or departure in all states of the wind, and closing completely the Zuyder Zee.

These orders having been given, he proceeded to Wesel, where he directed other works for the defence of this city, and to afford it an administrative importance which it then did not possess. At the same time, he made his presence in this quarter the pretext for the review of two divisions of cuirassiers. He inspected them between Düsseldorf and Cologne, made arrangements for

supplying them with all that they required with respect to organisation and equipment, and took advantage of their arrival on the Rhine to march them quietly on the Elbe. This was a convenient way of sending forward, almost unperceived, his heavy cavalry, of which these two divisions formed almost the half. He also employed himself at this time with the creation of the lancers. He had already in Poland had an opportunity of perceiving the utility of the lance, and having resolved to employ it in the present war, determined to convert into regiments of lancers six regiments of dragoons, one of chasseurs, and two of Polish cavalry. Having bestowed the necessary attention upon these various matters, he proceeded to Cologne, and devoted his attention to its defence.

In the meantime he had to determine many points relative to the foreign and domestic policy of the empire. The court of Prussia, profoundly disquieted at the approaching war, perceiving that since its territory would be the road of the belligerent armies it would be unable to remain neuter, and having no reason to favour Russia, which in 1807 had concluded peace at her expense, and had even accepted a portion of her territory (the district of Bialystok), was disposed to ally itself to Napoleon, provided that he would guarantee the integrity of the remainder of its States, and a territorial recompense for effective assistance. Unfortunately Napoleon remained deaf to the hints he received on this subject, in order that his designs might remain the better concealed, and the terrified court attributed this reserve to an intention of seizing at some future day the whole Prussian kingdom. This terrible fear constantly weighed upon the mind of the king, and he lost not a moment in making preparations for war; his design being to demand of Napoleon at the critical moment a declaration of his intentions, and should he refuse to grant to Prussia his alliance, to throw himself beyond the Vistula with 100,000 or 150,000 men, and to join the Russians at Königsberg. However well dissembled were the preparations of the Prussian court, they could not escape so acute an observer as Marshal Davout; and moreover, M. de Hardenberg, endeavouring every day to obtain some explanation from the French minister, M. de Saint-Marsan, and with this purpose taking pains to show what means Prussia possessed of being able to assist an ally whose cause she might espouse, permitted himself to declare that she could raise in a few days, if necessary, an army of 150,000 men. These words falling from the lips of the first Prussian minister had been a ray of light, and Napoleon directed M. de Saint-Marsan to repair immediately to the minister and the king, and to declare to each that his eyes were at length opened to the designs of Prussia, and that it was necessary that she should immediately disarm, trusting to his word of

honour that she should be admitted to his alliance on satisfactory conditions when prudence would permit him to declare his designs ; and that should she refuse obedience, Marshal Davout would march upon Berlin with 100,000 men to efface from the map of Europe the last remnants of the Prussian monarchy. At the same time orders were given to Marshal Davout to proceed without delay to the Oder, to cut off from the Prussian army the road of the Vistula, and to carry if necessary the court itself from Potsdam.

Napoleon had also to take very important measures with regard to Sweden. We have already related the circumstances attending the election of the new prince-royal. This prince had not been able to forgive Napoleon for refusing to listen to his proposition with respect to the cession of Norway. Having owed his election simply to accidental circumstances, and more especially the glory of the French armies ; possessing the attachment of no party in Sweden, and acquiring no esteem by his personal presence in the country since it was speedily discovered that he was a vain boaster ; prodigal of foolish promises, and less warlike than he pretended to be, he had been anxious to recommend himself to the Swedes by means of a brilliant acquisition which should flatter their patriotism. The Swedes, indeed, although much distressed at the loss of Finland, nevertheless perceived that this province so necessary to Russia must be the constant object of its desires and its efforts, and that the truest frontier for the two countries being, therefore, the Gulf of Bothnia (with the exception of the Aland Islands, these being indispensable, especially in winter, to the safety of Stockholm), the acquisition of Norway should be the recompense sought for the territory they had lost. But although Napoleon could easily promise the gift of Finland in the event of his war with Russia having a successful issue, it would have been a flagrant treason against his faithful ally Denmark to have hesitated a moment with respect to Norway. His significant silence had made the prince-royal aware of his sentiments on this subject, and he had from that moment abandoned himself to a spirit of hatred against Napoleon, which had long lurked at the bottom of his heart. The reigning king, enfeebled by age and bad health, had entrusted to him the administration, at least for the time being. Bernadotte had taken advantage of this to favour the Russian and English party, whilst he still ostensibly adhered to the interests of France, to which he owed his election. But whilst refraining from declaring himself hostile to France, he took every occasion of declaring himself entirely devoted to Sweden, of expressing his readiness to die for her, and of repeating that Sweden was under no obligation to be faithful to any allies save those who revered and preserved her interests. Whilst

holding this language in public, he favoured more than ever the contraband commerce, secretly intimating to the English that they might resort to the environs of Gothenburg notwithstanding the apparent existence of war, and hinted to the Russian legation that although the loss of Finland was very grievous to Swedish pride, what was lost was lost, and that it hoped to obtain compensation for the loss in a different quarter. He had, moreover, maintained in full force the order given to the Swedish marine to repress our corsairs, and openly to protect the soldiers who maltreated, even to the shedding of blood, our sailors at Stralsund.

Alquier was our minister at Stockholm, and as he had had the misfortune of being at Madrid a little before the fall of Charles IV., and at home at the moment of the seizure of Pius VII., he had been very unjustly accused of being wherever he appeared the sinister precursor of Napoleon's designs; all that he can be justly reproached with being the possession of a considerable power of foresight and a coldness of demeanour which is sometimes dangerous in delicate situations. It was to him that the new prince of Sweden had to explain himself, and an interview took place between them, the account of which would appear incredible, were not M. Alquier, who reported it to Napoleon, a witness worthy of entire confidence. After useless and insincere explanations respecting the English establishment at Gothenburg, the failure of performance of the principal clauses of the last treaty, and the French blood spilled at Stralsund, General Bernadotte insolently demanded of M. Alquier how it was that France, which he had served so well, and which was under such great obligations to him, should treat him so ill, even to the extent of endeavouring to injure him at Constantinople, Stralsund, and Stockholm by means of its agents. To these strange words, which he could scarcely believe that he had heard aright, M. Alquier replied that if France were under obligations to the new prince-royal, it had repaid them by raising him to the throne of Sweden.

Doubtless if it had been possible to foresee the course of future events, it would have been judicious to treat this mad pride with caution; but when we consider the state of existing circumstances, we may easily understand the indignation which it excited in the mind of the French minister; and it cannot but be admitted that there are some things which even the fear of instant death ought not to induce us to endure. Bernadotte was anxious that the particulars of this interview, in which he had displayed a spirit of feverish and even mad presumption, should not be transmitted to Napoleon, but nevertheless he could not refrain from carrying his boastful demeanour to the extent of saying to M. Alquier, "I particularly

beg of you to inform Napoleon of what you have just heard!" "As you wish it, I will do so," replied M. Alquier, and immediately retired. It was easy to understand that the above request, proceeding from so insincere a man as the prince-royal, had a meaning precisely contrary to its ostensible signification; but M. Alquier, who would have done his master good service by keeping silence respecting this conversation, did not dare to fail in the exact performance of the duty of his office, and transmitted full particulars of it to Paris. Napoleon, who was far from foreseeing the cruel punishments which Providence had in store for him, perused his minister's portentous narrative with a smile of pity, declaring that he had long since perceived the enemy gnawing at Bernadotte's heart, long since believed him capable of the blackest treason, and that he regarded this expression of his true character as worthy only of utter disdain. He ordered M. Alquier to quit Stockholm for Copenhagen without giving any explanation and without taking leave of the prince-royal. He directed M. de Cabre, secretary to the embassy, to assume its direction, at the same time refraining from visiting the prince-royal or holding any communications save with the Swedish ministers, and with them only in matters of necessity. At the same time he intimated to the Swedish representative at Paris that if satisfaction were not granted to France, especially with regard to Stralsund, the treaty of peace with Sweden would be considered null.

During the journey he was now taking Napoleon had also to give various orders relative to ecclesiastical affairs.

The deputation of prelates and cardinals sent to Savoy had found Pius VII. gentle and benevolent as usual, although agitated by the serious posture of affairs, and it had but little difficulty in persuading him that the decree of the council was satisfactory. This decree, as the reader must remember, obliged the Pope to institute nominated bishops within six months from the time of their nomination, and authorised the metropolitan to grant it in case he should neglect the performance of this duty within the stipulated time. Pius VII., favourably impressed by the reference made by the council to his authority, which he regarded as an acknowledgment of the rights of the Holy See, yielded to the solicitations of the deputation, adopted the new decree, and promised to institute without delay the twenty-seven new prelates. This result having been obtained, the cardinals and prelates departed, leaving the Pope more calm and more disposed to a reconciliation with the emperor, and flattering themselves that in return for the concessions they had induced him to make, they should obtain for the Pontiff a lot less hard and more worthy of his station.

Information of what had taken place at Savoy reached Napoleon whilst on his journey in Holland, and the important affairs of the Church were amongst those on which he had to determine during its progress. It is somewhat singular that the dispute with the Pope caused him almost as much anxiety as the war in Spain.

In the one case as in the other he found a resistance in the nature of circumstances against which he found the assaults of the sword to be perfectly futile, and with respect to which, indeed, truth and time, that is to say, reason and constancy, are alone of any avail. At the same time he believed that he had discovered a means of uniting all these troublesome matters into one head, which he would utterly destroy by completely subduing Russia in the ensuing war. Indulging in this idea, he considered that when he had once vanquished Russia he would triumph over every kind of resistance, either material or moral, which the earth could oppose to him; the commercial resistance of traders, the patriotic resistance of Spaniards, the religious resistance of the clergy, and so to speak, the common feelings of humanity. He demanded, therefore, that his attention should be left undisturbed by anything save the one great affair, the war with Russia; and when in the midst of his journey in Holland despatches came from the minister of worship calling his attention to a new phase of the religious quarrel, he was excessively annoyed, and replied rather by a cry of impatience than by an answer.

The acceptance of the decree of the council pleased him to a certain degree, but he was more gratified by the promise given by the Pope to institute the twenty-seven new bishops, for by this means the interrupted administration of the Church would be re-established. The letter which accompanied and explained these concessions, however, displeased him much, for its sentiments were opposed to the doctrines of Bossuet; and Napoleon, who was averse to the existence of liberty in any quarter in which he could himself domineer, wished it to prevail wherever it would not be in antagonism with his own power; this latter case was that of the Church, and Napoleon was therefore an ardent disciple of Bossuet. This being the case, Napoleon resolved to accept the effective part of the pontifical letter whilst he rejected the motives on which it was based, and determined to submit to the Council of State the decree of the council to which the Pope had assented, in order that the decree might be placed *au bulletin des lois*. As for the letter itself, Napoleon ordered it to be referred to a committee of the Council of State, that its conformity with the doctrines of the Gallican Church might be examined, and that as much delay might be caused by the examination as was

convenient. With regard to the twenty-seven new prelates, he directed all steps necessary to their canonical institution to be taken as soon as possible, and that the performance of this ceremony should be immediately demanded and obtained from the Pope, but that the prelates then residing at Paris awaiting the Pope's decision should be straightway dismissed.

These measures having been taken, Napoleon continued his journey, concluded the inspection of the troops and material which were being forwarded from the Rhine to the Elbe, and then returned to Paris, which he reached at the beginning of November. Other important matters awaited him there. Prussia and Sweden had replied to his imperious summons. The former, offered the alternative of either suspending her armaments or having Marshal Davout march immediately upon Berlin, had submitted. The solemn promise given by Napoleon had in some degree reassured the King of Prussia, and he had only demanded the immediate discussion of the terms of the treaty of alliance, which was to guarantee to him immediate possession of his States, and an increased territory on the conclusion of peace. Napoleon consented to open this negotiation, but directed that it should be protracted, in order that Russia, who believed war to be certain, might not suppose that it would be immediate.

The order sent to M. Alquier to depart for Copenhagen terrified the Prince-Royal of Sweden, who was only brave in outward show, and he declared that M. Alquier, in the habit of embroiling his government with every cabinet with which he held communications, had misrepresented the interview which had taken place between them. The fact was, however, that M. Alquier had reported nothing but the exact truth. In the meantime the reigning king being very unwilling that the misunderstanding with France should be still further increased, reassumed the direction of affairs. But although the hatred of the prince-royal was henceforth less apparent, it was by no means less dangerous. He commenced from this moment to forward the reconciliation of England with Russia; and when forced to give some explanation to those who had assisted to elect him simply on account of their inclinations in favour of France, he declared that the misunderstanding which had so unfortunately arisen was simply the result of a misfortune under which he laboured, which he now found himself compelled to avow, and which was no less than the having inspired Napoleon with a furious jealousy.

We may well understand with what disdain Napoleon would have listened to such folly as this. He again recommended a complete avoidance of any relations with the prince-royal, and the moderate but persevering continuance of the demands of

France relative to the contraband traffic, and the injuries inflicted on the French sailors.

As soon as he had re-entered Paris, Napoleon directed his ministers to examine carefully all the affairs of the administration of the country which were capable of being permanently arranged, in order that nothing might be left unsettled in the spring when he should depart for Russia, and continued to give his most sedulous attention to his military preparations; and so powerful was his system of government, that it was equally effectual either in the arrangement of domestic policy or military armament. But unfortunately, however great or magnificent may be a man's genius, the method of the universe is stronger than he, and is capable of baffling all his plans.

Before following Napoleon into the gulf into which he was now about to plunge, it is necessary to retrace the last series of events in Spain, the importance of which, in themselves as well as in relation to the great system of affairs at the period, was far from being slight. The recital of these events will form the subject of the following book.

BOOK XLII.

TARRAGONA.

WE have now reached a period when it is necessary to resume the narrative of the events in Spain succeeding the undecided battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, and the lost battle of Albuera, both of which took place in May 1811. The army of Portugal, deprived of the only chief capable of leading it, the illustrious Massena, was scattered about Salamanca in a state of misery, discontent, and disorganisation difficult to describe. Marshal Marmont, an intelligent and sedulous general, had devoted to it the most earnest attention from the moment of his arrival; but the evacuation of Portugal, and the apparent impossibility of driving the English out of the Peninsula, increased the confidence and boldness of the insurgents and the turbulence of the northern provinces, whilst aggravating the sufferings of our troops as well as of the inhabitants. In this state of affairs a new circumstance occurred to increase the general wretchedness.

On the 25th of May the celebrated Mina, successor of his nephew, who was in detention at Vincennes, having succeeded in forming a band of 3000 men, which he skilfully transported by turns from Navarre to the Basque provinces, and from the Basque provinces to Navarre, had assailed a convoy consisting of a thousand Spanish prisoners and a hundred waggons filled with wounded French soldiers proceeding towards France, guarded by 400 fusiliers of the new guard, and 150 men of the 28th leger and the 75th of the line. Colonel Dentzel, in command of the escort, had complained of its insufficient strength to General Caffarelli, but the latter had paid no attention to his remonstrances, and the convoy had set out from Vittoria for Bayonne. Mina, always possessed of accurate information, had concealed his forces in the woods on the right and left of the Tolosa road, and when the column of prisoners and wounded, more than a league in length, had ascended the mountain which rises beyond Vittoria, and was in the midst of the defile of Salinas, he suddenly rushed upon it, released the Spanish prisoners, and cruelly slaughtered with their assistance our sick and wounded. In spite of the most heroic efforts the

escort was unable either to retain possession of the prisoners or to save the wounded, and lost 150 of their own number in this fatal encounter; the only consolation for which is to be found in the fact that the Spanish prisoners, being situated between the cross-fire of our troops and those of Mina, expiated by the slaughter of great numbers of them the savage cruelty of their liberator.

On hearing the sound of the musketry General Caffarelli advanced with the reinforcements to attack Mina in his turn; but he only arrived to find the Spanish prisoners liberated, the sick and wounded slain, and Mina escaped; and instead of blaming himself, and himself alone, he blamed the brave men who had been engaged in this desperate struggle. And yet General Caffarelli was an honourable man, worthy of his illustrious brother. But this was a fresh example amongst a thousand others of the grievous state of confusion into which all things had fallen in Spain.

At Madrid the absence of the king, of whose return there could be little expectation, the wretchedness of the working classes, the dearness of provisions, which were seized by the roving insurgent bands even at the very gates of the capital, the fatigue, destitution, and dispersion of the army of the centre, which was exhausted in marching from Guadalaxara to Talavera, from Segovia to Toledo, without succeeding in keeping open the communications, carried discouragement and despair into the very heart of the kingdom.

In Estramadura and Andalusia affairs were no better. After the battle of Albuera, fought for the purpose of saving Badajoz, Marshal Soult had retreated to Llerena, and had established himself on the slope of the mountains which separate Estramadura from Andalusia. From these heights he overawed the English by his presence, and afforded to the besieged fortress the best moral support it was in his power to give, and urgently and reasonably demanded that succour should be sent to him. For if the aid he demanded did not arrive, if the army of Portugal did not descend promptly upon the Guadiana, in spite of the difficulties that the heat opposed to the march of troops, Badajoz must fall, and the powerful army of Andalusia, which had set out from Madrid the preceding year amounting to 80,000 men, but now, alas! very greatly reduced, would find itself deprived of a trophy which was the only reward it had obtained for all its sufferings and courage.

In Andalusia the state of affairs, although less deplorable, was still extremely unsatisfactory. The siege of Cadiz, which should have been the only occupation of the army of Andalusia, whilst the conquest of Badajoz, devised by Marshal Soult as a means of avoiding entering Portugal, had but served to divide

his forces and expose him to useless dangers, had made no progress. Marshal Victor, his troops having been reduced to 12,000 effective men, and scarcely sufficing to guard his lines, remained before the isle of Leon with the flotilla he had created and the great mortars he had founded, without sailors for the former or material for the latter. Depressed and discontented at the part which Marshal Soult had compelled him to play, he demanded as the only reward for his services to the empire that he should be immediately recalled. In the meantime the insurgents of La Ronda had been no less troublesome to General Sebastiani, who was constantly occupied in making head at Grenada against the English on one side, and against the troops of Murcia and Valencia on the other. But although a man of great wisdom and moderation, he was denounced by Marshal Soult as being unequal to the government of Grenada, which, however, he ruled more successfully than the marshal had ruled Andalusia, and he solicited his recall as earnestly as the Duke de Bellune.

One province and one army alone, as we have already said, presented a satisfactory aspect; namely, the province and the army of Aragon, under the command of General Suchet. This general was able, and he was also fortunate, being one of those men to whom a certain degree of talent seems to attract success. He had successfully taken Lerida, Mequinenza, Tortosa, and established order and regular government throughout his province, which was additionally fortunate in being neither traversed by the French armies, forming no portion of their road, nor threatened by the English, not being their object. This portion of the country was therefore almost happy in the midst of the frightful convulsions which agitated Spain, and almost loved its conqueror in the midst of the universal hatred towards the French.

It was on the frontier of his government that General Suchet met with the most serious difficulties—Villa Campa in the direction of Calatayud, l'Empecinado towards Guadalaxara, Mina in Navarre, and the banditti on the border of Catalonia never ceasing to give occasion for the exertions of his troops. But this fortunate general was in command of officers and troops worthy of himself, and the conquest of these bands was but a matter of detail.

In Catalonia, on the other hand, all was disorder. The banditti, supported and encouraged by the Spanish army of Catalonia, which held its base at Tarragona, filled it with desolation, and there was not a defile beside which they did not await to attack convoys whose escorts were too feeble, to release their prisoners, to slaughter the sick and wounded, and to seize the provisions which were being conveyed to the various

fortresses, and especially Barcelona. Whilst the banditti rendered the roads of the interior impassable, the English flotillas rendered as dangerous the routes which bordered the coast. In Barcelona the garrison and inhabitants were equally in want of provisions, although a whole army, that of Marshal Macdonald, was devoted to the purpose of revictualling it, and many naval expeditions were adventured with the same object; for in general only a fourth part of the stores sent reached their destination. General Maurice Mathieu, who was the governor of this place, displayed as much skill as firmness in maintaining his position, and overawing the inhabitants without driving them to despair. But he wrote that it would be impossible to keep in check for any considerable time longer so numerous a population.

The Catalan army finding at Tarragona a solid base, provisions and stores of all kinds furnished by the English navy, and a safe refuge in case of necessity, sometimes dared to venture from the sea-coast, on which Tarragona is situated, even to the foot of the Pyrenees, and to the great astonishment of every one introduced provisions into the fortress of Figüères, of which we had been deprived by treason. Taking advantage of the moment when the French, under General Baraguey d'Hilliers, had not as yet had time to collect sufficient troops in front of the fortress to commence the siege, M. de Campo-Verde had broken through our feeble line of blockade and had introduced both men and provisions.

We have already said what was the situation of our officers and soldiers, who, enduring greater misery than they were capable of inflicting on the enemy, and sometimes excited to excesses much to be lamented by the sight of the cruelties which they saw inflicted on their comrades, but at all times the least inhuman of any people who ever attacked or defended the Peninsula. The soldiers, if they could only obtain a little grain or a few cattle from the uncultivated and depopulated fields, and could make boots for themselves of the skins of the animals on which they had fed, were satisfied. The officers, on the other hand, habituated and obliged to live in a manner suited to their rank, endured cruel suffering both in body and mind. They were deprived, for instance, by the want of pay of the means of obtaining shoes for their feet. Napoleon, allotting 48 millions a year for pay, and leaving to the country the burden of supplying provisions, believed that he had supplied all that was necessary. But the pay for the years 1810 and 1811 should have been more than 165 millions, or more than 80 millions a year instead of 48. Of the sums due he had sent 29 millions in 1810 and 48 in 1811, that is to say, 77 millions instead of 165. What remained unpaid had been torn

from the country by the agency of the military governments. Of the 77 millions actually sent by Napoleon, a portion had been plundered on the way, a portion devoted to necessary purchases or indispensable repairs of the artillery, and a part still remained in certain depôts. The army of Andalusia had received scarcely anything; and since it was quartered in a rich country, would have wanted for nothing had Marshal Soult been as good an administrator as General Suchet. The army of Portugal, however, being condemned to serve in the stony districts of Portugal or Salamanca, had been in want of the simplest necessaries, its officers presenting a pitiable sight, and having little hope of relief, since in the first place the emperor was far away, and in the second they could present to him nothing but reverses. Where, then, after the hopes conceived in 1810, after two years of fresh struggles, after the despatch of reinforcements to the amount of 200,000 men, after the sacrifice of so many soldiers and generals, and the compromise of so many illustrious reputations, of those of Massena, Ney, Jourdan, Augereau, Soult, Victor, and St. Cyr, where was the conquest of Spain?

Was it the fact that this terrible country was really invincible, as asserted by an ancient tradition, and as its inhabitants delighted to believe? Excellent judges, who detested the Spanish war, and had had opportunities of personal inspection, St. Cyr, Jourdan, and Joseph himself, did not believe this, and believed that increased resources, patience, and perseverance might still command success. Doubtless great exertions had been already made, which would have been excessive for any object which was not so essential an one of the imperial policy; but until the end had been accomplished, the exertions which had been made were entirely ineffectual. The army of Portugal, for want of reinforcements to the extent of 40,000 men, and the supply of some millions for the purpose of procuring food and clothing; the army of Andalusia, for want of 25,000 additional troops, of sailors, of munitions, and a flotilla which was lying idle at Toulon; the court of Madrid, for want of some millions for the payment of its employés; and the armies of the north, for the want of 20,000 men and some millions of money for the purpose of establishing magazines, were equally ineffectual and wretched. In fact, nearly 400,000 men were become useless for the want of 100,000 additional troops and 100 millions of money. In all matters the greatest sacrifices are useless if they be not continued until the attainment of the desired object.

Doubtless if the 100,000 additional troops which were required were to remain as useless as the 400,000 already sent, there would have been good reason to refrain from making this

further sacrifice, but it was already easy to perceive in certain provinces symptoms of a fatigue of which immediate advantage should have been taken. The feeling with which Spain had been excited had been violent, unanimous, and legitimate; but nevertheless, after four years of war, at the spectacle of so much bloodshed and such widespread ruin, it was impossible not to ask why and for whom so much evil was endured. A calm had to a certain extent succeeded to the first state of excitement, and left room for reflection, and in Saragossa, Madrid, Seville, and other large cities men began to say that the princes for whom they fought were little worthy of the devotion they displayed towards them, and that the Spanish branch of the illustrious and august family of Bourbon having become utterly degenerate, deserved to be cut off; since the chief of the descendants of Philippe V., the honest and foolish Charles IV., lived at Marseilles as much the slave of the Prince de la Paix and his wife off the throne as on it; since his eldest son, a prisoner at Valençay, incessantly entreated the conqueror who had robbed him to bestow upon him one of the princesses of the Bonaparte family, and was so much afraid of being compromised by the acts of those who endeavoured to set him free, that he denounced them to the police; and since, in the last place, there was not one of the race, man or woman, who cared to extend a friendly hand to the heroic nation which poured out its blood in its cause. The Cortes of Cadiz, after having proclaimed some incontestable principles, but which were nevertheless very precocious for Spain, had only resulted in a species of anarchy, residing at Cadiz in a state of misery, discord, and perpetual disputes with the English. The Spaniards were well aware of these facts, and appreciated them at their true value as soon as the roar of the cannon was a moment absent from their ears. Joseph, on the other hand, was in the eyes of all those who had opportunities of personally judging of his character a gentle and enlightened prince, a representative of the moderate principles of the French Revolution, and afforded good grounds for hope that his government would be one of wise reform. He was a new prince certainly, and it might be said that he was a usurper, imposed on the country by another usurper; but had it not always been a historical tradition in Spain that the regeneration of the country must be the work of foreign dynasties? Had not Philip V. revived the fortunes of Spain by replacing the degenerate descendants of Charles the Fifth? And had not Charles the Fifth himself, although the legitimate heir, been a foreign prince, who took to Spain the brilliant civilisation of Flanders when there remained there no better representative of Ferdinand and Isabella than Jeanne la Folle? Might not hopes be indulged in, then, that Joseph's

reign would have similar good results? At Madrid, where the inhabitants had had an opportunity of becoming personally acquainted with him, he had been justly appreciated, and the national animosity had almost died out as regarded him. In Aragon, where General Suchet was the representative of the new government, the population had learned to think favourably of it, and to say that in the absence of war it would be a hundred times better than the Prince of Peace and the Queen Marie Louise. At the same time the incessant war, with its attendant wretchedness and devastation, and the idea which was generally entertained that if Napoleon did not annex to his empire the whole of Spain, he would at least seize the provinces of the Ebro, excited the enmity of even the most moderate of the Spanish population. And yet it was easy to perceive in Madrid and the surrounding districts that if Joseph had been able to recompense his various functionaries; to pay his troops; to furnish them with stores and equipments from regular magazines, instead of at the expense of the country; to maintain order and discipline as it was maintained in Aragon; to obtain from Napoleon and his generals the respect due to the sovereign of any country, but indispensable in the case of the king of a nation so proud as that of Spain; and to dissipate the widespread fear of the appropriation by Napoleon of the provinces of the Ebro, that some progress would have been made in reducing the country to submission.

The favourable feeling which began to arise in the capital, and which always displayed increased vigour when the state of affairs happened to be less sad than usual, showed symptoms from time to time of having spread to the other great towns; and it is a noteworthy fact that the Spanish troops, which at first had deserted as soon as enrolled in the service of the new king, began either from weariness or from jealousy of the guerillas to display fidelity, provided they were duly paid. Even the guerillas themselves, who were mere bandits, desirous of nothing but pillage, began to be gradually attracted by the prospect of pay, and an amnesty having been accorded to a certain number in La Mancha, around Toledo, in the neighbourhood of Guadalaxara, they had submitted and enlisted in the king's service.

None of these favourable symptoms existed in the hotbeds of insurrection, where the popular passions were still energetic and obstinate, where the English excited and fostered every sentiment hostile to France, where hopes of success were still fervently entertained, and where especially pillage was excessively lucrative; but although the position of the French in the Peninsula was one of great difficulty, it is quite certain that the exhaustion of all classes of society, and especially of the peasant

class, and the absence of any reasonable object to be obtained by the protraction of the struggle (for the recovery of the Bourbons of Marseilles and Valençay certainly was not such an object), would have occasioned the submission of the Spaniards, had one last and powerful effort been made; had the English, above all things, been expelled; had the necessary forces for the attainment of this object been employed; had the capture, which was quite possible, of Lisbon and Cadiz been secured; had the guerilla bands been suppressed, and the imitation of their ferocities been refrained from; had the reinforcements necessary for the attainment of these objects been supplied; and had not only these reinforcements been supplied, but the expenses of their maintenance also, thus releasing the country of the greater part of the miseries of war; and finally, had there been added to these resources a power, impossible to be exercised from a distance, of general direction—had, in fact, not a portion but almost the whole of the resources of the empire and the attention of the emperor himself been devoted to Spain, it is almost certain that a successful result would have been obtained. A portion only of the preparations which had been made for the Russian war would have sufficed for deciding in our favour the question which had been excited by the Spanish mission. Napoleon was wrong to make Spain the theatre on which was to be decided the great European question; but having once transferred it thither, he should there have decided it.

When Joseph, driven to despair, had quitted Madrid to go to demand of Napoleon either the adoption of another method in the conduct of Spanish affairs, or permission to re-enter into private life, many honest persons at Madrid, Valladolid, Burgos, and Vittoria had said to him: See how much we have to endure, and judge for yourself whether it will be possible to induce us to submit by such a régime as this! Our habitations are pillaged and burnt, and ourselves assassinated by your soldiers and those who call themselves ours, and our lives and property are thus at the mercy of brigands of every nation. We can hope for no good from the anarchical government of Cadiz, or the corrupted government of Ferdinand, and we would willingly resign ourselves to obtain all that we need from your hands; but deprived, for ever, perhaps, of our colonies, we are now threatened with the loss of our provinces of the Ebro, and no disposition is displayed to render our submission honourable. You yourself are despised and publicly insulted at the moment when endeavours are being made to render you our king. How then can you expect us to submit? Your functionaries, treated with contumely by the French generals, and almost dying with hunger, are reduced to the necessity of supporting themselves on soldiers' rations. How then can they command the least respect?

You go to Paris—report our words to the emperor. Your departure is interpreted in two ways: by your enemies as the signal that the veil of pretence is about to be laid aside, and that Spain is speedily to be declared a French province, in the same way as Lubeck, Hamburg, Florence, and Rome; by your friends, the number of whom is small, as a recourse to the superior genius of your brother, for the purpose of informing him of that of which he is ignorant, and perhaps for the purpose of inducing him to come hither and give his personal attention to the direction of affairs. You refrain from saying that the latter are right. Hasten to Paris, then, tell the truth, obtain reinforcements, and at the same time authority for yourself to act effectually, and for us a reassuring declaration with respect to the maintenance of the integrity of our territory. The moment is propitious, for in spite of your apparent reverses, in spite of the temporary successes of your opponents, there is a general weariness throughout the country which may speedily be converted into submission or despair—despair which would be terrible to those who might have provoked it.

These words, proceeding from the mouths of men worthy of credit, had been reported at Paris by Joseph, who, having proceeded thither for the purpose of being present at the baptism of the King of Rome, had remained there during May, June, and July. But unfortunately Joseph was subject to certain weaknesses which, although very pardonable in themselves, prevented Napoleon from entrusting him with the necessary authority. He was, as we have before said, a good, honest, sensible man, but indolent, prone to pleasure, expense, and the society of flatterers (and with regard to a fondness for flattery there is but little distinction between the characters of princes, whether ancient or modern), far too surely convinced of his possession of military talents, and very jealous of his authority. The existence of these defects in his character had thrown a certain degree of suspicion over his demands for more troops, more money, and the command-in-chief of the armies in the Peninsula, and had induced Napoleon to receive them so badly, that the intervention of a third person became necessary to prevent the recurrence of unfortunate scenes between the two brothers. Prince Berthier had been selected as major-general of the armies of Spain, and it would have been impossible to have selected a more judicious or discreet man, or one better informed on all points. Unfortunately he had not as much influence as talent; and if incapable of perverting the truth, was not, nevertheless, sufficiently courageous to declare it plainly. Moreover, Napoleon was at this moment exasperated against his brothers. Louis had but recently thrown at his feet the crown of Holland; Jerome, who had received Hanover in

addition to Westphalia on condition of supporting certain charges, had not fulfilled his engagements, and had been punished by the deprivation of a certain portion of Hanover; and Murat, a worthy but fickle and turbulent man, excited by his spirituelle and ambitious spouse, had bitterly displeased his brother by excessive extravagance and neglect of his navy, and was, moreover, accused by him of having under various pretexts held communications with the English along the coasts of his kingdom. Finally, we have already seen how greatly Napoleon was irritated by the half treasons of Cardinal Fesch. The unfortunate Joseph arrived, therefore, very *mal à propos* for the purpose of declaring unpleasant truths. Napoleon had had him informed that if he were desirous of abdicating as Louis had, he was perfectly at liberty to do so; that his brothers might at any time freely quit the thrones he had bestowed on them; that he was able to dispense with their services; and that the adoption of this conduct by them would even simplify the affairs of Europe; but that in the meantime they were not only kings, but also generals under his orders; and that he would not suppose that they would desert their posts without informing him previously, and receiving his permission. Such was the first explosion of Napoleon's excitable temperament; and this having passed off, the intervention of Prince Berthier had been the means of obtaining explanations somewhat calmer and more precise. Joseph had declared that it was essentially necessary that he should receive the respect due to him as the brother of the emperor and King of Spain, and that the generals should not be permitted to treat him, as they did, with contempt. He also asserted that the generals were so much at variance with each other, that there was danger of their sacrificing to their mutual jealousies the lives of their troops; and added that if it were desired to bestow upon him suitable dignity, to re-establish unity of system in the conduct of the military operations, and to prevent excess and pillage, it was necessary to endow him with the supreme command, at the same time appointing as chief of his staff some marshal worthy of confidence, and sending to him from Paris instructions to which he would scrupulously conform, leaving in the provinces only judicious and able lieutenant-generals. He also declared that it was a matter of no less urgency if it were desired that the exasperation of the Spaniards against the French should subside, that the devastating system of nourishing war by war should be renounced, and that instead of endeavouring to obtain money from Spain money should be sent thither, to be repaid at a future time; and that if he, Joseph, were supplied with a subsidy of from three to four millions a month, he would have well paid and faithful functionaries, an army of

Spanish troops entirely devoted to him, and more effectual than French troops for the suppression of the guerilla bands, a portion of whom also would be induced by the offer of pay to enlist in his service. That if it were preferred to convert this subsidy into a loan he would repay it within a few years, and would give a thousand French troops in exchange for each million advanced. And if, he said, the army were well paid and supported, and employed in the pursuit of the English army, and if Spain were assured that she would not be deprived of the provinces of the Ebro, a condition of calm peace would spread around Madrid, and would thence extend to the provinces, so that before long Spain, being in a state of complete submission, would restore to France her armies and her treasures, and a second time be governed, to the advantage of both nations, by the policy of Louis XIV. But if, on the contrary, he concluded, the existing system were persisted in, Spain would then become the tomb of Napoleon's armies, the confusion of his policy, and probably the source of his own fall and the ruin of his family.

All these allegations were true with the exception of a few trifling errors, which, however, served Napoleon as a pretext for the refusal of the most well-founded demands. That the moment was a favourable one for the subjection of exhausted Spain, and that if the English were once expelled this subjection would not be long delayed, was sufficiently evident from what had taken place in Aragon and even around Madrid. That the use of a few millions of money would render possible the creation of a devoted administrative service and a faithful Spanish army, which would be of effectual service as a police for the interior, might fairly be expected from what had taken place at Madrid; that without supplying the place of Napoleon himself, which would have been difficult, the appointment of a firm and able chief of the staff, such as General Suchet, for example, endowing him with absolute authority over all the generals, and placing at his disposal sufficient troops and money, would be the means of attaining the conquest of Cadiz and the pacification of Spain, was evident from the conquest of Tarragona and the pacification of Valencia. And there could be no doubt that by entrusting to Massena, with the aid of a hundred thousand men and sufficient means of transport, the expulsion of the English, the united genius of Suchet and Massena would bring to a conclusion this cruel war, which if ill conducted might easily be the gulf in which would be lost both the fortunes of Napoleon and of France. But it was an error of Joseph's to suppose that he did not need thousands of men as well as millions of money; it was an illusion to suppose that he was capable of commanding, and that it was only necessary to appoint some complaisant courtier chief of the

staff, for there was need of a real general commanding-in-chief, of such a man as General Suchet, who was a talented warrior, an able governor, and a conciliatory politician.

Whilst there was much truth, therefore, there was some error in the system propounded by Joseph, and this was sufficient to excite Napoleon's pitiless railleries against his brother's pretensions. To be a general, he said, required something more than mere ability to sit a horse, and to give some signs of command. To be a general, a man should unite to profound intelligence a decided character, great powers of application, and a habit of paying constant attention to the least details. For his own part, Napoleon continued, he had the statements respecting his troops always on his table, and they formed his favourite reading; he carried them to bed with him, and read them when he could not sleep; and that it was by virtue of this natural aptitude of spirit and character, of his incessant application and immense experience, that he was able to command and to ensure obedience, since his soldiers placed in him implicit confidence; but that as far as Joseph was concerned God had not made him a general; that he was by nature gentle, spirituel, and indolent; that pleasures were necessary to him, and too much work injurious; that men were in the habit of instinctively detecting this sort of disposition, and would laugh at the idea of being commanded by such a general, whilst jealousy would induce them equally to decline to obey the officer appointed to advise him. For these reasons, he said, Joseph could not be entrusted with any larger command than that of the army of the centre. As for the demand for money, he declared that he had none, and complained that his brothers, although ruling the richest countries in Europe, were perpetually demanding it of him. Spain, he said, contained sufficient for the supply of the whole world; and if Joseph knew how to govern, he would be able to procure the necessary funds for the purposes of administration, as he had already procured funds for gifts to his favourites, for the erection of royal residences, and the maintenance of a species of luxury which was out of place in the present situation of his affairs. With respect to the sufferings endured by Spain, he said that they were misfortunes for which there was no remedy, that the French soldiers suffered equally, that war was war, and that the Spaniards must patiently submit to inevitable evils. He laughed at Joseph's pretensions to the possession of the art of fascinating populations, and at his hopes of performing with millions of money what could only be done with thousands of men; declaring that the turbulence which existed in Spain could only be quelled by numbers of troops and the exercise of great vigour, and that when terror

had once produced submission, that benign system of government which all nations had a right to expect might succeed.

In adopting a tone of ridicule in reply to Joseph's demands, Napoleon did not behave with good faith, for he was far too clearsighted not to perceive to what extent they were well founded; but he could not change his system or devote to the war in Spain what he had destined for the war in Russia; and he was anxious, therefore, to continue the war in Spain with only the same resources, trusting that in any case success on the Borysthène would compensate for any want of it on the Tagus; a calamitous idea arising partly from comparative ignorance of the distant places respecting which he calculated, and partly from the giddiness of over prosperity.

This being the state of affairs, the journey undertaken by Joseph for the purpose of persuading Napoleon to alter his system with respect to Spain could have no result, or at least could but effect some slight changes in it of no real value. When the first explosion of his irritation had passed away, Napoleon, whose severity only lasted for the moment, and who, moreover, was sincerely attached to his brothers, granted certain changes, which were rather formal than real. Joseph was still confined to the command of the army of the centre, but was to exercise over all the provinces civil, judicial, and political authority. The generals were directed to respect him as a king and the sovereign of a country of which the provinces were temporarily occupied in accordance with the necessities of the war, and if, which was very improbable, Joseph should ever be tempted to join one of the armies of the Peninsula, it was to be immediately given up to him. Moreover, recognising the utility of increasing his influence over the provinces of the north, across which passed the line of communication with France, and where a large portion of the population was thoroughly wearied and disposed to submit, Napoleon offered to Joseph to replace Marshal Bessières, Duke of Istria, by Marshal Jourdan. The difficulty would be to induce the latter to return to Spain, and to accept office from Napoleon, between whom and himself there existed a mutual dislike, and to whose want of moderation he was especially adverse.

With respect to his finances, Joseph actually needed four millions a month for even the moderate support of his various functionaries in the capital and the central provinces, his household expenses, and the Spanish guard; of these necessary four millions, however, he had obtained but one, having been reduced for his whole revenue to the octrois of Madrid. This being the case, Napoleon consented to grant him a subsidy of a million a month, and to give up to him a fourth part of the contributions levied by all the generals in all the provinces of Spain, by

which it seemed probable that the four millions would be completed. But what chance was there that the generals, leaving their troops unpaid, and having the greatest trouble to obtain means of carriage from one part of the country to another, would take out millions from their chests for the purpose of sending them across Spain? General Suchet, indeed, might do this, although he had resolved, after having provided for the maintenance of his troops, to devote all the surplus revenue to the necessities of the country, and in fact, as we shall see, he did do it; but he was the only one who had either the will or the power.

With respect to the serious question of the territorial integrity of Spain, Napoleon held the most evasive language, declaring to Joseph that he was very desirous of leaving him in possession of his kingdom in its existing proportions, but that it was necessary for the purpose of intimidating the Spaniards to inspire them with the fear of losing some of their provinces if they still obstinately resisted; and that, indeed, if the war were much longer protracted, and became the source of much more expense, France would require some indemnity for her sacrifices. He advised, therefore, that the Spaniards should be rather terrified than reassured on this point. In the meantime, being unwilling to have a fresh family quarrel which would end, as was the case with the King of Holland, with the abdication of the King of Spain, Napoleon endeavoured to soothe his brother's anxieties, to encourage him, and inspire him with hopes; declaring to him that he was sending a large reserve force to the Peninsula, and that Suchet, after having taken Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa, would capture Tarragona and Valencia; that when this conquest had been achieved, there would be an army which might be directed to the south; that the army of Andalusia would then be able to assist the army of Portugal, the organisation of which was actually proceeding; and that the reserves which were at that moment crossing the Pyrenees would recommence in the autumn a campaign against the English, which would probably be more fortunate than the preceding one; that the submission of the Peninsula would thus within a short time be attained, when the military commands would cease of themselves, and Joseph would resume the full exercise of his royal authority. Strange and terrible delusions these, which Napoleon doubtless shared to some extent, but to a less degree than he asserted, for in his ideas Spain was now but of secondary importance, and all that went wrong in the south was to be compensated for by success in the north.

Joseph, although disgusted at his sovereignty, which presented to his eyes nothing but spectacles of misery, was nevertheless anxious to avoid a family quarrel, which must result to Napoleon

in the desertion of another of his brothers, and to himself in a relapse into private life, contented himself with these empty promises, and departed for Spain less miserably anxious than he had arrived, but little encouraged by Napoleon's vague declarations.

Traversing Vittoria, Burgos, and Valladolid, he found the inhabitants still more wretched than they had been on his departure, and he could only console them by repeating the empty promises which had been made to himself, and to avoid importunate questioning hastened to Madrid, where everything had become worse since his departure. The only real advantage he had obtained by his mission to Paris had been the promise of the receipt of a million a month from Paris. Two of these millions were due; the first of which had been expended in Joseph's journey and residence at Paris, whilst the second was to come with the military convoys, and had not yet arrived. The grant of a fourth part of the contributions levied on the country by the military governors had no effectual result, and Joseph was again reduced to the octrois of Madrid, and fell into a state of greater poverty. Also during his absence neither the members of the royal household nor the Spanish guard nor any of the functionaries had received a piastre. To add to the general misery a terrible drought had rendered the harvest so bad all over the continent that the price of provisions had risen to an extravagant height; and Joseph only returned to his capital to be present at a scene of the greatest wretchedness. He again transmitted his complaints to Paris couched in terms even bitterer than those of the letters written previously to his journey. But Napoleon, fully occupied with his one great object, paid no attention to them; and the reserve which had been withdrawn from Italy, and which was actually on its way towards the Pyrenees, was the only succour which he had troubled himself to send to Spain.

This being the state of affairs, it would have been best to have employed this reserve in consolidating the position of the French, and forming, by uniting it with the army of Portugal, a body capable of keeping the English in check, of disputing with them either Badajoz or Ciudad Rodrigo, and of preventing them from making any progress in the Peninsula until Napoleon should have settled in the north all those questions which he had resolved should there be determined. The fatal Andalusian expedition, which probably Marshal Soult had intended should atone for that of Oporto, and by means of which Joseph had proposed to extend his royal authority over a new country, and which had caused us to fail at Cadiz and Lisbon for the sake of Badajoz, the conquest of which decided nothing, and which had caused us to neglect the principal object of this war by uselessly

dispersing 80,000 men who would have sufficed for the expulsion of the English—this deplorable expedition, we say, should have served as a lesson, and if a retreat were not made from Andalusia upon La Mancha, which would certainly have been the wisest course to pursue whilst Napoleon was in the north, it would have only been commonly prudent to have paused at the borders of the conquered country, and to have then taken up a solid position. General Suchet would there have been able to keep possession of Aragon, and even to capture Tarragona, whence the Catalan insurrectionists drew their resources; Marshal Soult would have been able, without the capture of Cadiz, to guard Andalusia; and finally, the army of Portugal, reinforced by the reserve which had arrived, would have been in a condition to follow all the movements of Lord Wellington upon Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz in order to frustrate them. But Napoleon, judging of the state of affairs from a distance, and imagining that they were as he desired they should be, believing that Joseph had but demanded money for his own extravagant purposes, and that the generals demanded reinforcements only in accordance with their habit of requiring more troops than they needed, was persuaded that by granting a portion of the reserve to General Suchet he would be able, Tarragona once taken, to subdue Valencia, and that when Valencia had been vanquished it would be easy for him to advance towards Grenada; that Marshal Soult being thus set free on that side would be able to advance towards Estramadura, and that joining the army of Portugal, then reinforced by the reserve, he would be able in conjunction with it to hurl back the English towards Lisbon. As, moreover, he did not intend to recall the guard and the Polish troops before winter, and the reserve, he calculated, would arrive at the end of the summer, he considered that there would be time during the autumn to make great progress in the affairs of Spain, and to conquer almost the whole of the Peninsula, with the exception of Portugal, before that he himself should have set out for the north. Such were the fresh illusions on which he founded his plan of operations for the close of the year 1811.

But in the meantime, whilst the reserve was still to arrive, and Tarragona still to be captured by General Suchet, Marshal Soult, posted at Llerena, within sight of Badajoz, demanded to be aided in his attempt to save this place, which in spite of its heroic resistance was on the eve of surrender. Marshal Marmont, a generous companion-in-arms, and eager to distinguish himself at the head of the army of Portugal, spared no pains in his preparations to fly to the succour of Badajoz. Although Napoleon had recommended him to undertake nothing until his troops should have had some repose, should be properly equipped and provided with horses, he did not hesitate to

commence his march as soon as their most urgent necessities had been supplied. Well knowing that in conjunction with Marshal Soult his army must be numerically strong, he was more careful with respect to the quality than the number of the troops which he took with him, selecting from the 40,000 men, which were all that remained to him after the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, 30,000 effective troops, of whom 3000 were cavalry. The artillery he took with him only amounted to thirty-six pieces of cannon, a small number, but as many as circumstances permitted him to employ. After having in some degree restored the discipline and physical vigour of his troops by a month of repose and liberal rations, he resolved to comply with the urgent entreaties of Marshal Soult, and to execute a movement upon Estramadura, descending by the Col de Banos upon the Tagus, crossing this river at Almaraz, and advancing by Truxillo upon the Guadiana. Foreseeing the difficulty he would have in obtaining subsistence for his troops in the very impoverished valley of the Tagus, especially in the month of June, he required of Joseph's commissariat that it should send him by the Tagus to Almaraz three or four hundred thousand rations of biscuit, together with a pontoon equipage which he knew to be at Madrid, that the passage of the river might not be a cause of delay.

All these precautions having been taken, he had recourse to a feint for the purpose of deceiving the English, and retaining them before Ciudad Rodrigo whilst he marched upon Badajoz. With this intention he had stores prepared as though his sole intention were to revictual Ciudad Rodrigo, and proceeded thither on the 5th of June with his advanced guard and a portion of his army, whilst Reynier with the remainder of the army in two divisions passed the Col de Banos, descended upon the Tagus, and with the matériel which had come from Madrid made preparations for effecting the passage of the river at Almaraz. General Spencer, who remained on the Agueda with some English and Portuguese troops in the absence of Lord Wellington, who had led three divisions under the walls of Badajoz, was unable to make head against the French army, and did not even attempt it. He fell back before General Marmont's advanced posts, and the latter was able to communicate without difficulty with Ciudad Rodrigo, and to throw into it the stores which he had brought with him. This operation having been successfully accomplished, the marshal promptly retraced his steps, and rejoined Reynier upon the Tagus, without attending to the objections of Marshal Bessières, who declared this movement of the army of Portugal premature, and even a source of much danger to the north of the Peninsula, whilst no considerable portion of the reserve had

yet entered Castille. Marshal Marmont, nevertheless, persisted in his resolution, and continued his march towards Estramadura.

It was time that he should appear before Badajoz, for it was certain that it must surrender if not speedily relieved. Marshal Soult, although joined by General Drouet with the ninth corps, which had been ordered to throw itself into Estramadura after the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, having still no more than 25,000 effective troops, did not dare to hazard a battle with the English army, which numbered 40,000 men since the arrival of Lord Wellington with three divisions. He could not even inform the besieged garrison, so closely were they blockaded, that he had come to their aid; but the former, resolved to perish with arms in their hands, and to yield neither to threats of assault nor to assaults themselves, had determined rather to bury themselves under the ruins of the fortress than surrender it. There is indeed no example in the whole history of sieges, a species of warfare so fertile in the case of Frenchmen in illustrious facts, which surpasses the defence made by the garrison of Badajoz during the months of April, May, and June of the year 1811.

After having sustained a first siege from the 22nd April to the 16th of May, the date of the battle of Albuera, and having during all that time checked by a superior fire the approaches of the enemy, who had lost a thousand men without succeeding in effecting a breach; and after having been again invested after the battle of Albuera, without having received a single additional man or sack of wheat, this brave garrison had been from the 20th of May besieged by an army of 40,000 men.

The English had not been wanting on their side in making efforts for its capture, and had directed them in the east against the castle, and in the north against the Fort of St. Christoval, situated on the right bank of the Guadiana. The waters of the Ravillas, retained by a bar, had become a powerful means of defence for the castle; but unhappily it was built upon a projecting tongue of land, and exposed its sides to the English artillery, which continually attacking it with no less than twenty pieces of cannon, had completely demolished its high towers and exterior bastions. The terres, however, being of great thickness in this part, had preserved their escarpment, and the garrison by clearing the foot of the breaches under an incessant fire of grape, grenades, and howitzers had rendered them impracticable. Besides this, Lamare, the governor, had raised an interior entrenchment behind the breach, flanking it with cannons loaded with grape; and General Philippon, posted at the spot with the best troops, prepared to receive the assailants

at the point of the bayonet. These preparations having become known to the English, they had changed their plan of operations, and directed all the fury of their attack against the Fort of St. Christoval, on the other side of the Guadiana, and having made two breaches in the right bastion, had resolved to carry them by assault before even having carried their approaches to the edge of the fosse. Five hundred infantry, with some artillerymen and engineers, defended the threatened bastion, under Captain Chauoin of the 88th; and the besieged did not fail to clear, as they had at the castle, the foot of the walls under the enemy's fire, and had, moreover, strewed the bottom of the ditch with obstacles of all kinds, disposed a line of bombs at the summit of the breach, and placed cannon loaded with grape on the flanks, and a line of grenadiers provided with three muskets each in the rear. On the night of the 6th of June seven or eight hundred English bravely leaving their trenches, and advancing openly some hundreds of metres, arrived at the edge of the fosse, and were compelled to jump in, the counter-scarp not having been demolished, and had then attempted to scale the breach. But the fire of musketry receiving them in front, the grape shot of the cannon taking them in flank, and the bombs rolling down upon their legs, they had been compelled to retreat, leaving three hundred killed or wounded in the fosses of Fort St. Christoval.

The brave garrison, which had in this affair but five or six of their number wounded, was filled with enthusiasm, and only desired the repetition of such attacks; whilst the population, suffering cruelly from the fire of the English, and almost desiring the success of the French as a means of saving them from the horrors of an assault, were also inspired with feelings of great admiration. The English, confused and irritated, had avenged themselves during the following days by overwhelming the unfortunate city with murderous projectiles, and attempted to enlarge by powerful reinforcements of artillery the breaches of Fort St. Christoval. On the 19th of June they made a new and equally bold attempt to carry the two breaches. Two hundred men of the 21st, under Captain Joudiou and the sergeant of artillery Brette, defended them, and had taken the same precaution to render the enemy's success almost impossible. In the midst of the night the English threw themselves from their trenches into the fosses and escaladed the ruins of the walls; but our grenadiers, overwhelming them with discharges of musketry at the foot of the breaches, and then rushing upon them with the bayonet, drove them back from this second unsuccessful attempt with frightful carnage.

There was now no kind of danger capable of intimidating this brave garrison; but unfortunately provisions began to fail,

and there was fear that, worn out as it was with fatigue and privations, it would be compelled to yield to want although not to the assaults of the enemy. But the approach of an army of relief, although unknown to the defenders of the fortress, was known by Lord Wellington, who was always informed of our movements; and on the 10th of June, having received information of the march of General Reynier upon the Tagus, the English general determined to raise the siege, and began to withdraw his troops; the chief reason for this determination being that the munitions of war collected at Elvas had been exhausted, and that it was necessary without loss of time to employ all the available means of transport for the purpose of obtaining more from Abrantès, the principal depôt of the British army, twenty-five leagues distant.

On the 13th and 14th of June accordingly Lord Wellington, excessively vexed at having uselessly lost 2000 of his best troops under the walls of Badajoz, and at having been twice repulsed before a place defended by a mere handful of French, successively broke up all his camps, and retired on the 17th upon Caya, falling back upon the mountains of Portalègre, and taking up a well chosen defensive position, as was his custom when in the presence of the impetuous troops of the French army.

When the brave garrison perceived the enemy's camps disappearing, they were at first in doubt respecting what could have occurred, but speedily learnt with transports of joy, which were shared by the population, that by means of its own bravery and the succour which had arrived the second siege was to end as the first had done, in their own triumph. In fact, Marshal Marmont, after having lost some days before the Tagus on account of the insufficiency of the means of crossing it at his command, for they had only been able to forward to him from Madrid a portion of that which he had required, had at length crossed the stream, traversed the mountains of Truxillo, and on the 18th of June entered Merida, effecting on the same day his junction with Marshal Soult, who gave him the most hearty thanks for the aid he thus received, without which he must have endured the disgrace of seeing the capture by the enemy of Badajoz, which was the sole trophy of the two years' warfare in Andalusia.

On the 20th of June the two marshals, whose forces numbered over fifty thousand men, made their entry into Badajoz, congratulated the heroic garrison which had so valiantly defended the fortress entrusted to their courage, distributed amongst them the rewards they so well deserved, and carried their advanced posts close to the English, who at the sight of the enemy remained carefully shut up in the camp.

If this excellent army, which, with the exception of that of

Marshal Davout, was the best in Europe, being composed of veteran troops of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friesland, and having endured in addition to its other long campaigns three years of the most formidable species of warfare in the Peninsula; if this excellent army, we say, had been commanded by a single marshal instead of two, and this marshal had been Massena, it would not have failed to have sought an encounter with the English, and made Lord Wellington expiate the success he had already obtained, which was due in some degree certainly to his own indisputable merit, but in a greater degree to the errors and the passions of his adversaries. But Marshal Soult, rejoiced at having escaped the disgrace of seeing Badajoz fall before his eyes, was not disposed to risk new hazards; whilst Marshal Marmont, feeling the greatest distrust of his colleague, was little inclined to act in concert with him, and was also disinclined to compromise the successful result of his march by risking the chances of a decisive battle. There was no one, in fact, in the French army, save Massena, whose ardent military patriotism burned so fiercely at the sight of the enemy, that forgetful of himself he only cared to destroy or to be destroyed by the enemy before him.

The two marshals committed the error, and it was one of the greatest of the errors committed at this time, of remaining with 50,000 men in the presence of 40,000 of the enemy, amongst whom there were, moreover, only 25,000 English, without attacking them. They passed some days in the neighbourhood of Badajoz for the purpose of supplying its wants, reinforcing the garrison, repairing the breaches made in the walls, and filling its magazines, which were now positively empty. Many of the inhabitants had fled at the time of the first siege, many more had followed their example at the approach of the second, and the fear of a third driving away a certain number of those that still remained, the city was thus almost empty. And this would not have been an evil if the portion of the population which remained had not been unfortunately the most poor, the least capable of providing for their own subsistence, and the most difficult to keep in order.

The two marshals had scarcely been in company a few days before a quarrel broke out between them. Marshal Soult had long been absent from Andalusia; for having set out from Seville to fight the battle of Albuera, and having then determined to remain in position at Llerena, he had desired to draw the army of Portugal definitively within the circle of its operations, to leave to it the protection of Badajoz, to devolve upon it thus this most difficult portion of his task, and be able at length to devote his undivided forces to the siege of Cadiz,

which had been so unfortunately neglected for that of Badajoz. This idea was a very natural one, but somewhat unreasonable, for the necessary position of the army of Portugal was Salamanca, for the preservation of Ciudad Rodrigo, and for the defence against the English of Old Castille, which was the base of operations of all the French armies. It was certainly within its proper line of operations, but only just within it, when following the English from the north to the south it disputed with them the possession of Badajoz. But to demand that it should establish itself permanently in Estramadura was to require it to abandon its principal object for an accessory one. Had it done so, in fact, Lord Wellington would have been able to capture Ciudad Rodrigo (as a similar error subsequently enabled him), and by proceeding to Valladolid, to cut off the French communications. It must be added that to confine the army of Portugal at Badajoz by leaving it there alone, was to condemn it to the powerless state in which Marshal Soult had been at Llerena, and to the distress of seeing Badajoz captured under their very eyes. Reduced to 30,000 men as it actually was, it could effect nothing, and the only means by which it could again number 40,000 or 45,000 troops was by returning to the north, and rallying all those which it had left sick, wounded, or exhausted at Salamanca.

Marshal Soult, pressed by the letters which he received from Seville, presented himself one morning before Marshal Marmont to communicate to him his state of embarrassment and his wishes, and threw the man into a state of the greatest astonishment and distrust. And certainly to leave Marshal Marmont alone at Badajoz was to expose him to the danger of being attacked by more than 40,000 of the enemy, whilst he had only 30,000 with which to oppose them; and to satisfy the most ardent wishes of Lord Wellington, who awaited upon the Caya the abandonment of one of the marshals by the other in order to overwhelm him. Marshal Marmont, who was very distrustful of his colleague, believed that he saw in this proposition an example of unheard-of ingratitude, and a perfidious desire to expose the army of Portugal to some signal disaster, and indulged on the strength of this gratuitous supposition in the most profound resentment. The truth was, that whilst Marshal Soult was far from wishing to compromise the army of Portugal, since he must indeed have suffered with it, he was nevertheless anxious to throw upon it the most ungrateful part of his task, and be thus at liberty to attend to his own affairs. Marshal Marmont replied with extreme severity that if he wished to depart, leaving at Badajoz the bulk of the army of Andalusia, nothing could be easier, for it would remain to him, Marshal Marmont, to command the two united armies;

and that otherwise he himself would depart immediately, and would not return upon the Guadiana until he was assured of finding there a force sufficiently numerous, when united to his own troops, to vanquish the English. Having said this to Marshal Soult, he also expressed it to him in writing, in dry and peremptory terms, and made preparations for departure.

Since they would not remain united to give battle to the English, the two marshals could do nothing better than place Badajoz in a fair state of defence, and then proceed, each in his own direction, to perform their essential duties. The presence of Marshal Soult in Andalusia was, in fact, indispensable, and nothing but a great victory over the English could have excused his not being there; and it was equally necessary that Marshal Marmont should proceed towards the north of the Peninsula. Marshal Soult therefore quitted Badajoz on the 27th of June with a large portion of his army in order to proceed to Seville, only leaving General Drouet d'Erlon with two divisions and some cavalry to serve as a corps of observation around Badajoz. This was an error, for this corps, useless if the English departed, and insufficient if they remained, could not but be compromised, as the result speedily showed, and it would have been better to have simply left in Badajoz a garrison of 10,000 men in lieu of 5000, with stores in proportion, and to have withdrawn the whole of the army of Andalusia. Badajoz would thus have been better able to defend itself, and Marshal Soult more capable of fulfilling the task assigned to him.

However this might be, he marched from Badajoz to Seville, and Marshal Marmont placed himself en route towards the Tagus. The English, exhausted by two fruitless sieges, and being without the matériel necessary to recommence a third, and having in their ranks many sick, who had acquired upon the bank of the Guadiana the fevers of Estramadura, established themselves upon the Sierra de Portalègre, having need of repose, and taking up their summer quarters, which in that burning climate are equivalent to winter quarters in the north.

Marshal Marmont, whose mission as general-in-chief of the army of Portugal was to oppose the undertakings of the English, in the first place in the north, where was one principal line of communication, and in the second place in the south, selected with great discernment the part of the Tagus between Talavera and Alcantara as that from whence he could most easily execute his various duties. He was able, in fact, from the banks of the Tagus, by the Col de Banos, to reach Salamanca in four marches, to effect then a junction with the army of the north, and in concert with it to succour Ciudad Rodrigo. And from this same position he could also speedily

descend by Truxillo upon Merida and Badajoz, and unite there, as he did, with the army of Andalusia. Having determined upon this situation, he chose the bridge of Almaraz as the centre of the communications which he had to guard, and adopted as his headquarters the village of Naval-Moral, situated between the Tagus and the Tiétar, and covered by these two rivers. He commenced operations by strengthening as much as possible the bridge of Almaraz, providing it with two strong *têtes de pont*; and as there were on the plateau de l'Estramadura towards the Col de Mirabele dominant positions whence the works of Almaraz might be advantageously attacked, he constructed many forts on these positions, placing in them small garrisons. He also constructed on the Tiétar a bridge and a *tête de pont*, in such a manner as to render it equally easy to debouch from the one side or the other upon the enemy whom it might be necessary to encounter. These precautions having been taken, he cantoned one of his divisions at Almaraz, and disposed his light cavalry in echelons on the Truxillo road, in order to scour Estramadura, receive provisions, and obtain news from Badajoz. He established another of his divisions at Naval-Moral in order to guard his headquarters, and placed two at Placentia, so as to be always ready to pass the mountains and descend upon Salamanca, and one at the Col de Banos itself, to be always ready to debouch on Old Castille. Finally, he left the sixth division on his rear to defend against the insurgents the rich province of Avila. When he had completed this wise and skilful distribution of his forces, which permitted him to march upon Estramadura or Castille with equal rapidity, Marshal Marmont devoted his attention to the formation of magazines, the reparation of his artillery, and the care of his sick and wounded which remained around Salamanca. In the meantime, being situated on the confines of the army of the centre, and finding himself involved in disputes with it respecting the distance to which he might extend his search for provisions, he proceeded to Madrid in order to come to an understanding with Joseph, with whom he had been very intimate, and with whom, in accordance with a fatality peculiar to all Spanish affairs, he had had many violent disputes, although the disposition of each was gentle, and they were extremely partial to each other.

It will be remembered that Marshal Bessières had feared much the effect which would be produced upon the northern provinces by the withdrawal of the army of Portugal, and had made strenuous efforts to prevent its departure. The English, on their side, had indulged in hopes that these provinces would rise in insurrection as soon as the army of Portugal ceased to be in the midst of them. It happened, however, that these fears and hopes were equally unfounded, and in spite of the

exertions of the regency of Cadiz, the Castilians, almost as weary of the guerillas as of the French, had remained tranquil. At the same time, the guerilla bands had taken advantage of the opportunity to attempt some enterprises. Marquesita had surprised Santander, and committed great ravages throughout this province. The insurgents of Leon had harassed General Seras, but had been dispersed by some regiments of the young guard under Marshal Bessières, who, fearing that he could not occupy at the same time Burgos, Valladolid, Salamanca, Leon, and Astorga, had dismantled the works of Astorga, and withdrew from the Asturias General Bonnet, who had for three years maintained his position in these difficult provinces with as much vigour as ability, even keeping in check Galicia, which did not dare to revolt from the fear of being taken *à revers*. To recall him from the Asturias was, therefore, an error, which left the Asturians and Galicians at liberty to descend upon Castille. Nevertheless, in spite of these difficulties, Marshal Bessières was quite in a position to keep Castille in check, and was about to be reinforced, moreover, by the division Sonham, one of the three which composed the corps of reserve actually on its march to the frontiers of Spain.

Events of the utmost importance, and reflecting much glory on our arms, although productive of little addition to our power, occurred in the meantime in Catalonia and Aragon in connection with the army of General Suchet. It will doubtless be remembered with what vigour and what precision General Suchet conducted the sieges of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa, the success of which coming after the capture of Gironne almost completed the conquest of Aragon and Catalonia. Nevertheless Tarragona, the most important of the fortresses of this country, remained untaken, being protected, in addition to its own strength, which was great, by its contiguity to the sea and the support of the English fleet. It served, therefore, as the support, the asylum and inexhaustible magazine and arsenal for the insurrectionist army of Catalonia; and the necessity for its siege and capture was accordingly so urgent, that General Suchet had made with this view immense preparations, collecting a large and superb park of heavy artillery at Tortosa, together with 1500 horses. And all these preparations General Suchet had been able to make without ruining the country, by virtue of the repose which he had bestowed upon the province under his command, and the system of regular contributions which he had substituted for forcible seizures.

Besides the magazines of grain which he had made in Aragon and in the portion of Catalonia entrusted to his care, General Suchet had collected great numbers of cattle, partly by purchase from the inhabitants of the Pyrenees, and partly by

carefully preserving those which were seized from the insurgents of Soria and Calatayud. His stores being thus prepared, he had distributed his army in such a manner that Aragon should not be left exposed to the enemy whilst he should proceed to Lower Catalonia for the purpose of the capture of Tarragona. When Napoleon had detached the lower portion of Catalonia for the purpose of confiding it together with Aragon to the command of General Suchet, he had granted to him at the same time 16,000 or 17,000 men of the army of Catalonia, and had replaced them in that army by one of the three divisions of the corps of reserve. With this reinforcement General Suchet had 40,000 troops under his command, of whom he left 20,000 to guard Aragon, whilst he destined the other 20,000 for the siege he was about to undertake, and marched them upon Tarragona in two columns; the one of which, under General Harispe, descended from Lerida, whilst the other, under General Hubert, extended from Tortosa.

Tarragona, which consisted of a garrison almost equal in number to the army which was about to besiege it, and possessed formidable natural and artificial defences, was situated on a rock bathed on one side by the waters of the Mediterranean, and on the other by the waters of the Francoli, which passed under its walls, and was divided into upper and lower town. The upper town was surrounded by old Roman walls and modern works of considerable relief; whilst the lower town, situated at the foot of the upper town, on the level ground beside the Francoli, and on the seashore, was defended by a bastioned enceinte, regularly and strongly fortified. Above from the amphitheatre formed by the two towns there was visible a fort called Fort l'Oliva, built upon a rock, commanding all the environs, and communicating with the town by an aqueduct. Four hundred pieces of heavy artillery defended these three series of fortifications, which contained a garrison of 17,000 excellent troops under a good governor, General de Contreras, as well as a fanatical population, which was thoroughly resolved to defend the place to the utmost. In addition to these means of defence, the English fleet was able to keep the place constantly supplied with fresh stores of provisions, and to supply the place of those of the garrison who might be killed or wounded with fresh troops from Catalonia and Valencia.

From whatever side Tarragona might be approached, it presented equal obstacles to an attack. On the south and east was the escarpment of the rock, a series of well constructed lunettes, which united the enceinte of the two towns with the sea, and moreover the English fleet; on the north side was a dry and stony soil and the Fort of l'Oliva, which of

itself demanded a regular siege; and finally, on the ascent from west to south were the two towns, the one built above the other, with two series of fortifications in the low grounds and marshes bordering the Francoli. All the approaches to the place were therefore equally difficult, and its capture could only be effected by a long siege, which the Catalans and Valencians under the influence and support of the English would not fail frequently to interrupt.

All these difficulties, however, were far from daunting General Suchet, who regarded Tarragona as the most certain pledge for the security of Catalonia and Aragon, and as the key of Valencia. His two principal lieutenants were of the same opinion, and were ready to second his intentions with the utmost zeal. These were the general of engineers, Rojmat, a sagacious and determined man, and profoundly skilled in his art, and Valée, a general in the artillery, a man of a just and noble temperament, who joined to the greatest keensightedness on the battlefield that administrative forethought which is so indispensable to officers of his branch of the service. After having conferred with his lieutenants, General Suchet determined to attack the place on two sides at once, first on the south-west, by the low ground on the bank of the Francoli, bordering the low town, which it was necessary to capture before attempting to take the high town, and at the same time on the north by attacking the Fort l'Oliva.

Whilst the approaches were being opened in front of the low town, two of the bravest regiments in the army, the 7th and 16th of the line, under the young General Salme, attacked the Fort l'Oliva, before which the trenches were opened on the night between the 21st and 22nd of May. There was in front of this fort a work from whence the labour of opening the trenches received considerable interruption, and which by passing into our hands would serve as a protection for the troops engaged in it. Our soldiers therefore rushed upon it and took it at the point of the bayonet. But the Spaniards, who prided themselves on being invincible in the defence of their fortresses, and who had considerable reason for indulging in this pride, assaulted it in their turn to the number of eight hundred, and threw themselves upon it with furious cries, under the leadership of intrepid officers, who planted their colours at the very foot of the work they had resolved to recapture. But the men of the 7th and the 16th first pouring in upon it a volley of musketry, rushed upon this audacious column which thus attempted to snatch from them the fruits of their late victory, and drove it back under the very walls of the fort. L'Oliva presented a large surface without having much depth, and consisted of a line of bastions built upon a

rock, with fosses hollowed out of the rock, and having in the rear an indented wall which communicated with a postern gate of the fortress. Within these was an entrenchment, a little more elevated than the fort itself, and capable of offering a second means of resistance against a victorious enemy. There were twelve hundred men and fifty pieces of cannon of heavy calibre in these formidable works, and they could, moreover, easily obtain reinforcements from the town, which in its turn could receive them to an unlimited extent by means of its communication with the sea.

The approaches were carried on for many days under an incessant fire, and with considerable loss, amounting daily to fifty or sixty in killed or wounded, to the brave regiment which had obtained the honour of conducting this first siege. At length being desirous of abridging the duration of a labour which proved so fatal to our ranks, they hastened to establish a breaching battery at a little distance from the fort, and it was ready to receive the artillery on the evening of the 27th. The employment of horses was impossible on such ground, and our soldiers therefore harnessed themselves to the pieces and drew them up under a horrible fire of grape, which destroyed a great number of them without checking the ardour of the others. In the meantime the enemy, perceiving what was the object of the groups on which they fired, determined to frustrate it by a vigorous sortie. The young and valiant General Salme, with a reserve of the 7th, marched to repel it, and at the moment when he was crying *En avant*, met his death. He was adored by his soldiers, and deserved their affection, both on account of his courage and nobility of mind. Eager to avenge his death, they threw themselves upon the Spaniards, and drove them at the bayonet's point under the very walls of Olivo. In the meantime the twenty-four pounders had been placed in the battery, and on the following day, at dawn, the fire opened upon the right bastion, opposite to our left.

So short was the interval between the opposing batteries, that the effects of the artillery on each side were terribly destructive. Within a few hours a breach was opened; the battery played on the breach during the whole of the following day, and it was then resolved to attempt an assault, whatever might be the result obtained by our artillery, for fifteen days had already been spent before Tarragona; and if a single work could not be taken at such a cost of men and time, it was necessary to despair of being able to take the place itself.

Although they had suffered considerable losses, the 7th and 16th of the line had not abandoned to others the honour of carrying by assault the fort before which they had executed the approaches. A column of the 7th, consisting of 300 men, led

by an officer named Miocque, advanced to throw itself directly into the breach, whilst a second column of the same strength, consisting of soldiers of the 16th, under Commandant Revel, was to attack the right of the fort, and attempt to penetrate by the gorge. General Harispe was ready to support these two columns with a reserve, and all the army was directed to be under arms and to feign a general attack.

In the midst of the night the signal was given for the commencement of the assault. Our sharpshooters opened a vigorous fire around the two towns, as though an attack were about to be made upon the enceinte itself. The enemy, in a state of the utmost confusion, opened fire from all their batteries without knowing in which direction the enemy was approaching, whilst the English fleet at the same time commenced a cannonade along the shore. For the purpose of enabling them to discern in what direction the threatened danger was approaching, the Spaniards threw out fire-pots, whilst they mingled their infuriated cries with the prolonged hurrahs of our soldiers.

During this state of confusion, which was planned on our side, the two assaulting columns rushed out of the trenches, and were exposed for forty-five or sixty paces to the fire of the Fort l'Olivo. Arriving at the brink of the fosse hollowed out of the rock, they threw themselves into it, and whilst the column under Miocque ran with its scaling ladders to the right, to the breach which was but imperfectly practicable, the other, under Revel, turned to the left, to assail the fort by the gorge. At this moment 1200 Spaniards sent to aid in the defence of l'Olivo had just entered, and the gate closed upon them. A captain of engineers named Papigny, at the head of thirty sappers, attacked this gate with hatchets, and as it resisted their efforts, seized a scaling ladder with the intention of passing over it, but at that moment he fell struck by a ball, and fell breathing the name of his mother. In the meantime Revel, taking advantage of the circumstance that in this place there was no fosse, applied ladders against the escarpment, and the sappers and the grenadiers scaling the wall, leaped into the fort and opened the gate to the column. At the same moment Miocque's column, advancing to the breach and finding it impracticable, planted their scaling ladders, which were too short, until Meuniér, a sergeant of sappers and miners, lending his strong shoulders to the voltigeurs, they were enabled to ascend, and entering the fort, to assist their comrades. This method of entrance was, however, both too slow and too fatal, and another party having sought another way, an officer of engineers named Vacani fortunately discovered it in the extremity of the aqueduct which supplied l'Olivo with water, and which was only

protected by palisades. The two columns under Revel and Miocque having entered therefore by these various ways, threw themselves upon the Spaniards, who abandoned the fort and withdrew behind the entrenchment, where, being followed, and seeing scarcely any hope of safety, they defended themselves with despair; and as they outnumbered our troops, and the escarpment of the entrenchment aided their defence, it appeared probable that they might be able to defend l'Olive against us successfully. But the brave General Harispe advancing with his reserves and 500 Italians, under Marcogna and Sacchini, reanimated by their presence the ardour and confidence of the assailants. In one mass they scaled the entrenchment, and transported with rage, put to the edge of the sword the obstinate defenders of l'Olive. General Suchet and his officers arrived in time to save a thousand men, but about 900 Spaniards had already fallen. The shouts of victory informed both the besieged and the besiegers of this important triumph.

There were found in l'Olive fifty pieces of cannon, with a large quantity of cartridges, and no time was lost in turning the works of this fort against the fortress. Reassured respecting the result of the siege by the success just obtained, but terrified at the losses which the example of this success appeared to foretell, General Suchet desired to take advantage of the moral effect produced by it upon the two armies to tempt the garrison by conciliating words and the proposition of a truce, the pretext of which should be the interment of the dead. The garrison replied, however, in accents of disdain and rage to the overtures made by General Suchet, and it was evident that nothing would be gained except by force. As the season rendered the ground hard and difficult to excavate, and the exhalations from the corpses dangerous, it was necessary to burn them instead of burying them, and unhappily the number was considerable.

L'Olive having been thus taken, the approaches were opened in front of the lower town, and a series of redoubts were erected along the coast, which were armed with very heavy artillery, for the purpose of keeping the English at a distance, and as a protection against their gunboats. The trench was opened at a hundred and thirty toises from the enceinte, which formed the point proper to attack. There were on this side two bastions very close to each other, that of Chanoines on our left, and that of St. Charles on our right, the latter being connected with the wall of the port and the quay. The mass of fire, therefore, to which those who carried on the approaches would be exposed was not very considerable, since they could only receive that of the bastions towards which they approached. Somewhat above, indeed, and in the rear of these bastions, was the Fort Royal, and on our right, on the seashore, was another little fort named

Francoli, because situated on the mouth of that river ; this latter work was attached to this fortress by a bastioned wall ; and it was determined that whilst the approaches should be continued towards the two bastions, des Chanoines and St. Charles, a breaching battery should be directed against Fort Francoli.

Twenty-five pieces of cannon having been distributed amongst various batteries, which fired at once on the place itself and the Fort Francoli, speedily succeeded in opening a breach, which was perfectly practicable to an assault from our dauntless troops. Although it had a scarp and a counterscarp of masonry and fosses full of water, it was resolved to attempt the assault immediately, and St. Cyr Nugues, chief of the staff of General Suchet, conducting three little columns of infantry, led them to the attack on the night between the 7th and 8th of June. Our soldiers threw themselves into the fosses up to their breasts in water, and climbed the breach under a violent fire from the enemy. The Spaniards resisted desperately at first as usual, but as the work was only connected with the town by a communication both narrow and long, they feared their retreat might be cut off, and fled therefore towards the fortress. They were pursued by our soldiers, who shouted "To the town, to the town," with the hope of being able to terminate the siege by a *coup de main* ; but a terrible storm of fire and formidable works compelled them to stop, and convinced them that this hope was a vain one. Colonel St. Cyr Nugues drew back his troops into the Fort Francoli, and hastened to make it tenable, and to turn against the roadstead the newly captured artillery.

This was the second work carried by assault, but there still remained many others to be taken by the same means ; and among these was a lunette, named the Prince, resting on the sea, and occupying the middle of the wall which connected the Francoli Fort with the fortress. A breach was effected in it, and on the 16th it was taken after another assault, which was long and murderous. There now remained no more obstacles to the attack of the two bastions of St. Charles and Chanoines. The one on the right, that named St. Charles, covered the walls of the fort ; whilst the other on the left covered the angle formed by the west front of the enceinte, with the north front of Fort Royal.

If the enemy's batteries were not very extensive, they were very formidable on account of their height, and it was most probable that this attack would cost us many soldiers, in the formation of the approaches, in the service of the batteries, and the assault itself, which would doubtless be fiercely resisted, since on its success or the reverse depended the fate of the lower town and the fort itself.

General Suchet was ardently desirous of accelerating the

siege, for besides the daily loss of troops, which in the space of one and twenty days amounted to 2500 men, he perceived difficulties accumulating around him on all sides. The English fleet, escorting an immense convoy, had reinforced the garrison with 2000 men, provisions, and military stores of all kinds, and supplied it with a brave officer, General Saarsfield, who was to conduct the defence of the lower town. It had then disembarked on the Barcelona road the Valencian division, consisting of 6000 men, which was to join General Campo-Verde, who at the head of the Catalan army was in command of 15,000 men, with which he kept the field, hoping to seize our convoys, or to surprise us in our trenches, in concert with the garrison and the fleet.

General Harispe, established on the Barcelona route with his two divisions, one Italian and one French, kept a careful watch for attacks from this quarter; whilst General Habert, posted with a French division on the banks of the Francoli, guarded the Tortosa route by which arrived our convoys of artillery, and that of Reus, by which came our convoys of provisions. The remainder of the troops were employed in carrying on the siege. Precautions were taken against an attack whether from without or within, and General Suchet had perfect confidence in the ability of his valiant soldiers to resist either. But our outposts, echeloned on the route of our convoys, had every day to maintain conflicts with detachments of Campo-Verde's troops, and this general himself boasted of having received large reinforcements, and of being about to receive more. At the risk, therefore, of weakening his line of defence against the insurgents of Teruel and Calatayud under Villa-Campa, General Suchet determined to call to his aid General Abbé with a brigade. As the fate of the country depended on the result of the siege of Tarragona, it was necessary to sacrifice everything to the purpose of effecting its capture.

Influenced by the above reasons, and seconded in his endeavours by the boundless enthusiasm of his troops, General Suchet lost not a day nor an hour in the prosecution of the siege. The second parallel was already opened, and a series of batteries had been arranged which, embracing in their vast circuit the bastions Chanoines and St. Charles, would be capable of breaching both, and the Fort Royal also. General Suchet hoped to be able by a general and simultaneous assault to carry the lower town and all its defences; and flattered himself that after having made this grand effort, he might consider the difficult conquest of Tarragona almost accomplished.

Forty-four pieces of heavy artillery opened fire whilst the works in the trenches were still carried on, and were energetically answered by the cannon of the fortress, which was

almost the double of ours. Thus our *épaulements* were continually overthrown, and our brave artillerymen, undaunted in the midst of the ruins, continually rebuilt the destroyed works and replied to the enemy's fire whilst completely exposed to it, whilst the infantry seconded their exertions with the utmost devotion.

On the 18th the third parallel was completed. A subterranean passage led into the fosses of the two bastions, the counterscarp was overthrown, and the openings were completed by which the assaulting columns were to enter the fosses and throw themselves into the trenches.

On the morning of the 24th of June, at the very moment when Badajoz was rejoicing at its deliverance by the two marshals, all the batteries both old and new opened fire on the walls of Tarragona, which replied with the utmost vigour. The chief of our batteries was overthrown by a powder magazine; but Colonel Ricci, who was almost buried under the ruins, having been promptly rescued, re-established the battery, and again turned its fire against the enemy. In the meantime the infantry, eager to rush to the assault, with loud cries urged on the artillerymen to fresh exertions, and the latter responding to their wishes redoubled their activity and zeal.

In the evening three breaches were judged practicable, one in the bastion des Chanoines, another in the bastion St. Charles, and a third in the Fort Royal. General Suchet and the officers who aided him with their counsels resolved to hazard the result of the siege on a general assault, either to fail at once or to carry the lower town, the capture of which would ensure that of the upper town. The conduct of the assault was accordingly entrusted to General Palombini, and 1500 grenadiers and voltigeurs, together with sappers furnished with scaling ladders, were placed under his charge; General Montmarie taking up a position a little to the left with the 5th *leger* and the 16th of the line as a reserve, and a precaution against a sortie from the fortress; whilst still more to the left two battalions of the 7th of the line supported General Montmarie himself. It was also arranged that a vigorous fire should be opened from Fort l'Olive upon the two towns, and that General Harispe should threaten the opposite front with his whole division. The Spaniards on their side placed General Saarsfield with the best soldiers in the lower town. We may also observe as an instance of the rage with which the opposed troops regarded each other, that the summons to surrender usually made before an assault was now neglected.

At seven o'clock in the evening, whilst it was still daylight, three columns threw themselves simultaneously upon the three breaches. The first, composed of select men of the 116th, 117th,

and 121st, under the command of Colonel Bouvier of the engineers, rushed into the breach in the bastion des Chanoines, and attempted to wrest its possession from the Spaniards who defended it, and after a desperate struggle succeeded in arriving at its summit and repulsing the enemy, to be in turn repulsed by the latter; but our troops returned to the charge, and held their ground with desperate tenacity. A hundred grenadiers rushing upon a lunette somewhat to the right speedily carried it, and then hurried to the bastion des Chanoines to the aid of the troops under Colonel Bouvier. In the meantime a second column under the Polish officer Fondzelski, consisting of men selected from the ranks of the 1st and 5th *leger*, and the 42nd of the line, threw themselves upon the bastion St. Charles, and were met by the most determined resistance. But supported by a third column under the command of Colonel Bourgeois, they maintained their ground in the breach, and ultimately remained masters of it. Fondzelski then pursued the Spaniards across the low town, whilst Colonel Bourgeois, who followed him, proceeded to the left to the aid of Colonel Bouvier in his attack on the bastion des Chanoines, which by means of these various reinforcements was speedily taken, and the united troops threw themselves upon the *Château Royal*.

In the meantime General Saarsfield, coming up with a reserve, furiously attacked Fondzelski's troops, which had already taken possession of half the lower town, and which now, in accordance with the instructions they had received, withdrew into the houses, and obstinately defended them. Fortunately Colonel Robert of the 117th, with the aide-de-camp of the general-in-chief, M. de Rigny, who brought up a reserve of the 5th *leger*, 42nd, 115th, and 121st of the line, supported Colonel Fondzelski, drove back Saarsfield's troops, and advanced as far as the walls of the upper town.

The assault which had commenced at seven was concluded at eight, its result being to give into our possession almost a hundred pieces of cannon, an immense quantity of munitions, a few living prisoners, a great number of the enemy's killed and wounded, the bastions St. Charles and des Chanoines, the Fort Royal, all the lower town, the port and the batteries which defended it. Without loss of time a fire was opened upon the English squadron, and it immediately set sail. The losses of our troops in this fierce combat, in which they had had to contend with 5000 Spaniards, amounted to 500 men *hors de combat*, whilst that of the enemy was about 1300 killed, and about 200, for the most part wounded, who fell into our hands.

We had already undertaken four murderous assaults, and this was not the last which we should be compelled to make in the course of the siege of Tarragona—a siege which is a memorable

example of heroism, whether as regards the besiegers or the besieged. It now became absolutely necessary to bring the siege to a conclusion, for the English fleet, having proceeded a second time from the south to the north off the coast of Catalonia, had reinforced General Campo-Verde with a new Spanish detachment and a corps of 2000 English. There still remained at least 12,000 men in the upper town, with an immense artillery, and a sortie from within might at any time surprise us. On the 24th, in fact, considerable agitation was visible amongst the garrison, and mounted couriers were seen in the direction of Barcelona. The general-in-chief posted General Harispe, to whom he entrusted the most difficult undertakings, on the Barcelona road with two divisions of all the cavalry, whilst he himself took up a position between the fortress and the troops of General Harispe, ready to throw himself upon the point where his presence might be most necessary.

The trench was opened upon a sort of slightly inclined plateau rising to the upper town, and on a level with the roofs of the houses of the lower town. Our first and only parallel embraced almost the whole front of the upper town, composed in this part of four bastions, and had for its principal object the establishment of two batteries, to be directed against the bastion St. Paul, which was the last to the left. The works were vigorously proceeded with, in order that a breach might be speedily opened, for it was not expected that this noble garrison, after having endured four assaults, would shrink from the last, although it would thus expose itself to being put to the edge of the sword. One of our heralds having presented himself out of the trenches waving a white flag, had only received injurious treatment for answer. A deserter having given information of a projected attack from without, to take place on the 29th, the general-in-chief made every arrangement that the last assault should be made on the evening of the 28th. The construction of the breaching battery was hastened, and having been completely armed on the night of the 27th, the troops performing with enthusiasm the difficult task of placing the pieces in their positions, on the 28th of June, which was to be the last day of this memorable siege, the French opened fire at dawn with some anxiety, for it was absolutely necessary that a breach should be effected in the course of the same day. Three hundred good marksmen, posted in favourable positions, kept up a constant fire upon the enemy's embrasures for the purpose of destroying their artillerymen, and the Spaniards, boldly exposing themselves, were no less assiduous in firing upon ours. But nothing could daunt our artillerymen, or check the zeal with which they continued the cannonade which

was to open to us the walls of Tarragona. At length towards the middle of the day the breach appeared to widen beneath our continued fire. Our soldiers, thronging from every side of the camp, gazed eagerly at this spectacle, whilst the Spaniards from their ramparts provoked us to the utmost of their power with cries and taunts.

About five o'clock in the evening General Suchet determined to attempt the assault in order to avoid a combat by night, if, as it had been said, the great street de la Rambla, which ran transversely across Tarragona, should be barricaded and defended. General Habert, who had captured the town of Lerida, was to conduct the assault; and five hundred men in two detachments of the select companies of the 1st and 5th leger, the 14th, 42nd, 114th, 115th, 116th, 117th, and 121st of the line, and the 1st Polish regiment of the Vistula, were placed under his orders. A second column of almost equal force, taken from the French and Italian troops present at the siege, were placed under the orders of General Ficatier, and held in reserve. On the left and on the north front, which formed an angle with the west front which we attacked, General Montmarie was posted at the head of the 116th and 117th, with the object of endeavouring to carry by escalade the gate du Rosaire, near the bastion which had been breached, and opposite to the extremity of the Rue de la Rambla. These arrangements having been completed at half-past five, the general-in-chief gave the signal, and the first column, running across a certain space in which they were completely exposed, turned aside to avoid the aloes growing at the foot of the rampart, thence proceeded in a straight line to the breach, and commenced to ascend it under a terrific fire; whilst the bravest of the Spanish troops, armed with muskets, pikes, and axes, shouting furious cries, awaited them at its summit. For a moment our soldiers were on the point of yielding to the patriotic fury of the Spaniards, but at a signal from the general-in-chief a second column advanced, led by General Habert, Colonel Pepe, Captain Ceroni, and all the aides-de-camp of General Suchet, MM. de Saint-Joseph, de Rigny, d'Aramon, Meyer, Desaix, Ricard, and Auvray. With these was also an Italian sergeant named Bianchini, who as a recompense for prodigies of valour performed in the attack on Fort l'Olive had demanded and obtained the honour of marching at the head of the last assault of Tarragona. This reinforcement gave a vigorous impulse to our first columns, and the two columns arrived together at the summit of the breach. The brave Bianchini, after having received many musket-shots, still advanced and fell. The youthful Aramon was stricken down with a wound in the thigh. Our troops now penetrated into the town, some to the right and others to the left, for the purpose of turning the barricaded

streets, and especially the Rue de la Rambla. The general-in-chief immediately sent forward General Ficatier's reserve to take part in this second combat, which might be very desperate, as the garrison still numbered 10,000 or 12,000 men who were resolved to defend themselves to the death. In the meantime General Montmarie advanced towards the gate du Rosaire with the 116th and 117th of the line, and dashed into the fosse under a murderous fire. He had desired to plant ladders against the gate, but he found it walled up and barricaded. A knotted cord, suspended from one of the embrasures, and serving the Spaniards as a means of ascent, was then discovered by our voltigeurs, who seized hold of it, and climbed up one after the other, whilst the regiments remaining in the fosse received the fire from the walls; but scarcely had a few of our brave voltigeurs penetrated by this means into the place than the Spaniards rushed upon them, and they must have been overwhelmed had not an officer of engineers, named Vacani, entered the town with a detachment of sappers, who opened the gate du Rosaire with hatchets, and gave admission to the troops of General Montmarie, who then advanced into the interior of the upper town, and attacked the barricades of the Rue de la Rambla in conjunction with the troops of Generals Habert and Ficatier. Our troops were now thoroughly exasperated, and bayoneted all whom they met. A troop of the enemy having fled towards the cathedral, they pursued them to this edifice, which was ascended by sixty steps, and having rushed up these steps in spite of a murderous fire, slew them all without mercy. Finding, however, that there were here some hundreds of wounded, they stayed their hands and spared them. At the same moment 8000 men, the sole survivors of the garrison, having gone out by the gate of Barcelona, endeavoured to save themselves by the side of the sea; but General Harispe, throwing himself across their path, compelled them to give up their arms; and from this moment both the upper and lower towns and the Forts l'Olivo and Francoli were equally in our power.

Such was this horrible assault, the most terrible, perhaps, which had ever taken place, at least up to that time. The breaches were covered with the corpses of French soldiers, but the town was strewn with a far larger number of Spanish soldiers. The most extraordinary state of disorder prevailed throughout the streets; from time to time some fanatical Spaniards courted death for the sake of yet destroying a few Frenchmen. Our soldiers, yielding to a feeling common to all troops who have taken a town by assault, regarded Tarragona as their property, and overran the houses, in which they committed, however, more waste than pillage.

But General Suchet and his officers had little difficulty in

prevailing upon them to refrain from conduct which they assured them was an extreme and barbarous use of the rights of war. Gradually order was restored, the flames were extinguished, and account was taken of the trophies which had thus been obtained. Three hundred pieces of cannon were taken, with an immense number of muskets, projectiles, and munitions of all kinds, twenty flags, and ten thousand prisoners, amongst whom was the Governor de Contreras himself, whom General Suchet treated with the utmost respect, although the resistance which had rendered necessary the last assault had been an act of useless despair, and this assault might have been spared as well to the French as the Spaniards themselves. But patriotism should ever be honoured, however extreme. Besides the ten thousand prisoners, the enemy lost six or seven thousand by fire and sword. Our own losses were about four thousand three hundred men put hors de combat, of whom a thousand or twelve hundred were dead, and fifteen or eighteen hundred so much injured as to be incapable of again serving in the ranks. We lost besides about twenty officers of engineers, for this corps, always distinguished in the French army, had displayed as much courage as talent in the course of this memorable siege, which had lasted almost two months, during which nine breaches had been opened, and there had been five assaults, three of which, namely, those of Fort l'Olivo and of the lower and upper towns, were amongst the most furious ever known.

The capture of Tarragona was an event of the utmost importance; for it deprived the Catalan insurrection of its chief support, divided it from the Valencian insurrection, and was calculated to produce throughout the whole Peninsula an immense moral effect, of which full advantage might have been taken, if we had been prepared at that time to overwhelm the Spaniards with a vast concourse of troops. But unfortunately we were not so prepared, and in consequence of the exclusive devotion of Napoleon's mind to other designs, the only result of this great siege was to open to us the Valencian road. General Suchet had been ordered to dismantle Tarragona, in accordance with Napoleon's desire that Tortosa should be the only fortress occupied in this part of Spain, and he only consented to preserve Tortosa on account of the mouths of the Ebro; but as Suchet perceived, in common with General Rogniat, that by preserving only the upper town it might be occupied with a thousand men, he dismantled only the works of the lower town, leaving in the upper a garrison well provided with stores of all kinds, endeavoured to reassure and draw back the inhabitants, placed his park of artillery and munitions in Tortosa, sent back the principal detachments to the posts from which they had been drawn,

in order to repress the guerilla bands, which had become bolder than ever during the siege, and then, with a brigade of infantry, pursued Campo-Verde; but although he conducted the pursuit with the greatest activity, he was not able to come up with him. In the course of his pursuit of Campo-Verde he laid siege to the famous convent of Mont Serrat, and his troops took it almost immediately by the exercise of incredible boldness. He thus rendered all the services he could to the army of Catalonia, which was completely occupied in the blockade of Figüeres, and the periodical revictualling of Barcelona, and then re-entered Saragossa, to put in order the affairs of his government; and there found a marshal's baton awaiting him—a just reward for his services; for if the results of the sieges of Aragon and Catalonia, which were the best conducted sieges since Vauban, were due in great measure to the exertions of the officers of engineers, and the brave soldiers of the army of Aragon, they were also due in great part to the military skill of the general-in-chief, and the profound wisdom of his system of administration.

The months of July, August, and sometimes September could not but be in Spain months of inaction. The English were incapable of any active movements during these burning months; and our soldiers, although extremely active and inured to privations, had nevertheless need of some repose after their incessant marches. Nevertheless, in consequence of his forced sojourn in Andalusia, Marshal Soult had left affairs in so unsettled a state that he was compelled to be very active during these months so generally devoted to repose. Two Spanish divisions which under General Blake had taken part in the battle of Albuera, had been detached by Lord Wellington for the purpose of disturbing Seville. But instead of marching directly thither, they had proceeded to the district of Niebla, towards the mouth of the Guadiana; and Marshal Soult having sent in pursuit of them one of his divisions, retired with the remainder to Seville, to bestow upon the affairs of his government that attention which they required. He found the insurgents of the mountains of Ronda, always very active, occupied in laying siege to the town of Ronda itself, and those of Murcia, after having forced the 4th corps to shut itself up in Grenada, daring to advance even as far as Baeza and Jaen, to a position from which they could interrupt the communications between Andalusia and Madrid. It was necessary, therefore, to march at once upon Ronda, Jaen, Baeza, and Grenada, to repress this insurrectional boldness; and Marshal Soult, taking advantage of the departure of Marshal Victor and General Sebastiani, had abolished the system of *corps d'armée*, which was always bad, except where Napoleon himself was actually present; had persisted in only

leaving 12,000 men, including artillerymen and marines, before Cadiz, and then recalled the detachment which had been sent to Niebla, and the presence of which had been sufficient to compel the two divisions of General Blake to re-embark.

He had had himself preceded by General Godinot, at the head of a detachment which comprised three good infantry regiments, the 12th leger, the 55th and 58th of the line, and the 27th of dragoons, with directions to drive the insurgents from Jaen and Baeza, whilst the main body of troops advanced directly upon Grenada. The insurgents, although numerous, made no more determined a defence than they usually made in the open country, and successively abandoned Jaen and Baeza, to retire into the kingdom of Murcia. The marshal entered Grenada, rallied there a portion of the 4th corps, and on the 8th of August quitted this city to continue his march. In the meantime the insurgents of Murcia having joined Generals Blake and Bellesteros, who had come in English vessels from the mouths of the Guadiana as far as Almería, had taken up a strong position at La Venta de Baul, and numbered altogether about 20,000. The steep and almost inaccessible position which they occupied opposed great difficulties to an assault, and we at first lost some men in unsuccessful attempts. But General Godinot, having driven from Jaen the insurgents of Murcia, advanced to turn the position, and had scarcely appeared on the left of Marshal Soult when the Spaniards retired with the utmost haste into the province of Murcia, making a most disorderly retreat, and dispersing about the country to be put to the sword by the cavalry of General Latour-Maubourg. The prompt and entire dispersion of this corps was a guarantee, not that they would not again appear, but that they would not prove troublesome to us for at least some months. And now Marshal Soult, having posted in Grenada a portion of the troops of the old 4th corps, and sent reinforcements to Ronda under General Leval, entered Seville, to proceed at length with the siege of Cadiz, and to provide all that was necessary for its prosecution.

The remainder of the month of August was passed in almost complete inaction; Marshal Soult granting a little repose to his troops, which from the original number of 80,000 were now reduced to 40,000 at the most, and disputing with Joseph the possession of various detachments which he demanded for the army of the centre from the army of Andalusia. At the same time Marshal Marmont, who remained encamped on the Tagus, in the neighbourhood of Almaraz, was also continually quarrelling with Joseph with respect to the districts from which he had a right to draw forage for the troops under his command; whilst Joseph himself never ceasing to utter complaints, was

demanding that in default of the fourth part of the contributions levied by the generals, which they constantly declined to forward, Napoleon should send him an additional million a month; and could only rejoice in one consolation, which was, the appointment of Marshal Jourdan to be the chief of his staff. In the meantime Marshal Suchet, acting according to his own views, and involved in no such disputes, was quietly preparing the expedition of Valencia, which Napoleon had directed as the necessary consequence of the capture of Tarragona; and finally, General Baraguey d'Hilliers, specially charged with the blockade of Figüères, having driven back the Spaniards who attempted to make their escape, compelled them to surrender themselves prisoners of war, and thus to expiate the surprise of this frontier fortress.

During these months of inaction Lord Wellington formed his plans for the renewal of operations in September, and included in his projects nothing less than the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. In fact, since he had succeeded in freeing Portugal from the presence of the French, this plan was the best that he could have formed, for these fortresses were the keys of Spain, the one in the north, and the other in the south; and once master of them, he would be able to prevent the French from invading Beira or l'Alentejo, and could easily avail himself of the first opportunity for the invasion of Castille or Andalusia. Another reason which led him to form this plan was that he was anxious to perform some decided action, six months having now elapsed since Portugal had been reconquered without adding any remarkable performance to his former exploits. What he had done had been much praised in England, and with good reason, although perhaps this praise had been a little exaggerated, for it generally is so in cases in which it is paid after having been too long withheld. The opposition party in England, however, still existed, and partly in good faith, partly in conformity with systematic resistance to the course pursued by the government, whilst they confessed that Portugal was saved for the time, declared that no further success would be gained, and that the maintenance of a ruinous war in the Peninsula would most probably have no result equivalent to the risk to which it constantly exposed the English army of being driven into the sea by the French. Lord Wellington therefore was urged by an infinity of reasons, some of them military and others political, to perform some fresh distinguished action, and to capture either Badajoz or Ciudad Rodrigo—two obstacles which rendered impossible, whilst possessed by the enemy, every ulterior operation of any importance.

The task which he thus proposed to himself was, however, by no means an easy one; for if he advanced to Badajoz, it was

to be presumed that he would find there the united forces of Marshals Soult and Marmont; and if he advanced to Ciudad Rodrigo, he would there meet Marshal Marmont reinforced with whatever detachments he might be able to procure from the armies of the centre and the north. In either case he would run the risk of encountering forces too considerable to permit him to attempt a great siege in their presence, for according to his custom, he was unwilling to engage the enemy, save when in almost impregnable defensive positions, and when possessed of a numerical superiority in force which, in conjunction with his advantageous position, would render the result as certain as any warlike operation could be. Nevertheless, although Lord Wellington might be compelled to meet, either in the south or the north, forces superior in numbers to his own, he yet had in his favour many great advantages. The route which he had formed for himself within the frontiers of Portugal, from north to south, over which he had already passed so frequently, and which descended from Guarda to Espiñal, from Espiñal to Abrantès, and from Abrantès to Elvas, had been opened with great care, furnished with numerous magazines, and provided with bridges on the Mondego and the Tagus. He had 6000 Spanish mules to carry provisions for his army; he was sole commander of his forces, obtained complete obedience to his orders, and had the immense advantage, as he himself confessed, of being informed by the Spaniards of all the enemy's movements. The French generals, on the other hand, were independent of each other, divided in counsels, wanting everything, informed of nothing, and were never, except by a kind of miracle, united in the pursuit of any common end, or possessed of the materials necessary to the performance of any important operation. Napoleon had recommended them mutually to assist each other; but being unable to foresee the particular cases in which it might be necessary, he had been compelled to confine himself to a general recommendation; and we have already seen how they executed even the most precise orders given with respect to a determined and important object. It was by no means, therefore, impossible for Lord Wellington, by making his preparations in secret, and adroitly veiling his movements, to snatch a period of twenty-five or thirty days in which to undertake and complete a great siege, before the French could arrive to raise it. It was upon this chance that Lord Wellington based his plan of operations for the autumn of 1811, and the winter of 1811-1812.

His troops being at this time somewhat disorganised by their repulse before Badajoz, he resolved to change the object presented to their efforts, and on this account determined to proceed to Ciudad Rodrigo. He had, moreover, very judiciously

observed that Marshal Marmont, in ascending from Naval-Moral to Salamanca, to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, would have less chance of obtaining important reinforcements, than in descending into Estramadura to the relief of Badajoz, for in the last case he would be always sure of finding there Marshal Soult, who had at his command a much larger force than Marshal Bessières in Castille, and who had the greatest possible personal interest in the defence of Badajoz. It was much wiser, therefore, for Lord Wellington to attempt the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo than of Badajoz, except for the fact that he possessed on this side no park of siege artillery, and no place in which it could be securely stored; whilst for the attack of Badajoz he possessed two vast magazines, the first at Abrantès, whither an immense matériel had been transported by the English fleet, and the second at Elvas, between which and Abrantès there was a good road, and where all the matériel necessary to the prosecution of a great siege could be safely stored.

Nevertheless, refusing to be discouraged by this difficulty, Lord Wellington had a park of heavy siege artillery secretly transported to the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, sending it piece by piece, and then concealing it in various villages. He brought, moreover, all his divisions successively into Upper Beira, save that of General Hill, which remained in observation on the Guadiana, and encamped his troops behind the Agueda, leaving to the partisan Don Julian the care of reducing Ciudad Rodrigo to a state of want by incessant incursions across the surrounding country.

Towards the end of August and the commencement of September, Marshal Marmont, better informed this time than our generals ordinarily were respecting the enemy's movements, received information of the change of position of the English army, and received from General Reynaud, the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, a report that this fortress was reduced to the last extremities, that the garrison, already placed on half rations, had only sufficient animal food to last to the 15th of September, and only sufficient bread to last to the 25th, and that at that period it would be compelled to surrender. After receiving such information as this there was no time to lose. Marshal Marmont concerted with General Dorsenne, who had replaced the Duke of Istria, who had been recalled to Paris, and it was arranged that the latter should prepare a large convoy of provisions in the neighbourhood of Salamanca, and proceed thither with a portion of his troops, and that Marshal Marmont should quit the banks of the Tagus, repass the Guadarrama by the Col de Bâvas or Péralès, and descend upon Salamanca, for the purpose of concurring in revictualling Ciudad Rodrigo at any hazard.

These arrangements, perfectly understood on each side, were exactly carried out. Marshal Marmont concentrated his divisions, and carried them successively across the Guadarrama. He would have been glad to have marched the whole six towards Ciudad Rodrigo, by which means he would have had at his command more than 30,000 men, his corps having rallied a portion of its sick and wounded. But to have enabled him to have done this, it would have been necessary that Joseph should have sent him a division of the army of the centre, to have enabled him to guard the position of the army of Portugal between the Tietá and the Tagus, and to have done this would have been most distasteful to Joseph, and would have exposed his capital on the side of Guadalaxara or La Mancha. Not being able, therefore, to obtain this assistance from Joseph, Marshal Marmont was compelled to leave one whole division on the Tagus for the protection of his bridges and his depôts, and he selected for this purpose the division which he had placed on the Truxillo road, as a corps of observation in the direction of Estramadura. With the five others he passed the Guadarrama, and at the commencement of September arrived in the neighbourhood of Salamanca with 26,000 troops. In the meantime General Dorsenne had proceeded to Astorga with 15,000 excellent soldiers, comprising the young guard and one of the divisions of reserve which had recently entered the Peninsula. The cavalry especially was superb. He met on his march an almost equal number of Galician insurgents commanded by the Spanish general Abadia, and having driven them before him as far as Villafranca, turned to the left, towards Zamora and Salamanca.

On the 20th of September the two armies of the north and of Portugal united. They were both in a very effective state, thoroughly refreshed, provided with all necessary matériel, and at least 6000 excellent cavalry, and numbered altogether over 40,000 men. The English, usually so well informed, had not expected so prompt and extensive a combination of the French troops; and although their army was almost as numerous as ours, it was consumed with disease, by no means prepared for a battle, dispersed in cantonments so distant from each other that whilst Crawford's light division was in advance of the Agueda, occupied in the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, the main body of the army was far on the other side of this river. The effective English troops of Lord Wellington's army were, moreover, only 25,000, the remainder consisting of Portuguese.

The French generals, if they would have taken any pains to inform themselves of these facts, might have taken advantage of them to strike a decisive blow at the English general, which

his good fortune as much as his skill had enabled him hitherto to avoid. But whether informed of these facts or not, they should have considered that they might at any moment meet with the English army, either concentrated or dispersed, and should have been prepared in the one case to engage it, and in the other to destroy it.

It was consequently their duty to march as though they were constantly exposed to the necessity of fighting a battle. But they did nothing of the sort, and even neglected to arrange respecting engaging the enemy if circumstances should render it necessary or advantageous to do so. It was, in fact, only arranged that General Dorsenne, taking a direction to the right towards Ciudad Rodrigo, should introduce the convoy of provisions, and that Marshal Marmont, advancing with his cavalry by the left, should execute a vigorous reconnaissance around Fuente Guinaldo and Espeja. As the infantry of the army of Portugal had not yet arrived, General Dorsenne lent to Marshal Marmont the division Thiébault, to employ it as he might find occasion. The march was commenced, therefore, before all the army was assembled and in a fit state to receive the enemy should it appear. It was very improbable, indeed, that the English would be disposed to engage, for their position in front of the Agueda was not at this moment a favourable one; but whatever their position, it was unwise to approach them without being prepared to take advantage of favourable opportunities, or to guard against mischance.

Our troops marched upon Ciudad Rodrigo in this species of disorder, and on the 23rd of September had the satisfaction of succeeding in introducing without striking a blow an immense convoy of provisions. This end having been obtained, the two French generals had doubtless performed the chief object of their march; but they were anxious to obtain information respecting the English army, and Marshal Marmont, advancing to the left, resolved to execute the projected reconnaissance. Pushing forward with his cavalry, which were still commanded by the brave Montbrun, he perceived Crawford's light division divided into two brigades, situated at some distance from each other, and in such a state that a strong advanced guard might have destroyed them in succession. Moreover, Lord Wellington, whose army was much scattered, wanted one of its divisions, and did not hold one of those positions on which alone he chose to engage our troops, might have probably been vanquished, and his whole force destroyed, if he had advanced to the succour of Crawford's brigades.

Cavalry being unfortunately the only disposable force, that alone could be advanced. General Montbrun threw himself upon the English infantry with his accustomed vigour, scattered

them, although they occupied a very favourable position, and took four pieces of cannon, but could not keep them, for he was compelled to give way when the enemy's infantry, having rallied, returned to the charge. Marshal Marmont, who was present at this engagement, called loudly for the division Thiébault; but General Dorsenne, who was a man of perverse and selfish character, although a brave officer, either out of ill-will or want of time, failed to bring up his division until it could be no longer of any use; the two English brigades having rallied and united, and being already safe from our attack.

On the following day the whole infantry of the army was in line, but the English were in full retreat, and at too great a distance to enable us to come up with them, at least in a single march. It was evident that if we had attacked them on the previous day in suitable order, there would have been a good chance of crushing them; and even now it would still have been practicable to do this, had the soldiers had upon their backs three or four days' provisions; but they had not, and they were compelled to retrace their steps, with the single satisfaction of having revictualled Ciudad Rodrigo, and the bitter regret of having permitted the escape of the English army at the moment when it might have been overwhelmed.

Napoleon, persisting, as we have seen, in considering that the reserve recently prepared would be sufficient for the supply of the necessities of the Spanish war, provided good use were made of the autumn and winter, and desiring to withdraw in the spring the imperial guard, wished that the important operations should be commenced in September. The first of these was, in his estimation, the occupation of Valencia, and it was because the capture of Tarragona conduced considerably to the occupation of Valencia that he heard of with so much pleasure, and rewarded so munificently, this last exploit of General Suchet. He ordered this marshal, therefore, to be in the field at latest by the 15th of September, promising that a strong force should march in support of him in his rear, either under the command of General Decaen, who had replaced Marshal Macdonald in Catalonia, or under that of General Reille, commanding in Navarre, who was to receive two of the divisions of the reserve. When Valencia had been taken, Napoleon flattered himself that Marshal Suchet would extend his action as far as Grenada, that the army of Andalusia would then advance almost wholly towards Estramadura, the moiety at least of this army would join that of Portugal, increased to a force of 50,000 men by the return to its ranks of the wounded and sick, and its detachments, and that thus 70,000 men could enter Alentejo, whilst the army of the north, reinforced by two divisions of the reserve, would descend upon the Tagus by the route followed

by Massena, and would form a junction with these 70,000 men. By these means Napoleon hoped to be able to drive the English to the precipice which lay behind them, whilst they obstinately remained at Lisbon. But whilst he looked forward to such vast results, he still entertained the idea of withdrawing his young guard, proposing, however, to replace it by Drouet's fourth battalion, marched back to Bayonne, and there filled with the conscripts of 1811 and 1812, which would compensate, as far as regarded numbers, for the withdrawal of the guard.

Marshal Suchet was no less desirous to compass the conquest of Valencia than Napoleon himself. But of the 40,000 effective men whom alone he possessed of his 60,000 nominally effective, he had lost 4000 or 5000 in the siege of Tarragona and subsequent operations, and of the 35,000 remaining he had to detach at least 12,000 or 13,000 to guard Aragon and Lower Catalonia. He could only march, therefore, with 22,000 or 23,000 men, and this was a very small number with which to attempt the conquest of Valencia. He had already advanced once to the very gates of this great city, and had been able to judge of the difficulties of the undertaking; and Valencia was now defended by the whole of the Valencian army, by that of the insurgents of Murcia, and even by Blake's army, which, consisting of the two divisions Zayas and Lardizabal, had arrived from the banks of the Albura in the previous month. But whatever were the difficulties in his way, Marshal Suchet decided upon his course of action, left a division between Lerida, Tarragona, and Tortosa, under the orders of General Frère, for the protection of Lower Catalonia, another on the Ebro, under General Musnier, to guard Aragon, and then marched with 22,000 men upon Valencia. According to his custom, he had bestowed the greatest attention upon the organisation of his commissariat and artillery services. Tortosa, at the mouths of the Ebro, was still his great dépôt, containing the siege train, now repaired, which he had used in the capture of Tarragona, and vast magazines of the excellent grain of Aragon; and it was from thence that, following the route which runs along the coast from Tortosa to Valencia, he would obtain the necessary provisions and war matériel. For the supply of meat, however, it was arranged that each regiment should carry with it a flock of sheep.

These preparations having been made, Marshal Soult departed on the 15th of September for Valencia, his troops marching in three columns. With the principal of these he followed the highroad from Tortosa to Valencia, whilst the Italian division Palombini proceeded to the right by the mountains of Morella a san Mateo, and Harispe's French division crossed still more to the right the mountains of

Teruel. It was arranged that the three columns should unite in front of Murviedro, at the entrance of the plain named Huerta de Valence.

The army met with no serious obstacle in any direction, and drove before it all the roving bands which infested the country. On the 20th of September the three columns united in the environs of Castellon de la Plana. On the 21st they met with some hundreds of Spaniards at the passage of the Minjarès, a torrent which descends from the mountains to the sea, whom the dragoons speedily dispersed, and on the 22nd they arrived on the borders of the magnificent semicircular plain of Valencia, which is girdled by a chain of fine mountains, covered with palm, orange, and olive trees, and bounded by a glittering ocean on whose brink arises Valencia, with its numerous towers. On entering by the north (the army descended from the north southwards), the first obstacle which presented itself was the city of Murviedro, an open town, but built at the foot of the rock on which formerly stood the ancient Saguntum, and on which there remained a fortress, of a structure partly Roman, partly Arabesque, and partly Spanish. This fortress was garrisoned with 3000 men, well furnished with all kinds of stores, and our army could scarcely leave them in its rear whilst proceeding to attack Valencia, defended by a whole army.

On the 23rd Marshal Suchet took Murviedro with the division Habert, and the operation was not a very difficult one, although the garrison of Saguntum descended from its stronghold to endeavour to save the town at its foot. Having thus become masters of Murviedro, our troops, in spite of a vigorous fire from the fortress, established themselves in the houses which faced it, and barricaded them, and from these forced the garrison to remain shut up in their fortress. After a careful examination of this fortress, it was found to be inaccessible on all sides, except on the west, on which side it joined the mountains which form the enceinte of the plain of Valencia. On this side a gentle slope led to the first works, which consisted of a high and solid tower, which barred the rock on which the fortress was built, and which was connected by strong walls with other towers forming the enceinte. As the formation of the ground presented almost insurmountable obstacles to the formation of regular approaches, and as the utmost confidence could be reposed in the troops which had carried out successfully such extraordinary assaults, it was resolved to attempt to carry the place by escalade. On the 28th of September, therefore, at midnight, two columns of 300 chosen men, provided with scaling ladders, and supported by reserves, approached the fortress on the side which

appeared most easy to escalate. By a singular chance the garrison had selected this same night for the execution of a sortie. The sortie was vigorously repulsed, but the incident served as a warning to the garrison, and there was no longer any use in attempting a surprise. Unfortunately, however, the columns selected for the assault, being filled with unrestrainable ardour, could not, in the midst of the confusion attendant on the repulse of the sortie, be withheld; and the first column planted its ladders, and boldly attempted to reach the summit of its walls. But the ladders were not of the necessary length, nor sufficiently numerous, and the enemy was aware of the attempt; at every point, therefore, at which a ladder was planted, a crowd of furious men struck down with musketry, pikes, and hatchets the bold assailants who attempted to scale their walls. The second column, attempting to renew the attack, was repulsed in the same way; and this hardy attempt, which had been planned as a means of economising time and bloodshed, cost us about 300 men in killed and wounded without any useful result.

Much distressed at this check, Marshal Suchet now perceived that he must proceed by the ordinary methods. A regular siege appeared indispensable for the capture of the rock of Saguntum, and it was asked whether it might not be better to mask this obstacle by a simple detachment, and to march forthwith upon Valencia. But the marshal having already left in his rear two of the enemy's fortresses named Peniscola and Oropesa, did not dare to neglect a third fortress, containing a garrison of 3000 men, and was anxious to capture it before carrying his operations any further.

It was now necessary to bring the heavy siege artillery from Tortosa, and on this account to capture the fortress Oropesa, which completely intercepted the route. General Compère, therefore, was ordered to proceed with the Neapolitans, numbering 1500 men, to Oropesa, and with the first pieces of heavy artillery which should arrive from Tortosa to overthrow its walls and open the route. The Neapolitans accordingly, under the direction of French engineers, opened the approaches, and carried them forward with much ardour and intrepidity. On the 9th of October the breaching battery was placed in position, armed with some heavy pieces of artillery, and an opening made in the principal tower. The little garrison which defended it was unwilling to await the chances of an assault, and surrendered on the 10th of October. The park of heavy artillery could now be brought, therefore, without interruption to the camp under Murviedro.

The Generals Valée and Rogniat, having returned to the army from which they had been absent for a time by

permission, arranged the plan for the attack of the fortress of Saguntum, and decided that it should be conducted on the west, that is to say, by the slopes which join the rock of Saguntum to the mountains. The trenches had to be dug in a very hard soil, which was often a bare rock, and in a situation exposed to walls and elevated towers, from which the enemy could place hors de combat forty or fifty of our men a day; and whilst our troops were employed in the difficult works of the approaches, the chiefs of the bands which infested the mountains of Teruel, Calatayud, and Cuença, situated between the provinces of Aragon and Valencia, were more active than ever, attacking our posts, and carrying off our cattle.

Impatient to triumph over this terrible obstacle which prevented its advance, the army was anxious to be permitted to attempt an assault as soon as possible. But the establishment of batteries under a continual fire from the enemy had caused infinite trouble and serious losses, and a breach could not be effected until the 17th of October. Our artillery, skilfully directed, destroyed the first bastions; but there was ancient masonry in the walls which was as hard as a rock, and above them the Spaniards, animated with the utmost energy, careless of the fire of our battery, took aim at our artillerymen, and destroyed them man by man, and thus frustrated our efforts.

At length, on the afternoon of the 18th, although still presenting an escarpment sufficiently difficult to surmount, the breach was declared practicable, and the assault was ordered. The Spaniards standing in the breach, and on the summit of the tower in which it was made, were armed with muskets and hatchets, and shouted the most furious cries. Colonel Matis, with 400 select men of the 5th leger, and the 114th and 117th of the line, and the Italian division, advanced boldly under the most tremendous fire. But in spite of the courage of the assailants, the breach was so steep, and the enemy's fire so vigorous, that the soldiers who attempted to climb over the ruins were beaten down, and they were forced to renounce the attempt after a fresh loss of 200 men in killed or wounded. Thus this fatal citadel of Saguntum, taking into account the loss consequent on the first escalade and the losses during the progress of the works, had already cost us 700 or 800 men, without any result. In the meantime the Valencian army, perceiving from the midst of the plain what was taking place at Saguntum, felt increased confidence in its walls, and having seen the unavailing attempts against Valencia of Marshal Moncey in 1808, and of General Suchet in 1810, flattered themselves that this new attempt would have a similar result.

It was upon this army, so full of self-complacency, that General Suchet determined to wreak his vengeance, and by its utter defeat expiate the check inflicted on him by the determined garrison of Saguntum. He considered, moreover, that the defeat of this army in the open field would be a source of so much discouragement to the enemy, that it might lead, by its simple moral effect, to the simultaneous capture of both Saguntum and Valencia. But he was unwilling, for the purpose of meeting the enemy's army, to withdraw too far from Saguntum or to approach Valencia too closely, and he was seeking for a suitable position on which to meet it, when General Blake himself offered him the opportunity he desired.

The garrison of Saguntum, whilst causing us serious losses, had also suffered them; its energetic spirit began to fail, it anxiously awaited relief, and demanded it by signals with the vessels which passed along the coast. General Blake had not less than 30,000 men, amongst which were the divisions Zayas and Lardizabal, the best troops in Spain; and had been joined, moreover, by the Murcians under General Mahy, and the brave partisan Villa-Campa.

He now advanced, therefore, into the midst of the plain, withdrawing from Valencia and approaching Saguntum as though he were about to meet the enemy in battle. Marshal Suchet was much rejoiced when he perceived these dispositions, and made preparations for an engagement. On the morning of the 25th of October the two armies were face to face.

General Blake placed on his right, beyond a ravine named Picador, and along the shore, the division Zayas, which the Spanish flotilla was to support by its fire; in the centre, the division Lardizabal, supported by the whole of the Spanish cavalry, under General Caro; and on his left, the Valencian division Miranda, that of the partisan Villa-Campa; and finally, even beyond his left, with the intention of turning us by the mountains, the troops of Mahy. These troops amounted, as we have said, to 30,000 men, as good soldiers as Spain could furnish. The remainder of his troops had been left for the protection of Valencia.

General Suchet's troops only numbered 16,000 or 18,000 men, for he had been compelled to leave a certain number before Saguntum; but these 16,000 or 18,000 amply compensated by their valour for their inferiority in number. On his left, and towards the sea, he posted Habert's division, opposite the division Zayas; in the centre he opposed Harispe's division, the Italian division Palombini, the 4th hussars, the 13th cuirassiers, and the 24th dragoons to the division Lardizabal; finally, on his right he placed the brigades Robert and Chlopiski, and the Italian dragoons, to hold in check the troops of Miranda,

Villa-Campa, and Mahy, which threatened to cut us off from the Tortosa route, our only line of retreat. Our artillery and the Neapolitan infantry were to continue the attack on the towers of Saguntum during the battle.

At daybreak the army of General Blake commenced its movement, and Marshal Suchet, crossing at that moment the field of battle with a squadron of the 4th hussars, perceived Lardizabal's Spaniards advancing in the centre with order and precision upon a mamelon which would serve as a point d'appui to our whole line; and he immediately ordered Harispe's division to proceed thither, and as the Spaniards had the start, threw upon them his squadron of hussars to check their movement. The hussars, however, although they charged with great bravery, were repulsed by the Spaniards, who boldly mounted upon the mamelon and established themselves there. General Harispe, who arrived when the mamelon was already taken, marched thither at the head of the 7th of the line, and left in reserve the 116th of the line with the 3rd of the Vistula. The Spaniards received the charge of our troops with a very vigorous fire, and more firmness than usual, but the 7th of the line attacked them at the bayonet's point, and overwhelmed them. The whole of Harispe's division then deployed in front of Lardizabal's division, which had paused whilst the two wings of the Spanish army continued to gain ground. Marshal Soult determined immediately to take advantage of this situation to cut off the Spanish army by the centre; and with this purpose sent forward Harispe's division, whilst he kept back, on the other hand, Habert's division on his left, and the brigades Robert and Chlopiski on his right.

Whilst these orders were in the course of execution, Duchand, commander of the squadron of artillery, having carried forward with much boldness the artillery of Harispe's division, in order to throw grape upon Lardizabal's infantry, was charged by the whole body of General Caro's cavalry. The hussars who attempted to sustain the charge were driven back, and many of our pieces fell into the power of the Spaniards, who, little accustomed to take prizes, expressed their joy on the occasion with loud shouts. At the same moment all Lardizabal's infantry marched towards us with the greatest confidence. But the 116th advanced to meet General Caro's cavalry, checked them with its weight, and then the brave 13th cuirassiers, led by General Boussard, threw themselves on the Spanish infantry, and broke and sabred them. From this moment the enemy's centre, pierced by our troops, was compelled to retreat; and not only did we retake the French guns, but also a portion of the Spanish artillery, and many prisoners, amongst whom was General Caro himself.

The two wings of the army, which had at first been withheld, were now advanced by Marshal Suchet, who, in spite of a wound in the shoulder, declined to quit the field of battle, and placed in line with the centre. General Habert, whose troops were opposed to the division Zayas, drove it at the first charge to the village Pouzol, and there having driven it still further to the heights of Puig, carried these heights themselves with the bayonet, whilst Colonel Delort, uniting the left with the centre, charged at the head of the 24th dragoons the remainder of Lardizabal's infantry. On the right Generals Robert and Chlopiski repulsed the troops commanded by Mating, and the Italian dragoons completely routed them by a vigorous charge.

Defeated thus at every point, the Spaniards retreated in disorder, leaving in our hands twelve pieces of cannon, 4700 prisoners, 1000 dead, and four flags; whilst on our side we had lost in this struggle, in which the Spaniards fought more desperately than they usually fought in the open field, about 700 in killed and wounded. The chief results of the battle were that it destroyed the prestige of the Valencian army, discouraged the garrison of Saguntum, and dissipated the vainglorious confidence felt by the inhabitants of Valencia in their walls.

After he had collected the trophies of his victory, the marshal summoned the garrison of Saguntum, which the defeat of the Spanish army had deprived of all hope of relief; and it consented to capitulate, surrendering into our hands 2500 prisoners, the remainder of the 3000 men by whom, at the commencement of the siege, the fortress had been defended. This first result of the battle of Saguntum was a source of great satisfaction to Marshal Suchet, who now found himself master of the plain of Valencia by reason of the solid point d'appui which he had now acquired there, and who had, moreover, in the town of Murviedro a safe place of protection for his siege train, his sick, and his stores. Possessing, moreover, on the grand Tortosa route Fort Oropesa, which alone commanded the road, he was perfectly secure of his line of communication up to the Ebro.

It now became an important object with General Suchet to disengage his rear from the bands which had taken advantage of his advance to assail the entire circle of the frontiers of Aragon. L'Empecinado and Duran, replacing Villa-Campa, had overpowered the garrison of Calatayud; Mina, sallying from Navarre, although pursued by several columns of French troops, had seized an entire battalion of Italians; and the Catalans, retaking Mont Serrat, had rendered very difficult the position of Frère's division, which was charged with the duty of keeping watch over Lerida, Tarragona, and Tortosa. The marshal, therefore, made various necessary movements

of troops in his rear; and marched his prisoners under the escort of a strong brigade towards the Pyrenees, whilst he sent couriers after couriers to Paris to make known his situation and his need of prompt aid.

It was now necessary that he should cross the Guadalaviar, a rapid little stream on the bank of which is built Valencia, for the purpose of investing this vast city, which was occupied by a numerous army, and which, independently of its old enceinte, was still further protected by an uninterrupted line of earth entrenchments, bristling with artillery, and forming a vast entrenched camp. To these defences were added a multitude of irregular canals, large, deep, and full of running water, which were the riches of Valencia during peace, as they were its defence in war. There were obstacles, therefore, which the 17,000 men, who were all that remained with Marshal Suchet after the despatch of a brigade as an escort for the prisoners, were insufficient to overcome.

Whilst awaiting the reinforcements he had solicited, and which he hoped to receive from Navarre, the marshal employed the month of November in blockading Valencia, advancing Habert's division to the left as far as Grao, a port of Valencia, and seizing the Faubourg Serranos, in spite of a most vigorous resistance on the part of the Spaniards, who defended it foot by foot. This faubourg was separated from the town itself by the Guadalaviar, and our troops took, by having first entered by sapping and mining, the three great convents that commanded it. Ascending towards the right along the Guadalaviar, they also seized some villages which were on its left bank, that which we occupied, and fortified themselves there. We had thus created a long line of circumvallation from the sea to beyond Valencia, and to complete the envelopment of this city it only required that our troops should cross the Guadalaviar in front of General Blake, force the canals with which the plain was furrowed, and shut up the army of succour within the walls of the city itself. The marshal, however, delayed this operation, which would necessarily be followed by the assault of the entrenched camp and the old wall, until the arrival of the reinforcements which had been promised, and which he momentarily expected.

Napoleon, in fact, on receiving news of the battle of Saguntum, believed that the whole fate of the Spanish war was concentrated around Valencia, and that the destinies of the Peninsula depended on the capture of this important place. It is certain, indeed, that the conquest of this city, which for many years had resisted all our attacks, succeeding that of Tarragona, would have produced a great moral effect on the Peninsula, and almost as great as that which would have been

caused by the conquest of Cadiz, although far less than that which would have resulted from the occupation of Lisbon, since the capture of this latter city would suppose the defeat of the English. Napoleon desired, therefore, that everything should be subordinate, and almost sacrificed to this important object.

By his despatch of the 20th of November he ordered General Reille to quit Navarre immediately, however necessary it might be to keep Mina in check, and to enter Aragon with the two divisions of reserve which were under his orders, whilst General Caffarelli replaced him in Navarre; and this latter general was in his turn replaced in Biscay by General Dorsenne. At the same time he ordered Joseph to send forward a division upon Cuença; Marmont, although so distant from Valencia, to detach under General Montbrun a division of infantry and one of cavalry to join at Cuença that which should be sent by Joseph; and finally, Marshal Suchet to advance a corps as far as Murcia. He wrote to all, what was, indeed, true, but with great exaggeration, namely, that the English had a great number of sick, as many as 18,000, he said; that they were on this account incapable of undertaking any movement, and that the Castilles, Estramadura, and Andalusia could therefore be without danger stripped of their troops; that Valencia was the only important point, and that when it had once been taken, a vast number of troops might then be set free to act from east to west with the utmost vigour against the English.

These orders, expressed with great precision and in the most imperious terms, were better executed than usual, and in accordance with the species of fatality attending the Spanish war, this punctual obedience was only obtained on the occasion when it was undesirable, for General Reille would have sufficed to enable General Suchet to perform his task. However this might be, General Reille held in check the guerilla bands, entered it himself with a French division, and marched at the head of these two divisions upon Valencia by the Teruel road. General Caffarelli replaced him in Navarre. In the meantime Joseph, who expected great results from the capture of Valencia, willingly deprived himself of a portion of his army, and directed upon Cuença the division Darmagnac; whilst Marshal Marmont, who grew weary of his state of inaction on the Tagus, and who would have rejoiced to march himself upon Valencia, not having been authorised to proceed thither in person, despatched General Montbrun with two divisions, one of infantry and one of cavalry. Marshal Soult, however, replied to Napoleon's order that he could not from the bottom of Andalusia aid Marshal Suchet in the kingdom of Valencia;

and he was right. He acted accordingly, therefore, and sent nothing.

With much pleasure Marshal Suchet saw arrive successively more reinforcements than he had demanded, and towards the end of December learned that General Reille, an officer who was as intelligent as he was energetic, was approaching from Ségorbe with the Italian division Severoli, and with a French division composed of the best regiments of the old Neapolitan army; a force which amounted to 14,000 or 15,000 men, and was accompanied by forty pieces of cannon. After having himself reviewed these troops at Ségorbe on the 24th of December, he returned to Valencia, and resolved to cross the Guadalaviar immediately for the purpose of completely investing the city, before General Blake could escape from it, or bring up a new division of General Frère's which was said to be about to appear. He fixed on the 26th of December for the execution of this project, as General Reille would thus be able to occupy the left bank of the river, which he was now about to abandon, and even to assist at the conclusion of the operation.

On the 26th of December, whilst a portion of Habert's division masked the Faubourg de Serranos, the remainder of this division, advancing to the left, passed the stream towards its mouth, enveloped Valencia on the side of the sea, and took possession of a height called Mount Olivete. In the centre and a little above Valencia the Italians of the division Palombini, rushing through the water up to their middle, passed the Guadalaviar at a ford, and under the most vigorous fire, attacked the village of Mislata, which was bravely defended, and protected by a deep canal named Acequia de Favara, the passage of which was of greater difficulty than that of the stream itself. To second this movement and completely envelop Valencia, General Harispe with his division crossed the Guadalaviar above the village Manisses, at the point where were situated the prises of water which turned the course of the Guadalaviar into a thousand canals through the plain of Valencia; and Marshal Soult had calculated that General Harispe, avoiding thus the obstacle of the canals, would be able more speedily to turn Valencia, and effect the investment on the south.

The movement of General Harispe was a little delayed by his awaiting the arrival of General Reille, since he was unwilling to leave unsupported the numerous troops which remained on the left of the Guadalaviar. Without this support, indeed, General Blake, who was about to be blockaded on the right bank, would have been able to escape by the left bank by breaking through the feeble detachments there placed. As

soon as the approach of the troops of General Reille was observed, General Harispe pushed forward, fell on the rear of Mislata, released the Italians who were maintaining a most unequal combat, assisted them in the occupation of the disputed positions, then descended to the south of Valencia, and towards the end of the day completed its investment. During this circular movement around Valencia, General Mahy, at the head of the insurgents of Murcia, and the partisan Villa-Campa with his division, had withdrawn upon the Xucar and upon Alcira, being unwilling to be shut up in Valencia, and rightly judging that the troops of General Blake would be quite sufficient for its defence, could it be defended, and far too many to have to surrender, should it be forced to capitulate. The general-in-chief sent the dragoons in pursuit of these retreating troops, but the only end attained was the capture of a few prisoners.

This operation, now successfully executed, cost us about 400 men in killed and wounded, who were for the most part Italians, since the only resolute resistance had been at Mislata. It completed the investment of Valencia, and assured us, should we capture the city, of also capturing General Blake with 20,000 men. But certainly if the Valencian population, amounting to 60,000, supported by 20,000 regular troops, well provisioned, and defended by numerous and extensive works, were animated still by the sentiments which had inspired it in 1808 and 1809, it would be able to make a long resistance, and cause us to pay dearly for its conquest. But the high-spirited and sanguinary men who had slaughtered the French in 1808 were now either more peaceably disposed, or dispersed, or terrified.

Three years of civil and foreign war and courses *lointaines*, sometimes in Murcia, sometimes in Catalonia, had fatigued this active and patriotic population, and worn out their passions. Valencia was now in the same state as Saragossa and many other parts of Spain. Provided those were disarmed who had adopted a taste for the habit of using arms, and a fondness for pillage, the remainder, suffering from the insupportable tyranny alternately exercised by each party, was ready to submit to a clement conqueror, with a reputation for honour, and bringing to them rather repose than slavery. The remembrance of the massacres committed on the French in 1808, which would have been a motive for resisting to the utmost a pitiless besieger, was, on the contrary, a reason for surrendering at once to an enemy whose gentleness was known, and who ought not to be forced to a severity contrary to his nature.

These sentiments, influencing the army of General Blake, prevented the adoption on any side of the resolution to destroy Valencia, as Saragossa had been destroyed, rather than surrender it to the enemy. Marshal Suchet had received infor-

mation of this disposition, and desired to carry forward the approaches as rapidly as possible, in order to preserve the immediate submission of the city, for he was far from secure of retaining for any considerable time the concentration of force which was under his command. He resolved, therefore, to carry forward works against two points of the defence which offered circumstances favourable to an attack. At the commencement of January 1812, Henri, the colonel of engineers, who had signalled himself in all the memorable sieges of Aragon and Catalonia, opened the trenches towards the south of the town, in front of an angle formed by a line of outer works, and to the south-west, in front of the Faubourg St. Vincent. Within a few days the works had been pushed as far as the foot of the entrenchment, but with the loss of Colonel Henri, who was justly regretted by the whole army, on account of his courage and talents; and General Blake, seeing no means for maintaining a desperate defence, abandoned the outer line of defences, and retired within the enceinte itself.

Marshal Suchet, discerning very clearly the true state of affairs, immediately advanced under the walls, and placed in position a battery of mortars to overpower at once a resistance which was already dying out. But if he were anxious to terrify the population, it was far from his intention to destroy a city in whose wealth he hoped to find the chief resource of his army, and after having thrown into it some bombs which caused more consternation than harm, he summoned General Blake to surrender, and received from the latter an equivocal refusal. The bombardment continued simultaneously with the parleying, and on the 9th of January 1812 the army of General Blake surrendered itself as prisoners of war to the number of 8000 men. Marshal Suchet entered Valencia in triumph, the just reward of wisely conceived combinations bravely executed, and fortunately aided by circumstances. The population received calmly, and almost with satisfaction, a chief of whose good government Aragon boasted, and was not sorry to have reached the conclusion of a war which at that time appeared to be solely advantageous to the English, who were as odious to the Spaniards as the French themselves.

Marshal Suchet hastened to introduce into the administration of the kingdom of Valencia the same order he had carried into that of the kingdom of Aragon. The populations both of Valencia and the neighbouring towns were disposed to submit to his authority, and he was able to calculate on a submission as complete as that he had obtained in Aragon. It was necessary, nevertheless, that he should retain sufficient troops to hold in check the turbulent portion of the populations, which had already thrown itself into the mountains, and prepared to take advantage

of the dispersion of our forces, which was the necessary result of the extension of our occupation, to disturb Murcia, Cuença, Aragon, and Lower Catalonia.

The capture of Valencia, succeeding that of Tarragona, was indisputably both fortunate and brilliant, and capable of exercising throughout the Peninsula a considerable moral influence, but on condition that our forces, so far from being diminished, should be increased in proportion to the extended country they had to occupy; that the precipitate withdrawal of the large force which had been carried eastward, and which left the English at liberty in the west, should be promptly retrieved; and that the enemy should not be allowed time to take advantage of this, but should, on the other hand, be attacked at that very moment with the greatest possible energy. If, in fact, the army of the north had been sufficiently reinforced so as to be able not only to keep in check the guerilla bands, but to cover Ciudad Rodrigo; if the army of Portugal had been augmented sufficiently to invade either Beira or Alentejo, or, at least, to check Lord Wellington; if, finally, the army of Andalusia had received sufficient reinforcements to enable it to take Cadiz, and to add the *éclat* of this conquest to that of the capture of Valencia; then a moiety of the army of Andalusia added to the whole army of Portugal, and a detachment of the army of the north, would have been able to drive the English upon Lisbon, and to blockade them in their lines until the proper moment should have arrived for a great effort to take them. Unfortunately these conditions could not be fulfilled but with extreme difficulty at the present moment, when every care had a direction towards the Vistula, instead of towards the Tagus; and Napoleon was, moreover, about to order that as soon as Valencia should have been taken, General Reille was to enter Aragon with his two divisions, to leave General Caffarelli at liberty to re-enter Castille, and the imperial guard at liberty to re-enter France.

Thus Valencia had scarcely been taken when General Reille retraced his steps, and Marshal Suchet found himself reduced to his own forces, which were sufficient, indeed, for the government of Valencia, but quite insufficient to undertake any distant expedition, or to act as far as Murcia and Grenada. He took advantage, however, of this withdrawal of troops to get rid of his prisoners, and sent them to France.

Napoleon, who had at first desired, after the capture of Valencia, to direct against the English an overwhelming force, and with this purpose to leave his guard in Castille during the whole of the winter at least, had now resigned that idea, pressed as he was by certain circumstances, which we shall presently have to narrate, to march his armies on the Vistula, and he resolved to recall immediately his guard, the Poles, the cadres

of a certain number of fourth battalions, and a portion of his dragoons. Towards the close of December, therefore, he demanded his young guard of General Dorsenne, which caused a diminution of at least 12,000 men; and demanded of Marshals Suchet and Soult the regiments of the Vistula, which caused a fresh withdrawal of 7000 or 8000 Polish troops, excellent soldiers; and this diminution of force was especially damaging to Marshal Suchet, who remained with 15,000 men in the kingdom of Valencia. He recalled also the fourth battalions which had composed the 9th corps, and which belonged almost entirely to the regiments of the army of Andalusia, and this was a fresh withdrawal of 2000 or 3000 men, who were much to be regretted for their distinguished qualities as soldiers. Finally, Napoleon recalled twelve regiments of dragoons of the twenty-four employed in Spain.

The result of these measures was the withdrawal from Spain of 25,000 of the best troops. And this was not all; for Napoleon, no longer designing the march of two combined armies upon Lisbon, advancing one by the Beira, the other by the Alentejo, but being especially anxious to guard against an offensive movement of the English in Castille, which might have imperilled our line of communication, changed, at the very moment of the capture of Valencia, the destination of Marshal Marmont, and drew him from the banks of the Tagus to the banks of the Douro, causing him to repass the Guadarrama. He had ordered him to quit Almaraz, and to establish himself at Salamanca with the six divisions of the army of Portugal, to which he had added a seventh, that of General Souham, which was one of the four of reserve. The division Bonnet was to form the eighth. General Caffarelli, now returned from Navarre, which he had occupied for a moment during the movement of General Reille upon Valencia, had succeeded General Dorsenne in the command of the army of the north, and was to receive, as compensation for the withdrawal of the guard, one of the four divisions of the reserve, and at the same time to cover Madrid, if the enemy should attempt to proceed thither, as they had done at the time of the battle of Talavera. Finally, as it was the departure of the guard which determined the new position assigned to the army of Portugal, Marshal Marmont was ordered to conform immediately to the instructions which he had received.

At the moment when these orders reached him, however, Marshal Marmont was in a state of embarrassment, which prevented him from obeying them; for, in accordance with the extreme precipitancy with which the concentration of the forces towards Valencia had been conducted, he had been ordered to despatch General Montbrun with two divisions, one

of infantry and the other of cavalry; and General Montbrun, instead of stopping at Cuença, as the division Darmagnac sent by Joseph, and waiting until it was necessary that he should go further, had acted quite otherwise. Taking advantage of his liberty, and the season which was favourable to the performance of marches, he advanced as far as the very gates of Alicante, which, although ready to open to Marshal Suchet, were not so to him.

General Montbrun might have committed a fault, very excusable in the case of such a character as his, but whether wrong or not, less than eighty or a hundred leagues from Almaraz, and whilst he was so far removed with a third of the army of Portugal, it was a difficult thing for Marshal Marmont to quit the Tagus with the two other thirds, and thus to place additional distance between himself and his principal lieutenant. However, Marshal Marmont, although capable of judging of the merit of the orders he received, executed them because he was obedient, and less animated with personal passions than most of his comrades. Moreover, he had received information that the English, repulsed before Ciudad Rodrigo at the end of the preceding September, were preparing a new attempt against this place, and he commenced to march his troops from the banks of the Tagus to the banks of the Douro, and to remove his headquarters from Naval-Moral to Salamanca. In order to guard against the inconveniences of this strange situation, he removed at first only his hospitals, matériel, and two divisions, and left two divisions on the Tagus to assist General Montbrun; and with more than usual forethought prepared at Salamanca a second store of artillery for the troops whom he left on the Tagus, that they might, in case of urgent need, rejoin him by routes which were very short but impracticable for artillery.

We now see how singular and perilous was the situation created by the precipitate determination, first to carry all the troops towards Valencia, and then to draw them back towards Castille in order to prepare for the departure of the troops destined for Russia; and the English must have been very indolent or very ill informed had they neglected such advantageous opportunities. Lord Wellington, although by no means fertile in ingenious and bold combinations, was nevertheless careful to seize favourable occasions. He never created them, but he seized them, and this is in general sufficient, for those which fortune offers are generally the safest, whilst we can only create them for ourselves at the risk of much hazard and peril.

We have already explained how, being compelled to do something, and having no better enterprise open to him than

the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz, Lord Wellington was lying in wait on a well-opened route, ready to throw himself on one of these two fortresses as soon as he could believe that he had before him twenty or five and twenty days in which to conduct a siege; and this space of twenty-five days was secured to him by the concentration of all the French forces upon Valencia, which he knew to have become the sole source of care to the court of Madrid. Before Marshal Marmont could be informed; before he could recall General Montbrun, and set his whole army in motion; before General Caffarelli could return from Navarre to reinforce the army of Portugal; before, in fact, forty thousand men could be led under the walls of Ciudad Rodrigo, Lord Wellington would certainly have time to attack and take this fortress. He had, moreover, already transported thither the necessary siege materials, had not quitted the environs since the revictualling accomplished by Marshal Marmont and General Dorsenne, had employed his time in the care of his sick, and had quietly collected a great park of heavy artillery. In fact, no preliminary operation had been left unprepared, and he would be able on the day succeeding his first march to commence the siege, the accomplishment of which was the object of his ambition, and he determined to undertake it without loss of time.

Before the cruel surprise which was preparing for us as a punishment for our faults, there had already arisen a most bitter disagreement on account of the expedition attempted by the division Gerard to Arroyo del Molinos. We have seen that Marshal Soult had left General Drouet at Merida to watch Estramadura. General Drouet no longer commanded the 9th corps, which had been distributed amongst the divisions of the army of Andalusia, but the 5th, the command of which had become vacant by the return to France of Marshal Mortier. Marshal Soult had authorised him to extend as far as the environs of Caceres the levy of the contributions, and General Gerard, placed at the head of one of the divisions of the corps, a very energetic but rather careless officer, had advanced as far as the city of Caceres itself, in the basin of the Tagus, whilst the corps to which it belonged was at Merida upon the Guadiana. It was very imprudent to send him so far, and as imprudent on his part not to have been more careful in so hazardous a position. The English general, Hill, was at no great distance, in the direction of Port Alègre, and being urged by Lord Wellington not to remain inactive, seized with empressement the occasion which offered itself, and which was a most favourable one, for he had but to quietly ascend the basin of the Tagus to be able to cut off the too confident general from his line of communication with the Guadiana;

and he performed this operation, arriving on the 27th of October close to General Gerard's rear. The latter had been warned of the danger which he incurred, but with the rashness of his improvident courage had replied to General Briche, who gave the warning—"You seem to see the English everywhere;" a most offensive remark, and very little deserved by the brave general to whom it was addressed. General Gerard, however, perceiving the necessity of retracing his steps, had already sent forward one of his two brigades, and with the second waited on the morning of the 28th near Arroyo del Molinos the arrival of the Alcade of Caceres, who had promised to bring the thousand ounces which had been levied on the city, when he was convinced too late of his injustice towards General Briche.

Surrounded by more than 10,000 men, of whom 6000 were English and 4000 were Portuguese, he endeavoured to compensate for his imprudence by his valour, and contrived to extricate himself by the sacrifice of a battalion of the rear-guard composed of select companies, having an officer at its head named Voirol, who had distinguished himself at Albuera. This battalion, surrounded on all sides, defended itself with heroic courage, but was overwhelmed and compelled to surrender; and this cruelly rash enterprise thus cost us nearly 2000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and was a real subject for congratulation with the English, since it furnished them with a remarkable fact to compensate for the inaction of the summer, and to employ the public mind in England, which had hitherto brooded on the repulses before Badajoz, and the last revictualling of Ciudad Rodrigo by the French. General Gerard was sent by General Drouet to Marshal Soult, and by Marshal Soult to the emperor, to render an account of his conduct; and his superiors, had they been just, when they accused him of imprudence, should have accused themselves of imprudence which was at least as great as his.

We were unfortunately to suffer still greater mischances, and all by reason of the same want of vigilance which had been so fatal during the last war, and Ciudad Rodrigo, of which, as we have said, Lord Wellington designed the siege during the concentration of our forces in the direction of Valencia, was to furnish us with another instance of its effects. This fortress, situated between the army of the north and the army of Portugal, was confided to the care of two officers, Marshal Marmont and General Dorsenne; of whom the latter, however, to whom had been entrusted the duty of supplying the garrison with provisions, was more particularly responsible. But although very capable of commanding a division in the open field, General Dorsenne knew nothing respecting

the defence of a fortress, and had entrusted to General Barrié, who knew even less, the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo, and gave him 1800 men to defend a place of which the defence required at least 5000. The French had employed twenty-four days in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo when defended by 6000 Spaniards, well provided with all kinds of stores, and as brave as fanatics. But how long would 1800 French troops be able to defend it, when destitute of stores, and regarding themselves as sacrificed by the negligence of their chiefs? General Dorsenne failed to ask himself this question, and being aware that he had some months before, in company with Marshal Marmont, carried provisions to Ciudad Rodrigo, scarcely thought any more respecting the matter.

General Barrié, however, having learned the true state of affairs, had not failed, at the close of December, to inform the commander of the army of the north of the enemy's movements, which, although very carefully concealed, were nevertheless very apparent, to announce that the provisions of the place would be exhausted in February, that the garrison was very insufficient for its defence, and that it must speedily fall before any serious attack. These messages were received as General Briche's advice had been received by General Gerard, as the importunity of an officer who was always complaining, demanding more than he needed, and more than could be granted him. The conduct of a superior is always imitated, and Napoleon having treated his generals in this manner, there was now scarcely an officer who did not behave towards his inferiors in the same way.

The fortress was therefore left to itself with a garrison of 1800 men, now reduced to 1500 by sickness, desertion, and daily skirmishes against the Spanish scouts in the neighbouring country. The breach by which the French had entered had been repaired, but with dry stone, in default of other materials. On the mamelon called Le Grand Teso had been constructed a redoubt of little strength, and the exterior convents of Saint François and Saint Cruz had been occupied by 200 men, which reduced by that number the garrison left to guard the walls.

Lord Wellington, after he had secretly conveyed his siege train near the frontier, crossed it on the 8th of January 1812, hoping that before the return of the troops sent to Valencia by the army of Portugal, and to Navarre by the army of the north, he should have carried a place wanting in all means of defence, as Ciudad Rodrigo appeared to be at that moment.

Having crossed the Agueda on the 8th, and invested the fortress, he determined to carry the lunette on Le Grand Teso in the evening. Armed with three cannon, and guarded by 500 men, it was incapable of offering any very great resistance,

and the troops of the unfortunate detachment which defended it were either taken or slain. Immediately afterwards Lord Wellington, who had not less than 40,000 troops under his command, commenced the siege works, and enveloped the place in trenches from the convent of Saint Cruz to that of Saint François. To attack that portion of the walls which had been breached by the French was a mere matter of course, and the approaches were conducted towards that point; and as the convents of Saint Cruz and Saint François took the English trenches in flank, it was resolved to carry them by assault—by no means a difficult undertaking, as there were less than 50 soldiers in the one, and 150 in the other. The former was attacked on the night of the 13th, and the 50 men who occupied it being insufficient for its defence, retired, after having done their best. General Barrié made a sortie to retake this post, and succeeded in his attempt, but was compelled to evacuate it again before the attack of a multitude of assailants. The convent of Saint François was of more importance to the enemy, for it commanded the left of the English trenches, by which Lord Wellington designed to undertake a second attack. The 150 men who guarded this convent, assailed by an overwhelming force, and threatened with being isolated from the city, retired after having spiked their cannon. A more extensive experience in the defence of fortresses would have taught General Barrié that to attempt to defend detached posts with so few men was to sacrifice troops uselessly. At the same time it must be added that had he even confined his efforts to the defence of the fortress itself, he could not very considerably have prolonged its defence with the force at his disposal.

All the outer works having been taken, Lord Wellington directed twenty-six cannon against the old breach, and in a few hours the uncemented stones began to fall away with frightful celerity, and the breach speedily became practicable. The besieged here, as at Badajoz, taking advantage of the habit of the English to open a breach before having destroyed the counterscarp, bravely attempted to clear the foot of the walls. But being very weak in numbers, and ill covered by the counterscarp and the glacis, they were speedily driven away by the enemy's fire, and the English artillery was able by accumulating ruins at the foot of the breach again to create the slope. Lord Wellington had learned at Badajoz what it was to attempt the assault of places defended by French troops, and perceived that to render an assault successful it would be necessary to divide the attention of the besieged by simultaneous attacks. He established, therefore, a new breaching battery on the left of his trenches towards the convent of Saint François, and the artillery of the fortress, although it

caused much damage to the new works, being incapable of resisting the overwhelming fire directed against it, a second breach was speedily effected at this point, and although not extensive, was deemed practicable.

General Barrié, who had decided to perish sword in hand, took the ordinary measures to resist the assault. He had a double entrenchment raised behind the breaches, flanked them with cannon loaded with grape, placed on their summits bombshells which were to be rolled down upon the enemy by hand, and posted chosen troops behind them. Having only a thousand men available for the defence, and there being two breaches to defend, and the whole circuit of the fortress to guard, the only reserve he had against a column which might have forced the wall consisted of a hundred men. Nevertheless, when summoned to surrender by the English general, he replied that he would die upon the ramparts, and would never capitulate; and this determination is worthy of all honour, for in the state to which the fortress was now reduced he might have capitulated in full accordance with the most honourable rules regulating the defence of fortresses.

On the night of the 18th of January Lord Wellington threw two columns upon the two breaches, and placed reserves in proper positions to support them. The column directed against the great breach on the right, after having run, completely exposed, to the brink of the fosse and dashed into it, attempted to climb up the ruins of the fallen wall, and were many times driven back by the grape-shot, grenades, and musketry directed against them from the fortress; and General Barrié, who was at this spot because it was the one most seriously threatened, could flatter himself for a moment that the defence had been successful. At this moment, summoned by a great clamour to the little breach, and supposing that it had been carried, he ran thither with his reserve, and finding that it was a false alarm, returned to the great breach. But the second English column, after having been repulsed from the little breach, returned in force, overpowered the voltigeurs who defended it, and penetrated into the tower. On this occasion, General Barrié, supposing it to be another false alarm, failed to advance with sufficient speed, and his column which defended the great breach, being taken *à revers*, was compelled to lay down its arms. The garrison and its commander had protracted their resistance to the utmost, and they can only be reproached with a few errors, the avoidance of which could not have rendered the defence successful. The town, although an English ally, was pillaged, Lord Wellington being forced to permit this act of barbarity to the temper of his troops. We have a profound respect for the English nation and its valiant army, but we must

be permitted to observe that French soldiers never need such a stimulant as this.

Ciudad Rodrigo, attacked on the 8th of January, had thus fallen into the hands of the enemy on the evening of the 18th, and had therefore been taken within a space of ten days. Such a result may appear extraordinary, but the ruined state of the fortifications, the insufficiency of the garrison, the great number of the besiegers, and we must add, the prodigality with which Lord Wellington expended the lives of his men, of which he took so much care in the open field, sufficiently explain the promptitude of this success, which cost the English army thirteen or fourteen thousand men in killed or wounded, and some of its most distinguished officers, especially the brave and hardy Crawford, who commanded the light division. The English, having no special artillery troops, and their engineers, although very intelligent, being but little versed in the profound art of Vauban, neglecting the usual means of approach, had trusted the fate of the siege to assaults. This system, which had failed before Badajoz, which had succeeded before Ciudad Rodrigo by means of many simultaneous attacks, is a mode of proceeding which requires a considerable army, the sacrifice of an immense number of men, and great energy, and which, notwithstanding the presence of these necessary advantages, is very liable to defeat before a numerous and resolute garrison.

The promptitude of the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo was as a thunder-stroke to the commander of the armies of the north and of Portugal, and the staff at Madrid, the latter being the less surprised, since it had blamed the conveyance of all the disposable troops towards Valencia, of which Lord Wellington took so much advantage. The person most grieved was Marshal Marmont. At the moment when he received the news, which was on the 10th of January, of the commencement of the siege, he was proceeding from the banks of the Tagus to the banks of the Douro, relying upon the protraction of the defence to at least twenty days; and he hoped before the expiration of this period to have assembled five, or even six or seven of his own divisions, and to have obtained twelve or fifteen thousand auxiliary troops from the army of the north, by which means he would have been able to march to the relief of the besieged fortress at the head of forty thousand men. But the negligence of General Dorsenne, who was charged with the protection of Ciudad Rodrigo, had very much abridged the time during which it was possible for the garrison to prolong the siege; and we must add that Marshal Marmont himself, in proposing to succour the place in twenty days, had not sufficiently considered the accidents which so frequently disappoint the most careful calculations. Nevertheless, although of a

character naturally very generous, Marshal Marmont permitted himself to declare that General Barrié was a miserable fellow who had not known how to defend the post committed to his care.

The despair of the generals of the north and of Portugal on learning the result of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo may easily be conceived, for Old Castille was now unprotected, and our line of communication was exposed to the attempts of a solid army, which we had never yet really defeated, and which now began to lay aside its usual circumspection.

Marshal Marmont, who was excessively vigilant in everything which directly concerned himself, perceived the danger of his position, and seeing that Ciudad Rodrigo was lost, was eager to supply its place by defensive works at Salamanca, which had become the capital of his government, and which was to be at a later period the scene of a bloody battle. He displayed much activity and intelligence in the plan of these works, making use of three large convents situated around Salamanca to supply the place of regular fortifications, which this city was without, and established there a sort of entrenched camp which a resolute troop would be able to defend for a considerable time. He also bestowed great pains on the establishment of magazines and hospitals.

The troops of General Montbrun had at length returned, but Marshal Marmont, although having now at his disposal seven fine infantry divisions and two of cavalry, could by no means regard with tranquillity the task before him. His infantry numbered about 44,000 men, and as at least 10,000 were necessary to guard the bridge of Almaraz on the Tagus, the Cols de Banols and de Péralès on the Guadarrama, Zamora on the Douro, Leon and Astorga towards the Asturias, he was able to march at the head of only 34,000 infantry, and his whole army, including the cavalry and artillery, numbered about 40,000 combatants; whilst the English army numbered about 60,000, of whom half were English and half Portuguese. It would not have been prudent to have attempted to meet such an army as the latter even with 50,000 men, and most assuredly not if they had not been all at hand, well clothed, well armed, well fed, and if they had been detached upon a number of accessory services, which were indispensable in a country of which the population was entirely hostile. As for the reinforcement of 4000 men drawn from the army of the centre, Marshal Marmont regarded it, with reason, as a chimera, in the situation in which Madrid was at that time. He could not reckon upon more than the 12,000 men of General Caffarelli, who had replaced General Dorsenne, and who had found in the state of the provinces of the north sufficiently plausible reasons to delay,

and even to refuse, his contingent. He could not, therefore, quietly await the dangers which might pour around him; and in the meantime there was another part of his task at which he was no less terrified, and which was the defence of Badajoz. A secret presentiment, which does much credit to his foresight, warned him that Lord Wellington would probably, after the surprise of Ciudad Rodrigo, proceed to surprise Badajoz, and he asked himself how he could quit Castille and leave it unguarded, for the purpose of flying to the defence of Badajoz, which was at least fifteen marches distant from Salamanca. In the midst of these perplexities he sent a confidential aide-de-camp to Paris to inform Napoleon of all these dangers, and to say that the only manner of preparing against them was, in his opinion, to unite under one command the armies of the north, of the centre, and of Portugal. Were he sure of always being obeyed, he said, he believed that, by a good distribution of his forces, and by always having fifty or sixty thousand troops at command, he might be in a state to resist the English; and although, he added, this would be a very considerable command to entrust to a person who, as was his own case, had neither performed such services nor gained such a reputation as could justify a pretence to it, nevertheless, what he proposed was far preferable to the divided state of command actually existing. In default of this concentration of command, Marshal Marmont demanded permission to serve elsewhere.

It was a great disadvantage to Napoleon, that distrustful by character and by long acquaintance with men, he permitted himself to fancy he perceived interested views even in the most judicious counsel. Napoleon loved Marshal Marmont, who had been one of his aides-de-camp, and whose amiable and brilliant qualities he thoroughly appreciated; but in consequence of long familiarity, and the habit of trusting him in an off-hand manner, he failed to attach sufficient importance to his advice, declaring that his head was turned with ambition, declaring that he was not capable of such a command, that to satisfy him Joseph would have to be deprived of the army of the centre, which was impossible, and that the marshal, besides, was interfering in matters which did not concern him, since Badajoz had not been entrusted to his care; that he had but to guard well the north of the Peninsula against the English; that it was for the army of Andalusia to defend Badajoz, and that it would be perfectly sufficient to defend it, provided the English should attack this place with two divisions, namely, with Hill's division reinforced, but that if they attacked it with five, which would be, in fact, with almost their whole army, led by Lord Wellington, that the army of Portugal should then throw itself upon Coimbra, or even march upon Thomar, and that in that

case Lord Wellington would be obliged to retrace his steps and to abandon the siege of Badajoz; that it was absolutely necessary to pursue this manner of manœuvring, and that if it became a matter of urgent need to succour the army of Andalusia, it should be by advancing by the Beira and the left of the Tagus as far as Coimbra or Thomar, being always careful to cover our line of communications with the Pyrenees.

These views were just, as were all those of Napoleon with regard to matters of war; but although generally so, it was by no means impossible that in particular cases they might lose their justness, and even become a source of ruin. If Badajoz, for example, instead of being placed in a state of defence, which would enable it to hold out for twelve months, should scarcely be in a position to maintain a siege during one, the diversion directed to be made on the Tagus, although very specious, would be no decisive reason to induce Lord Wellington to raise a siege which was on the point of being crowned with success. Moreover, it would be necessary that the march upon the Tagus should be attempted with sufficient forces, and for this purpose it would also be necessary that the armies of the north and of Portugal, at least, should be placed under a single head. But this, unfortunately, was what Napoleon was unwilling to admit.

The secret presentiment of Marshal Marmont with respect to the projects of Lord Wellington was but too well founded; for the latter, encouraged by the rapid conquest of Ciudad Rodrigo, and feeling each day more persuaded that the French armies by their isolated movements would leave him time to execute short and unexpected sieges, had made every preparation on the day succeeding that on which Ciudad Rodrigo was captured, to make a furious attempt on Badajoz, with immense supplies of whatever was necessary to a great siege, and with a prodigal expenditure of human blood. He had already, with this purpose, transported a vast matériel from Abrantès to Elvas, and marched successively all his divisions upon the Alentejo, taking care to remain in person upon the Coa, in order that his design might not be suspected; and in this object he perfectly succeeded.

The garrison of Badajoz had not ceased to besiege Marshal Soult with cries of alarm, and to demand aid at his hands. But Marshal Soult, thinking that what had occurred once would occur again, and failing to take into account the altered state of affairs, believed that Badajoz, which had already resisted a siege of two months, would certainly be able to resist the enemy now during one, especially since its defences had been perfected; and as time would thus be allowed both for himself and Marshal Marmont to advance to its aid, there was no occasion to be anxious respecting this threat of a new siege.

He should have considered that it is most unwise to rely on succour expected from a distance; that although the English had conducted the first siege very badly, they might conduct the second much better and with greater means at their disposal, and that it was necessary, therefore, to place this fortress in a perfect state of defence. A garrison of five thousand men, which number was reduced to four thousand at the moment of investment by the enemy, was completely insufficient. Ten thousand men, with provisions and munitions in proportion, were necessary to resist the attack of the English army; and it would have been much better to have raised the garrison of Badajoz to this strength than to have left in Estramadura the corps of General Drouet, which could do nothing else than fall back before the first appearance of the English; for had the garrison consisted of ten thousand men and some cavalry, it would have been able to overrun a great extent of surrounding country, and have served as a corps of observation for Estramadura better than the corps of General Drouet, would have been almost invincible in the case of a siege, and been able to provide itself both with forage and provisions. At the end of February, a month after the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, when it had become evident that the enemy projected a new siege, the fortress had no more than two months' provisions, with a supply of powder by no means sufficient for the purposes of a long siege, and was completely without the wood necessary for palisades and blindages. The defences of the place, indeed, had been improved on the right as on the left. On the right bank the breaches of Fort St. Christoval had been repaired, the scarps raised, and the fosses deepened in the live rock. On the left bank the castle had been placed in a state of defence, the foot of the lunette of Picurina, which covered it, had been perfected, the flood of the Rivillas considerably increased by means of a strong retention of the waters, and finally, the Fort of Pardaleras entirely closed at the gorge. The fronts on the south-west had always been the most exposed part; but mines had been formed under these fronts, in order to keep off the enemy. Wood, unfortunately, had been wanting for palisading the fosses, and the construction of blinds; but the heroism of the garrison enabled it to dispense with these, and to maintain their ground when exposed to the bombs and howitzers.

Such was the state of affairs when the English appeared under its walls on the 16th of March 1812, numbering at least 50,000 men, and provided with an immense matériel. As they were no more skilful in the art of sieges now than they had been at the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, they resolved to push forward the approaches just sufficient to render possible the establishment of the breaching batteries, and to enable them to take advantage

of this numerical superiority to make two or three simultaneous assaults, which would be a costly but most probably effectual means of overwhelming the garrison, which, despite its bravery, would not be sufficiently numerous to resist them.

The investment of the fortress having been immediately completed, the English, without loss of time, made choice of the point of attack. Disgusted by their misadventures in their previous attempts against the Fort St. Christoval, they directed their efforts on the left bank of the Guadiana, and consequently against the fortress itself. The attack on the side of the southwest, although presenting greater facilities, was still neglected, and this time from fear of the mines constructed in this quarter. The English advanced to the east towards the castle, and towards the fronts contiguous to the Trinidad gate, in spite of the flood of the Rivillas and the lunette de Picurina. On the 17th, on the day succeeding the investment of the fortress, they opened the trenches in front of the Picurina lunette, an unfinished work, of but slight relief, closed at the gorge by a simple palisade, and easily capable of being taken by assault, and the capture of which would render easy the erection of a battery with which to breach the fronts against which was to be directed the new attack. On the 19th the besieged desired to employ a means of defence which is both usual and efficacious in cases in which the garrison is brave and resolute, namely, a sortie, by which the works of the besiegers might be destroyed, the progress of the trenches delayed, and consequently the progress of the siege also. A sortie was accordingly executed by our troops with great vigour, driving the English from their trenches, and enabling us to destroy a portion of the trenches themselves; but our troops, in place of retreating without false pride when their end had been attained, persisted in disputing the ground with the enemy, and had twenty killed and a hundred and sixty wounded. The English loss amounted to three hundred men, but this number was of little importance to an army of fifty thousand, whilst the loss on our side was of great injury to the besieged, who only amounted to four thousand. The garrison renounced, therefore, this means of prolonging the defence, which is efficacious only when a garrison is numerous.

The works having been pushed on with extreme activity, on the 25th of March the English were able to effect a breach in the Picurina lunette, to demolish its saillant, and break down the sides; and in the evening they attacked it with three strong columns supported by reserves. The lunette was only defended by two hundred soldiers selected from all the regiments; and no more troops, in the existing state of the garrison, could have been devoted to this purpose. The three columns having thrown themselves into the fosse (for the English persisted in

their system of not pushing the approaches as far as the brinks of the fosse itself), one of them rushed behind the work, and attempted to tear away the palisades, so as to be able to enter the gorge, but recoiled before a very vigorous fire; and the second, having at the same time attempted to enter the breach, had been in like manner driven back; but the third, planting ladders against the least protected portion of the wall, reached the parapet at the very moment when the second column, returning from the check, escaladed the half-demolished saillant. The little garrison having to resist two simultaneous attacks was insufficient for its task, and was compelled to lay down its arms, having lost eighty-three men in killed or wounded, whilst eighty-six were made prisoners. The loss on the side of the English was about three hundred.

Our artillery immediately opened a furious fire on the victors in possession of the Picurina lunette, and rendered the occupation of it very dangerous; and it was only by the sacrifice of many of the soldiers that they were able to effect a lodgment in the conquered work, and establish breaching batteries against the two opposite bastions. From this time they abandoned almost all their other batteries, the position of which had been very ill selected, and devoted themselves exclusively to the new ones.

In the meantime the French artillery, admirably served, made them pay dear for this rash manner of proceeding; but as powder soon began to fail, the garrison supplied the place of the fire of artillery with the fire of musketry, and the best marksmen of each regiment directed their fire against the English artillerymen. If the garrison had had sufficient powder, and had been sufficiently numerous, a furious cannonade might have been accompanied by a vigorous sortie against the enemy's position in the gorge of the Picurina lunette, and would probably have deprived the besiegers of all the advantages they had obtained, and driven them back to the position they occupied at the commencement of the siege. The execution of such a sortie, however, would have required eleven or twelve hundred men, and the probable sacrifice of three or four hundred; and it was far better that the garrison should reserve both itself and the powder it still possessed for the decisive day of assault.

This moment was not long to be delayed; so rapid was the progress made by the besiegers, and so incapable were the besieged of resisting it. The garrison, however, had already gained fifteen days, by the sacrifice, it is true, of seven hundred men out of four thousand, whilst the enemy had still failed to effect breaches in the two bastions by which they had determined to enter. On the 31st they had established various batteries containing twenty cannon of heavy calibre against

the two bastions they were attempting to demolish. They prolonged their trenches to the right and left, with the object of raising many other batteries which should reply to the artillery of the fortress, enfilade its defences, and increase the number of the breaches to three. Within a very short space of time there were fifty-two pieces of great calibre in position, from which was opened a terrific cannonade, to which the garrison, which had reserved its munition until the last moment, replied by a fire which was no less vigorous, and which succeeded in dismounting many of the enemy's pieces; but the English, possessing a superabundance of matériel, and displaying great courage, replaced their dismounted cannon under a storm of projectiles; and our own artillerymen, who suffered themselves not to be surpassed or even equalled, in like manner maintained their ground in their ruined embrasures, and redoubled their exertions in the midst of flying shot and shell. The courage of the garrison had reached that pitch when danger is no more thought of, and they had sworn to a man to die rather than surrender, or go to die on the pontoons in which the English, to the disgrace of civilisation, caused their prisoners to perish. The most unfortunate persons in the midst of this terrible struggle were the inhabitants, a considerable number of whom, of the poorer classes, remained in the town. The garrison had had the humanity to afford them a sparing subsistence from its own stores; but not having the means of constructing casemates or blindages for itself, it could not protect these poor persons from the storm of shells in which it boldly lived itself. Terrible lamentations, therefore, filled this desolated town, and wrung the hearts of our soldiers, who, insensible to their own perils, were full of compassion for the unfortunate creatures whom during fifteen months they had been accustomed to regard as their compatriots.

At length the decisive moment drew near. Three large breaches were effected in the attacked bastions, and the besiegers, having contrived to diminish the volume of the flood by destroying a portion of the banks by which it was retained, rendered these breaches accessible, without, however, taking the precaution, the neglect of which was to cost them dear, of throwing down the counterscarp, in conformity with the ordinary rules of military engineering.

Lord Wellington did the garrison the honour of not summoning it to surrender, for he knew that every proposal with respect to capitulation would be useless. The governor, in fact, having assembled the chief officers in council, it had been decided unanimously and amidst the acclamations of the troops, that they should await the assault, and rather perish sword in hand than surrender; and the garrison immediately employed

all the means which the greatest skill could suggest for the defence of the breaches against a resolute enemy. The able and intrepid chief of the engineers planned and traced out the necessary works, and the soldiers executed them with enthusiasm. Whilst half of them guarded the ramparts, the other half, working in the fosse, cleared the foot of the breaches, which was a perilous undertaking, but possible since the enemy had not taken possession of the brink of the fosse. Many fell before the enemy's howitzers and grenades, but others continued to remove the heaps caused by the ruins. Unhappily the English artillery, still pursuing its work of demolition, speedily re-established these mounds. The most effectual work executed by the garrison was on the rampart itself, where a second entrenchment was constructed behind the breaches, chevaux de frise planted in front, barrels filled with explosive matter placed on the sides, and the streets barricaded which led to the point of attack. A last and formidable means of defence was prepared. The enemy persisting in not pushing the approaches up to the brink of the fosse, and not having thrown down the counterscarp (which is the wall of the fosse opposite the fortress), our troops were able to work at its foot. The commander of engineers, Lamare, placed there a long chain of bombs and barrels charged with explosive and destructive matter, connected by a chain of powder, to which it was planned that the brave officer of the engineers, Mailhet, lying in ambush in the fosse, should set fire at the moment of the assault.

These arrangements having thus been made, select troops were posted at the summit of the breaches with three muskets a man, cannon loaded with grape were placed at the sides, whilst a reserve, which was as strong as circumstances permitted, awaited the orders of the governor at the principal spot in the town. Lord Wellington had made every preparation for attempting the assault on the evening of the 6th of April, the twenty-first day since his arrival before Badajoz; and had resolved to make it with such an enormous force that success would be almost certain.

On the 6th of April, therefore, about nine o'clock in the evening, the artillery of the besiegers vomited forth upon the fortress floods of destructive fire. Two divisions under General Coleville rushed directly towards the breaches, whilst Picton's division, furnished with ladders, proceeded to the right to attempt to escalate the castle at a point at which its weakness had been observed, and Leith's division turned to the left for the purpose of attempting another escalate at the extremity of the south-west, which the English had hitherto neglected. The two divisions commanded by General Coleville arrived at

the brink of the fosse, leaped in, and immediately rushed upon the breaches. A great shout from our soldiers announced their appearance, and they were permitted to advance until they had begun to climb the ruins, when the fire of musketry received them in front, whilst the grape-shot took them in flank, and they were hurled down headlong from the breach; and whilst the rear of the columns attempted to support the first ranks, Mailhet, descending into the fosse, in the midst of this frightful tumult, match in hand, at precisely the right moment, fired the long chain of bombs and barrels arranged along the foot of the counterscarp. Instantly there commenced on the rear of the assaulting columns, and in the path of those who supported them, a series of terrible explosions, which moment after moment hurled forth storms of destructive missiles and fatal fire. Moment after moment this murderous fire burst through the gloom, to be succeeded by the night, and again to burst forth, illumining death in a thousand different forms. Unhappily the intrepid Mailhet was himself struck by the explosion of a shell. At length the two English divisions which had been thrown on the three breaches, notwithstanding their bravery, yielded to the fury of the resistance, losing their forward impulse under the incessant hail of musketry and grape-shot hurled against them. Already almost 3000 English had fallen, and Lord Wellington was about to order a retreat when circumstances in another direction changed the whole course of affairs. On the right of the attack General Picton had, with rare intrepidity, planted ladders against the sides of the castle, and the Hessians, who were charged with the defence in this quarter, either from surprise or treachery, permitted the precious entrenchment which had been confided to their courage and their loyalty to be invaded by the enemy, and an English officer, rushing to the gates which led to the town, hastened to close them, and thus render the position of the English in the castle secure before the French should have time to arrive. The governor Phillippon, who had been frequently deceived by false cries of alarm, and who kept his reserve for some moment of extreme danger, refused at first to believe the news of this entrance of the enemy into the castle; but convinced, too late, of the reality of the fact, he decided to despatch thither 400 men; and these, received at the first gate with a murderous fire, proceeded to the second to find their efforts there equally vain. In the excessive desire on our side to obtain admittance into the castle and expel the English, it was determined to detach from the south-west walls, which had hitherto been neglected by the enemy, and now appeared but little threatened, a portion of the forces which defended them, for the purpose of assisting in the recapture of the castle. This was done, and

Leith's division, which had planned an escalade on this side, finding the rampart abandoned, were able by the aid of a multitude of ladders to reach the top of the wall, which was here but of little height; and the entrance had no sooner been effected than the troops of this division ran along the rampart to take *à revers* the French troops which had hitherto victoriously defended the breaches. Seeing this, the guard which defended the nearest front rushed upon the English with the bayonet, and stopped them. But the latter, returning immediately to the charge with overwhelming numbers, regained the advantage, and spread themselves over the town. From this moment indescribable confusion arose in the ranks of the heroic garrison which defended the other portions of Badajoz; and the defenders of the breaches, taken *à revers*, were compelled either to surrender or to fly. The governor, the chief of the engineers, and the staff, after having made every possible exertion, attempted, by running to the bridge of the Guadiana, to withdraw with some remnants of the garrison into the Fort St. Christoval, for the purpose of there defending themselves, but they were either killed or taken in their attempt.

On the following day they were conducted to the presence of Lord Wellington, who received them with all courtesy, but refused to listen to their entreaties in favour of the unhappy town of Badajoz. It certainly was not our duty to intercede for these Spaniards, or that of the English to punish them for our resistance; but Lord Wellington, after having politely received our officers, gave up, without pity, the town of Badajoz to pillage, as the just right of troops which had gone so valiantly to the assault.

The siege of Badajoz cost us about 1500 in killed or wounded, and 3000 prisoners, but it cost Lord Wellington more than 6000 men placed hors de combat, which was a greater number than he had lost in any of his battles. Nevertheless his end was not the less attained. Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz had been snatched from us, Portugal was closed against us, and thenceforth Spain lay open to the English.

Marshal Soult, on learning the peril of Badajoz, which had been frequently intimated to him, had tardily quitted the lines of Cadiz, and had at length set out to the succour of the besieged place, at the head of 24,000 men, which were all the active troops of which he could avail himself, whilst continuing to guard Grenada and Seville, and he hastened to Llerena in the hope of finding there, as in the preceding summer, Marshal Marmont with 30,000 men. A vain hope, for Marshal Marmont was not there; and the news of the capture of Badajoz threw Marshal Soult into the greatest consternation, for the sole trophy of his Andalusian campaign had thus escaped him, and

should Lord Wellington choose to carry forward his operations by Estramadura and Andalusia, all the routes were open before him.

In the meantime Marshal Marmont had not remained idle. Bound to remain in Old Castille by Napoleon's formal orders, he had recourse, on learning the extreme danger of Badajoz, to the manœuvre which had been prescribed to him. He had passed the Agueda with five divisions, dispersed the guerilla bands which infested the country, driven back the detachments of English troops which guarded the frontier of Portugal, and then had paused from the fear of a failure of provisions, and the conviction also that what he did was perfectly useless. His manœuvre, however, was not altogether without effect, for the news of it induced Lord Wellington, who might have been tempted to attack Marshal Soult, whose troops he knew to be only 24,000 men, to suspend his march, and resume the route of the north of Portugal.

Napoleon, on hearing of the capture by the enemy of these two places which had cost the French so much blood and so much exertion to obtain, and which had been the chief obstacles in the path of the English either to the north or to the south, was as much grieved as irritated, and attributed this misfortune to every one by turns; to Marshal Soult, who, he said, at the head of 80,000 men had done nothing at all; to Marshal Marmont, who had not known how, he complained, to modify orders issued to him at the distance of three hundred leagues. These reproaches were, however, scarcely just. Marshal Soult had scarcely at that moment more than 50,000 men at his disposal, and could not have made any serious opposition to the proceedings of the English but by the sacrifice of Grenada. His real mistake had been the leaving the corps of General Drouet in Estramadura, where it was perfectly useless, and of not having supplied Badajoz with 10,000 men, cavalry, and sufficient powder and provisions. Badajoz would thus have been able to hold out during many months, and time would have been afforded for its relief. As for Marshal Marmont, the order he received directing him to remain in Old Castille, not to descend into Estramadura, and not to advance to the succour of Badajoz except by a diversion in the province of Beira, was so precise, that no general, however bold, could have ventured to disregard it.

The position which this marshal had originally taken, that of Almaraz on the Tagus, was the only suitable one, the only one which would have enabled him to advance by turns to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz. If, in fact, he had received reinforcements of 20,000 men, whom he might have posted at Salamanca, he would have been able to march upon

Badajoz with the 30,000 he had upon the Tagus, and in union with the army of Andalusia would have been able to meet Lord Wellington with 55,000 men, and have raised the siege of Badajoz. If, on the other hand, the point of danger had been in the north, he might have repassed the Guadarrama, and finding there the 20,000 men posted at Salamanca, would even in this case have at his command 50,000 men, with whom he might have checked all Lord Wellington's efforts. By refusing him a reinforcement of 20,000 men, and fixing him in Old Castille, Napoleon had rendered the fall of Badajoz almost inevitable. Certainly the idea of a diversion directed from Salamanca upon Beira was a just one, as any idea of Napoleon's with respect to war naturally would be, and it was proved so by its result, since it drew Lord Wellington to the north of Portugal the day after the capture of Badajoz. But unhappily it had drawn him away the day after instead of the day before its capture. The plan in itself was a very good one; but a general kind of fitness is not sufficient in practice, for without the most rigorous precision in the calculation of distances, time, and forces, the best plans must fail or even become sources of misfortune. Doubtless if Badajoz had contained a garrison of 10,000 men, and powder and provisions in sufficient quantity; and if the Duke de Ragusa had had 50,000 men, and more magazines always well provisioned, and had marched under these conditions upon Coimbra, Lord Wellington would infallibly a second time have relaxed his hold, and abandoned the siege of Badajoz. But Badajoz having no means of making a protracted defence, and the Duke de Ragusa being unable with the means at his disposal to do anything but make an empty menace, it was impossible by a simple demonstration upon the Beira to turn from his purpose so skilful and determined a man as Lord Wellington.

Thus in 1811 as in 1810 all our combinations in Spain had miscarried, and all the reinforcements sent thither been unavailing. Before entering upon the detail of the still sadder events which were about to happen to us in the Peninsula, let us retrace the course which affairs had taken there during the last two years. We have already seen in the fortieth book of this history how unfortunate had been the issue of 1810; how at this period Napoleon, who had wisely determined to employ all the available forces in Spain in the decision of the European question which he had carried thither, and to direct his chief efforts against the English, had permitted himself to be diverted from his plan by the persuasions of Joseph and Marshal Soult, and had consented to the fatal Andalusian expedition, which had caused the dispersion of forty-four thousand of the most veteran troops then in the Peninsula; we have seen how Massena,

sent to Lisbon with seventy thousand men, soon reduced to fifty thousand by local circumstances, had found in front of Torres Vedras an insurmountable obstacle, which, nevertheless, he might have been able to overcome had he been reinforced with twenty-five thousand men from Andalusia, and an equal number from Castille; how Marshal Soult had neither been able nor willing to aid him; how General Drouet had been equally unable; how Napoleon, engaging with disastrous facility in new designs, had refused him the fifty thousand men which would have been sufficient; and how, finally, this campaign, which should have struck the English a mortal blow, had only resulted in misfortunes to ourselves, and uselessly consumed the hundred and fifty thousand men who had been sent to the Peninsula after the peace of Vienna. These sad particulars are doubtless present to the memories of the readers of this history; and we have had to show in the present book that the results of the campaign of 1811 were no less unfortunate.

Since the middle of 1811 Napoleon had resolved to carry his arms, under his own command, to the north, that is to say, Russia; he should have confined himself in the meantime to an imposing defensive position in Spain; and had Marshal Suchet been left in Aragon or Catalonia, without reinforcements, but at the same time without the necessity of entering upon new tasks, this marshal, especially after the capture of Tarragona, would have remained in peaceable and undisturbed possession of these provinces; had Marshal Soult been left at Seville, and Marshal Marmont on the Tagus, unburdened by the necessity of sending troops to Valencia, but ordered to hasten at the first signs of danger to the relief of Badajoz, as they already had, with so much success; and had Marshal Marmont been permitted to unite with his own troops the army of the north, receiving also the largest portion of the reserve, it is probable that the efforts of the English against Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo might long have been baffled, and Lord Wellington reduced during a whole year to a state of inaction which would very much have injured him in the public opinion of his country. But unwilling to renounce anything, engaged in preparations for his gigantic expedition against Russia, desiring to carry forward matters energetically in Spain, flattering himself that they would be much advanced during the autumn and winter of 1811, Napoleon renewed, by his orders directing the expedition of Valencia, the fault which he had committed in permitting the expedition of Andalusia; condemned Marshal Soult to extend his operations without having received reinforcements, and whilst he concentrated all his available forces towards him for a moment, left Lord Wellington at liberty to seize Ciudad Rodrigo, close the Beira against us, and open Castille to himself.

Marshal Marmont had hastened to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, but having to collect his widely scattered forces, had arrived too late, and this sole trophy of the campaign of Portugal was snatched from us. Badajoz still remained to us, also the sole trophy of the campaign of Andalusia; and we were to lose it by the same cause. Napoleon compelled, sooner than he had at first supposed, to recall from Spain his guard, the Poles, the dragoons, and the fourth battalions, and marching all to the north of the Peninsula, with the object of subsequently marching them to the north of Europe, had drawn Marshal Marmont from the Tagus to the Douro, and posted him there, thus exposing Badajoz, which Lord Wellington, always on the alert, had seized as he had seized Ciudad Rodrigo, taking advantage of the void left in front of this fortress by our erroneous movements. For the purpose, therefore, of capturing Valencia, we had lost Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo, the sole fruits of two difficult campaigns, the sole serious obstacle in the way of an offensive march on the part of the English. Such was, and could not but be, the result of this method of giving orders from a distance, of giving orders whilst the mind was engaged on other matters, and of devoting to each object only half the resources and the attention it demanded.

The commission of these faults left our affairs in Spain in the following state. General Suchet remained at Valencia with a force just sufficient to keep the country in subjection, but far too small to render practicable any operations at the least distance; Marshal Soult was in the midst of Andalusia, with a force insufficient for the capture of Cadiz, and insufficient to engage the English, should they, after the capture of Badajoz, march against him, which was, however, very improbable; finally, Marshal Marmont, in the north, where the English desired to strike the decisive blow, either on Madrid, or on the line of communication of the French armies, deprived of Ciudad Rodrigo, would have been able, provided Joseph and General Caffarelli had reinforced him *à propos*, to have assembled 40,000 men with which to engage Lord Wellington at the head of 60,000. This then was the state of affairs in Spain after there had been sent thither reinforcements to the amount of 150,000 men in 1810, and 40,000 good troops and 20,000 conscripts in 1811, in addition to more than 400,000 troops which had entered the Peninsula from 1808 to 1810! Of these 600,000 men there did not now survive the half; and of these only 170,000 were in a state fit for active service; and finally, we must add, that of these 170,000 only 40,000 could, by being well manœuvred, be rendered capable of covering Madrid and Valladolid, or in other words, the capital and our line of communications!

Napoleon, at the moment of his departure from Paris, having learned by experience the difficulty of commanding from a distance, adopted the plan of bestowing upon Joseph the command of all the armies serving in Spain, without prescribing to him, however, the sole plan of action which might yet have saved everything, and which was that of leaving Marshal Suchet at Valencia, since he was there, at the same time throwing back the army of Andalusia upon the Tagus, uniting it there under a sole command with the army of Portugal, and establishing these two armies, which together would have formed a compact force of 80,000 men, in a well chosen position, from which they could, at the first signs of danger, have advanced upon Madrid or Valladolid, following the line of march adopted by the English. But Napoleon contented himself with ordering all his generals to obey Joseph's commands, without considering how Marshal Suchet, who was in the habit of governing alone, how Marshal Soult, who was resolved to reign exclusively in Andalusia, and how Marshal Marmont, who had not ceased to be at variance with the court of Madrid, on account of the interests of the army of Portugal, might be able or would be willing to submit to the exercise of this authority by Joseph, who had been so long slighted and sneered at by Napoleon himself. Marshal Jourdan, who was appointed chief of Joseph's staff, composed with respect to the state of affairs a memoir which was full of good sense and sound argument, pointing out all the inconveniences we have just alluded to, and it was sent to Paris. Before we narrate how it was answered by Napoleon, and which is a far more serious matter, by events themselves, we must again turn our attention to the affairs of the north, to that other abyss into which Napoleon, constrained by his evil genius, was about to plunge his own destinies, and unfortunately, those of France at the same time.

BOOK XLIII.

PASSAGE OF THE NIEMEN.

NAPOLEON and Alexander had remained since the month of November last in a posture of defence, presenting to each other a menacing aspect, the latter not desirous of war, indeed, terrified at its risks, yet resolved to hazard them rather than sacrifice the dignity or the commercial prosperity of his people, and meantime neglecting nothing which might terminate the Turkish quarrel, whether by arms or diplomacy; the former, on the contrary, without eagerness for the conflict, nay, decided in his measures much more by ambition than taste for danger, and making his preparations with an emulous energy proceeding from an immovable conviction of its necessity sooner or later, should he require from Russia the same absolute submission which Prussia and Austria paid him. While affairs stood thus, now that all that could be said had been said on the occupation of Oldenburg, the admission of neutrals into Russian ports, the origin of the mutually defiant armaments of France and Russia, and that all fresh negotiations concerning topics so monotonous were become impossible, there was nothing left but silence and action. Now it was one corps which had to be organised, now another; this to be moved towards the Dwina or the Dnieper, that towards the Oder or the Vistula. But things could not go on thus without the certainty that the two opponents must soon find themselves face to face, hand to hand, and ready for mutual slaughter. All men of sense and right-mindedness in Russia, France, and Europe generally, some on the common grounds of reason and humanity, others on the more special yet generous motives of patriotism, felt with pain that the issue of a persistence for some days longer in this silence and activity must be a deluge of blood from the Rhine to the Volga. The most active champion of these noble sentiments, M. de Lauriston, forced himself to write to Paris to the purport that there was no wish for hostilities at St. Petersburg, that, on the contrary, it was opposed to their sympathies, but that if begun, it would be waged with fearful resolvedness; still should France consent to humour slightly the Russian sensitiveness, make some concessions in favour of the

Prince of Oldenburg, and be contented with measures a little more rigorous against the English flag, it at least might assure the preservation of peace for itself, however matters might turn out in the rest of Europe. By means of insisting he had drawn from Napoleon some expressions, such as, "Lauriston permits himself to be overreached," outbreaks to which M. de Bassano added despatches full of arrogance and blindness.

Distressed at not being listened to at Paris, M. de Lauriston insisted upon being so at St. Petersburg, taking pains to point out the difficulty and danger of a fresh struggle with Napoleon; and demanded, with the dignity of honest conviction, that instructions should instantly be sent to Prince Kourakin to obtain an explanation on all the disputed points, for, he declared incessantly, none of the points on which the two powers appeared to be at variance were worth a war. The cabinets of Vienna and Berlin adopted the same course, the one in good faith, the other from motives of prudence. Prussia saw in a European conflagration, in which she would be forced to take part, new dangers for herself, and her prudent king, Frederick William, was not one of those who, when in a state of misfortune, think it necessary to take active proceedings at the risk of bringing on themselves still greater misfortunes. Moreover, the obligation which Prussia would be under of declaring herself in favour of Napoleon should war be declared, was very repugnant to Germanic sentiment, which, although repressed, nevertheless existed in perfect sincerity. Frederick William, therefore, was ardently desirous of peace, and transmitted to St. Petersburg urgent entreaties, and had even proposed the intervention of his good offices, with a view to the maintenance of peace between France and Russia; all these exertions, however, had been received with disdain by the latter, which was indignant that Prussia was not her ally. Austria, although she hoped that a fresh struggle between France and Russia would furnish her with opportunities of reinstating her fortunes at the expense of the one or the other of them, was nevertheless no less terrified at the idea of a war between these powers, especially as she perceived the necessity of being the ally of France, and was urgent, therefore, in her advocacy of peace at St. Petersburg, and offered her intervention, which was rejected as disdainfully as had been the same offer by Prussia. At length Russia, who was importuned with entreaties which seemed to imply that the maintenance of peace depended on her, replied to the ministers of the two powers: "Advise others to maintain peace, since you seem so desirous of it. Advise those to maintain it who now wish for war, and compel me in my own despite to prepare for it."

As it was so repeatedly urged that some attempt at explana-

tion ought to be made before the sword was finally drawn, and that Prince Kourakin was not calculated to appease the quarrel, the government at St. Petersburg had at length turned its eyes towards a man who was well fitted to re-establish a good understanding between the disputing powers, if it were possible. This was M. de Nesselrode, principal secretary to the legation at Paris, very young, but very distinguished, talented, far-sighted, and judicious, possessing the confidence of the Emperor Alexander, and treated with much more serious consideration by the Emperor Napoleon than Prince Kourakin himself. He had been heard to say, since his return to Paris, that if it were really desired, all could be arranged; that Napoleon was not so passionately fond of war as had been supposed; and that by treating him in an open, straightforward manner, an honourable arrangement could easily be obtained. The government at St. Petersburg was very much inclined, therefore, to send him to Paris with instructions and powers to arrange all the questions recently raised, and which had been envenomed rather by what had not been than by what had been said. M. de Nesselrode showed that he felt exceedingly flattered at being entrusted by such a mission at his early age, and made every preparation for securing its success. Unfortunately, however, that which so much flattered him, inspired M. de Romanzoff with the utmost jealousy, and although the latter was extremely interested in preventing the war, he took umbrage at the progress made by the young diplomatist, and the confidence which Alexander appeared to repose in him. He made, therefore, certain objections to this mission, although he was ready to make many sacrifices for the purpose of maintaining peace and an alliance with France. One of these objections, and it was especially calculated to touch Russian susceptibility, was, that to send an envoy to Paris with a special mission to negotiate a peace, would have the appearance of imploring it, especially when the senders were not the authors of the measures which had provoked the war.

However, an event which had lately happened in Turkey to the advantage of the Russians, afforded them an opportunity which they resolved to seize, of sending M. de Nesselrode to Paris without showing any appearance of timidity. General Kutusof, who was at this time charged with the direction of the war, had taken advantage of the negligence of the Turks, who, after the capture of Rutschuk, had remained inactive, for by drawing them to Nicopolis, by feigning an intention to pass the Danube, since he had crossed it near Rutschuk, he had surprised the vizier's camp, dispersed a portion of his troops, and held the remainder strictly blockaded in an isle of the stream. This success, which appeared calculated to compel the Porte to treat for peace, had

caused great rejoicings in St. Petersburg, whither the news had arrived in November 1811. General Kutusof had been immediately authorised to open a negotiation for peace, ceasing to propose some of the conditions on which Russia had formerly insisted. Thus, the surrender of the Danubian provinces, which were Bessarabia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, was no longer to be demanded, but only that of Bessarabia and Moldavia, and this last as far as the Sereth ; in addition to a species of independence for Servia, a small territory on the coast of the Caucasus, at the mouth of the Phase, and a sum of twenty millions of piastres towards the payment of the expenses of the war. Negotiations were opened on these bases at Giurgevo, and an armistice of several months agreed on ; and every moment it was hoped at St. Petersburg that a courier would arrive bringing tidings of the conclusion of a peace.

These results, although less brilliant than those which Alexander had dreamed of obtaining, since he had flattered himself that, besides Finland, he might be able to add to his empire at one stroke Bessarabia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, were sufficiently advantageous, and the acquisition of Finland and Bessarabia alone would throw considerable lustre on the commencement of a reign which would probably last a considerable time longer. But Alexander's chief reason for rejoicing in these results was, that they enabled him to send M. de Nesselrode to Paris without showing any signs of timidity. All his troops being set at liberty by the conclusion of the war on the Danube, he would appear as much to give peace as to receive it.

Instructions, therefore, were prepared for M. de Nesselrode ; Alexander taking the trouble to draw them up himself, and authorising M. de Lauriston to announce the speedy departure of the new plenipotentiary. M. de Nesselrode was advanced a step in diplomatic rank, that he might present himself before Napoleon clothed in all the signs of the imperial confidence. A last courier was impatiently awaited from the banks of the Danube, that M. de Nesselrode might be despatched at the moment when the conclusion of the war with Turkey should be known, that the new negotiations might be conducted on the side of Russia with the greater dignity and force.

The various courts of the continent, and more especially those of Austria and Prussia, were informed of these proceedings ; and M. de Lauriston sent an account of them to Paris, with the evident satisfaction of a good citizen, more delighted with having done what he considered right than what he was certain would meet with approval ; for it is very evident from his language that he was very doubtful respecting the manner in which his court would regard his efforts for the maintenance of peace.

Certain news of the departure of M. de Nesselrode did not

arrive in Paris until the middle of September, and then for various reasons very much disconcerted Napoleon. He had already received information of the reverses sustained by the Turks, who, he said, had behaved like brutes, and he regarded the conclusion of the war with Turkey as the commencement of the war with France; having always supposed, in fact, that the Russians only awaited this event to turn against him, and force him to choose, as, in fact, he had already done, between unacceptable conditions or war. The news of the mission of M. de Nesselrode no longer left him in any doubt; for he concluded from it that Russia considered the war in Turkey to be almost concluded, and hastened to take advantage of its conclusion to dictate conditions to France. There was something in this which greatly irritated him, and would have excited him to an outburst of passion, had he not conceived a vast plan which demanded the most profound dissimulation. He was anxious, in fact, whilst always protesting his desire for peace, and continually repeating that his armaments were simple measures of precaution, to arrive successively on the Oder and the Vistula, before the Russians should have crossed the Niemen, in order to preserve the immense stores of grain and forage which were in Poland and Old Prussia, and which the Russians would not fail to destroy if time were allowed them to do so, since they loudly boasted of being ready to make deserts of their provinces, as the English had made one of Portugal. It was on this account that Napoleon, after having made himself secure of Dantzic, took care at this moment to render himself secure of the navigation of the Frische-haff by negotiations with Prussia, in order to pass by water from Dantzic to Königsberg, and from Königsberg to Tilsit. It was from the Niemen only that he intended to make use of land transport, and flattering himself that he would be able to convey provisions for his army a distance of two hundred leagues, he believed that he would be able to advance sufficiently far to strike a blow at the very heart of Russia. The whole of this plan, however, would be baffled, should the Russians foresee it, and pouring down suddenly upon Old Prussia and Poland, devastate them, burning their granaries, and driving off the cattle. It was necessary, therefore, little by little, unperceived and without a decided rupture with the enemy, to reach the Vistula, and from thence the Pregel before the enemy; it was necessary also, and this was a moment of no less importance, to retard hostilities until the year 1812, for a necessary condition of the efficacy of the immense transport service which Napoleon had prepared, was the collection and maintenance of a great number of horses, and that it might not be necessary so to overburden them with provender for

themselves that they would be unable to convey provisions for the troops, it was necessary to defer the war until June, at which time, in the north, the earth is covered with food fit for cattle. Moreover, considering the extent of his preparations, although they had already occupied two years, Napoleon knew that two months were not to be despised, and that as the weapon of the Russians would be destruction, whilst his own would be the creation of resources, time would be of little aid to them, whilst it was indispensable to himself.

For these reasons, therefore, it was necessary that he should glide, as it were, as far as the Vistula, gaining not only ground but also time without provoking a rupture. For the purposes of such a design as this nothing could be more favourable than an indefinite species of quarrel in which there was a constant repetition of such vague complaints as—"You arm. . . . And you also. . . . But you began to arm first. . . . Nay, that is not truth, it was you. . . . We have no wish for war. . . . And we are equally averse to it." . . . and such declarations, which were apparently very insignificant, but were in reality well calculated on by him who occupied whole months with these purposeless reproaches, gaining by means of them December, January, and February, and hoping to be able, by their aid, to snatch the months still remaining up to June. As, therefore, a clear and categorical explanation must have put an end to a situation which was so favourable to Napoleon's designs, the arrival of M. de Nesselrode, by provoking this explanation, could not but be far from agreeable to him. Whatever skill he might employ, it was impossible that so keen-sighted a man as M. de Nesselrode could be prevented from forcing him to a complete explanation.

He formed the resolution, therefore, of giving immediately his final military orders, and at the same time of taking the most convenient method of preventing M. de Nesselrode from coming to Paris, whilst still carefully guarding against wounding the pride of Russia, or driving her to an immediate rupture. He saw Prince Kourakin very frequently; he knew, for the rumour of it had already spread over all Europe, that the mission of M. de Nesselrode would speedily take place, and he never alluded to it in conversation with the prince, which was a sufficiently plain manner of showing his disapproval of it. Nor did he stop here; for, conversing on the subject with the Prussian ambassador, who, as a matter of course, listened to his words and reported them to Berlin, whence the desire of aiding in the cause of peace would cause their speedy transmission to the court of St. Petersburg, without displaying any decided intention of not receiving M. de Nesselrode, he manifested considerable dissatisfaction on the subject, appear-

ing to disapprove of the *éclat* given to this species of extraordinary mission, which was, he declared, a means of exciting the amour-propre of the disputing powers, and to render them less inclined to make mutual concessions. To this indirect disapprobation of the mission of M. de Nesselrode he added, on an important occasion, a marked coldness towards the Russian legation itself. On the first day of the year, a day devoted to receptions, he scarcely addressed a word to Prince Kourakin, who, very attentive to little things, did not fail to remark it, and concluded that the mission of M. de Nesselrode was either too late or displeasing, and that there was no chance of its success. A matter of still graver import was the rumour of the orders given by Napoleon, and a rumour, however slight, always reaches the ear of an ambassador, however ill-informed. Napoleon had urged the exercise of the greatest discretion, but so many persons had to be confided in, and some of the matters to be executed were in themselves so difficult of concealment, that, although secrecy might be possible with respect to the public, it was not so with respect to a diplomatist who, moreover, paid well for the offices of treachery. In fact, M. de Czernicheff, aide-de-camp to the Emperor Alexander, who was frequently in Paris, had purchased the services of a clerk, who betrayed the most important secrets of the minister of war. By these various means, therefore, Prince Kourakin learned Napoleon's orders, and these orders could not leave him in doubt respecting the certainty of speedy hostilities.

In the first place, he had ordered M. de Cessac, who had become minister of war, to prepare the *senatus-consultum* for the levy of the conscription of 1812; a measure which was necessarily very significant, since the ranks, having already received the whole conscription of 1811, were sufficiently filled for an armament of simple precaution. In the next place, Napoleon had demanded of the German governments that they should furnish him with their complete contingents, and had demanded this not only of the chief of them, who were capable of keeping a secret, but even of the little princes, by whom it was certain to be speedily divulged. He had written in cipher to Marshals Soult and Suchet to send him immediately the regiments named *de la Vistula*; and had given orders for the immediate return of the young guard, which was cantoned in Castille, and of the dragoons.

Independently of these orders, Napoleon had marched upon the Rhine, not the detachments of the guard which were in Paris itself, which would have caused too great a sensation, but those which were stationed in the environs, such, for example, as the regiments of the Dutch guard. He urged on the purchases of horses, which had not, in his opinion, been executed

with sufficient rapidity, and set in motion battalions d'équipages of which the organisation was complete. Finally, he sent orders directing the movement of the army of Italy. This army, having to traverse Lombardy, the Tyrol, Bavaria, Saxony, to reach the line on the Vistula occupied by the army under Marshal Davout, had to commence its march a month earlier than the others to enable it to be equally advanced. However, as of all the measures which he had to take this would be the most striking, since he could not displace the army of Italy, and send it forth from its cantonments to overrun half Europe without taking a decided step in respect to the war, he was anxious to keep this matter perfectly secret, and communicated with Prince Eugène without the intervention of the public offices. He directed this prince to dispose of his divisions at Brescia, Verona, and Trieste for the middle of January, in order that they might be ready to march towards the end of the same month with all their matériel; and he demanded that they should be prepared to set out in January, although he did not expect that he would require them until February, because his great experience had taught him that a month was not too much to allow for inevitable delays. He had planned to send forward the Italian troops towards the end of February, and of not moving those of Marshal Davout until the course of March, but to throw them rapidly upon the Vistula should the news of the movement of the army of Italy draw the Russians to the Niemen. Otherwise, he proposed to push slowly his columns on the Vistula, so as to have them there by the middle of May, to carry from thence by the middle of May to the Pregel, and by the middle of June to the Niemen. By thus allowing three months for the movements from the Elbe to the Niemen, both men and horses would be able to arrive without being fatigued, and reach the theatre of war completely effective and well equipped.

Of all these measures the Russian legation was ignorant only of the departure of the army of Italy, with which Prince Eugène was alone acquainted, and the recall of the Polish troops of Spain, which had been made by sealed despatches to Marshals Soult and Suchet. It was acquainted, however, with all the others, and could not, therefore, retain any doubt respecting the commencement of the war in 1812. Prince Kourakin, in fact, had not retained any since the commencement of January, since the reserve, evidently intended, which had been kept towards him with respect to the mission of M. de Nesselrode, the unusual coldness which had been displayed towards him, and which was in great contrast with the civilities of which he had hitherto been the object; and finally, all the proceedings with which public rumour alone was sufficient to make him acquainted, were equivalent to the most warlike demonstration.

Prince Kourakin therefore despatched on the 13th of January an extraordinary courier to inform his court of what he had learned and observed, and to express his opinion that war was certain; and that it was absolutely necessary to prepare for it. He even demanded instructions with respect to extreme cases, such as, for example, the event of his having to leave Paris. Perhaps his great sensibility to the cold manner in which he had been treated by the court had strengthened his convictions; but if his displeasure on this account had alone caused him to declare that the French had resolved on war, this displeasure had but served to enlighten him with respect to the truth, for at this moment war had certainly been irrevocably determined on.

When Prince Kourakin's despatches arrived at St. Petersburg, every preparation had been made for M. de Nesselrode's mission to Paris, and it only awaited the arrival of a courier from Constantinople. Unhappily this courier did not arrive, and M. de Romanzoff, full of jealousy of the young diplomatist, took an unfair advantage of this delay. The courier sent by Prince Kourakin had reached St. Petersburg on the 27th, and excited there the most lively sensation. The perusal of the despatches which he brought filled all minds with the ambassador's opinion, and no one could any longer doubt that war was imminent. Already the general opinion had inclined to the belief that this would be the actual issue, and rather than submit, as Prussia or Austria, to all the demands of Napoleon, rather than sacrifice what was left of Russian commerce, all Russia resolved to brave the last extremities. As, however, there is always a great difference between the expectation of a fact and a fact itself, and a difference to which the minds of men are extremely sensitive, the public mind in St. Petersburg was now profoundly agitated, and to such an extent that M. de Lauriston was able to say without exaggeration that all St. Petersburg was filled with consternation.

It was considered in Europe at that period so great a hazard to brave Napoleon, his genius, and his valiant armies; there were so many terrible recollections, such as those of Austerlitz, of Jena, of Eylau, and Friedland, that even those who were inspired with the most noble sentiments of patriotism, or the most bitter enmity of aristocratic Europe against us, could not fail to experience a sensation of terror at the idea of recommencing a struggle which had always succeeded so ill. And indeed, if Fortune were this time unpropitious, Russia would be exposed to the danger of falling to that second rank to which Prussia and Austria had descended, and of which all Russians had so great a horror. Providence, which keeps its secrets so well, had not yet declared its secret on this point,

and the Russians were as ignorant that they were on the eve of their grandeur as Napoleon that he was on the eve of his fall. But even of the secrets of Providence genius can always discover some trace, and they are sometimes unveiled even to the glance of passion.

Passion, which so generally blinds men, and so rarely enlightens them, nevertheless, on the present occasion, assisted the Russians to discern a portion of the truth. The catastrophe of Charles XII. returned vividly to their remembrance; the recent distress of Massena in Portugal, which had been caused by means of devastations, and which had been published throughout all Europe with a kind of barbarous boasting, was no less eagerly considered; and everywhere throughout Russia it was declared that without destroying the fields of others, as the English had done, they would be able, by devastating their own country, to place Napoleon in a position more frightful still than that in which the English had placed Massena. The general cry, therefore, of the whole Russian army was, that it would devastate the whole country, and then withdraw into the farthest part of Russia, and that it would then be seen how the terrible Emperor of the French would be able to subsist in the midst of desolated plains, totally wanting in food for his soldiers as in forage for his cattle, and that, like another Pharaoh, he would perish in the vastness of the desert, as the other in the vastness of the deep. This plan of avoiding great engagements, and of retreating and devastating the country, had obtained a hold on every mind. There were even amongst the officers of Alexander men of unusually ardent temperament who advised that the desert should be carried forward, and that for this purpose they should invade Poland and Old Prussia, and after having destroyed their rich granaries, immediately retreat.

Alexander, who shared the general opinion that Napoleon should be opposed by means of long tracts of country and devastation, was resolved to decline battles, and to retreat into the very interior of Russia to avoid them, only pausing to fight when the French should be exhausted with hunger and fatigue; but he did not concur with those who urged the immediate devastation of Old Prussia and Poland. To take the offensive and to advance was to offer opportunities to the great gainer of battles, and to share with him also the wrongs of aggression, at least in the eyes of the populations, and Alexander, before demanding of his nation the least sacrifices, was anxious that the whole universe should be convinced that he was not the aggressor. Finally, Alexander had a reason for declining to adopt this course of conduct, which he expressed least, but which nevertheless influenced him considerably, and this was,

that being anxious to preserve peace as long as it could honourably be preserved, he was unwilling to compromise it by an imprudent initiative. In the meantime M. de Romanzoff, whose policy had been founded on the French alliance, and who would lose by the war the very basis of his system, and the true motive for his admittance into the councils of the empire, still flattered himself that when Napoleon should be on the Vistula, and Alexander on the Niemen, it would be possible to bring about a species of armed negotiation, and that on the very eve of the frightful contest the various powers would probably be more pliable; that Napoleon, having seen more clearly the difficulties attending this distant warfare, would be less exacting, and that an explanation would be come to at the last moment, and a means of compromise discovered which would save the honour of both. This was a feeble hope, doubtless, but it was, nevertheless, one which neither Alexander nor M. de Romanzoff were willing to renounce.

In accordance with these views Alexander, with the assistance of his ministers and some generals who were in his confidence, determined on the plan to be adopted for the conduct of the war. It was decided that there should be two considerable armies, and their elements were already assembled, the one on the Dwina, and the other on the Dnieper, two rivers which, rising within a few leagues' distance of each other, flow, the first towards Riga and the Baltic, and the second towards Odessa and the Black Sea, thus describing a vast transverse line from the north-west to the south-east, and constituting, so to say, the interior frontier of the great Russian empire. These two armies, having their advanced posts on the Niemen, were to retreat at the approach of the enemy, forming a complete mass of two hundred and fifty thousand men, to whom it was hoped that reserves to the number of one hundred thousand might speedily be added. A third army, of forty thousand men, was to be a corps of observation in the direction of Austria, uniting with that of the Danube, which amounted to sixty thousand men, and these, according to the course of events in Turkey, would proceed to the theatre of war, and thus increase to four hundred thousand men the sum total of the Russian forces.

These resources, independently of the vast tracts of space, of the climate, and the projected devastation, were of considerable force, and supported the confidence of the Russians. But other motives contributed still further to fortify them. The Russians thought that in this struggle public opinion would play an important part, and that those who were able to obtain it in their favour would thereby have a great advantage. They knew that France herself, although condemned to silence, did

not approve of these incessant wars, in which blood was poured out for objects which it did not understand, since its frontiers had not only attained but even passed the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees; and that notwithstanding the immense enthusiasm for the person of Napoleon, a bitter hatred had begun to arise against him, and would burst forth at the first reverse; that this hatred was, in Germany, by no means concealed, but, on the contrary, eager and public, and more violent than even in Spain, where the exhaustion consequent on the war had somewhat relaxed it; that in the allied States, such as Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Saxony, the conscription would speedily become the most odious of institutions; that in Prussia, moreover, in addition to the distress caused by continual wars, was that caused by the loss of its pristine greatness; that in Austria, where an outward appearance of calm had prevailed since the peace and the marriage, the court cherished a hatred which was more bitter than ever against France, regretting, as it did, the loss of Italy, and above all, of Illyria; and that finally, in the north, in Poland even, there were sufferings which very much diminished the enthusiasm for Napoleon, and procured adherents to the opinions of certain great Polish lords who thought Poland should be reconstituted, not by France, but by Russia, and that the crown of the Jagellons should be placed on the head of Alexander, or a prince of his family. And certainly unfortunate Poland, which had no other wealth than its corn, its wood, and its hemp, which could no longer be transported by the port of Dantzic since the continental blockade, suffered horribly; its nobility being ruined, its people overburdened by imposts, and the city of Dantzic, converted from a rich commercial city into a fortified town, reduced to the last state of misery. General Rapp, an accomplished courtier, but nevertheless a man of good heart, had been so touched by the spectacle of these evils that he had pointed them out to Marshal Davout, declaring that if the French army suffered a single reverse, there would be an insurrection from the Rhine to the Niemen. The cold and stern Davout himself, although caring little for sufferings which he was always ready to share with his soldiers, and observing with respect to public affairs the silence which he imposed upon others, had nevertheless transmitted to Napoleon the letters he received on this subject from General Rapp, accompanying them with these remarkable words: "I remember, in fact, sire, that had not your majesty performed miracles at Ratisbon in 1809, our situation in Germany would have been a very different one."

Those were sad truths which, added to the consciousness of their real strength, inspired the Russians with a confident determination to enter upon a formidable struggle; and said

they, if war be pregnant with cruel misfortunes, it also frequently affords considerable advantages; should Napoleon, as Charles XII., find in Russia the plains of Pultawa, all Germany would rise in his rear, the allied princes would be forced by their people to withdraw from his alliance, Poland herself would conceive the idea of obtaining her reconstitution at other hands than those of Napoleon, and France, exhausted by the shedding of her blood, and worn out by the sacrifices to which she was compelled by a boundless and unreasonable ambition, would no longer be capable of those efforts which, at former periods, she had made for the support of Napoleon's greatness.

These motives confirmed Alexander in the resolution of putting Napoleon completely in the wrong, and of declining to take the initiative, of remaining on the bank of the Niemen without passing it, and awaiting in a formidable but reserved attitude the approach of the enemy. This course of conduct appeared to him the best both in a military and political point of view, without taking into account that it preserved a chance of peace which at the last moment might disarm the whole world.

The Russian diplomatic agents were directed to act in the spirit of this policy. There was evidently nothing to be hoped for from Prussia and Austria; but the alliances which were offered with ardour, and even with importunity, were those of England and (is it credible?) of Sweden. An alliance with England was natural and legitimate, and was inevitably the first blow struck between France and Russia. The English cabinet, in its impatience to conclude this alliance, had availed itself of a demand of saltpetre made by Russia to neutral commerce, to send to Riga twelve vessels filled with powder; and had then despatched to Sweden an agent, Mr. Thornton, who, on the appearance of the least hope that he would be received, was to throw himself into the first Russian port that should be open to him; and in the meantime he was to endeavour to enter into communication with the Russian legation through the Swedish cabinet.

Nothing, we must add, could have been more natural than this impatience of the British cabinet, and the only objection that could be made to it is that it was too petulant, and by its over-eagerness exposed itself to the reproach, if a reproach were still possible, of those whom she had desired to disunite for ever. But Sweden, or to speak more precisely, the prince who owed to France his advancement to the throne of Sweden, employed himself with the greatest eagerness to seek out our enemies and to form alliances against us. Instead of being astonished at the spectacle of this dishonest heart, we are rather revolted; and it is one of the most striking portions of

the extraordinary scene which at this moment was presented to the eyes of the world.

We have noticed the manner in which Prince Bernadotte, elected Crown-Prince of Sweden, had already declared himself in active and undisguised hostility to Napoleon, with the occasion and object of this change of policy. The refusal of Norway, an act which formed so honourable an exception to the emperor's general conduct, and the contemptuous silence enjoined on the French embassy, awakened in his heart the old hatred long nourished against Napoleon, and which had for its source, however incredible it may appear, simple envy. Naturally of an envious disposition, he presumed to look with an evil eye on the man who should have ever remained far beyond the mark of his jealousy, such was the pre-eminence of fame and station on the side of General Bonaparte above all the claims of General Bernadotte. That he should have looked with malignity on the glory of Moreau, Massena, Lannes, Davout, men a thousand-fold his superiors, might have been conceived; but for such a sentiment towards Napoleon there was required the very frenzy of envy kindled in a little heart and mean spirit. Invested for a time with the regency, in consequence, as has been narrated, of the bad health of the king, then, though deprived of the post from the sovereign's terror at an excessive alteration in the relations with France, still in secret the chief mover of the national policy, he had suddenly gone over to the parties originally opposed to his succession, namely, the English faction, composed of the trading and landed interests which found their advantage in the interdicted commerce, and the noblesse whose principle was hatred of France and innovation. To them the tone of his language, more or less distinctly expressed according to circumstances, but always remarkable for imprudence, was that he had determined to be no slave of Napoleon's, that he desired to be a Swede, and not a Frenchman, and that desiring above all things the prosperity of his new country, he would never lend himself to the convenience of France, which might induce her to ruin Sweden by the deprivation of its trade. To those on the other hand, comprising all the friends of France, who had accomplished his election, in their passionate emulation of the Revolution of 1789, their regrets for the old grandeur of Sweden, and the military reputation which led them to choose a French general, his talk was of honour, fatherland, valour, while, without explaining the manner in which it was to be done, he engaged to lead them to victory, and to restore the greatness of their nation. Besides flattering all parties in the State on the topics most dear to them, he endeavoured to establish relations with the English and Russian legations, the latter of which was alone officially recognised at Stock-

holm, by taking care that each should have what might be most favourable to its interests. To both he asserted his readiness to break off the yoke of France, and obey the signal whenever the great powers should resolve on giving it, boasting that he knew the weak points in the genius and resources of Napoleon, and would impart the secret how to overthrow him. Even in the French armies General Bernadotte, he said, was highly prized, but would England and Russia but establish good intelligence with Sweden, there was no end to the advantage which it might prove to them; for, as soon as Napoleon should have advanced into the interior of Poland, where he might have been annihilated in 1807, and was, in fact, only saved by the intervention of Bernadotte, he, the Crown-Prince of Sweden, could come down with 30,000, or even 50,000, should he be subsidised, and raise the whole of Germany in the rear of the French host. In return for his aid, he demanded, not indeed Finland, of the importance of which to Russia he was well aware, but Norway, which, he argued, it was unreasonable to leave to Denmark, the steadfast ally of Napoleon, and therefore traitor to the cause of Europe.

These confidences, made with incredible indiscretion to England and Russia, had excited a kind of distrust, and gained their author but little esteem. When addressed to the King of Prussia in a secret interview demanded of his ambassador, they had disgusted the sense of honour in that monarch, who had not dared to denounce this faithless child of France, but had not failed to warn us to beware of him. As for the powers which were either actually at war with us, as was England, or about to be, as Russia, they had behaved cautiously towards an enemy of Napoleon, whom they were willing to make use of, whilst they hesitated to trust him. In order to enter into close relations with both of these powers, the new Swedish prince had proposed to employ the influence long enjoyed by Sweden in Turkey to negotiate a peace between the Turks and the Russians; and thus this personage who had only so lately appeared on the world's stage, and was so unexpected an enemy to France, offered to reconcile England with Russia, and Russia with the Porte, and was anxious to be at any price the connecting link of these various political chains, the sword in the hands of these coalitions.

In the meantime Alexander, the object of whose system of reserve was, as we have already said, to place his adversary completely in the wrong, and to remain free to accept a peace at the last moment, was by no means willing to yield to the impatience of the English, or to the intrigues of Sweden. He had made the very natural reflection that when the rupture with France should have once been accomplished, an alliance

with England would be an immediate result, and be effected on such terms as he might choose. He refused, therefore, the vessels filled with gunpowder, forced them to depart from the waters of the Riga, and intimated to Mr. Thornton that the time had not yet come for his appearance at St. Petersburg. As regarded Sweden, since its alliance with Russia was less a matter of certainty, since this power might, in its ambitious restlessness, be alienated from Russia by the rejection of its advances, as it had been alienated from Napoleon by a disappointment suffered at his hands, Alexander determined to listen with apparent attention to its incredible proposals, and to take that time for their consideration which their importance demanded. He sent magnificent furs to Prince Bernadotte, and heaped on him the most flattering testimonies of esteem. In the meantime Turkey, which had obstinately rejected the conditions which had been proposed to it, and which was unwilling at any price to abandon Moldavia as far as the Sereth, to consent to a Russian protectorate over Wallachia and Servia, to the cession of a portion of territory, however small, along the Caucasus, or the payment of a war indemnity, it felt quite certain that within a few days Russia, pressed by the armies of France, would be compelled to resign all her pretensions, and Alexander accordingly modified still farther the proposed conditions, renouncing the protectorate of Servia and Wallachia, the territory which had been demanded along the Caucasus, and the war indemnity, but still insisting on the whole of Bessarabia, on Moldavia as far as the Sereth, and flattered himself that by obtaining peace on these new conditions he would secure full liberty to employ his forces against the French army.

Such were the plans of Russia, and they were plans which, as we cannot fail to perceive, were very well conceived and very well adapted to their object. In the situation to which matters had now come, there could be no object attained by M. de Nesselrode's mission to Paris, and it was therefore abandoned to the great, but unwise, satisfaction of M. de Romanzoff. Alexander intimated this new resolution to M. de Lauriston with a grief which he did not dissemble, telling him that the courier which had left Paris on the 13th of January had brought tidings which allowed no hope that peace could yet be preserved, and that he was excessively grieved at this, since peace had always been the object of his desire. He repeated, as he had already repeated a hundred times, the measures he had been willing to take, and the sacrifices he was ready to submit to, for the preservation of the French alliance, to prove what he called his *innocence*; but declared that no earthly power should drive him to any other terms; that he

could sustain a war of ten years if necessary, and would retreat to the farthest part of Siberia rather than sink to the position then endured by Austria and Prussia; that Napoleon, in provoking this rupture, had acted in a manner very contrary to his own interests, for that England was already near the end of her resources, and that by continuing to keep the continent closed against her commerce, and turning against Lord Wellington the forces then prepared against Russia, Great Britain would be forced to a peace within a year. Alexander continued, that for his part, he would remain inaccessible in the line which he had traced out, his troops would remain behind the Niemen, and would not be the first to pass it; that he was anxious that his nation and the world should be witnesses that he was not the aggressor, and that he carried his scruples in this respect even to the extent of refusing to listen to one of the propositions of England, that he had refused the gunpowder they had offered him, and he declared on his word of honour that he would in like manner dismiss Mr. Thornton should he present himself. Finally, Alexander said that in this state of things the mission of M. de Nesselrode was no longer possible, that not only his dignity but his common-sense rendered it impossible that he should now attempt to send it, since it could have no effectual result.

Upon M. de Lauriston's insisting that M. de Nesselrode would still be well received in Paris, Alexander related to him all that we have narrated respecting Napoleon's significant silence respecting the proposed mission, and his coldness towards Prince Kourakin from the time that this mission had been talked about, and concluded by declaring that it was known from other sources that Napoleon was averse to it; by these other sources Alexander meant Prussia, who, with the best intentions, and believing that she might be of service towards the maintenance of peace, had communicated Napoleon's reflections respecting the inconveniences of giving too much éclat to M. de Nesselrode's journey; and thus by its very zeal for peace had aided in bringing about its rupture.

During the course of the above conversation Alexander had appeared more moved than ever, but nevertheless thoroughly resolute, and had evidently spoken as a man who had no hesitation in expressing his aversion to war because he had determined to wage it, and with terrible energy. He left M. de Lauriston as affected as himself, for this excellent patriot regarded the approaching war with a species of despair, for he saw what must be its results. On the 3rd of February M. de Lauriston transmitted to his court all accounts of the communications which had taken place between himself and Alexander with scrupulous exactness. His courier arrived at

Paris on the 17th of February; and had been preceded by others who had carried almost precisely similar tidings, and had left little room for doubt that, as the last positively announced, M. de Nesselrode's mission would not set out from Russia.

Napoleon, by becoming sure that M. de Nesselrode would not come to Paris, attained his object, but nevertheless Russia appeared far too resolute, and although she was apparently too much intimidated to venture to take the initiative, he learned that there were not wanting bold spirits amongst her children who urged that her armies should cross the Niemen and anticipate the French at Königsberg and Dantzic. He considered, therefore, that it was time to conclude his alliances, and to set his troops in motion, so that he might not be the last to arrive on the Vistula, and he took care to accompany these decisive steps with some acts of policy calculated to calm the sensation they would produce in the Russian cabinet by affording it certain hopes of peace.

Up to this time Napoleon had not wished to conclude his alliances from fear of too much alarming Russia, and he was excessively dilatory with regard to unhappy Prussia, which was in a constant state of fear that these long delays concealed some abominable scheme. It will be remembered that Napoleon had imperiously demanded of her that she should cease from preparing her armaments, threatening to seize Berlin, Spandau, Graudentz, Colberg, the king himself, the army, and all that remained of the monarchy of the great Frederick, if she did not put a stop to her preparations; and on the other hand, giving his word of honour, that if she yielded to his wishes on this point he would conclude with her a treaty of alliance of which the first article should stipulate the integrity of her territory. Since the month of October he had held her in suspense under various pretexts, and at length, in the month of February, when matters had arrived at a point at which delay was no longer possible, Napoleon very much delighted the king and M. de Hardenberg by announcing to them that he was ready to sign the treaty of alliance. The King of Prussia, whom Russia had treated very harshly in 1805, and had completely deserted in 1807, considered himself under obligations only to his country and his crown, and being convinced, moreover, in common with all the world, that Napoleon would still be the victor, declared himself his ally, since it was impossible to remain neutral. His policy at this moment was, as he had to furnish Napoleon with a contingent, to give him one which should be as strong as possible, in order that on the conclusion of peace his recompense might be the greater, consisting of the restitution of fortresses, the diminution of the war contributions, and an extension of territory.

He offered, therefore, as many as a hundred thousand men, all good soldiers, commanded by the worthy General de Gramont, and ready to serve with goodwill as soon as they should see in the French alliance a means of obtaining the restoration of their country. As the price of this aid the King of Prussia demanded the restoration of one of the fortresses of the Oder, which had remained in pledge in the hands of Napoleon (as Glogau, for example), a release from the fifty or sixty millions which the Prussian treasury still owed to France, and finally an extension of territory in proportion to the services that the Prussian army should render. Frederick William was also anxious that some territory, and his wishes pointed especially to Silesia, should be regarded as neutral, that he might retire into it far from the tumult of arms, for Berlin, situated on the route of all the armies in Europe, could not but be involved in the war.

It was Napoleon's policy neither to destroy nor to raise Prussia. It was sufficient for his purposes that she should be in subjection and disarmed, and he had not sufficient confidence in the Prussian soldiers to permit any great number of them to be armed. He did not precisely distrust either their valour or their loyalty, but he considered with good reason that on the occasion of any reverse being suffered by his arms they would be carried along with the current of the Germanic sentiment; he was unwilling, therefore, that Prussia should arm more soldiers than were permitted to her by the existing treaties (which number was forty-two thousand), and thereby engage in heavy expenses which would afford her a pretext for not fulfilling her pecuniary engagements towards France. Influenced by these various motives, therefore, he rejected the propositions made to him by Prussia, declaring that twenty thousand Prussians would be sufficient, since he did not so much require troops with which to combat the Russians as provisions and baggage horses, and that consequently he could not release the contributions due from Prussia, and could only consent to receive horses, cattle, and grain in part satisfaction of the money she still owed. He refused also to surrender Glogau, for this fortress, he said, was on his line of operations; and as for the neutralisation of Silesia, he very reasonably remarked that although he was very willing to admit it, it could not be guaranteed without the consent of Russia also. As for the integrity of the existing Prussian dominions, and a revision to her advantage of her frontier line on the conclusion of peace, he could make ample promises without any difficulty.

Prussia could not dispute with Napoleon in the state into which she had fallen, and consequently by a treaty signed on the 24th of February it was agreed that Prussia should furnish

twenty thousand troops under the immediate command of a Prussian general, but bound to obey the orders of the general of the corps of the French army with which they might serve; and these twenty thousand men whilst remaining in Prussia were to be distributed as follows: four thousand at Colberg, two thousand at Potsdam (to guard the royal residence), and the remainder in Silesia. The war contribution still due from Prussia to France was definitively fixed at forty-eight millions, of which twenty-six millions were to be paid in mortgage bills, fourteen in kind, and eight in silver, these last to be paid at the conclusion of the existing war. For the fourteen millions payable in kind were to be furnished fifteen thousand horses, forty-four thousand cattle, and a considerable amount of wheat, oats, and forage. It was agreed also that these supplies in kind should be conveyed to the Vistula and the Oder.

On these conditions Napoleon guaranteed to Prussia the territory she then had, and in the event of obtaining a prosperous issue in the Russian war, promised an extension of frontier in recompense for its former losses; and this treaty could not fail to be approved of by all persons of sense, for being under no obligation to Russia, the King of Prussia was right to seek for safety where he could hope to find it. As for Napoleon, as it was too late to adopt the policy of re-establishing Prussia as a great and powerful kingdom which, holding everything from him, would necessarily remain faithful to him, he chose the best course possible when he withdrew a portion of its soldiers, disarmed the others, and took its horses.

The position of affairs with regard to Austria was different; for Austria was under no fear of the loss of its very existence, and no need of the French alliance; and so far from being, as Prussia was, in the power of four hundred thousand Frenchmen, had Italy almost at her mercy from the moment that Prince Eugène departed from it. She had desired therefore to escape from the French alliance, to remain a spectator of the conflict, and to share with the victor some of the spoils of the vanquished. She believed that Napoleon would be the victor, and would rather therefore ally herself with him than with Alexander, but for the greater safety would have preferred to be the ally of neither. There were no means, however, of escaping from Napoleon's iron hand; it was necessary to declare either for or against him, and after all, his triumph being more probable than that of Alexander, by declaring for him Austria would probably regain Trieste, which of all its losses was the one which Austria felt most severely.

The court of Vienna consented, therefore, to form an alliance with France, but demanded that the greatest possible secrecy should be kept with regard to it, and that this secrecy should

be observed as long as possible ; for, said M. de Metternich, of all Austria only he and the emperor were agreeable to this alliance, and if such a negotiation should be rumoured too soon, an insurmountable opposition would very probably be excited. Moreover, it was urged, it would thus be possible to surprise Russia by the unexpected presence in Volhynia of a *corps d'armée*.

Napoleon consented to the stipulated secrecy, for it was sufficient for him that he could rely on Austria, and of but little importance when the alliance between them should become known ; and he even shared in the desire to keep the treaty with Austria secret, in accordance with his constant wish to avoid as far as possible forcing the Russians into active war.

It was agreed, therefore, by a treaty signed on the 16th of March, that France and Austria should reciprocally guarantee the integrity of their actual States ; that for the present war Austria should furnish a corps of thirty thousand men, which should be ready at Lenberg on the 15th of May, provided that at that time the French army by its offensive movements should have drawn to it the Russian forces ; that this corps, commanded by an Austrian general (the Prince of Schwarzenberg), should be under the direct orders of Napoleon ; and that finally, if the kingdom of Poland should be re-established, France, in recompense for the assistance afforded her by Austria, would grant her a compensation in Illyria, and that if the war should have a prosperous issue, would behave towards the Emperor Francis, with regard to the new division of territories, in conformity with the friendship which should unite a father-in-law and a son-in-law.

This treaty engaged Austria to furnish but a very feeble assistance to Napoleon, and left it possible for her to say at St. Petersburg that her alliance with him was only a matter of form, and entered into for the sole purpose of avoiding a war with France, for which she, Austria, was not prepared. She could also add, if she chose, that in acting thus she had only acted towards Russia as Russia had acted towards herself in 1809.

Having concluded these treaties of alliance, Napoleon directed his whole attention to setting his troops in motion. He had already directed the army of Italy to concentrate itself at the foot of the Alps, and Marshal Davout to be always ready to throw himself upon the Vistula should the Russians, which was very improbable, be the first to pass the Niemen. All being now prepared, he ordered the first marches, but in such a manner that the Niemen should not be reached before the month of May. Let us glance at the manner in which he had

distributed the various portions of his vast army, which was the largest which had been seen since the ages of those victorious barbarians who had displaced whole populations, and was certainly the largest regular army which had ever existed, being the vastest collection ever known of strong well-disciplined soldiers, free from that mass of women, children, and servants which formerly formed three-fourths of the numbers of invading armies.

Although Napoleon had delegated to Marshal Davout, on account of his peculiar talents, the organisation of the greater portion of the army, he had not appointed him to the command of as many troops as he had entrusted to him to discipline, for he reserved to himself exclusively the disposition of the large masses. He desired only that Marshal Davout, being the nearest to the theatre of war, and in the most favourable position for active proceedings should the Russians cross the Niemen, should have a force sufficient to stop them; and confided to him, therefore, five French divisions which had been formed out of the three old divisions, Morand, Friant, and Gudin, and had in each regiment from three to five war battalions. To these was to be added as a sixth division a Polish division, which was already at Dantzic, but formed no part of the garrison, and was composed of good troops who had successfully made the campaign in 1809 against the Austrians. Napoleon had preserved the old distribution of his cavalry into light, employed in reconnaissances, and cavalry of reserve, employed in attacks in line. The latter had a certain portion of light cavalry in its ranks, but chiefly consisted of heavy and medium cavalry, that is to say, of cuirassiers, lancers, and dragoons. This reserve was divided into four corps; the first, comprising five regiments of light cavalry and the two divisions of cuirassiers, was added to the army of Marshal Davout, who had, therefore, about eighty-two thousand infantry and artillery, three thousand five hundred light cavalry particularly attached to his corps, and eleven or twelve thousand cavalry of reserve, the whole amounting to ninety-six or ninety-seven thousand of the best troops in Europe. They bore the title of the first corps, and their headquarters were at Hamburg.

Napoleon confided also to Marshal Davout the Prussian division of sixteen or seventeen thousand men, which was under the immediate orders of General Grawert, and the number of troops under the marshal's command was thus raised to one hundred and fourteen thousand.

Napoleon gave to Marshal Oudinot the second corps, which comprised, together with the divisions stationed in Holland, the remainder of the troops organised by Marshal Davout, but not placed under his command. These were the two French

divisions Legrand and Verdier, formed from part of the ancient divisions of Massena and Lannes, and a good Swiss division, to which had been added some Croatian and Dutch battalions. With the light cavalry, the artillery, and a division of cuirassiers borrowed from the cavalry reserve, this corps numbered forty thousand troops almost as good as those of Marshal Davout. Its headquarters were at Munster. Three or four thousand of the Prussian troops, at this time guarding Pillau, the Nehrung, and all the posts which close the Frische-haff, were also intended to form a portion of the second corps.

Under the title of third corps Napoleon entrusted to Marshal Ney, of whose energy he wished to avail himself in this campaign, the remainder of the old troops of Lannes and Massena, adding to them the Wurtemberg troops, which had already served under Marshal Ney, and thus forming a total of thirty-nine thousand men, infantry, artillery, and light cavalry; and as he proposed to employ Ney in the execution of vigorous enterprises, he also placed under his command the whole 2nd corps of the reserve cavalry, numbering about ten thousand men, chiefly cuirassiers. Marshal Ney's headquarters were fixed at Mayence.

The army of Prince Eugène was called the 4th corps, and consisted of two divisions of French infantry, including the best troops of the old army of Italy, an Italian division which had become very excellent, and some of the royal guard, amounting altogether to about forty-five thousand soldiers of all arms. This corps was under the command of course of Prince Eugène, who had Junot for his principal lieutenant.

Napoleon assigned to the Polish army the title of the 5th corps. As we have before said, a Polish division in the pay of France had already been placed under Marshal Davout, but there still remained two other Polish divisions which received the emperor's pay, and were to be incorporated with the French troops. The Polish army properly so called was under the orders of Prince Poniatowski, who was in the service of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and had already made under its orders the campaign of 1809, a campaign which was as honourable for the troops engaged in it as for the general who conducted it. This corps numbered about thirty-six thousand men of all arms, and had its headquarters at Warsaw. The Bavarians, to the number of twenty-five thousand men, who had served with the French since 1805, formed the 6th corps, and were entrusted to General St. Cyr, whom Napoleon raised from disgrace on account of his merit, and notwithstanding an indocility of temper which was often the cause of great inconvenience. It was arranged that these Bavarians were to join the army of Italy at Bareuth, in order to fight by its side; for Napoleon had

distributed the various portions of his vast army, which was the largest which had been seen since the ages of those victorious barbarians who had displaced whole populations, and was certainly the largest regular army which had ever existed, being the vastest collection ever known of strong well-disciplined soldiers, free from that mass of women, children, and servants which formerly formed three-fourths of the numbers of invading armies.

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fourth battalions drawn from Spain, and some sixth battalions belonging to the regiments intended to have six, should form a reserve corps entrusted to Marshal Augereau, and amounting to 37,000 men. Finally, he had had the precaution to send forward from 15,000 to 18,000 recruits, who were to supply the losses resulting from the first marches. There remained the division furnished by the little German princes, amounting to 5000 men; and a division amounting to 10,000, with which Denmark, in consideration of our having incurred the enmity of Sweden in defence of its interests, had agreed to furnish us in case Bernadotte should execute his project of making a descent on the rear of the French army. The latter division was to be assembled on the Holstein frontier.

By taking into account, in addition to the active army of 423,000 men, this army of reserve of 130,000, some detachments scattered amongst various little posts to the number of 12,000, the sick, the greater number of whom had been prostrated by the active service necessary in winter for the maintenance of the continental blockade, and who amounted to no less than 40,000, we find the enormous number of 600,000 men set in motion for the purposes of this formidable conflict.

Napoleon desired that the troops should remain in these positions during the month of May, that this month might be employed in bringing up the men and matériel which might have fallen into the rear, in throwing bridges over the various arms of the Vistula, in organising the navigation of the Frischehaff, in obtaining numerous waggons, horses, and oxen from Prussia, furnishing the waggoners with stores, and mounting the cavalry which as yet wanted their horses; so that when the month of June had arrived, and the ground was covered with herbage, the troops might advance between Königsberg and Grodno, and cross the Niemen on the 15th or 20th of June. Napoleon's first care was to draw from Spain, Italy, France, and Germany this crowd of troops, and to march them with such care and method that they should not be exhausted by fatigue, or cover the routes with sick and stragglers, and that especially the Russians should not be too much excited by their advance and provoked to invade Poland and Old Prussia.

We have already mentioned Napoleon's plan of effecting his contemplated movements under cover of Marshal Davout's corps, which, being between the Elbe and the Oder, had but eight or ten marches to make to reach the Vistula, an imposing body of 150,000 men, and to check the Russians should there be need. On the 1st of April Napoleon intended to set his masses of troops in motion, to advance these under Marshal Davout to the Vistula between Thorn and Marienberg, to unite the Saxons with the Poles around Warsaw, and to post Jerome's West-

phalians at Posen; then on the Oder, in a second line, to post Oudinot at Stettin, Ney at Frankfort, and Prince Eugène with the Italians and Bavarians at Glogau; the guard, with the engineer and artillery corps, and the sappers and miners, being intended to form a third line between Dresden and Berlin.

Napoleon had already despatched, as we have seen, the necessary orders to the army of Italy, which had the greatest distance to traverse, to join the troops assembled in Germany. When the first movement of this army, appointed to take place at the end of February, should have been effected, Napoleon proposed to march Marshal Davout's troops on the Oder, the Saxons to Kalisch, in order that they might the more speedily join the Poles, and at the same time to advance in a second line Oudinot upon Berlin, Jerome upon Glogau, Ney upon Erfurt, and at the end of March to order a halt in order that all the corps might have time to rally their stragglers, and to bring up their baggage. These various points having been attained, a halt was to be made up to the 15th of April, when the second and third lines were to advance on the Vistula and establish themselves in the following order: the Prussians in advance between Elbing, Pillau, and Königsberg; the troops of Davout in the rear between Marienberg and Marienwerder; those of Marshal Oudinot at Dantzic; those of Ney at Thorn; those of Eugène at Plock; the Poles, Saxons, and Westphalians at Warsaw; the guard at Posen.

The instructions given by Napoleon were in conformity with this plan. Prince Eugène received orders to traverse the Tyrol so as to reach Ratisbon at the beginning of March, the Bavarian generals being directed to meet Prince Eugène at that point at the same time; and Ney, Jerome, and Oudinot to place themselves immediately in line with the right, coming from Italy. When these various movements should have been masked, Marshal Davout was ordered to throw the division Friant towards Swedish Pomerania, for the purpose of punishing Sweden for her conduct, to push his other divisions upon the Oder from Stettin to Custrin, to occupy with the Prussians Pillau and the points which command the navigation of the Frische-haff, to unite himself by means of his cavalry with the Poles on the side of Warsaw, and if, contrary to all probability, the Russians should take the offensive, to march directly against them and drive them back beyond the Niemen.

Everything being thus arranged, Napoleon was anxious to add diplomatic precautions to those which he had already taken with regard to the movements of his troops, in order to prevent the Russians from too speedily commencing the contest. He had already avoided the mission of M. de Nesselrode, and lest his manner of doing this should have driven Alexander from his

temporising system, he now endeavoured to obviate this danger, and with this object sent a despatch to M. de Lauriston, in which he gave him a detailed account of his military movements, declaring that their object was to save from the hands of the Russians the rich granaries of Poland and Old Prussia, and that for the purpose of preventing them from ravaging these countries, it was necessary when the movement of the army of Italy, which would be the first, should be known, that M. de Lauriston should positively deny it, whilst admitting the march of a few Tuscan and Piedmontese conscripts, sent beyond the Alps to rejoin their corps in Germany; and that when it should be impossible any longer to deny it, he should admit the concentration of the French army on the Oder, but declare at the same time that this concentration did not necessarily imply war any more than the concentration of the Russians on the Dwina and the Dnieper; and that even if the French army advanced a little beyond the Oder, it would only be taking a position precisely equivalent to that taken by the Russian armies, and whilst Napoleon was always rather ready to negotiate than to fight, he wished to take an attitude suitable to his dignity.

In this despatch M. de Lauriston was directed to put forward the idea of an armed negotiation rather than of a war already resolved on, to re-demand even, if the Russians still desired it, the mission of M. de Nesselrode, and in the last extremity, but only then, to offer a personal interview between the two emperors on the Vistula. Finally, to prevent premature hostilities, M. de Lauriston was authorised to engage that the French armies should pause on the bank of the Vistula, but to do this only with the appearance of a negotiator so anxious for peace that he exceeded his instructions; and should all these ruses fail of their intended effect, M. de Lauriston was then to declare immediate war, demand his passports, and to compel the representatives of the allied courts to demand theirs.

So anxious was Napoleon to prevent a premature commencement of hostilities, that he had recourse to a more direct means to the attainment of his object. He had with him at this time M. de Czernicheff, employed in frequent missions from St. Petersburg to Paris, having numerous relations with the French court, and endowed with powers of fascination which he had made use of to corrupt one of the principal clerks of the minister of war. This fact began to be suspected, but it was not the moment to take public notice of this discovery. Napoleon devised the plan, therefore, to send M. de Czernicheff to Alexander with an earnest declaration of his pacific intentions, that he desired only the fulfilment of the conditions of Tilsit, and that he was perfectly ready to substitute a negotiation for war.

Napoleon's pretext for taking this step was a sufficiently natural one. In the course of their long conversations with M. de Lauriston, the Emperor Alexander and M. de Romanzoff had declared their opinion that Napoleon's desire to effect the reconstitution of the kingdom of Poland was evidently the real object he cherished in his heart, and the cause of his refusal to sign the convention of 1810. M. de Lauriston in his recent despatches had reported this conjecture of Alexander and his minister, and it was sufficient to furnish Napoleon with the pretext he desired.

In a long interview with M. de Czernicheff, he declared that by his last despatches from St. Petersburg he found that very false ideas were held with respect to his projects, since it was there supposed that he intended to reconstitute the kingdom of Poland, and that his military preparations had been made with this object. He assured M. de Czernicheff that this was a complete error, that he had never contemplated such an enterprise, and that if he had, he would have attempted it in 1807 and 1809; that his refusal in 1810 of the convention by which Alexander demanded that he should engage never to re-establish the kingdom of Poland was because the form of the engagement required of him was dishonourable, and not because he entertained any idea of doing anything contrary to its spirit; that his sole reason for arming was because he believed that Russia was withdrawing from her alliance with France for the purpose of making one with England; that if this were her intention, it was necessary that she should prepare for war; but that if, on the contrary, she were willing to avoid serious hostilities with France, she must close her ports against England, and aid him, Napoleon, in reducing her to submission by the destruction of her commerce.

Napoleon took great pains to produce on M. de Czernicheff's mind the impression that war was not inevitable, and would have succeeded in persuading him of this, had not the latter received only a few hours previously from the war office certain proofs of the activity of preparations so vast and so energetically carried forward, that it was impossible to reconcile them with the idea of a simple military demonstration destined to support negotiations. Nevertheless M. de Czernicheff felt less certain of the imminence of the war after this interview, and received a letter from the Emperor Napoleon to the Emperor Alexander, in which, in polished and amicable but somewhat haughty words, he requested the latter to receive as from himself the communications he had made to him through M. de Czernicheff, and repeated that however advanced the preparations for war might be on either side, they might yet receive a peaceable termination. On the same day M. de Bassano addressed a fresh despatch to M. de Lauriston,

which completely developed Napoleon's desire of gaining time, so as to be able to take the initiative at the commencement of the war; and declared Napoleon to be as little desirous of an interview with Alexander, as of any negotiation save that which might be conducted by the 450,000 men whom he had set in motion, and whose march would probably induce the Russian cabinet to return to the system established at Tilsit, and would *replace Russia in the state of inferiority in which she then was.*

In the meantime murmurs began to arise such as had not for a long time been heard in Paris, and revealed the depth of the sufferings caused by the dearth, the conscription, the levy of the national guards, and finally the war, by which all these evils were either produced or aggravated.

A frightful drought, which had lasted during the whole of the summer of 1811, had ruined the cereals throughout the whole of Europe, while it produced excellent wines, known by the name of *vins de la comète*. In France the price of wheat had risen to fifty, sixty, and seventy francs the hectolitre, a price very much higher than that which would be represented by the same figures in these days. The people could no longer purchase it, and in many parts of the country were guilty of turbulence, which had the effect of increasing the value of provisions by causing them to be concealed.

Napoleon, formerly hostile to the revolutionary doctrines (and by this expression we understand not the pure and noble principles of '89, but the senseless opinions born of the madness of popular passion); Napoleon, we say, formerly hostile to these doctrines, had gradually adopted them, in accordance with his usual habit of permitting himself to be carried in everything beyond the bounds of reason. Opposed to the regicide, he had yet in a moment of anger shot the Duc d'Enghien; a bitter censor of the civil constitution of the clergy, he yet held the Pope a prisoner at Savoy; thoroughly disapproving of the violence of the directory, he had nevertheless at this moment his prisons full of persons detained solely on religious grounds; despising, as he did, the revolutionary policy which had excited war throughout Europe, he was now at war with Europe for the purpose of placing his brothers on most of the thrones of the west; and finally, after having overwhelmed with sarcasms the administrative principles of 1793, such as the maximum, and the commercial rigours with respect to America, he had by his legislation with respect to colonial produce created throughout all Europe a system of commerce the most strange and violent that could be conceived, and which his war against English commerce to a certain degree excused. But with regard to cereals, in his

eagerness to quiet the popular murmurs, and to free his policy from all connection with the dearness of provisions, and to please, in short, the masses, on whom he had laid so many heavy burdens, he devised doctrines unworthy of his fine mind, determining in spite of the opposition of the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès to have the price of bread regulated at the will of local administrations.

The formation of the cohorts of the national guard was another cause of suffering and murmurs. It is scarcely credible, but nevertheless true, that Napoleon, who was so confident in his power as to provoke unnecessarily a fresh conflict with Europe, was nevertheless oppressed with a vague but constant presentiment of some great danger.

Under the influence of this feeling, Napoleon considered that the reserves already existing between the Rhine and the Elbe, and in the interior of the empire, were insufficient, and desired therefore to raise one hundred and twenty thousand men under the title of the National Guard.

Thus the last measure, the expediency of which, though not understood, was unhappily but too certain, and proved to what danger Napoleon had exposed his own and our existence, had induced a general discontent at Metz, Lille, Rennes, Toulouse, and several other chief cities of the empire. Actual riots broke out in almost every town. Even in Paris, the schoolboys, so commonly alive to warlike sentiments, now gave expression to the pacific dispositions of the nation with all the energy proper to their age, giving vent to seditious cries against the recent levies in the public thoroughfares, and pursuing with violence the agents of the police, on whom they bestowed the detested sobriquet of *mouchards* (spies).

An additional affliction was the re-establishment in the departments of non-stationary regiments for the purpose of enforcing the rules of the conscription. The number of refractory conscripts, lowered the year preceding from 60,000 to 20,000, had since risen, in consequence of numerous appeals made during the latter period, to 40,000 or 50,000. It was Napoleon's purpose again to diminish the list, taking from it one-twentieth of a thousand to recruit the ranks of the regiments of the islands. New vexation, new murmurs, new causes of irritation could not fail to be the result. The soldiers of the non-stationary corps took up their quarters, as has already been stated, in the families of the refractory recruits, compelling them to furnish lodging, food, and a tax of several francs a day, so that they were often reduced to extreme misery. There were departments where as much as sixty, eighty, or even a hundred francs had been thus extorted, and from the poorest households. Some prefects had protested,

but most kept silence, and executed the law at all risks. If in France, where glory at least recompensed for such sufferings, they were resented with lively indignation, a baneful effect was their necessary consequence throughout the newly incorporated lands, which could only view in them a means for the perpetuation of their slavery. At the Hague, Rotterdam, and Amsterdam risings attended the conscription. In East Friesland, the prefect, who personally superintended the business of the levy, was assaulted and put to flight. Prince Lebrun, Governor of Holland, for interceding in behalf of the delinquents, was exposed to a rude reprimand for his weakness. It was Napoleon's wish that some unfortunates might be slaughtered with *éclat* to serve as an example to those who should essay emulating them; a sad lesson, whence they learned by counterfeiting submission for the moment to keep themselves ready for the attack when we should have all Europe on our hands.

In the Hanse towns departments the aversion to the levies for the land and sea services was still stronger. Holland might find some advantage in its reincorporation with the empire; but there was no convenience to the towns of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubec, naturally the ports of Germany, in their forming part of France, to which their interests were as alien as their sentiments. They were frightened, but not reduced, by the death of a needy captain who had conveyed some travellers to Heligoland. The city of Hamburg was placarded by night with satirical papers, which the police had the greatest difficulty in tearing off. The population was unanimous in seconding, as has been related, deserters from our service; not only Germans, Italians, and Spaniards, but even Frenchmen, treating them as friends from the time they left their ranks. They were sheltered by day, conveyed on their journey by night, transported in boats over rivers, and fed for nothing on their way home.

A partial mutiny arose in the ranks of the Hanse towns' regiments composed of veteran soldiers in the service of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubec, officered in part by Frenchmen. Some companies employed to guard the remote coasts of the Baltic offered violence to their officers who remained loyal, and seizing some fishing smacks took refuge in Heligoland. It was found necessary to send the most disaffected of these three regiments, the 129th, inland, and surround it with troops of reliable fidelity, under the command of Marshal Davout. The reports on the temper of the Dutch and Westphalian contingents were unsatisfactory, notwithstanding the unceasing care bestowed on the latter by King Jerome. An insurrection broke out at Brunswick, a populous city, from regret for its exiled duke, and several of our soldiers suffered severely.

Jerome's intervention, for the purpose of softening measures against the guilty, was replied to by an order of the day issued by Napoleon, which entrusted the trial of every crime perpetrated against the French army to a camp-tribunal of none but French officers.

The state of public feeling was no better in the south than in the north of the empire. The refusal of all political liberty, and well-nigh all national independence, a yoke less hated certainly than that of Austria, but with its own article of rigour, the conscription, incessant war, the deprivation of all commerce, and the contest with the Church, at length embittered against France the Italians who had originally welcomed her with the greatest eagerness. It was true that Lombardy, under the mild, regular, but equitable government of Prince Eugène, contrasted as it was with the harsh rule of the house of Austria, remained tranquil. True, too, that the sentiments of Piedmont (Genoa excepted, which sighed for the opening of the sea) were growing into accordance with those of France, and that there was a little more sympathy in that people for a warlike policy; but in Tuscany, with its aversion for war, its unbroken reminiscences of a native government, gentle, wise, and philosophical, of its claims as a birthplace of the sovereignty of intellect over Southern Italy, and of the decided influence of the clergy; in Rome, where the populace was inconsolable for the crushed Papacy, where the antipathy to the domination of Ultramontanes was as vigorous as in Calabria, hatred was scarce dissembled, so that there, as in the rest of the empire, one reverse could produce the burst of a general rising. To bring such about, the presence of the smallest band of Englishmen would have been enough.

Such sentiments diffused over so many different countries were doubtless not reflected by the mirror of daily publicity, which by exaggerating the object forces those to survey it who would willingly blind themselves to its presence. Every one experienced the truth of the tales in his own person, but men's hatred was confirmed and their rage insensibly increased by the information conveyed in the assent of traders and travellers, that in this and that province the self-same outrages were endured. Napoleon had certainly a mind far too comprehensive not to discern this state of things; but so far was he from concluding that he should refrain from aggravating the peril by a new war, so far from reasoning as on his return from the campaign of Wagram, when he for a moment bent his thoughts to the pacification of Europe by the restoration of peace, that he inferred from all this the necessity of instant war with Russia, in hope of crushing at once, in 1812 as in 1809, the discontents ready to burst forth into action.

In the meantime he could not fail to observe the general fear which was entertained of the approaching war, and he was irritated at the objections which were not addressed to him, but which he divined because he had been compelled to address them to himself, and he frequently answered these objections in conversation with persons who had not even thought of them, or who if they had even thought of them would not have dared to express them. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès was the only man who ventured to attempt to dissuade his master from the impending enterprises, and to him Napoleon declared, as he had declared to all the world, that a conclusive struggle with Russia was absolutely necessary, and that as it was necessary the sooner it took place the better. With regard to the war itself, Napoleon by no means underrated its gravity; and whilst he admitted that it would probably be of longer duration than those he had hitherto waged, declared that he had made suitable preparations for conducting it with safety.

After having insisted upon the difficulties of the war, Prince Cambacérès spoke of the general disposition of Germany, of the little reliance that could be placed on the good faith of the little German princes, or of Austria, or on the ability of the King of Prussia to keep his engagements. Napoleon, however, treated all those fears as chimerical, and declared that, even if well founded, they would all be guarded against by a powerful army encamped on the Elbe.

Napoleon now hastened to make such arrangements as would enable him to quit Paris at the first movement made by Russia. With the exception of the waggons, which were somewhat behindhand, everything proceeded as well as he could wish, and he was able to reckon that before May or June at the farthest every preparation for his formidable struggle would have been completed. His finances were, at least for the moment, in a state to meet his immense expenses. His budget, which used to be systematically confined to seven hundred and forty or seven hundred and seventy millions, had suddenly risen to nine hundred and fifty millions, an augmentation partly due to the annexation of the Roman States, Illyria, Holland, and the Hanseatic departments. Holland, however, cost more than she brought on account of her debt, which absorbed thirty-one millions out of fifty-five millions of receipts.

In addition to this augmentation of a hundred millions, sixty millions had been added to the revenue by the famous tariff of the month of August, which permitted importation of colonial produce at a duty of fifty per cent. But although the budget reckoned thus a hundred millions more of receipts, there still remained a deficit. The personnel and matériel of war, which in 1810 had absorbed, the first two hundred and fifty millions,

the second one hundred and fifty millions, altogether four hundred millions, had required about four hundred and eighty millions in 1811, and would soon need more than five hundred; whilst the navy, which had formerly cost one hundred and forty millions, had cost one hundred and seventy millions since the annexation of the navies of Holland and the Hanse towns. And thus the new resources which had been obtained by the annexation had not only been absorbed by the expenses of military administration, but this annexation had even been a source of increased expense. But, on the other hand, the government sales of contraband goods, and confiscated property of the great Spanish families, had produced great receipts. The products of these various sources of revenue amounted to one hundred and fifty millions, of which sum Napoleon devoted ninety millions to the arrears due on account of former budgets, and there then remained at his disposal sixty millions, an addition to his *domaine extraordinaire* which, after deducting all dotations and sums expended on public works, still amounted to about three hundred and forty millions; but as a portion of this sum had been lent to the treasury, and a still larger portion was due from Westphalia, Saxony, Bavaria, Prussia, and Austria, only one hundred and twenty-three millions of it were immediately available; and this sum, in addition to the sixty millions before mentioned, formed a reserve fund of one hundred and eighty millions. With such a reserve, therefore, and a budget which could afford to allow five hundred millions to the military service, and one hundred and seventy to that of the navy, Napoleon believed that he was provided with funds sufficient for the regular payment of a force which amounted, without taking into account the national guards, to twelve hundred thousand men, of whom nine hundred thousand were French. We must remember, however, that the three hundred thousand troops in the Peninsula only cost the French treasury forty millions, the remainder of the expense attending their maintenance being defrayed by Spain; and that this was also the case with a certain number of troops in Illyria and Germany.

Amongst the most important of the affairs which Napoleon was anxious to arrange before the commencement of the war with Russia was the compact he was ready to enter into with America against England. In spite of the success of Lord Wellington in Spain, the domestic affairs of England had latterly fallen into a still more disastrous state; her merchants and manufacturers were almost entirely ruined; her labouring classes were without work and without food; and the British cabinet was aggravating these evils by its extravagant conduct with respect to America, which was now almost the only great

country which remained accessible to British commerce, and towards which, so far from treating it with caution and consideration, it behaved as Napoleon had behaved towards the States of the continent; its famous orders in council, which Napoleon had met with the no less famous decrees of Berlin and Milan, being the cause of a quarrel which was on the point of breaking out into open war.

America, as we have already seen, at first replied to these orders and decrees by interdicting, by the law of embargo, her vessels from touching at the European ports, and subsequently limited this prohibition to the coasts of France and England, at the same time declaring that it would be withdrawn with respect to that one of the two powers which should renounce its own rigorous system. Napoleon had accordingly withdrawn his decrees of Berlin and Milan as regarded America, which country had in return repealed the law of embargo with respect to France, whilst she maintained it with respect to England; and it was on this subject that she was now engaged in a quarrel with the latter country.

England would have gained more than France by imitating Napoleon's conduct with respect to America; but the spirit of maritime supremacy permitted her only to modify very slightly her orders in council, instead of repealing them entirely. She had ceased to demand that American vessels should resort to the banks of the Thames for the purpose of paying her tribute, but declared the ports of the French empire blockaded from the mouths of the Ems to the frontiers of Portugal, from Toulon to Orbitello, which was, in fact, a paper blockade. America declared that the rights of neutrals were entirely opposed to this fictitious blockade, and that she would maintain her law of non-intercourse with respect to England although she had repealed it with respect to France; and a last outrage committed by England rendered war between the two countries imminent. Under the pretext that many of her sailors, to avoid serving in her navy, had emigrated to America, she boarded American vessels and seized all the sailors speaking English; and of course, as the two nations speak the same language, she thus seized almost as many Americans as English subjects. The vessels of the former country frequently resisted this treatment, and thus the exasperation between the two countries reached its height, and war between them was regarded as inevitable.

In the meantime the English opposition had numerous and just causes of dissatisfaction with the cabinet; and although the opposition, doubtless, exaggerated, as is usually the case, the errors of the government, it would but have expressed the truth had it declared that it was to England's interest that commerce should be entirely free, whilst it was to the advantage

of Napoleon that it should be checked, and that by its unreasonable conduct in persisting in maintaining its orders in council it was preparing for its country the most calamitous of privations, in the loss of relations with America, and a war which could not but be infinitely dangerous should Napoleon obtain a new triumph in the plains of the north.

The grave question of Irish emancipation was another cause of violent division between the various English parties. Ireland was at this time in a worse state than any other part of the British dominions, and required the presence of troops which could have been much more usefully employed in Portugal. The opposition, inflexible on this point, maintained with passion that the only means of appeasing Ireland, and setting free the troops by which it was held in check, was to grant it an equality of rights with the other portions of the United Kingdom. In the meantime the situation of parties in the English House of Commons was such that a single check experienced by the English armies would have overthrown the war policy; and in spite of the advantages obtained by the enemy in Spain, and the reverses sustained by our troops, Napoleon might still, by leading his forces in this direction, instead of throwing them into the abyss of the north, have turned the policy of England towards peace.

Although Napoleon failed to see this state of things in its true light, he comprehended that, as the English were alienating the Americans by every species of vexatious conduct, it was necessary to draw them into his interest by an entirely opposite mode of treatment. The great difficulty was, how to be able to grant the commercial favours required by America without at the same time relaxing the continental blockade. Nevertheless, having to a certain extent relaxed with respect to them the restrictions of which the Americans complained, and despatched M. Serurier to Philadelphia to promise them the most free admission into France should they definitively break with England, he flattered himself, and the event proved that he was right, that in less than a month he would have formed an alliance with America against England.

Napoleon's diplomatic efforts with regard to the approaching war were not confined to this direction. Although excessively irritated against Sweden, he nevertheless, as the crisis of affairs approached, listened to certain hints which probably came from Stockholm, through Bernadotte's wife, the sister of the Queen of Spain, who was much distressed at the idea of a rupture between France and Sweden, and up to this moment had been unwilling to quit Paris. These hints were to the effect that the existing misunderstanding had been caused by M. Alquier's want of address, that the prince-royal

was only anxious for an honourable opportunity for entering into an alliance with France, that his connivance in the contraband traffic was only caused by the bad state of the Swedish finances, which this traffic increased; and that if France would subsidise Sweden, she would close her ports against the English, and provide her with an army to be used against Russia. Napoleon very much doubted the sincerity of these offers; but as it was quite possible that Bernadotte, whose advances had been very coldly received, as was known at Paris, by England and Russia, might be really returning to his allegiance to France, it was necessary that such an ally should not be altogether rejected; for the march of a Swedish army upon Finland, whilst a French army should advance upon Lithuania, would be a very useful diversion; and an agent, named by the princess-royal, was accordingly authorised to convey to Stockholm the views and requirements of the French court.

In the meantime the month of March was drawing to a conclusion, and everything was succeeding according to Napoleon's wishes. One of Davout's divisions, that of General Friant, had entered Swedish Pomerania, and after having put a stop to what remained of the contraband traffic, had advanced to Stettin on the Oder. The division Gudin had advanced farther and taken up a position at Stargard, having in front of it the cavalry of General Bruyère on the Dantzic route. Desaix's division was posted at Custrin on the Oder, having its light cavalry at Landsberg in the direction of Thorn; whilst Marshal Davout himself, with the divisions Morand and Compans, and the cuirassiers attached to his corps, had approached the Oder, and was ready to cross it at the first signal. Marshal Oudinot's troops, after having assembled at Munster, had echeloned on the Berlin route; and Marshal Ney had advanced from Mayence to Erfurth, and from Erfurth to Targan on the Elbe. The Saxons had passed the Oder; the Viceroy of Italy, after having crossed the Alps with his army, had traversed Bavaria, rallied the Bavarian troops, and advanced almost as far as the Oder. During these various movements the officers had kept their troops, in conformity with the orders they had received, under as strict discipline as was possible, but, unfortunately, excesses very much to be regretted were committed by the corps of Marshal Ney and Prince Eugène, which recompensed themselves for some privations they had had to endure at the expense of the countries traversed.

Up to this period no rumour had announced that this vast display of force had provoked the Russians to take the initiative; and consequently Napoleon, in conformity with his plan, ordered a fresh movement to be made by his troops at the commencement of April, from the Oder to the Vistula, intend-

ing to halt them on the latter river, that the columns might be rallied, the baggage brought up, and the vegetation sufficiently advanced to provide for the cattle during their progress. At the same time, in order that hostilities might be delayed until this required advance in vegetation had taken place, he sent another despatch to M. de Lauriston, informing him of this second movement made by the troops, and dictating to him the language he was to hold on the occasion. By this despatch M. de Lauriston was ordered to say, that the Emperor of the French having been informed of the march of the Russian armies towards the Dwina and the Dnieper (which was entirely untrue), he had determined to take up a position on the Vistula, since he feared an invasion of the Grand Duchy; but that he was always ready to treat with the Emperor Alexander, or even to hold a personal interview with him between the Vistula and the Niemen, in order that all differences might be settled in an amicable conference such as that of Tilsit or Erfurth.

In the meantime, the greatest resentment at these proceedings was felt at St. Petersburg, and the presence of M. de Czernicheff, who had arrived there on the 10th of March with an amicable letter from Napoleon, but with personal impressions of an entirely opposite character, had not tended to diminish the effect of the news which arrived from every part of the continent. The news of the two treaties entered into by Napoleon with Prussia and Austria, especially revealed to the Emperor Alexander and his minister, M. de Romanzoff, the imminence of the approaching danger; for as Alexander knew that Napoleon had delayed entering into the former treaty from the fear of giving too much umbrage to Russia, he could only conclude from its having been now signed that Napoleon had determined upon decided action, and no longer cared for dissimulation. Prussia had sent M. de Knesebeck to St. Petersburg to explain to the Emperor Alexander the sad necessity she found herself under of taking part with France in the war against Russia; and M. de Knesebeck, either authorised by the king, or carried along by national feeling, had permitted himself to declare that the King of Prussia was in his heart devoted to Russia, and that there could be no doubt he should be speedily able to ally himself with Alexander should the latter pursue a wise course of conduct; and with respect to this latter point M. de Knesebeck gave the wise advice, which was so injurious to us, that the Russian forces should retreat before the French, enticing them into the interior of Russia, and then attack them when they should be exhausted by hunger and fatigue; promising that should this plan be adopted the whole of Germany would ally itself with Russia, in order to effect the downfall of the audacious invader who during twelve years had devastated Europe.

Alexander received with haughty indulgence the explanations of Frederick William, whilst he was sedulously attentive to the wise counsels of his envoy. He was less indulgent, however, towards the Austrian ambassador, M. de St. Julien, who denied the existence of the treaty between his country and Napoleon, and did so in good faith, since his court, that it might the more surely deceive Alexander, had left him in ignorance on the subject. At length in one of his interviews with M. de St. Julien, when the Austrian minister was endeavouring, as usual, to call in doubt the very existence of a treaty between his country and Napoleon, Alexander produced a copy of the treaty itself, at the same time expressing his extreme astonishment at this conduct on the part of Austria, which he regarded as an abandonment of the cause of Europe, and declaring that, as he could not defend Europe alone, he would follow the general example and treat with Napoleon, since the remoteness of his country would always enable him to maintain his independence, whilst those who had abandoned him would remain slaves. M. de St. Julien, who was a member of the vast aristocratic coterie which overspread the continent, and was inspired with a feeling of profound hatred against France, was too surprised and confused to offer any excuse, save the allegation of his ignorance on the subject, and could only promise that in a few days he would be able to offer satisfactory explanations respecting it.

Although Alexander could now no longer doubt that war was inevitable, he was resolved to abstain from destroying any last chance of peace which might yet remain by taking the initiative, and scrupulously to refrain even from touching with his advanced posts the territories of Napoleon's allies. He further resolved even to await, before quitting St. Petersburg, some act more formally aggressive than the march of the French troops upon the Vistula, and in the meantime held last interviews with M. de Lauriston, in the course of which he shed tears as he spoke of the impending war, and Napoleon's injustice in attempting to renounce all commerce with neutrals. M. de Lauriston was excessively urgent that, even if M. de Nesselrode were not sent, some one should be sent with a reply to the communications and letter sent by Napoleon through M. de Czernicheff, and although Alexander declared such a step was evidently useless, he nevertheless wrote a letter to Napoleon in answer to the one carried to St. Petersburg by M. de Czernicheff, in which he declared that he had at all times been anxious to bring his disputes with Napoleon to an amicable termination, and that the world would one day acknowledge what he had done towards this end; that he had sent to Prince Kourakin powers to negotiate, and that this ambassador had always been in posses-

sion of them, and that he was ardently desirous that on the new bases thus set forth a pacific arrangement might be attained. M. de Serdobin was the bearer of these last conditions, and by them Alexander declared himself ready to accept any compensation for Oldenburg that might be offered him; to make such changes in the ukase of December 1810, of which French industry complained, as might be compatible with the interests of Russia; and to examine even if Napoleon's own commercial system could not be adopted in Russia—on condition that the absolute exclusion of neutrals, especially Americans, should not be demanded, and that the French troops should evacuate Old Prussia, the Duchy of Warsaw, and Swedish Pomerania.

The Russian court had refrained as yet from entering into any engagement with England, in conformity with her plan of avoiding any step which might render war inevitable. Indirect communications, however, had been opened in the Swedish court, which prepared the way for the immediate formation of an alliance between the two countries as soon as circumstances should have rendered reserve unnecessary; and this moment having arrived, or nearly arrived, when Napoleon had not hesitated to conclude his alliance with Prussia and Austria, Alexander sent M. de Suchtelen to confer with Mr. Thornton, the agent sent thither by the English government, not only respecting the conditions of peace with England, but also of an alliance, offensive and defensive, with a view to the maintenance of war *à outrance* with France.

In the meantime, as Bernadotte became urgent for an answer to his proposition to the Russian court, and as, although it distrusted very much the character of the new prince-royal, his true relations with France were shown by the occupation of Swedish Pomerania by the troops of Marshal Davout, on the 5th of April (the 24th of March with the Russians), Alexander concluded a treaty with the court of Stockholm, which conceded to it the object of its most ardent wishes, namely, Norway, and guaranteed to the two States their actual possessions, which was, in fact, a surrender by Sweden of the possession of Finland to Russia. For the realisation of the views set forth in this treaty, it was agreed that Sweden should assemble an army of thirty thousand men, and that Russia should lend her one of twenty thousand; that with these fifty thousand men the prince-royal was first to seize Norway, and that when this operation, which it was supposed would be an easy one, should have been accomplished, he should descend upon some point in Germany and take the French army in the rear. It was not expressed, but it was understood, that Britain was to assist in this diversion with both subsidies and troops. In the meantime Denmark was to be informed of the manner in which she was to be despoiled, and

offered a recompense in Germany, not distinctly pointed out, but such as the future war could not fail to procure for her; if Denmark did not consent to these terms, war was immediately to be declared against her; and that as there could not but be considerable doubt respecting the manner in which such a treaty would be regarded, not only by Europe, but even by Sweden herself, it was agreed that the Swedish cabinet should commence by declaring her neutrality with regard to the belligerent powers, and from this state of neutrality should pass to a state of war against France.

The most important question which Alexander had to consider was that respecting peace with the Turks. The certainty of war between France and Russia had induced the Turks to resist any concessions to Russia, whilst they persisted in refusing to become our allies, for they could not forget their resentment at the manner in which they had been treated at Tilsit, although the new course of policy adopted by France had been of a kind to recompense them. In the meantime, as nothing could be more disadvantageous to Russia than the continuance of war with Turkey, and as it was very probable that a hundred thousand men withdrawn from the Danube on the Vistula, and carried against the flank of the French, would be sufficient to change the destiny of the war, Alexander determined to send Admiral Tchitchakoff on a mission to the east; and giving him the immediate command of the army of the Danube, and the eventual command of the army of General Tarmazoff, actually in Volhynia, directed him to make either peace or war, resigning a few of the demands hitherto made by Russia, demanding, for example, Bessarabia alone, and taking the Pruth as a frontier instead of the Sereth; and should they not yield to these conditions, to snatch from them by energetic warfare what they refused to peaceful negotiation.

In the meantime the news which continued to arrive increased the anxiety felt at St. Petersburg to the highest pitch, when there suddenly arrived an employé of the Russian legation sent by Prince Kourakin with the information that one of the servants of the Russian embassy had been arrested in Paris on a charge of tampering with the persons employed in the French government offices, and had been refused to Prince Kourakin, who had demanded his surrender in the name of diplomatic privileges. But a still graver piece of information brought by M. Divoff was to the effect that he had fallen in with the troops of Marshal Davout beyond the Elbing. All parties in St. Petersburg declared that Alexander could no longer delay to repair to his headquarters. Alexander had not time to see M. de Lauriston before his departure, but he sent his assurances of his esteem, and declarations that he, Alexander, did not quit his capital to

commence the war, but if possible to delay it, affirming once more that he would be ready at his headquarters to negotiate a peace on the most equitable and moderate bases.

On the 21st of April, having first performed his devotions in public in the church of Cazan, Alexander set out on his road, accompanied by the chief persons of his government and his court, and proceeded towards Wilna. At the moment of his departure he received a satisfactory communication from Austria, declaring that if Russia would take no proceedings against her territory, she need fear nothing from the 30,000 Austrian troops. In the meantime M. de Lauriston awaited at St. Petersburg orders from his court for his departure, for he did not wish by demanding his passports to add a new war signal to all those which had already been given in spite of all his exertions to the contrary.

Napoleon awaited the moment when Alexander should quit St. Petersburg to depart from Paris, and in anticipation of this moment had ordered a third movement of his troops, by which they would be advanced upon the Vistula, where he intended that they should pass the month of May. He ordered Marshal Davout to concentrate his troops between Marienwerder, Marienberg, and Elbing, the Prussians being always in advance as far as the Niemen; Marshal Oudinot to take up a position at Dantzic, so far as to form the left of Marshal Davout's position; Ney to establish himself at Thorn, so as to form the right; whilst Prince Eugène was to advance to Plock on the Vistula with the Bavarians and Italians; King Jerome to assemble at Warsaw the Poles, Saxons, and Westphalians; the guard to take up a position at Posen; and the Austrians to debouch from Galicia to Valencia. In this new position the army would occupy the line of the Vistula from Bohemia to the Baltic, and present a formidable mass of five hundred thousand men, without taking into account the reserves.

In the meantime, in his anxiety to avoid actual hostilities until the month of June, Napoleon had recourse to fresh subterfuges, by this means causing a delay which was to be one of the principal causes of the misfortunes of the approaching campaign. He had resolved, therefore, to send a new envoy to Alexander, who should repeat to him all that M. de Lauriston had already said, in new words and under another form, and for this purpose selected M. de Narbonne, who had entered his service in 1809 as governor of Raab, and directed him to repair to Alexander's headquarters as the bearer of Napoleon's compliments, and whilst avoiding all dissensions foreign to his mission, to express a desire and even a hope that an armed negotiation between the two sovereigns on the Niemen would not only put an end to the war, but bring about a renewal of

the alliance between them. M. de Narbonne was to declare the object of his mission to be to repair the errors of the French generals, whose impatience or want of thought had permitted them to indulge in aggressive acts without the orders of their government; whilst he had to declare, should Russian troops have advanced at all beyond their own territories, that such an advance was a very excusable military precaution; and he was directed by those methods to amuse Alexander for twenty or thirty days with the idea that a negotiation would put a stop to the war. At the same time Napoleon informed M. de Narbonne of the true purposes of his mission, and directed him to make the most accurate possible observations of all that might come under his notice at the Russian headquarters.

These last precautions having been taken, Napoleon prepared to set out, proposing to proceed first to Dresden, and to remain there during two or three weeks for the purpose of holding a court, which should present to the world such a display of power as it had not seen since the days of Charlemagne, Cæsar, and Alexander.

At the moment of his departure he determined, in spite of the remonstrances of the prince arch-chancellor, on a violent measure, which placed his government on a level with the revolutionary governments which had preceded it. This measure was a tax on corn. The dearth had continued, the price of corn had risen to sixty or seventy francs the hectolitre, a price which would be exorbitant now, but which was much more so then, and the populace mingled with its cries of famine passionate accusations against the farmers and corn dealers; and Napoleon, unable to resist his desire of putting a violent check to the excessive dearness, and believing that he could deal with commerce as he dealt with Europe, published various decrees in the beginning of May, by which the prefects were not only empowered to draw up tariffs for the sale of wheat according to local circumstances, but also to compel those in whose hands it was to bring it to market.

On the 9th of May, after having confided his personal power to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, and recommended him to use it, not faithfully, for he could not doubt his fidelity, but energetically, of which there was much greater doubt, and after having left as a protection for his wife, his child, and the centre of Europe some hundreds of old soldiers of the imperial guard who were incapable of any active services, and after having repeatedly declared to all with whom he conversed that he hazarded nothing by this distant war, which he intended to conduct with great care, and to conclude in two campaigns, he set out for Dresden with the empress, from the midst, not

of the affection of his people, but of the admiration, fear, and submission.

Having arrived at Mayence on the 11th, he employed the 12th in visiting the fortifications, in giving orders, and the commencement of that reception of sovereigns in which most of the princes of the continent were successively to take part. On the 13th the imperial court passed the Rhine, stopped for a moment at Aschaffenberg with the prince-primate, and on the following day met the King of Wurtemberg, who, a proud sovereign of a little State, paid Napoleon the compliment of meeting him on his way, but not the flattery of accompanying him to Dresden. The imperial court passed the night at Wurzburg with the Grand Duke of Wurzburg, uncle of the empress, slept at Bareuth on the following night, and on the 15th at Plauen, traversing Germany through the midst of unheard-of crowds with whom curiosity counterbalanced hate, and the emotions of whose curiosity, in fact, expressed themselves in a manner which almost resembled the expressions of affection and joy.

On the morning of the 16th the good sovereigns of Saxony met the imperial court at Fryburg, and in the evening accompanied it on its entrance into their capital.

On the following day, the 17th, Napoleon held a levée, in the course of which he displayed himself courteous but haughty, and appeared much more intoxicated with his power than he really was, for certain glimmerings of the truth had not failed to cross his spirit. But his doubts were short, and scarcely interrupted his confidence in his unvarying success, in the extent of his forces, and the consciousness of his genius.

Napoleon expected to meet at Dresden the Emperor and Empress of Austria, the latter of the house of Modena, haughty and disdainful of the recent grandeur of her son-in-law, the former delighted to witness the state of a daughter whom he loved, though ashamed of the degradation of his nation. He was of that order of mind which excuses treason on the ground of necessity, and escapes from remorse in thoughtlessness. While his word was pledged to Alexander, he listened to the overtures of his rival, desirous of securing himself in either event from risk. His family pride had been flattered by an Italian antiquarian, who demonstrated the princely rank of the Bonapartes of Treviso in the Middle Ages; and which, as well as his own reverses, veiled for the time the affections of his empress, who was conciliated by the presents and sedulous courtesy and even filial dutifulness of Napoleon.

It was on the first day alone that the King of Saxony entertained the allied sovereigns. Afterwards, although in his own capital, he appeared the guest of the emperor, for whom a movable palace had been forwarded from Paris. Dresden over-

flowed with princes and ministers jostling each other to catch sight of or exchange a word with him whose present grandeur sometimes appeared but the antecedent of a tragic catastrophe, and the consequent enfranchisement of Europe, sometimes the offspring of a constant good fortune, and the pledge of success against infatuated Russia. But such flattery, however it might inflate the Duke of Bassano, fell unheeded on the satiated ears of the emperor, who by night devised employment for the thousand courtiers who attended his progress. One matter demanding his attention was the discontent of Germany at the burden which the march of the French army imposed.

Prussia's contract for the supply of the troops had been frustrated by Napoleon's reluctance to discover the line of march. Thus Ney's and Eugène's soldiers, many of them from Wurtemberg and Bavaria, and therefore the more careless of outrages, the blame of which France must bear, had given occasion for loud murmurs. The additional subject of dissatisfaction with Prussia was the occupation of Spandau and Pillau, the key of the cape of Frische-haff, under pretence of providing a guard for the war matériel, for which, in accordance with the treaty, these forts served as the dépôt. The king was resolved, spite of the feeling of humiliation which made him dread the festivities of Dresden, to have an interview with the emperor on these topics, and sent a favourite to the latter, and therefore a living proof of the folly of haste in matters of life and death (for Napoleon had once condemned him to be shot), M. de Hatzfeld, to confer on the matter. This nobleman was well received, but Frederick William was too important a monument of the glory of France, and therefore his presence was commanded. Other grave themes of discussion were, firstly, the reply of the English government to the last offer of France, intimating an acquiescence in the general changes of the map of Europe, on the terms of restitution of Sicily to the house of Bourbon, Portugal to that of Braganza, and of Spain to Ferdinand VII., with whose cause London had identified itself, proposals which, though made with diplomatic courtesy, an incredulity as to the sincerity of France's desire for peace neutralised; and secondly, a much more serious matter, the demand of his passport by Prince Kourakin, in consequence, as was afterwards discovered, of the detention of a servant supposed to be implicated in a conspiracy, and the refusal to negotiate on the basis of a retreat to the Oder, as proposed by M. de Serdobin. The prince was dissuaded from persisting in his intention by the Duke of Bassano, but Napoleon, fearful of being forced to move before June, when vegetation should be far advanced, and the troops sufficiently rested, instructed M. de Lauriston to demand permission to follow Alexander from

St. Petersburg, where, though treated with politeness, he could hear nothing of importance, to Wilna. When there he was to remonstrate on the menacing act of Prince Kourakin, and M. de Serdobin's proposition for the evacuation of Old Prussia before the conclusion of a treaty (though untruly so represented), terms more insolent than any offered by Napoleon, even after the rout of Austerlitz and Friedland. Should M. de Lauriston fail (an extreme case) in obtaining leave, he must demand his passport, though even the transmission of messages to and fro should occupy from five to twenty days. In the other case, besides the gain of time, there would be the advantage of having M. de Lauriston's personal report as to the warlike preparations at Wilna, and even the information collected by acute couriers while passing by the advanced posts.

Napoleon's attention was engaged, too, by vain hopes held out by Sweden of a diversion on the flank, for the treaty of the 5th of April was secret, and the readiness to receive Norway in lieu of Finland was unknown to him; as also by the promise of Turkey, which, while resolute against any treaty with Russia which should involve the resignation of Moldavia and Wallachia, was reluctant to give up even Bessarabia in the event of France commencing hostilities at once. General Androssy was despatched to Constantinople to assure the sultan.

The important subject of Poland still remained to be decided. In the meantime all the world expected to behold its reconstitution, and believed that this was the motive which had induced Napoleon to engage in the impending war. How, in fact, could he make use of those provinces which a fortunate war might give into his hands, if he were not to devote them to this noble purpose? Moreover, Napoleon himself, when on the point of engaging in a new war with Russia, had admitted that one of the natural consequences of that war would be the restoration of Poland. But unfortunately his good sense, which in the midst of his rash enterprise pursued him as a kind of remorse, prohibited him to indulge in hopes of the success of such a measure of reparation as this. In his first campaign of 1807 he had found considerable enthusiasm in Posen, Cracow, Warsaw, and some other large towns, but he had nowhere observed that universal and irresistible vehemence which could have rendered practicable a national reconstitution. And matters in this respect had not sensibly changed in 1812. The high noblesse was divided, the lesser was ruined, and the people engaged in the painful struggle with adversity. Moreover, the continental blockade, the might of which had fallen with peculiar severity upon Poland, had little tended to attach its people to France, and had entirely alienated the Jews, whose commercial resources rendered them important persons in cases

of war. The fervour of Polish sentiment was, indeed, almost entirely confined to the army—of which one portion had fought with us in Italy, Germany, and Spain, whilst the other, formed under Prince Poniatowski, but in our school, had distinguished itself in 1809 in the defence of the Grand Duchy—to the large and patriotic city of Warsaw, and to the other cities of the Grand Duchy, whose enthusiasm it was easy to excite. All that Napoleon could hope to effect, therefore, was a large development of the Polish army; to increase it to one hundred and fifty thousand or two hundred thousand men, and by means of its army to raise Poland once more to the rank of nations. But unhappily he could spare neither the time nor the resources for the execution of such a plan.

In the meantime Napoleon determined to spare no efforts to excite in Poland that patriotic emotion by means of which he hoped to obtain both men and money, and with this object resolved to send some considerable person to Warsaw with the title of ambassador, which would be equivalent to a declaration that he regarded the Grand Duchy of Warsaw as a new State, not simply an appanage of Savoy, but an independent existence, and capable of resuming the position of the ancient kingdom of Poland. This personage was to urge the Poles to confederate, to rise en masse, to form a general Diet, and to double and triple the army of Prince Poniatowski. For this difficult mission Napoleon selected M. de Talleyrand, and the selection was a good one, for in addition to great personal qualities, which rendered him peculiarly fitted for such a mission, he was at this moment the confidant even to infidelity of the court of Vienna, and he would therefore be able to cause less disquiet than any other to this court in the pursuit of his delicate mission. But on this very side the project failed, for with an impatience little worthy of him he was guilty of such imprudences on the subject at the court of Vienna, that Napoleon experienced new distrust with respect to him, and having arrived at Dresden seeking some one whom he might send to Warsaw in his place, his choice fell upon the Archbishop of Malines, M. de Pradt, and it would have been difficult to have chosen a man who had more spirit and less prudence.

Having summoned M. de Pradt and announced to him his appointment to the mission—we are about to attempt, he said, to render Russia less powerful, less ambitious, less proud, without, however, having any intention to destroy her. With such intentions, he continued, the reconstitution of Poland was an object evidently desirable, but that in every case it was necessary that Poland should pour out her own blood, since France could not revivify her supply by shedding her own. At the same time he pointed out the necessity of behaving with much

prudence with respect to Austria. The archbishop set out, at once terrified and proud of the task set before him, for he was ambitious of being in his own age one of those great politicians of whom the Church had furnished such remarkable specimens in times gone by.

The orders he had received to behave cautiously with respect to Austria, whilst at the same time striving to excite the national sentiments of the Poles, were very appropriate to the difficulties of the moment. She had been so ill treated in the course of the territorial arrangements of the age, especially when Napoleon had directed them, that she had no wish to be dragged into any further discussions with him respecting territory, and her language with reference to the compensation she might receive from Poland was so vague, cold, and evasive, that Napoleon, perceiving that her troops would soon be on his flank and in his rear, temporised with her whilst he awaited the advent of the divinity from whom he was in the habit of expecting the accomplishment of all his wishes—Victory.

Napoleon, having devoted three days to these various affairs, now prepared to depart, when the King of Prussia arrived at Dresden to complete the circle of crowned courtiers. He arrived on the 26th of May, and was received with the respect due to his character, which was respectable, although false, in obedience to stern necessity, and to his rank, which was still very elevated amongst sovereigns notwithstanding the misfortunes of his country. Napoleon conversed with him with much openness respecting his projects, and took pains to convince him and M. de Hardenberg that he had no designs against the Prussian territories. He excused the excesses committed by the French troops on their march, promised that all the damage they caused should be paid for, and moreover, that Prussia should receive a large territorial compensation should the war have a prosperous issue. He had persuaded Frederick William, who had resolved to retire into Silesia during the war, not to quit his royal residence, that he might thus display a confidence in his royal ally, which would have a good effect on the minds of the populations; and when the latter presented his son to the emperor, and offered him to him as one of his aides-de-camp, he appeared less sad than usual, although he was treated with less consideration in the midst of this wondrous assemblage of princes than he deserved.

The month of May having now nearly reached its end, the season for active operations drew nigh. Moreover, M. de Narbonne had arrived from Wilna, after having fulfilled the mission with which he had been charged to the Emperor Alexander, and he brought word that although Alexander was distressed at the idea of war, he was resolved to maintain a

desperate struggle, and to withdraw into the depths of his empire rather than conclude a peace which would enslave him, as the other monarchs of Europe had already been enslaved. At the same time, he affirmed that Alexander was equally determined not to take the initiative in hostilities; and this was the only information brought by M. de Narbonne which interested Napoleon, for it permitted him to feel entire security in the peaceful achievement of his preparatory movements.

Since it would be necessary, in accordance with the plans he had laid down, to carry his arms from the Vistula to the Niemen between the 1st and 15th of June, Napoleon determined to quit Dresden on the 29th of May, to proceed by Posen, Thorn, Dantzic, and Königsberg to the Niemen; and after having overwhelmed his father-in-law and mother-in-law with filial attentions, displayed the utmost testimonies of respect towards the King of Prussia, shown the most cordial friendship towards his host the King of Saxony, and behaved towards his royal visitors with lofty but gracious politeness, he embraced the empress with emotion, and left her more afflicted than might have been supposed probable in the case of a wife who had been selected for reasons of policy. These adieux having been completed, on the 29th of May, Napoleon, accompanied by MM. de Caulaincourt, Berthier, and Duroc, left Dresden for Posen, at the same time having the report opened that he was proceeding to Warsaw, although this was far from his intentions, since he was unwilling to contract personal relations with the Poles before he knew what he could obtain from them; but he was desirous of inspiring them with indefinite hopes, and of persuading the enemy that his first efforts would be in the direction of Volhynia, when, in fact, they would be in a completely opposite quarter.

On his route he found traces of the excesses committed by his troops, and at Thorn was himself much disgusted at the manner in which the Wurtemberg and Bavarian troops had pillaged and mercilessly devastated the Duchy of Posen. He addressed severe reproaches to Marshal Ney, Prince Eugène, and the hereditary Prince of Wurtemberg, who commanded them. There was, however, some excuse for these commanders in the difficulty there had been to provide for their troops during the forced marches they had had to make; difficulties which were much increased by the numerous artillery which accompanied them, and the enormous size of the waggons which conveyed their provisions. Already many of the illusions which had inspired Napoleon with the hope of being able to overcome the great difficulty presented by the extent of country before him began to dissolve; and an immense quantity of baggage waggons choked up the roads of Germany, and covered them

with the carcasses of horses which had been forced too young into a too laborious service.

The city of Thorn, when Napoleon arrived on the 2nd of June, presented a scene of extraordinary tumult, for besides the youth of both the old and the new noblesse who were there, with sumptuous appointments, ready to take part in this campaign as though it were a simple march of triumph, there were now in this city the staffs of the emperor, of the Major-General Berthier, that of King Murat, of Prince Eugène, of King Jerome, and of Marshals Davout, Ney, Oudinot, &c. In addition to the tumult caused by the presence of men, horses, and equipages, was the confusion which naturally arose from the presence of the natives of all countries, speaking French, German, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese, in a city of which the inhabitants only spoke Polish. Napoleon was irritated by this uproar, and alarmed at the embarrassment which he foresaw might be occasioned by the elaborate preparations of the staffs for their own comfort; he made various regulations, therefore, with respect to the baggage which might be taken by each; and having compelled the dismissal of a number of diplomatists whom the monarchs, his allies, had intended to send in the train of the grand army for the purpose of furnishing them with information respecting its movements, Napoleon employed himself in reducing the transport service of the army to the limits required by absolute necessity.

Napoleon determined that the general movement of the army from the Vistula to the Niemen should take place on the 6th of June. King Jerome, forming the right, was to advance with the Saxons under Reynier, the Poles under Poniatowski, and the Westphalians under his own direct command, by Pultusk, Ostrolenka, and Goniondz, to Grodno. The Viceroy Eugène, forming the centre with the Bavarians under St. Cyr, and the army of Italy under his immediate orders, was to leave Soldau on the 6th, and traversing the saddest provinces of Poland, approach the Niemen in the environs of Prenn. Marshals Oudinot, Ney, Davout, and the guard, composing the left and great body of the army, were to proceed by the roads of Old Prussia parallel to each other, so as not to be a mutual hindrance, and to follow the course of the Niemen from Tilsit to Kowno; Ney passing by Osterode, Schippenbeil, Gerdaun; Oudinot, by Marienwerder, Liebstadt, Eylau, Vehlau; Davout, by Elbing, Braunsberg, Tapiau. The guard and the parks were to remain in the rear, so as not to be a cause of obstruction. Napoleon calculated that on the 15th or 16th of June all his troops would be in a line along the Niemen, and that after three or four days' repose they would be able to enter upon active operations.

The emperor himself proceeded by Marienberg to Dantzic, where many things required his personal care, and where he was to meet his lieutenants Davout and Murat, whom he had not seen for two years. It was at Marienberg he met Marshal Davout at the moment when he was about to depart to Königsberg to place himself at the head of the movement of the army, and the reception he received at the hands of the emperor was not in conformity with the confidence Napoleon had always had in his great talents and solid character. In fact, whilst Marshal Davout had performed services which exceeded any of the same kind ever known, in accordance with the orders of Napoleon, he had modified these orders as circumstances rendered necessary, without fear of the misconstruction which might be put on such conduct by jealousy; and Major-General Berthier, who was his secret and dangerous enemy, because he, Berthier, had been accused in 1809 of having compromised the army, whilst Marshal Davout was considered to have saved it, had taken pains to make Napoleon acquainted with the least resistance offered by Marshal Davout to the imperial orders. By an unfortunate concurrence of circumstances, the Poles, being in quest of a king for their kingdom when it should be reconstituted, had turned their attention towards the Prince of Eckmühl, and had expressed their wishes on this point in the salons of Warsaw, until they had reached the Tuileries, and excessively displeased Napoleon, who was little satisfied at the attempt at royalty made in Portugal, and made and realised in Sweden. Marshal Davout knew nothing and would have cared little for the intended honours, for he was one of the few of Napoleon's companions in arms who had not grown enervated at the sumptuous banquet of Fortune. But Napoleon, failing to inquire into the truth of this fact, finding everywhere along the banks of the Vistula the traces of the most profound veneration for Marshal Davout, and his name in every mouth, became not so much jealous as annoyed at a greatness which he had himself created, and received his marshal with a coldness of which the latter took no account, being habituated to Napoleon's brusqueries, and attributing their increased frequency to an irritability which increased with age, fatigue, and cares. But the period of his favour with his master had entirely passed away.

On the 7th of June, Napoleon arrived at Dantzic, where he met another of his lieutenants, Murat, who had been less fortunate in becoming a king than Davout in remaining a lieutenant, and who, while he was the most brilliant and daring of soldiers, was quite capable of being led into infidelity by vanity, ambition, and evil counsel, and had inspired Napoleon with considerable distrust; and the latter, that he might have

at his disposal the best cavalry officer of the age, and at the same time be able to keep constant watch over a very fickle man, had summoned Murat to the army. When they met at Dantzic, Murat was fatigued and sick at the time, and Napoleon, remarking his paleness and the absence of his ordinary looks, demanded roughly what was the matter, and whether he were not content with being a king. "But, sire," replied Murat, "I scarcely am a king." "I have not made you and your brothers kings," bitterly replied Napoleon, "that you should reign in your fashion, but in mine, following my policy, and remaining Frenchmen on foreign thrones."

Napoleon passed several days at Dantzic in inspecting the fortifications of a place which was to play an important part in the impending war; in visiting the magazines and bridges of the Vistula, and rectifying and completing all that had been done with the most unequalled skill. From Dantzic he proceeded to Elbing, and from Elbing to Königsberg, where he arrived on the 12th of June, with the purpose of inspecting the means of interior navigation, by which were to be conveyed his vast magazines from the *depôt* of Dantzic to the heart of the Russian provinces. Colonel Baste, a distinguished officer, who was as intrepid by land as by sea, was entrusted with the direction of this navigation, which, commencing at Dantzic, passing by the Vistula, Frische-haff, the Pregel, the Deime, the Curische-haff, the Niemen, and the Wilia, ended at Wilna itself. To this officer, moreover, had been entrusted the defence of the Frische-haff and the Curische-haff, being entrusted for this purpose with two battalions of the imperial guard, which were to occupy these vast lagunes with gun-boats strongly armed.

At Dantzic were the *depôts* of the guard and of the troops of Marshal Davout, and these were able to furnish, independently of the troops left in the works, a division mobile of 8000 men at Dantzic, and of 6000 at Königsberg, which, communicating by means of cavalry, would always be able to unite against an unexpected attack. Napoleon, having seen with his own eyes the execution of his orders, directed the immediate departure of a first convoy, comprising provisions and the whole *matériel* of six pontoon bridges. A second convoy was to consist of an equal quantity of provisions and the munitions of the artillery; whilst the following were to carry provisions and clothing and the siege train intended to be employed against Riga.

Whilst these convoys proceeded towards the Pregel and the Niemen, Napoleon devoted his attention to the hospitals, and organised sufficient for the reception of twenty thousand patients between Königsberg, Braunsberg, and Elbing, and having em-

ployed the first half of June in these various works, he resolved to enter upon the actual commencement of this formidable campaign, and devoted a few moments on the banks of the Niemen to certain necessary preliminary formalities.

On the day following that on which Napoleon had departed for Dresden, M. Signeul had arrived there from Stockholm with a secret message from the prince-royal, in answer to the overtures made through the princess-royal. At the same time that the official communication was made by accredited Swedish ministers announcing in cold and haughty terms the intention of Sweden to remain neutral between the belligerent powers, and offering, which was simply ridiculous, the mediation of Sweden between the contending powers. In the secret communication Bernadotte, who was as faithless to his new ally as to his native country, declared that Sweden could well resign Finland, the possession of which would but involve her in a perpetual war with Russia, and that the recompense she hoped to obtain for the loss of it was Norway, which Nature evidently intended to be united with Sweden, whilst the loss of this country might well be recompensed to Denmark by the grant of Swedish Pomerania. With respect to the subsidy, Bernadotte declared that Sweden could not equip an army without it, and that the value of twenty millions which Napoleon had attributed to the permission to introduce colonial produce on the continent was quite illusory, since the English would not fail to perceive the motives of this introduction, and immediately put a stop to it. On the twofold grant, therefore, of Norway and a real subsidy of twenty millions, the prince-royal offered to bind himself to France by a treaty which must, doubtless, violate that which he had signed with Russia.

Napoleon was excessively irritated at this message, and severely blamed and ridiculed the blindness of the prince-royal, which rendered him willing to resign Finland to Russia. "*Le miserable !*" exclaimed Napoleon repeatedly ; " he is untrue to himself, to Sweden, and to his native country ; he is not worthy of occupying my attention ; let no one mention his name to me, let no answer be sent to his message, either officially or privately."

This resolution, although very honest, and almost inevitable on account of the difficulty of persuading Denmark to resign Norway, must nevertheless be very much regretted, for thirty or forty thousand Swedes threatening St. Petersburg instead of Hamburg would have changed the destinies of the war.

The second diplomatic matter which now occupied Napoleon's attention was the declaration to be published at the commencement of the war ; and as a motive was necessary for an immediate rupture, so as to enable the French troops, with some

show of decency, to cross the Niemen about the 20th or 25th of June, Napoleon, with his usual address, devised one which, having little real foundation, was sufficiently specious to deceive many historians; and this was, that Russia, having demanded the evacuation of Prussia as the preliminary to any negotiation, had attempted to impose upon France a dishonourable condition. This pretext was contrary to the truth, since Russia had demanded the evacuation, not as a preliminary condition, but as an assured consequence of any negotiation on the disputed points. To this assumed offence was added the provocation occasioned, it was said, by Prince Kourakin's reiterated demands for his passports. Some plausible pretext was wanting for the immediate commencement of hostilities, and Napoleon adopted these for the want of better. M. de Lauriston was ordered, therefore, to demand his passports immediately, under the pretext that the endeavour to make us evacuate Prussia having become public, was an outrage which could not be tolerated; but in case he should have already proceeded to Wilna (and this renders completely nugatory the idea that the refusal to admit him to Wilna was the cause of the rupture), he was directed not to demand his passports before the 22nd, Napoleon wishing to cross the Niemen on the 22nd or 23rd. At the same time he was informed that the despatch written to him on the 16th from Königsberg would be antedated, and appear to have been sent from Thorn on the 12th, in order to persuade the Russians that he was more distant, and less in a position to commence active proceedings than he really was.

This diplomatic formality having been accomplished, Napoleon departed from Königsberg to join his troops on the Pregel. His first care was to provide his troops with provisions sufficient for ten days, in the course of which he hoped, as at Ulm in 1805, at Jena in 1806, and at Ratisbon in 1809, to strike one of those terrible blows which, from the very commencement of operations, usually disconcerted his enemies during the remainder of the war; and with a view to this object Napoleon repaired to Insterberg, where he arrived on the evening of the 17th of June.

In accordance with the general plan which he had formed for his first operation, Napoleon resolved to pass the Niemen at Kowno; and to comprehend the motives which induced him to take this resolution, we must glance at the vast countries which were to be the theatre of this formidable war, which was to be the greatest and most tragic that had ever occurred.

The immense plains which stretch from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea are traversed on one side by the Oder, the Vistula, the Pregel, the Niemen, and the Dwina, rivers flowing to the west, and on the other by the Dniester,

the Dnieper, the Don, and the Volga, rivers flowing to the east, and compose, as is well known, the territory of Old Prussia, Old Poland, and Russia; and it was on these vast plains that Napoleon was about to endeavour to overcome, by the efforts of his genius, the greatest difficulties of war, namely, those which are presented by distant tracts of country, especially when they are neither cultivated nor inhabited. The lower portion of these plains, and so to say, the embouchures of the Oder, the Vistula, the Pregel, and the Niemen, form the sad but prodigiously fertile territory of Old Prussia. By ascending these streams and proceeding from west to east we arrive at more sterile districts, where there are fewer inhabitants and more forests and marshes; and these characteristics we find in still stronger development as we proceed farther to the east, towards the sources of the Vistula, the Narew, the Niemen, and the Dwina. Proceeding from the sources of the Vistula and its tributaries, and those of the Niemen and the Dwina, towards those of the Dniester and the Dnieper, we encounter a soil of which the uncertain inclination offers so slight a flow to the waters on its surface that it is covered with marshes and dense forests. Still advancing to the east across this district, we arrive between the sources of the Dwina and the Dnieper, about twenty leagues distant from each other, and find ourselves in a species of opening extending from Witepsk to Smolensk, by which we emerge from Old Poland into Russia, and reach a country in which, the waters flowing more freely, the marshes and forests disappear, and we see before us the plains of Old Russia, on the bosom of which rises Moscow, Moscow the holy, as it is named by the patriotism of its children.

With his unequalled *coup d'œil*, Napoleon had perceived at a glance that his march should be directed towards this opening, which is situated between the sources of the Dwina and the Dnieper, between Witepsk and Smolensk. It is here that are situated, in fact, the gates of the east, and where formerly the Poles and the Muscovites, in their alternate victories and defeats, were accustomed to be reciprocally stopped, for the Dwina on one side, and the Dnieper on the other, were the limit between Russia and Old Poland, before the famous partition, which had been the misfortune and the shame of the last age.

But before these gates could be reached it was necessary to traverse Old Prussia, and that part of Poland which had recently been reconstituted as the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

The upper course of the river Bug, and the upper course of the river Narew, both tributaries of the Vistula, formed by their inflections the first part of the boundary line of the Grand Duchy on the side of Russia; and this frontier line, after having sometimes followed the Bug and sometimes the Narew, Brezesc-

litowsky to the environs of Grodno, joins the Niemen at Grodno, and pursues the course of this stream rising to the north as far as Kowno, thus separating Poland properly so called from Lithuania. At Kowno, the Niemen, definitively taking its course to the west and running towards Tilsit, no longer separates Poland but Old Prussia from Russia. The frontier line which had to be now crossed ran therefore to the north, from Brezesc to Grodno, following by turns the Bug or the Narew, then running still more to the north from Grodno to Kowno, following the Niemen, and finally turning abruptly towards the Kowno, proceeding in this direction as far as Tilsit, and from this point following the course of the Niemen. It made, therefore, at its northern extremity an angle towards Kowno, and it was there that Napoleon had determined to pass the Niemen, to gain a point from which, according to circumstances, he might halt, or from which he might set forth to force the gates of Old Prussia and plunge into its immense plains.

The disposition of the Russian forces was of a nature to confirm Napoleon in his choice of this route; for the Russians, although they had their advanced posts at the very frontier of their territory, on the upper streams of the Bug and the Narew, and along the Niemen, nevertheless only regarded the Dwina and the Dnieper as the true line of defence. These rivers, as we have already said, rising at the distance of twenty leagues from each other, and flowing, the Dwina towards the Baltic, and the Dnieper towards the Black Sea, presented, with the exception of the opening between Witepsk and Smolensk, a continued and immense line running from the north-west to the south-east, and traversing the whole empire from Riga to Nicholaieff. Since they had commenced the concentration of their forces, the Russians had naturally formed two principal collections of troops, one on the Dwina from Witepsk to Dunaburg, the other on the Dnieper from Smolensk to Rogaczew, and these collections of troops had gradually been converted into two armies, which had been advanced, the first to Ulm, the second to Minsk, with the intention that they should unite, or act separately, according to circumstances. The first of these armies, commanded by General Barclay de Tolly, posted on the Dwina, with its headquarters at Wilna, and its advanced posts at Kowno on the Niemen, was to receive the reserves from the north of the empire; whilst a second, commanded by Prince Bagration, posted on the Dnieper, with its headquarters at Minsk, and its advanced posts at Grodno on the Niemen, was to receive the reserves of the centre of the empire, and to unite itself by means of General Tarmazoff's army with the troops of Turkey.

Amongst all the confused and contradictory reports of the agents sent to reconnoitre the enemy's position, Napoleon's

military genius had clearly shown him that there must be an army on the Dwina, and another on the Dnieper; the one of which (numbering one hundred and fifty thousand men) would be in a position to advance in the direction of Wilna and Kowno, whilst the other (numbering a hundred thousand men) would advance in the direction of Minsk and Grodno. This being actually the case, Napoleon immediately determined on his plan of operations.

The Niemen, as has already been stated, flows northwards from Grodno to Kowno, and there, making an abrupt turn, flows to the west from Kowno to Tilsit. By advancing, therefore, upon Kowno, in the basin of the angle formed by the Niemen, Napoleon would have but to pass the Niemen at Kowno with two hundred thousand men, to advance upon Wilna with that terrible energy which always distinguished his commencement of operations; and by placing himself there between the army of the Dwina and that of the Dnieper, he would secure the separation of those armies from each other during the remainder of the campaign; and would thus, moreover, be in a position to advance upon Moscow, since he would have but on his right and his left the divided elements of the Russian power.

For the execution of this plan Napoleon determined to unite under his own command the corps of Marshals Davout, Oudinot, Ney, and the imperial guard, and two of the four corps of the cavalry reserve, amounting altogether to two hundred thousand men; and with this crushing mass of troops to advance by Kowno upon Wilna, whilst Marshal Macdonald with thirty thousand men should pass the Niemen at Tilsit on his left, take possession of the two banks of this stream, and ensure its free navigation by our convoys; Prince Eugène, at the head of about eighty thousand troops, should cross on his right at a place named Prenn; and King Jerome, at the head of seventy thousand troops, should cross it at Grodno.

Having made the most detailed arrangements for the execution of his vast plans, Napoleon quitted Königsberg on the 17th, to proceed, by Vehlau, Insterberg, and Gumbinnen, to the Pregel, a river that flows parallel with, but some leagues behind, the Niemen, and on the banks of which all our *corps d'armée* had taken up positions for the purpose of receiving their provisions. Having here reviewed the various corps, Napoleon hastened, by means of the waggons which had already arrived, the conveyance from Vehlau to Gumbinnen of sufficient rations to enable each corps to take with it at least six days' provisions, instead of the ten days' provisions he had hoped to have provided them with during the first operations; and sent forward the cavalry reserve, and the reserve of artillery, and the pontoon equipages, ordering Marshal Davout to escort them with his

corps to Wilkowisk, so that they should arrive before Kowno by the 22nd or 23rd. On the 21st, Napoleon left Gumbinnen, and arriving at Wilkowisk on the 22nd, was only separated from Kowno and the Niemen by the great forest of Wilkowisk. The fatal moment had therefore now arrived, and he was on the bank of that river which may well be said to have been the Rubicon of his prosperity. All the corps had reached the bank of the Niemen, and he had no longer cause to hesitate to cross it.

Having ordered Marshal Macdonald on his left, and Prince Eugène on his right, to cross the Niemen at Tilsit and Prenn respectively as soon as possible, and directed King Jerome to reach Grodno by the 30th at the latest, Napoleon, on the 23rd of June, debouched from the forest of Wilkowisk with two hundred thousand troops, leading them above Kowno opposite the river they were about to cross. General Haxo, after a careful reconnaissance, had discovered, a league and a half above Kowno, towards a place named Poniemon, a point where the Niemen afforded great facilities for its passage, and Napoleon, having discovered by personal inspection that the position offered the advantages attributed to it by General Haxo, ordered General Eblé to throw three bridges across it that same night. Before dawn this order was executed, and the light cavalry enabled to pass to the opposite bank.

On the morning of the 24th of June, whilst the sun, rising brilliantly, illumined one of the most magnificent spectacles ever seen, the following short and energetic address was read to the troops, who were inspired with the utmost ardour. "Soldiers! The second Polish war has commenced. The first ended at Friedland and at Tilsit! . . . At Tilsit, Russia swore an eternal alliance with France and war against England. She now violates her oaths; and refuses any explanation of her strange conduct. . . . Russia is constrained by a fatality; she is about to meet her fate. Does she suppose that we are degenerate?—that we are no longer the soldiers of Austerlitz? She offered us the choice of war or dishonour, and we made our choice without hesitation. Let us march then, let us pass the Niemen, let us carry the war into her own territory. The second Polish war shall bring glory to the French arms; and when we conclude peace, it shall be a peace that shall destroy the ill-omened influence that Russia has exercised on the affairs of Europe during the last fifty years."

This proclamation having been vehemently applauded, the troops descended from the heights in three long columns. Marshal Davout's infantry, preceded by the light cavalry, were the first to cross the river; and each division, passing in its turn to the opposite bank, arrayed itself in battle array on the

plain on the farther side, the infantry in close columns, the artillery in the intervals between the infantry, the light cavalry in advance, and the heavy cavalry in the rear. The corps of Marshals Oudinot and Ney followed; then the guard; and after the guard, the parks. Within a few hours the right bank was covered with these magnificent troops, which, descending from the heights of the left bank, and pouring down in long files upon three points, seemed like three irresistible torrents filling with their waters the plain into which they poured.

After having contemplated for some hours this extraordinary spectacle, Napoleon quitted the height on which his tents had been pitched, and descending to the Niemen, crossed it by one of the bridges, and turning abruptly to the left, and preceded by some squadrons of cavalry, hastened towards Kowno, into which our light cavalry had already entered without difficulty, in pursuit of some Cossacks who had hastened to repass the Wilia. Napoleon, accompanied by the Polish lancers of the guard, was anxious to become immediately master of the two banks of the Wilia, to throw the pontoon bridges across it, and thus be able to pursue the Russian rearguard; and accordingly the Polish lancers dashed into the river in close column, but when they had reached the middle of the stream they could not resist the force of the current, and although boats were instantly sent to their aid, twenty or thirty paid with their lives for their enthusiastic obedience. However, communication between the two banks of the Wilia was speedily established, and Napoleon went forward to sleep at Kowno, after having ordered Marshal Davout to echelon his advanced guard on the Wilna route.

Thus the die was cast. Thus Napoleon marched towards the interior of Russia at the head of four hundred thousand men, followed by two hundred thousand others. Thus the same man who two years before, on his return from Austria, had reflected a moment on the lesson given at Essling, had taken pains to bestow peace on the world and on his empire, to endow his throne with hereditary stability, to assume the character of a man of domestic tastes, to appease all enmities, to evacuate Germany, and to force England to make peace;—this same man, we say, was now advancing to the north, leaving behind him France exhausted and disgusted with a murderous glory, all independent minds indignant at his political tyranny, and Europe weary of the yoke he had laid upon her; whilst all these feelings were sullenly cherished in the ranks of the army which he took with him, an army composed of troops of all nations, only held united by his genius and his prosperity. What would become, in the midst of the distant tracts of

country it now traversed, of this vast army of six hundred thousand men, following one star, if this star should suddenly pale from before their sight? This problem, to our misfortune, has been solved for the world in a manner it can never forget! But it still remains to inform it, by the detailed narrative of events, of that of which it has only been informed by the clamour of a terrible catastrophe. In this sad and heroic recital we are about to engage. Glory we shall meet with at every step; but of good fortune not a trace beyond the Niemen.

END OF VOL. VII.

